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**U.S. – UKRAINE SECURITY COOPERATION 1993-2001  
A CASE HISTORY**

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## U.S.-Ukraine Security Cooperation 1993-2001-A Case History

### *Introduction*

When President George Bush visited Kiev in August, 1991, and discouraged Ukrainian independence, few in the Administration—with the exception of then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney—thought a sovereign and independent Ukraine was possible.<sup>1</sup> Since the establishment of Ukrainian independence, relations between the two sides have developed rapidly. While Ukraine has ineptly handled domestic political and economic reform and is plague by corruption, its foreign and security policies have generally been a success. One of the pillars of its foreign policy has been a strong cooperative security relationship with the United States. Likewise, as the United States made little headway in other spheres (i.e., trade, combating corruption, foreign investment, promoting civil society, privatization and other economic reforms), the security relationship took on even greater significance in the relationship.

Short of formal alliances, which would provoke Russia and perhaps cross a Russian red line, Ukraine has woven an intricate system of security “partnerships” with its principal neighbors—Russia and Poland—as well as with the NATO alliance and the United States. Indeed, one of the pillars of Ukraine’s foreign policy has been to pursue security cooperation with NATO and the United States to off-set the influence of Russia without actually going so far as to provoke Russian military or economic retaliation. Ukraine, by its own statements and actions, appears to have strategically set its sights on European and Trans-Atlantic integration, but it also appears willing to make tactical decisions from time to time to accommodate Russia. One such instance may have been the sacking of Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk who supposedly courted NATO too closely while giving short shrift to relations with Moscow.

Ukraine has benefited from poor U.S.-Russian relations for most of the period following its independence. U.S. resources intended for the higher priority U.S.-Russia security relationship have doubtlessly been redirected to Ukraine. For example, there has only been one significant U.S.-Russian ground forces exercise since 1993. Ukraine, however, has hosted annual exercises with the United States since 1995. Additionally, of the eight-six United States European Command (USEUCOM) military contacts planned with Russian in the period 1997-2001 only three were executed. The rest were cancelled by the Russians.

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<sup>1</sup> “Remarks by President Bush in Address to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 1 August 1991.

The Russians consider most military cooperation could be categorized under the rubric of Partnership for Peace (PfP) "military tourism". With no interest in the U.S. or NATO defense reform models, the Russians found it easy to cancel military cooperation over disagreements on NATO enlargement and the NATO-led campaign in Kosovo. The only exception is the Balkans, where cooperation has an operational character and a strategic imperative. USEUCOM, during the same time period, conducted over 300 military contacts with Ukraine. With Russia antagonistic and unwilling to cooperate militarily with the United States what began as a program to dismantle the post-Soviet Ukrainian nuclear arsenal and promote military-to-military contacts became the largest program of peacetime military cooperation with a former Soviet state. The U.S. program of defense and military cooperation has been in existence since 1994. For a relatively small investment, the robust program of military cooperation has accomplished much in seven years. Short of a formal alliance, this program of engagement has integrated Ukraine, even if incrementally, into Western security structures. Showpiece and sustentative events have provided a means for Ukraine to consolidate its sovereignty and independence vis-à-vis Russia. In 1999, then Vice President Gore lauded this program of cooperation as the best example of the Clinton Administration's military strategy of "Shape, Prepare and Respond". The following is a case history of U.S.-Ukraine peacetime military engagement from 1993-2001—its successes, its failures—and recommendations on its applicability to future security cooperation programs<sup>2</sup>.

### **The Strategic Environment**

U.S.-Ukraine security cooperation has been carried out within a strategic environment that had surprisingly little influence on its breath and scope. After the initial decision to establish a security cooperation program, both external and internal factors (especially Ukrainian domestic political and economic policies), have affected the program only marginally. De-nuclearization, the division of the Black Sea Fleet, the NATO campaigns in the Balkans, Ukraine's lack of progress on economic reform, elections, rampant corruption, political repression, etc., were not directly linked to engagement. Critics deride the fact that security cooperation continued unabated given President Kuchma's poor record on reform, the lack of freedom of the press, ineffective efforts to combat corruption, and his efforts to suppress the opposition. This criticism is unfair. Given Ukraine's geopolitical importance, disengagement was not an option for the United States. Instead, senior U.S. defense officials used contacts with counterparts to reproach Ukrainian military and civilian authorities on these deficiencies and to encourage reform.

The strategic context within which U.S.-Ukraine security cooperation took place was framed by several milestones. The first was de-sovietization and transformation of the military remaining on Ukrainian soil following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the creation of national armed forces. This process is still ongoing. Ukraine's armed forces (UAF) are characterized by a bloated senior officer corps, military bases and infrastructure left in place from the Cold War, and Soviet-era equipment and force structure. Reforming this military is a key objective of U.S.-Ukrainian security cooperation.

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<sup>2</sup> During the Clinton Administration military to military cooperation was referred to as peacetime military engagement or shaping activities. The Bush Administration uses the expression security cooperation. This paper uses the terms interchangeably.

The second milestone was de-nuclearization—enabling Ukraine to rid itself of the nuclear weapons and supporting infrastructure that was left behind by the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as signing and adhering to the various arms control and non-proliferation treaties and protocols. The “Agreement between the United States of America and Ukraine Concerning Assistance to Ukraine in the Elimination of Strategic Nuclear Arms and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” also referred to as the CTR Umbrella Agreement for Ukraine, was originally signed on October 25, 1993 and later extended until December 31, 2006. All the nuclear warheads were removed from Ukraine by June 1996 and shipped to Russian territory. By October 2001, under the auspices of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program (the Nunn-Lugar program), the remaining 46 SS-24 missiles and their silos and 44 BEAR and BLACKJACK strategic bombers were destroyed. From 1994-2001, CTR provided the majority of funding for defense and military contacts. Following de-nuclearization, the United States declared Ukraine a “strategic partner” and was the driving force at NATO supporting Ukrainian independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. By 1997, the division of the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine and the resolution of potential instability stemming from issues related to the majority ethnic Russian population of Crimea were resolved. Also in 1997, following the lead of the United States, Ukraine and NATO signed the NATO Ukraine Charter, which established a distinct relationship between NATO and Ukraine. The number of bilateral military contacts almost doubled during this period, but in 1998 the most significant event to date affecting the program occurred, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigned Ukraine to the area of operations (AOR) of the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR). In 1999, NATO expanded eastward. Poland and Ukraine began to intensify their security cooperation. The war in Kosovo had little impact on the security relationship, even though the Ukrainian public supported the Serbs. Following the fighting, in August, Ukraine deployed a contingent to KFOR.

The security relationship reached a high-water mark in 2000, with three major U.S. exercises on Ukrainian soil, a visit by the Ukrainian Navy Flagship to Operation Sail (OPSAIL) 2000 in New York Harbor, 18 senior-leader visits, and the largest number of events to date. The year 2001 also witnessed increasing emphasis on a defense assessment of the Ukrainian armed forces by OSD and USEUCOM. However, the strategic context of the relationship and the importance of Ukraine to the United States both appear to be changing for the worse, despite reassurances from both sides that they are not. Since 2000, the Ukrainian internal political and economic situation has deteriorated, and expectations for renewed efforts at reform following the 1999 presidential elections have been unmet. Instead Ukraine’s political and economic transition appears to have fallen further behind its neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe. Several pro-Western officials were sacked, corruption was prevalent, press and political repression continued, economic reform lagged and Ukraine continues arms transfers to states of concern. The domestic situation hit bottom when President Kuchma was linked to the death of a journalist. These internal factors, the U.S.-Russian rapprochement following the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, Russo-centrism in the Bush Administration, and the lack of a significant Ukrainian role in the “War on Terrorism” are all contributing to the decline of the security relationship with the United States.<sup>3</sup> NATO enlargement will further contribute to this trend. Ukraine must declare itself

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<sup>3</sup> During the Clinton Administration the U.S. relationship with Ukraine received greater emphasis. Ukraine was considered in the words of Sherman Garnett the “keystone in the arch” of European Security. The

a NATO aspirant and adopt the Member Action Plan (MAP) soon, or it runs the risk of being marginalized in a diminishing pool of Partnership for Peace countries.

### **The Beginnings of Defense and Military Cooperation**

The United States Department of Defense (DoD) and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) signed a Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation on Defense and Military Relations on July 27, 1993. This agreement established a program of defense cooperation at the Department-Ministry-level. The first substantive activities between these offices began in July 1994.

There are two distinct but related DoD security cooperation programs. The first is programs that are at the defense level—the department and ministry of defense –level. The second level includes military programs, which are carried out by the Joint Staff, General Staff, armed services, unified commands, and service component commands of the unified command. At first, DoD-MoD cooperation was at the forefront of the relationship. This reflected the U.S. Government's (USG) emphasis on de-nuclearization, civilian control of the military, and supporting reform efforts to create a defensively-oriented military to replace the military establishment left behind by the collapse of the Soviet Union. By 1998, however, the military relationship would come to eclipse cooperation between the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in both breadth and scope. This change was caused by several factors, most importantly the assignment of executive agency authority for security cooperation from the Joint Staff to USEUCOM on October 1, 1998. As a combatant command, EUCOM placed more emphasis on regional stability, interoperability, access to air space, bases and infrastructure in times of crisis and collective defense than on defense reform. Defense reform per se remained a goal because it was compatible with these objectives and directed by OSD. This difference in emphasis between OSD and EUCOM would produce conflict, however, and it begged for a more integrated approach which, was partially realized in 2000 with the creation of a Joint Working Document. The Office of the Secretary of Defense element for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia (RUE) has overall responsibility for security cooperation with the republics of the former Soviet Union. From 1994-98, the DoD executive agent for military cooperation was the U.S. Joint Staff J5 (Plans and Policy). Unlike most countries, which are assigned by the President to regional Commanders in Chief (CinCs), in accordance with the Unified Command Plan, the Soviet Union was always assigned to the Joint Staff. When the Soviet Union broke apart into fifteen states, the Baltic States were quickly assigned to the USEUCOM, reflecting long-standing U.S. policy that they had never been part of the Soviet Union, but the remaining twelve were left under the responsibility of the Joint Staff. In part, this was a reflection of the Cold War mentality which still sought to control U.S. activities in the former Soviet Union from Washington. At the same time, the complexity of the relationships with these states—particularly in matters dealing with weapons of mass destruction and attempts to de-nuclearize Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan—were thought

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Bush43 Administration appears to be a less willing proponent of Ukraine and much less attentive to the relationship. Ukrainian fears are being realized, namely that their relationship with the U.S. is inversely tied to the U.S. relationship with Russia and does not stand on its own. Thus when U.S.-Russian relations are sound, U.S.-Ukrainian relations not as important.

by the first Bush and Clinton administrations, especially the National Security Council (NSC), better managed by the Interagency (Department of State (DoS), NSC, and DoD) than by a unified command. By 1997, it had become apparent to OSD and the Joint Staff that a staff in Washington did not have the resources to manage the growing security cooperation programs with the New Independent States. In addition, by that time these states had returned their nuclear weapons to Russian control, and a policy battle ensued in Washington. The fight was at two levels—within the Interagency arena and between USEUCOM and the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). The Interagency decided to assign all the NIS except Russia to the regional CinCs. Russia and the Caspian Sea remained with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The precise geographical division of the remaining NIS, however, was unresolved. EUCOM, with 83 countries in its area of responsibility, nevertheless made its case for all eleven countries. There was consensus within DoD to assign Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the Caucasus states to EUCOM. The assignment of the five Central Asian countries was more controversial. USCINCEUR argued that these countries should be aligned according to their politico-military perspective East to West and not North to South. In this manner, these states would generally follow existing ethnic, linguistic, and political linkages and be integrated into European security institutions. Ties to Turkey would also be acknowledged. CINCEUR's arguments failed to persuade the Interagency community, however, and the 1 October 1998 UCP assigned these states to the USCENTCOM, which was regionally focused on the Persian Gulf, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. The Caspian Sea and Russia remained assigned to the CJCS.<sup>4</sup>

Up to this point, EUCOM, the services, the National Guard and other unified commands had conducted activities with Ukraine in support of the Joint Staff; in other words, as one of several contributors to the plan of military contacts. The Joint Staff J5 planned, negotiated, and oversaw the execution of these events. These events and activities concentrated on familiarization, confidence building, establishing trust between former adversaries, and demonstrating U.S. commitment to a sovereign and independent Ukraine.

In 1993, State Partnership Programs were established between Ukraine and the U.S. states of California and Kansas. These states, especially California, conduct a broad range of events and activities with Ukraine. While the State Partnership Program initially had a solely military orientation, it became much broader in scope and now includes educational, cultural, economic, and civil government components, including involvement of the business and academic communities in each state. The military component, however, plays a significant role in the overall program of defense and military contacts (DMC).

Several high-level policy fora were established. The Joint Staff and General Staff talks were initiated in 1994. In 1996, the U.S. and Ukraine created a bi-national commission, chaired by Vice-President Gore and President Kuchma. One of this commission's four committees was the Security Committee chaired by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy & Threat Reduction and the Deputy MoD of Ukraine. The OSD-MoD Bilateral Working Group was also established in 1996.

Beginning in 1994, under the auspices of the Joint Staff J5 and OSD, a plan of military contacts was created. Initially, events and activities were not linked, and goals and objectives were broad and not clearly defined. The initial goals of the program were: 1) encouraging

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<sup>4</sup> The 2002 UCP assigns the Russian Federation minus the Far East Military District (assigned to U.S. Pacific Command) to USEUCOM.

military reform; 2) promoting civilian control of the military; 3) fostering greater regional cooperation; and, 4) facilitating Ukrainian participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace Program. These goals encouraged a large number of events, the success of which could not be measured either objectively or subjectively. However, at that stage in the relationship, developing mutual trust, effective communication, initiating an examination of interoperability and the applicability of U.S. models through familiarization events was exactly what was required.

Through 1998, the program of DMC continued to evolve, and the DoD element in Ukraine responsible for managing the execution of the DMC program was the U.S. Defense Attaché Office (USDAO). USDAO Kiev was de facto following what had become known as the "Moscow Model". During the early 1990s, as the U.S. military presence in Moscow grew, the Ambassador had directed that all U.S. military organizations assigned to the embassy report to and be under the control of the defense attaché. In theory, this provided a single military point of contact for the ambassador and the Russian government. It also seemingly simplified the integration and coordination of U.S. security cooperation with the Russian MoD. However, what may have worked in Moscow and had been the modus operandi in Kiev until 1998 was increasingly problematic and ineffective. During the first three years the types of events, the complexity and number of military-to-military contacts increased. By the time that the Unified Command Plan switched Ukraine to EUCOM, the DMC program with Ukraine dwarfed that with Russia. Additionally, USCINCEUR had a different concept for planning and executing peacetime military engagement programs.

### **The Transition to USE COM**

To facilitate the transition of executive agency responsibility for DMC programs with Ukraine from the Joint Staff to EUCOM, the Joint Staff J5 drafted a document, *The Enhanced Strategy for the NIS (ES-NIS)*. Rather than a blue print on how the transition would be made, the *ES-NIS* was a broad strategy document. What made it even more superfluous was that extended staffing action delayed its publication. It reached and was signed by the Secretary of Defense only a few months before the effective date of the transfer (October 1, 1998), long after it would have been of use to EUCOM<sup>5</sup>. With little lead time, EUCOM reacted by requesting that the Joint Staff continue to draft the 1999 Military Contact Plan. EUCOM would assume responsibility for the execution of the plan on 1 January 1999. In hindsight this created a different set of problems, primarily due to the fact that EUCOM was left to execute a plan others had designed. So the first truly EUCOM plan was the 2000 plan. To ease the transition, EUCOM and the Joint Staff held several face-to-face meetings with the Ukrainian MoD and General Staff to alleviate any concerns that the transition signaled a diminution of the relationship. The U.S. side stressed that this was a normalization of the relationship comparable to our relationship with Israel or the United Kingdom. To aid the transition, EUCOM found it necessary to establish a New Independent States (NIS) Inter-Directorate Working Group (IDWG) to coordinate the various aspects of six NIS DMC programs. The NIS IDWG was chartered by the EUCOM Chief of Staff and chaired by the EUCOM J5 (Policy and Plans) Division. Members included the EUCOM primary and special staff and the service components. Participants were at the major and lieutenant

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<sup>5</sup> The ES-NIS was more useful for CENTCOM as the effective date of the transfer of the five Central Asia states was October 1, 1999.

colonel level. The IDWG met quarterly to facilitate dialog, plan and assess activities, and to exchange information. EUCOM also assigned approximately 70 percent of the military contacts to the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP). The remaining activities, principally exercises, senior leader visits, training, events, Marshall Center courses and conferences, were planned and overseen by the Eurasia Branch, Europe Division, J5 (Plans and Policy). Security assistance programs remained under the purview of the J4 (Logistics) Directorate.

To justify and prioritize security cooperation assistance within its AOR, EUCOM developed a Regional Working Group (RWG) process in 1996. The process evolves each year, but it is intended to prioritize and allocate engagement resources by country.

## **U.S. Military Organizations in Ukraine**

### ***The Defense Attaché Office (USDAO)***

Until 1998, the USDAO in Kiev provided in-country administration, logistics and operations support, and coordination and liaison for defense and military contacts (DMC). Even with its limited staff and competing missions, the USDAO accomplished this additional mission better than one would expect. The principal actor within the USDAO for DMC was the Army Attaché, perhaps reflecting this officer's background as a Eurasian Foreign Area Officer and Ukraine being ground forces centric (more than half of the military contact plan comprises ground forces events). With the majority of the events focused on the Ukrainian ground forces and lacking the training, education, and experience of a regional specialist such as the Army Attaché, the other members of the USDAO devoted much of their effort to dealing with the high interest, high priority, high visibility and service specific events such as senior leader visits, conference, port calls, and exercises. The result was that in any given year from 1994-1998, only about fifty percent of the planned military contact events were carried out, with both sides canceling events. The ultimate reason for these cancellations was that neither side had created an organizational structure focused solely on DMC. The plan became an end to itself. At best, the USDAO viewed DMC as a means to accomplish other missions. At worst, (and this reflected the view of its headquarters, the Defense Intelligence Agency), DMC was a distraction from that mission. Primarily for these reasons, in 1996, the European Command wanted to establish a Security Assistance Office and a Military Liaison Team in Kiev as soon as possible.

### ***The Military Liaison Team (MLT)***

Military Liaison Teams (MLT) are part of the USEUCOM Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), which was established in 1992 at the direction of then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. The JCTP has had MLTs in the Ministries of Defense of most Central and East European countries. There was one in Belarus from 1993 through 1998, one was established in Kiev in 1998 and they have been in Georgia and Moldova since 1999. The MLT is part of the USEUCOM Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP). The MLTs plan and facilitate execution of familiarization activities between the host nation military and the U.S. armed forces in the areas of military professionalism, civilian control of the military, democratization, and closer ties to NATO by presenting foreign militaries with the U.S. example of how a civilian-controlled military works in democratic, free market - oriented society.

As early as 1993, USEUCOM had argued for the establishment of a Military Liaison Team (MLT) in Kiev, however, successive defense attaches and U.S. Ambassadors, have refused to approve the deployment of a MLT to Ukraine. DMC administration in Ukraine continued under the USDAO. Several CINC's deferred to the Ambassador on this issue, but by late 1997, as Ukraine's assignment to EUCOM became inevitable, placing an MLT in Ukraine became a top EUCOM priority, and the Ukrainian General Staff supported it. The campaign began during the first-ever visit of the Deputy CINC (DCINC) to Ukraine in February, 1998. The primary objective of the visit was to get the Ukrainians, the U.S. Ambassador, and the USDAO to agree to an MLT, but the ambassador preferred to continue business as usual, i.e. the "Moscow Model".

The EUCOM staff and the DCINC believed that the Defense Attaché's Office had prompted the Ambassador's decision. A few months later, the issue would come to a head during the annual Colonels Conference at which the 1999 plan of military contacts was developed. During this planners' conference in April 1998, in Stuttgart Germany, the Ukrainians through the Ukrainian defense attaché to the United States confirmed Ukraine's desire for an MLT, and the U.S. defense attaché agreed to support the concept and work to obtain the ambassador's concurrence. Having obtained the ambassador's approval, EUCOM then dispatched a team of negotiators from the J5, JCTP, and a military lawyer to Kiev to negotiate the memorandum of agreement and logistics requirements with the Ukrainian MoD, Foreign Relations Directorate (FRD). These talks were conducted at lieutenant colonel and colonel -level. The major points of disagreement at this time were the physical location of the MLT, the status of its members, and Ukrainian staffing of its team members. During MLT negotiations with Ukraine, the Ukrainians expressed concern on the status of the assigned U.S. personnel. This concern was not just related to their diplomatic status, but to any precedents the "stationing" of non-accredited foreign military personnel might have on Ukraine's on-going negotiations with Russia regarding basing of Russian military personnel in Crimea. EUCOM generally sought to place the MLTs in the MoD of the host nation, But the Ukrainians refused to allow the MLT to be housed in the MoD's facilities, citing a lack of office space. The Chief Ukrainian negotiator let slip perhaps the real reason when he said "you wouldn't allow a team of Ukrainians in the Pentagon". Instead, the MLT was collocated with the Foreign Relations Directorate, now the MOD Department for International Cooperation or DICMOD, on the grounds of a military academy. The team was to have members from the MOD, Border Troops, National Guard of Ukraine (disbanded in December 1999), and the Ministry of Emergency Situations, as well as office spaces, vehicles, communications, computers, interpreters, and a driver. The Ukrainians provided the office space while the USG funded the rest. These other ministries' armed forces were included because the original agreement on defense cooperation also applied to them. The U.S. funded the renovation of MLT office spaces, which included a restroom and conference room, signs, and other minor improvements to the site. Establishing the MLT was an important step towards improving the security relationship. It provided the U.S. necessary access to the MoD and General Staff on issues related to DMC, and, very importantly, it created a combined U.S.-Ukraine team to plan and support DMC.

### ***Security Assistance and the Office of Defense Cooperation***

A EUCOM Security Assistance Office (SAO) was established in Ukraine in 1996 and it was later re-designated the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC). This office is responsible for managing Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing grants and loans, Excess Defense Articles (EDA), and Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities funds. On March 11, 1997, per Presidential Directive (PD) -97-19 (or PD-97-19), Ukraine became eligible to purchase or lease U.S. defense articles and services. The other activity administered by the SAO/ODC is International Military Education and Training (IMET), initiated in Fiscal Year (FY) 1992. Lastly, the SAO/ODC acquired 13 English language laboratories and materials. Like the MLT, the SAO/ODC is an office of the U.S. European Command.

### ***Defense Threat Reduction Office***

A fourth U.S. military office in Kiev, the Defense Threat Reduction Office or DTRO (formerly the Arms Control Implementation Unit), has no direct role in DMC, but rather its role is to assist in the implementation of arms control accords.

### ***U.S. Defense and Military Actors in Washington and Germany***

In addition to these organizations in-country, there are also several principal actors in the United States and Germany. In Washington, the key policy role within DoD is played by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia (DASD ASD-RUE). Another key actor is the Joint Staff, principally the J5 RUE. Additional roles are played by the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and various Defense agencies. In Germany the principal office responsible for politico-military activities and DMC with Ukraine is the J5 Directorate for Plans and Policy, Europe Division, but other important players are the EUCOM principal and special staff primarily the J3 (exercises), the J4 (security assistance), the J2 (intelligence), the Joint Contact Team Program, and the service components in Europe-U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Navy Europe (USNAVEUR), U.S. Marine Forces Europe (USMARFOREUR), U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) and U.S. Special Operations Forces Europe (USSOCEUR).

### ***Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and General Staff Actors***

On the Ukrainian side there are two organizations concerned with military cooperation: the MoD's Directorate for International Cooperation (DICMOD) within the MoD and the Peacekeeping and Verification Center (PKOVC), which is part of the General Staff. DICMOD was formerly called the Foreign Relations Directorate. This office is similar to a the Foreign Relations Office (FRO) in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). The primary role of the FRO and the FRD is to serve as a single point of contact for defense attaches and the host government and as a go-between for the foreign attaché and the host nation military. Additionally, DICMOD/FRD is responsible for Ukrainian bi-lateral military cooperation. Ukraine has several bilateral military to military cooperation programs notably with the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Poland, and Germany. The PKOVC is responsible for multi-lateral military cooperation, for example with NATO, and the United Nations. Ukraine has the most robust program within the Partnership for Peace

and has contributed forces to a number of UN peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, Africa, and Lebanon.

### **Creating a Military Contact Plan**

By its very nature, carrying out a program of DMC with the NIS required a consolidated plan. This was true for three reasons. First, all military activities with the NIS required Interagency (NSC, DoS, and OSD) approval. Second, to obtain CTR funds, OSD required that planners identify events and necessary funding in advance. Third, the NIS MoDs were accustomed to putting all the events onto a plan that could then be signed by a senior military official—the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman or CINC and his counterpart. Having a consolidated plan, however, was not the norm. For most other countries in the European theater, events were planned and executed by various activity managers with little if any guidance from policy makers. So, given that there was not and still is not a shaping or security cooperation doctrine or standard operating procedure, the unique NIS requirement for a consolidated plan and the scale of the DMC program with Ukraine provided the impetus to create one. It took several years to develop, and it still has not been perfected, but the process and its evolution merit further investigation for their applicability to security cooperation planning in general, as well as security cooperation planning for a specific country.

As previously discussed, until 1997, plans were developed by the Joint Staff J5. Events were solicited from the services, National Guard, combatant and functional commands and others based on broad objectives, such as promoting regional cooperation. The first military contact plan in 1994 included 14 events, but by 1997 the plan had grown to 70 events. In April 1997, the Joint Staff J5 hosted the first “Colonels Conference”, a meeting of U.S. and counterpart Ukrainian planners to draft the 1998 military contact plan. The 1998 plan included over 80 events. Soliciting events worked for the Joint Staff; that is, it resulted in a plan of events tied to objectives (however broad), with organizations willing to provide personnel, units and equipment to execute the events. This method acknowledged that, as a staff, the Joint Staff could not task the services, commands, etc. to conduct events, but instead it provided a vehicle and requisite funding for organizations that chose to participate in engagement. The result was that several separate programs were created within the overall program. For example, medical events, chaplain and legal events appeared on early plans in numbers that far exceeded actual Ukrainian requirements. At one point a Ukrainian general asked his U.S. counterpart to stop sending chaplains or at least send Orthodox ones. Planners at EUCOM were concerned that once the command assumed executive agency, it would be necessary to rein in these disparate programs. It would take two years to do so.

The transfer of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the three Caucasus States from the CJCS to the USCINCEUR AOR occurred on 1 Oct 98. EUCOM hosted the last Colonels Conference in April 98 in Stuttgart, Germany. According to the agreement, the Joint Staff J5 completed the plan and handed it off to EUCOM for execution. The 2000 plan therefore was the first Military Contact Plan drafted and executed by EUCOM. Rather than rely on solicitation, EUCOM decided to hold a planning meeting to develop the 2000 plan in Kiev and rely on in-country EUCOM assets for administrative support. The Ukrainians did not have to travel (except for Navy and Air Force representatives headquartered outside of Kiev). The plan was developed under the auspices of the USDAO and the Military Liaison

Team (MLT) during a meeting in Kiev in the spring of 1999. Attending the meeting were members of the MLT, the EUCOM service components, the U.S. Coast Guard, the USDAO, and the Security Assistance Office (SAO). The resulting plan was an improvement over past plans: events were linked to objectives and concept sheets were drafted, but the meeting focused solely on Joint Contact Team Program activities. The rest (exercises, senior leader visits, Marshall Center courses and conferences, events involving training, ships visits and many SPP events) were planned in Stuttgart with various agencies of the U.S. government by means of a "limited" call for events. In other words, the majority of events were given over to JCTP activities. Those events/contacts/activities that fell outside the purview of JCTP (e.g. exercises, training, conferences, senior leader visits) were planned by the EUCOM J5. In the summer of 1998, the two event lists were merged into one plan, which was then coordinated within EUCOM, with the Joint Staff, OSD, the services, the California and Kansas National Guard, the National Guard Bureau, DoS, the NSC, the White House, the U.S. embassy in Kiev and then approved by the lawyers and the IWG and signed by the EUCOM CINC and the Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff (CHOD).

Though this was a better process, it still needed to be improved. Having two categories of events confused the Ukrainians and frustrated U.S. planners. OSD felt it had no say in the plan's development and wanted to insert events or at a minimum influence the planning process. To develop the 2000 plan, EUCOM again decided to co-host a meeting in Kiev with the Ukrainian MoD. In this manner the Defense Attaché Office, Office of Defense Cooperation and Military Liaison Team could all be represented. EUCOM brought J5 planners, exercise planners, representatives of the EUCOM service components, a medical planner, Kansas and California National Guard representatives, and a HQ USCG planner. OSD and JS J5 desk officers were also invited. Ukraine was represented by MoD and General Staff planners, Service planners, Border Troop personnel, Ministry of Emergencies planners, and observers from the Interior Troops. The attendees were presented with specific objectives and asked to develop a prioritized list of events tied to these objectives. The total number of events was limited to 120. Events were also limited in number by category so that medical events, for example, could not exceed a certain number. Because of legal restrictions on the Joint Contact Team Program (the conference hosts) the conference was again broken into two parts. The first two days were dedicated to non-JCTP events and the last two days to JCTP events—approximately 70 of the 120 events planned that year. Concept sheets describing the events and delineating the points of contact and estimated costs were also drafted. The conference was generally viewed as a success, but two problems soon became evident. First, the restrictions on the JCTP that prevent it from involvement in training precluded one conference to plan all events. This confused the Ukrainians and doubled the amount of time required to conduct the conference. Second, disagreements arose between OSD and EUCOM as it became apparent that it would be difficult to integrate Defense Department/Ministry-level programs and initiatives with those of a combatant command. Additionally, the Ukrainians came to the conference with the same old events pursuing bureaucratic self-interest in most case, rather than focusing on concrete and meaningful objectives.

The process for drafting the 2001 plan was in some ways a step back and at the same time a step forward. The planning meeting was once again held in Kiev. The Ukrainians were told to come to the meeting with draft concept sheets (the U.S. side's past requests for these planning documents had not been met). EUCOM only sent a small contingent of

planners, and the Defense Attaché Office's participation was minimal, but the MLT and Office of Defense Cooperation were well represented. Event proposals were objective-driven for the most part, but, from the Ukrainian side, they still reflected organizational self-interest rather than MoD priorities. The rest of the plan building process remained more or less the same.

This situation naturally raises the question, why is such a complicated process necessary to create a plan of military contacts? The main reasons for such a complex process are funding and organization. Security cooperation funding is "stove piped". Defense and military contacts programs rely on at least six different funding sources, each with its own restrictions and desired objectives. U.S. organizations in-country are established to execute programs funded by different sources and are restricted by law or policy from carrying out certain activities. The MLT cannot help the USDAO support an exercise. The ODC, which manages the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) cannot manage Ukrainian attendance at courses and conferences at the Marshall Center. There are many more examples of such restrictions

Headquarters, USEUCOM is the place where all of these programs converge, but the command has split security cooperation responsibilities among different staff directorates. What is worse is that the JCTP program continues to absorb a large portion of the command's budget for security cooperation, and JCTP maintains a large staff at the headquarters and in-country in the form of MLTs while its activities are seriously limited by legislation. The most significant shortfall is that JCTP can not conduct training.

## **Funding**

### ***Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)***

Peacetime military engagement with the Ukrainian armed forces is funded from a variety of sources. These various sources of funds support different programs and carry varying restrictions. The source of the money influences what can be accomplished as much as the intentions or objectives of either side. One example of a key program is the multi-billion dollar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program appropriation, which includes a set aside for defense and military contacts with the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU). CTR has provided several hundred million dollars each fiscal year for assistance to facilitate the elimination and the safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons. It also has incentives for demilitarization; established programs to prevent the proliferation of weapons, weapons components, and weapons-related technology and expertise; the expansion of military to military contacts; and the related conversion of equipment/infrastructure and the retraining of military personnel. CTR funds were X-year funds, in other words the funds were to remain available until expended. After the FY94 appropriation, Congress removed the direct reference to military to military contacts in the appropriations language, but it continued funding for DMC. CTR funds initially remained available until expended. Beginning in FY98, these funds were no longer X-year funds and again had to be appropriated each year.

The vagueness of the appropriations language after FY 94 in terms of DMC left the determination on what types of activities could be funded up to legal interpretation by the OSD General Counsel, Joint Staff, and USEUCOM lawyers. While the appropriations language did not radically change from year to year, the legal interpretations often changed with the arrival/departure of staff attorneys. CTR DMC funds were absolutely necessary for the military contacts program with Ukraine and other states of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine received up to \$2.7M annually. From 1994-1998, CTR provided the sole source of DMC funding, with the exception of security assistance monies and Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF) for participation in PFP and In-the-Spirit of PFP exercises and conferences. While lawyers broadly interpreted what CTR funds could pay for, what CTR could not pay for was clear. CTR could not be used to fund formal training or purchase equipment. Lawyers broadly interpreted what it could pay for. CTR funds could be used to support events intended to support threat reduction, de-militarization and defense reform and restructuring, including the event itself, as well as what was required to support the event—travel pay, meals, lodging, and consumables such as fuel, (though fuel was only approved on a case-by case basis and with a strong justification). The events were intended to support threat reduction, de-militarization and defense reform and restructuring. Many different types of events can fit into these categories, including re-orienting a force from war fighting to peace support operations (restructuring), creating a non-commissioned officer corps (defense reform), assisting the transition to a civilian controlled military (defense reform), military education and training reform (defense reform), border security (threat reduction), etc. Initially, many events were related to confidence building and familiarizing each side with the other's armed forces. As the relationship matured, the types of events became varied and more complex and the appropriateness of CTR became a concern to policy-makers in OSD.

### ***Traditional CincCINC Activities Funds (TCA)***

Traditional CINC Activities are those which that CINCs conduct within their Areas of Responsibility (AOR) to promote regional security and other U.S. national security goals. TCA funds usually pay for travel, per diem, lodging, and "representational expenses" (small gifts, meals and social functions) associated with military-to-military contact programs. Specific TCA programs vary widely among the regional CINCs, but all implement the National Security and National Military Strategies. Since 1993, USEUCOM has used the majority of its TCA budget (historically approximately \$15M annually) to fund the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) in Central and Eastern Europe and in the FSU. The JCTP uses these funds to support the CINCs goals of stability, democratization, military professionalization, and establishing closer relationships with NATO. The intent of TCA is to complement other engagement programs such as exercises, international military education and training, foreign military sales and financing, etc. TCA funds are to be used to fulfill the CINC's need for flexible resources to interact with the militaries within the AOR in order to promote the theater strategy of access and influence. Arguably, disbursing these funds to JCTP reduces this flexibility, because a significant portion of the funds are tied up in overhead costs.

TCA funds can be used to support any operations & maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel (MILPERS) activity for which the CINC has authority. Some examples include:

- Temporary Duty (TDY) pay for Military Liaison Team members, Traveling Contact Teams, familiarization visits, staff assistance/assessment visits, joint/combined exercise observers, bilateral staff talks, host nation medical and dental support visits, and guard and reserve participation in similar regional security type programs.
- Program administration, to include supplies, equipment, translation service, and civilian employee salaries for regional and national security related programs/projects including, but not limited to, Humanitarian/Civic Assistance (HCA) planning or requirement meetings, infrastructure improvement planning meetings, unit exchanges, State Partnership programs, regional conferences and seminars, personnel and information exchange, training program review and assessments, and shiprider programs whereby members of foreign navies spend time aboard U.S. warships.
- TCA can also be used to fund studies involving regional security and other US national security goals.

TCA funding cannot be used to fund:

- Any activity specifically denied by Congress.
- Any activity in violation of appropriation/authorization guidelines,
  - TCA cannot be used to fund travel for "non-developing countries."
  - Meals, mementos, and entertainment specifically authorized as part of Official Representation Funds.
- The acquisition of weapons systems or major end items.
- Research and development.
- Training of foreign militaries normally funded with IMET or FMS.
- Direct support to foreign countries or the provision of equipment to foreign countries, including supplementation of funds appropriated under FMS or any provision of the Foreign Assistance Act.
- Exercise Related Construction (ERC).
- MILCON projects.
- In addition, TCAs are not:
  - Substitute funds for unfunded requirements in the normal budget process or used to fund purchases of equipment or services for a specified project budget year after year. Projects started under this program should be programmed through the appropriate service POM.
  - Intended to replace or duplicate any other specifically authorized or appropriated fund sources currently available to the CINC.

While it may appear that TCA provides the CINC with a flexible and significant amount of funding, in reality many military engagement planners, policy makers, and defense attaches believe that TCA falls far short of what is required. A significant amount of TCA (as much as 40 percent) pays for JCTP administration, to include supplies, equipment, translation services, civilian employee salaries, temporary duty pay and allowances for MLT members, as well as National Guard man days for MLT members and JCTP staff. What remains is principally used to fund military contacts. Because of the restrictions described above, JCTP is limited to familiarization activities. Familiarization is not inherently bad. It can be a fundamental part of an integrated program. For example, in 1998 the Ukrainian MoD began

a process to reform military education and training. To assist this effort, OSD and USECOM held a planning conference in Kiev and developed a 3-year familiarization program to acquaint the Ukrainian military with the U.S. Army officer and NCO education system. The first year, the JCTP organized a familiarization visit to bring a group of Ukrainian military education specialists to the United States to examine the U.S. Army NCO, pre-commissioning, and junior officer education and training system and a reciprocal visit by U.S. experts to Ukraine. The second year focused on staff colleges, and the third year focused on senior service schools. The Ukrainians were able to speak to instructors, observe training, receive copies of programs of instruction, and review curricula; in other words, they were able to familiarize themselves with the U.S. Army education system. Once they began to reform their education system, they then might then use other engagement programs to exchange instructors with a U.S. military school, bring in a Mobile Training Team to teach Ukrainians to write programs of instruction and develop curricula, purchase computers and software and establish an English Language Lab. This type of familiarization, ensuring linkage to a variety of activities to achieve a specific objective works, but it's the exception. What too often happens is that the host nation requests a mismatched set of events that in the best cases can be tied to mutually agreed to objectives, but in most instances cannot. In Ukraine, this has not only been a shortfall of TCA, but also CTR DMC. In fact, in Ukraine, significant amounts of TCA monies have been used to fund administrative and overhead costs. Prior to 1998 and the establishment of the MLT, CTR could be used to fund a wider range of contacts because, though CTR had its own restrictions, they were much less restrictive than TCA. Since 1998, the CTR funds provided to the JCTP has have been under the same restrictions as TCA funding.

### ***Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF)***

A third funding source is Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF). Established in 1994, WIF is a combined jointly administered and funded DoS and DoD program that supports primarily non-NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) member states' participation in the PfP program. WIF is a U.S. bilateral program designed to:

- facilitate the participation of partner states in exercises and interoperability programs,
- promote interoperability with NATO,
- support efforts to increase defense and military cooperation with PfP partners, and
- develop strong candidates for NATO membership.

The Departments of State and Defense jointly fund and administer the initiative. The Department of State funds equipment transfers and training, while DOD supports partners' participation in combined exercises and NATO-PfP interoperability projects. In the context of the U.S.-Ukraine bilateral relationship, WIF is used to fund conferences, and "In-the-Spirit of PfP" exercises. WIF also has many of the same restrictions that apply to CTR and TCA. Additionally, until recently, WIF could not be used to defray U.S. costs. A benefit of WIF was thought to be that it could fund incremental improvements related to health and welfare of U.S. forces participating in an exercise and fund repairs and improvements related to an exercise. According to this interpretation from 1995-1999 the Ukrainians used WIF to repair wharfs in Odessa and to repair barracks and exercise facilities (including water and electrical infrastructure) at the Yavoriv Military Training Area (YMTA)

in western Ukraine. In the spring of 1999, however, the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (DSCA) ruled that this was an inappropriate use of WIF, and such expenditures were immediately ceased. Coming just a few months before the *PEACE SHIELD 99* exercise at YMTA, this decision caused a diplomatic incident. The Ukrainians had come to expect such funds when hosting an ISO-PfP exercise. In this case, the Ukrainians had already begun the renovation of barracks, dining facilities and water infrastructure. Without WIF to complete the project, the facilities were unusable. EUCOM and the USDAO, working through OSD RUE, attempted to have the decision reversed, but were not successful. This decision was particularly frustrating to U.S. elements in Stuttgart and Kiev, because WIF guidelines were vague and based on precedent or linkages to similar appropriations, legislation and restrictions. No standard operating procedure existed at the time.

CTR, TCA, and WIF, three funding sources, three sets of guidelines, three sets of accounting procedures, and no clear guidance to the understaffed and over-worked offices in Stuttgart and in Kiev. To make up the shortfall left in the wake of the DSCA decision, USEUCOM pursued yet another funding source to complete the repairs at YMTA— Exercise Related Construction (ERC) Funds. ERC is authorized under Title 10 USC Section 2805 (PL 97-214) and is used to prepare and maintain infrastructure for exercises and training. An ERC project can be new construction, conversion of an existing facility, or restoration of an existing or deteriorated facility. ERC is limited to \$1.5M per project, and EUCOM's annual ERC program is approximately \$1.4M. Since Ukraine was hosting two ISO-PfP exercises at the time and, given its high priority in the AOR, even though it had to compete with the 89 other countries in the AOR it was able to compete successfully. Ukraine received ERC for YMTA in 1999 and 2000.

### ***Security Assistance Funds***

The final large major money sources available to fund peacetime military engagement with Ukraine are International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants and loans. IMET provides training in the United States and, in some instances, at overseas military facilities. A component of IMET is Expanded IMET (E-IMET). E-IMET develops professional level management skills in the areas of military justice, codes of conduct, and protecting human rights. Presently, IMET makes available over 300 courses to foreign militaries. The courses are provided on a grant basis. Since fiscal year 1994, Ukraine's IMET budget has doubled from \$700K to approximately \$1.5M today. Ukraine sends 50 students, mostly junior and mid-level officers, to IMET-funded activities each year. The U.S. has extended Ukraine FMF grants since fiscal year 1997 and funded FMS cases since FY98. FMF/FMS funds have been spent on initiatives to enhance Ukrainian capabilities in for peace support operations. Equipment purchases have included tactical radios and High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HUMMWV). In 1999, Ukrainian FMF was diverted to support the deployment of Ukraine's contingent to the U.S. sector of KFOR. Since then, the MOD has attempted to prioritize FMF resources to fulfill defense reform objectives. As a result, Ukraine cut back the number of HUMMWV's acquired and made communications and simulations a priority.

These are the major source of funding for DMC. Ukraine also receives additional monies on a year to year-to- basis. For example since 1999, Ukraine has competed and won Department of State Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) funds. Additionally, Humanitarian assistance has helped to finance a children's orphanage, a tuberculosis sanitarium and a burn clinic in Odessa.

### **Ukrainians in the Balkans**

Ukraine began its participation in OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN (KFOR) in September 1999. During a private meeting at the YMTA in July 1999, the DSACEUR, General Sir Rupert Smith, and then Ukrainian Minister of Defense Kuzmuk apparently discussed and decided to send a Ukrainian contingent to the NATO peace support operation in Kosovo. Ukraine was already supporting SFOR operations in Bosnia. Ukraine contributed the 240<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion under the operational control of the French and 10 IL-76 aircraft in support of both IFOR and SFOR. The Ukrainian IL-76s were the first NIS military assets placed under NATO command. As part of the NATO draw-down in Bosnia, these assets were re-deployed to Ukraine in 2000.

The first Ukrainian KFOR contingent arrived in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) via Greece in August 1999. The contingent then deployed to Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo in November. The two month delay resulted because of funding shortfalls, time required to draft a logistics support memorandum of understanding between the U.S. Army and the MoD, building infrastructure for housing Ukrainian forces and equipment, and transferring authority of the Ukrainian contingent to NATO. This force comprised the 37<sup>th</sup> Reconnaissance Company and the 14<sup>th</sup> Helicopter Detachment. The reconnaissance company manned check check-points and escorted convoys, while the helicopters flew in general support of Commander Kosovo Force (COMKFOR) ferrying distinguished visitors and providing stand-by medical evacuation. The Ukrainian contingents distinguished themselves well. In fact, at NATO's insistence the helicopters were extended in-theater several times.

These two elements were funded from Ukraine's FMF account and this would prove problematic. This was an unprecedented use of FMF. Funds intended to train and equip foreign forces were being diverted to support their participation in actual operations. Further complicating the funding question was a decision by the U.S. commander of Task Force Falcon to house the Ukrainians at the same standard as U.S. forces (i.e. in Southeast Asia-huts (SEA-huts) more or less wooden living structures) and not in Ukrainian tents. The Ukrainians were also supported by Brown and Root a U.S. logistics contractor at a cost of \$50 dollars per day for food, laundry, bath, etc. This was five times the cost of supporting the Ukrainian National Contingent the following year when the Ukrainian contingent had moved out of Camp Bondsteel. At the time, however, the U.S. commander was concerned of the appearance of a double standard at his base, and \$1.3M of \$4M of Ukraine's FMF was spent on the SEA-huts. Almost all of these funds were recouped for the Ukraine FMF account the following year when USAREUR purchased the SEA-huts from Ukraine to meet new requirements at Camp Bondsteel. Nevertheless the failure of Ukraine to self-finance its contribution to KFOR caused much consternation in Washington and Brussels. As the mission was extended beyond the agreed six months, much scrambling occurred in

Washington and other NATO capitals to find monies to support the Ukrainians. In this regard the U.S. and NATO were motivated by both political and practical considerations.

Both found it desirable to have the Ukrainians involved in a NATO operation as it visibly demonstrated Ukraine's support of the alliance. Second, it was important to have a non-Russian Slavic NIS involved in the operation, and, third, day-to-day involvement with U.S. and NATO forces in an actual operation would enhance combined operations and interoperability with Ukrainian forces. There were two principal drawbacks. First, over \$4M in FMF was being diverted from its intended use and second, NATO was concerned that a precedent was being set whereas NATO would fund the participation of other Partners in NATO operations. Some went so far as to refer to the Ukrainians as mercenaries. Almost a year after it had arrived in the Balkans the reconnaissance company redeployed to Ukraine and was replaced by the 1<sup>st</sup> Polish-Ukrainian Battalion (referred to as POLUKRBAT in Poland or UKRPOLBAT in Ukraine). On 21 July 2000, the combined unit's Ukrainian contingent deployed to Kosovo and was collocated with the Poles, thereby abandoning the Ukrainian site at Camp Bondsteel. The 14<sup>th</sup> Separate Helicopter Detachment (4 Mi-8 helicopters and 66 personnel) continued to operate from Camp Bondsteel, albeit with U.S.-managed Allied funding, and FMF continued to support the Ukrainians in POLUKRBAT. Funding for the helicopters eventually was reduced, and NATO made the decision that they were no longer needed. The Ukrainians then deployed the helicopters to FYROM, where they were re-flagged as Macedonian and flew missions in support of the FYROM armed forces against the Albanian insurgents. Ukraine's arms transfers to FYROM have elicited an unfavorable response from NATO which views the introduction of attack helicopters, armored personnel carriers and tanks as an escalation of the conflict and a non-proportional use of force against lightly armed guerrillas and endangering the civilian population.

### **The Ukrainian-Polish Battalion**

The Ukrainian-Polish Battalion or UKRPOLBAT (referred to in Poland as POLUKRBAT) was established by Poland and Ukraine in 1997 as a combined military unit for conducting United Nations Security Council-sanctioned peacekeeping (Chapter VI) missions. Until recently, the battalion has been more show than substance and "combined" more in name than in command and control, force structure, logistics and training. Aside from notional staff integration, the battalion's two national contingents have operated independently and to different standards. However, its national elements do train together, most notably during the *PEACE SHIELD* series of exercises. Since 2000, both sides have been committed to improving the battalion's interoperability. U.S. material assistance training and advice have likewise also helped this effort. UKRPOLBAT is the cornerstone of U.S.-Polish-Ukrainian trilateral military cooperation-, an OSD initiative to garner harness Polish defense reform experience, geographic proximity, and cultural kinship to assist Ukrainian defense reform and restructuring.

In July 2000, UKRPOLBAT deployed to the Multinational Brigade (East) sector in KFOR (the U.S. sector). The initial deployment comprised 793 persons, including a 30-man Lithuanian platoon attached to the Polish contingent and the 267-man Ukrainian contingent. The combined staff consists of 15 Ukrainian officers: a Deputy Chief of Staff, a deputy in each of the S-1 (Personnel), S-2 (Intelligence), S-4 (Logistics) and S-6 (Communications)

sections. Ukrainians also provide the Deputy S-3 officer (Operations), two duty officers, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, and three staff officers in the S-5 section (Politico-military affairs). The Ukrainian National Contingent (UNC), – MOD Unit A3977, operates within the western sector of the POLUKRBAT AOR, in the predominantly Serbian Strpce Opstina. A lieutenant colonel commands the UNC and simultaneously serves as the Deputy Commander of POLUKRBAT. Since moving from Camp Bondsteel, the UNC is billeted and headquartered in Brezovica. The contingent's missions are to conduct day and night vehicular and dismounted patrols of populated areas within its AOR. This includes monitoring the population, protection of Serbian Orthodox churches, operating temporary checkpoints along main roads for documents inspection and weapons and contraband searches. Additional missions include escorting Serbian convoys and school children, providing emergency medical treatment to local residents, and securing/assisting with in the distribution of humanitarian aid.

The UNC is equipped with armored reconnaissance vehicles and trucks. Sub-units of the UNC are the 1<sup>st</sup> Special Company operating in the westernmost sector of the POLUKRBAT AOR. The unit operates with the Germans supporting a German-Ukrainian platoon-sized checkpoint and mans an observation post. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Special Company is assigned to the eastern part of the sector, and its missions include combined patrols with U.S. Army military police. The UNC maintains its own rapid reaction force of two squads, and the remainder of the contingent includes a communications platoon, an engineer platoon, a technical support platoon, a logistics support platoon, a medical point, a military police element, and a headquarters staff element. Logistics is provided by a 17-person Ukrainian National Support Element (NSE), which is located adjacent to the Poles Camp White Eagle and consists of a motor pool for 14 vehicles, food storage units and container-type living and ablution shelters (showers, toilets) purchased with U.S. FMF. The NSE maintains a 20-day supply of food supply, ammunition, and fuel and one year's stock of medical supplies and a 20-day supply of fuel. It also operates a field bakery, a kitchen, a laundry facility and a medical point. Food and provisions are provided from Brown & Root Services at Camp Bondsteel or contracted in bulk through the U.S. Army for local purchase. There is also a five officer Special Operations Group. This is a separate element which includes the overall commander of the UNC and four liaison officers assigned to HQ KFOR.

While the POLUKRBAT has a good reputation within KFOR and has distinguished itself in several operations, most notably in early 2001 when it uncovered the largest arms cache to date, the UNC nevertheless is still plagued by shortcomings. These include a lack of professionalism, significant training deficiencies, weak small unit leadership, and poor discipline. There have also been allegations by U.S. and Polish soldiers of that Ukrainian soldiers have been involved in the unauthorized sale of fuel to locals, a charge that is reminiscent of accusations that Ukrainians soldiers serving in the Balkans in the mid-90's were involved in a host of black market activities. Having identified these deficiencies, the Ukrainian and U.S. planners are adjusting the DMC program to train future contingents on a variety of mission essential tasks, including: crowd control and / dispersal, conducting searches, mine awareness, field sanitation, peacekeeping tactics, techniques and procedures/ drills, rules of engagement, international law, patrolling, etc. The Ukrainian MOD is also emphasizing the importance of English language skills; unlike their Polish counterparts, the Ukrainians lack adequate English proficiency. Still some judge that, the

UNC is ill-equipped for such types of mission. Soviet-era vehicle are unsuited to the terrain and mission and break down frequently. The force lacks portable communications and night vision devices. Even with these shortcomings, however, few doubt that the KFOR mission is of great value to the Ukrainians. It provides daily contact with NATO forces in an operational environment, which facilitates the identification of training and equipment deficiencies and at the same time focuses remedial actions through the program of DMC.

### **The Yavoriv Military Training Area (YMTA)**

U.S.-Ukraine combined ground forces exercises have been conducted at YMTA since 1995. Until 1997, the exercises named *PEACE SHIELD* alternated between Ukraine and the continental United States. In 1997, NATO conducted its first major exercise in the NIS— *COOPERATIVE NEIGHBOR 97*. Greece was the NATO lead for the exercise. For a variety of reasons, including Greek highhandedness and less outside funding, the Ukrainians came away from the experience dissatisfied with NATO and reverted back to bilateral exercises.

This change in Ukrainian goals came as a disappointment because EUCOM exercise policy at the time was for a PfP country to be gradually weaned from U.S.-sponsored exercises. The EUCOM model was for countries to start by hosting a small bilateral exercise, then to move to a larger multilateral U.S. sponsored exercise, and then finally shift to NATO sponsored exercises. When it “slipped back,” Ukraine had already advanced to the point where U.S.-sponsored exercises should have been replaced by NATO sponsored ones. As a result, EUCOM pieced together a *PEACE SHIELD* exercise which the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Warrior Prep Center at YMTA in the summer of 1998.

At the April 1998 BWG in Yalta, Ukraine announced it had not pursued a NATO exercise for 1999. OSD directed EUCOM to plan an exercise in the summer of 1999, well within the usual 24 month planning cycle. The Army fought the tasking citing other priorities and *PEACE SHIELD*'s low training value for U.S. forces, but relented in November in the face of OSD and USCINCEUR pressure to conduct the exercise largely for geopolitical reasons. Planning occurred in less than 12 months. To avoid future “pop ups,” USCINCEUR decided that there would be a U.S.-sponsored ground forces exercise at Yavoriv every year until Ukraine again hosted a NATO sponsored exercise. At the same time, the U.S. encouraged Ukraine to offer to host a NATO exercise at Yavoriv at the earliest opportunity.

In August 1999, a team of U.S. specialists from USAREUR, the 7<sup>th</sup> Army Training Command and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers were sent to Yavoriv at the request of OSD to provide a comprehensive assessment of the training area (the largest in Europe) and to create a blueprint to bring the range up to U.S. and NATO standards. Within thirty days USAREUR produced a detailed report. Unfortunately one might say the report was done too well. It angered the Ukrainians because it denigrated what they purported was to be an outstanding facility, and it upset OSD plans to help the Ukrainians with their plans to market the training area to NATO because the improvements came with a substantial price tag. Even though the report provided information needed for incremental improvements, it was largely ignored for political reasons. Instead, at OSD's direction, a second team was sent to

assess what minor, incremental improvements could be made on the margins to improve the facility. These identified improvements were almost all related to safety, health, and welfare.

In March 1999 at the NATO Ukraine Commission (NUC), and then again formally at the Washington Summit in April, NATO declared Yavoriv a NATO PfP Regional Training Center. It was made clear in Washington and Brussels that the announcement came without attendant funds for improving the facility. USDAO Kiev had played a key role in drafting the proposal on Yavoriv for the Ukrainian MoD. Despite its own statements to the contrary that major funding would not be made available, OSD soon began to tap various funding sources to make improvements to Yavoriv. The first roadblock was when, in May 1999, scarcely a few months before PEACE SHIELD 99 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency made a determination that WIF could not be used to fund exercise-related improvements. Prior to this interpretation WIF had been used in Ukraine and other countries to pay for incremental site improvements related to an exercise. In the case of Ukraine WIF had indeed been stretched fairly far to pay for improvements to the electrical power system, buildings, and water supply. Expecting another infusion of these funds the Ukrainians had begun to renovate facilities at Yavoriv. The site would have been unusable had the Ukrainians not paid the difference between anticipated and actual funding levels. In an effort to continue improvements to the site, EUCOM agreed to provide ERC for each year that a U.S. sponsored exercise was held at Yavoriv.

Marketing national training centers to NATO and Partner militaries has been popular in recent years, and NATO encouraged PfP designations for various centers. The reality, however, is that for these training centers demand is not there. Countries prefer to use their own training centers and the U.S. has excellent training facilities in Germany. While Yavoriv may be the largest training center in Europe, with the exception of a handful of PfP, ISO-PfP and bilateral exercises, the vision of creating a PfP regional training center there is yet still unrealized. Nevertheless, Ukraine continues to invest U.S. assistance dollars and its own funds to improve the facility. Comments by senior U.S. officials have contributed to Ukrainian misperceptions on the viability of marketing YMTA. Rather than attempt to recreate the U.S. Warrior Prep Center in Germany, a state-of-the-art simulation center, to lease to other countries, the Ukrainians would be better off spending limited FMF on higher priority projects (e.g. interoperable command, control, and communications equipment, military education and training of junior officers, non-commissioned officer development, and English language training).

### **Exercises**

The U.S. and Ukraine have been conducting combined exercises since 1995 under the bilateral In-the-Spirit of PfP program. EUCOM's J3 initially described the PfP and ISO PfP exercise philosophy as "crawl, walk, run," later recharacterized as "incrementally increasing complexity" when the first description was found to be offensive to partner countries. The concept nonetheless remained the same. PfP countries would begin by participating in as many PfP exercises as practicable, then they would host a small-scale bilateral exercise with the United States, then host a multilateral exercise with the United States, and finally host a NATO PfP exercise. The exercise planning cycle was 24 months from concept development to execution. Ukraine progressed through this system well. From 1995-1997,

the Ukrainian and the U.S. militaries conducted a series of bilateral ground forces exercises name *PEACE SHIELD* at Yavoriv and in California. These were largely computer-assisted command post exercises.

In 1997, Ukraine also hosted a maritime exercise in the Black Sea—*SEABREEZE 97*. Before going further a discussion of *THE SEA BREEZE 97* is necessary. This exercise became contentious, and the controversy has never been adequately explained. Similar to ground forces exercises, the U.S. began conducting bilateral maritime exercises with Ukraine in 1995-, for example, *AMPHIBEX 95* at Mikolayev in July 1995 with the USS Pensacola, a reinforced company of Marines, helicopters, and approximately 300 Ukrainian participants. The U.S. Marines and Ukrainian Naval Infantry also exercised together during *AUTUMN ALLIES 95* at Camp Lejeune, NC, *AUTUMN ALLIES II* at Norfolk/Little Creek, VA, and at several PFP events. In 1997, Ukraine was ready to host a multilateral maritime exercise. The planned exercise was originally called *SALAMANDER* and was intended as a bilateral exercise with a possible invitation to Russia. *SALAMANDER* was originally envisioned to be similar to *AMPHIBEX 95*, but the Commander of the Ukrainian Navy proposed a vastly expanded event with a peacemaking component. Under this proposed scenario, the exercise was to take place in Crimea near Sebastopol. Sovereignty over Crimea, the division of the Black Sea Fleet, and the Russo-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty were all being negotiated as *SALAMANDER* then *SEA BREEZE 97* was being planned. In December 1996, the U.S. IWG approved the Crimea location, given the resolution on Russian-Ukrainian property issues virtually everywhere except in Sebastopol. Based partly on the original Crimea location and the original “aggressive” scenario (rejected by the Ukrainian General Staff and U.S. planners) aimed at Russia, the Russia’s protested *SB97*. In the end, the exercise took place 26-31 Aug 97. Russia still protested and encouraged local ethnic Russians to protest, but crowds were generally friendly, and protests were smaller than threatened. The participants included the United States, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. The exercise site was moved from the Opuk Training Area near Sebastopol to Ozero Donuzlav farther from Sebastopol, but still in Crimea and the Shirokiy Lan Training Area northwest of Crimea. The MoD convinced a reluctant Ministry of Foreign Affairs to approve the new exercise location. The actual scenario featured maritime and ground operations followed by an “administrative” amphibious landing, all in response to a natural disaster to restore order and render humanitarian aid. By the time of the exercise, a Ukrainian-Russian accord had been concluded on the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and the Russo-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty had been signed. Critics have argued that *SB97* needlessly provoked Russia, but by going forward with the exercise the United States reinforced Ukrainian sovereignty and in the longer run contributed to regional stability by demonstrating U.S. commitment to Ukrainian independence.

*SB97*, while a political success in spite of the Russian protest, provided little training value to U.S. participants. *SB98* was the largest maritime exercise to date and included at-sea and amphibious components. The Russians participated in the exercise with aircraft, helicopters, ships and navel naval infantry. *SB99* took place in two phases. The first phase was conducted in the spring in the eastern Mediterranean Sea as a passing exercise between U.S. and Ukrainian warships and in-port training in Israel. Phase two was a shipboard command post, computer-assisted exercise in the summer in Crimea. *SB 99I* was moved to the Mediterranean for operational reasons (to take advantage of the availability of U.S. warships)

and so that the presence of U.S. (NATO) forces in the Black Sea would not be a campaign issue for the opposition in the Ukrainian Presidential elections. After SB99, both sides agreed to cancel the SB series and to transition to the NATO PfP maritime exercise *COOPERATIVE PARTNER in 2000*. U.S. Navy Europe, however, requested that the SB exercise continue, so planners agreed to rotate *SEA BREEZE* with *COOPERATIVE PARTNER* every other year. With the successful conclusion of *COOPERATIVE PARTNER 2000*, Ukraine effectively made the transition of its maritime exercise program from a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral event culminating in a PfP multilateral NATO exercise.

In 1997, Ukraine hosted its first NATO PfP multi-lateral ground forces exercise at *COOPERATIVE NEIGHBOR 97 (CN97)*. As discussed earlier, this was the first and last NATO-hosted ground forces exercise in Ukraine. After conducting several "pop up" exercises with Ukraine, EUCOM opted to schedule an annual PEACESHIELD exercise until Ukraine again hosted a NATO PfP exercise. When that occurred, *PEACESHIELD* and a NATO PfP exercise would alternate annually and PS would be phased out by 2006. In the meantime, the California National Guard hosted PS 97, a brigade-level computer assisted exercise in November 1997. EUCOM co-hosted PS at the YMTA in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. PS 2000 is noteworthy because the U.S. 82d Airborne (Infantry) Division deployed and conducted a strategic parachute drop of a battalion-size task force from the United States to the Yavoriv Military Training Area as a strategic reinforcement of an on-going peace support operation. PS 00 and PS 01 were used to prepare Ukrainian and Polish peacekeepers for peace support operations in the Balkans.

### ***ROUGH AND READY 2000 (RR2K)***

*ROUGH AND READY 2000* was a joint civil-military disaster response workshop conducted in Ukraine. Planning and coordination began in June 1998 and *RR2K* occurred in May 2000. The California National Guard (California Air and Army National Guard) and its partner nation, Ukraine, conducted this event in May 2000 in the Kharkov-Chiguiv area of eastern Ukraine, following eighteen months of combined planning. The location is significant, as prior to *RR2K*, all U.S. sponsored exercises had occurred in western and southern Ukraine. This was the largest DMC conducted in eastern Ukraine. The objective of the workshop was to expand the area of U.S.-Ukrainian cooperation to the eastern part of the country, to conduct an inter-agency event, and to allow civilian and military emergency response teams to share civil emergency planning, medical disaster response, and public health techniques and procedures. The event was initially intended to be an exercise, but the Congressionally mandated exercise limit in Europe made it necessary to conduct the event as a CTR-funded workshop emphasizing military support to civil authorities and civil-military relations. Without the exercise designation, the EUCOM J5, rather than the J3, served as the EUCOM lead for the event. This presented some unique challenges to arrange strategic airlift (a civilian airliner was chartered), JOPEs inputs, drafting an event directive vice an exercise directive, and establishing the chain of command and command relationships. These were worked out successfully, and U.S. Air Forces, Europe, sponsored the workshop and provided force protection, medical and logistics support.

A natural and man-made disaster scenario drove the workshop, with focus on these areas:

- Air, water, and land rescue

- Emergency medical assistance
- Public health assistance
- Emergency transportation assistance (rail, air, vessel, vehicle)
- Aero-medical evacuation
- Joint agency emergency management

The scenario was evenly divided between emergency/ public health management and emergency medical/ public health response. The *ROUGH AND READY 2000* workshop supported USCINCEUR peacetime military engagement with Ukraine. EUCOM provided \$1.4M in CTR funding and coordination that were critical to the success of the event. Planning and coordination began in June 1998 and *RR2K* occurred in May 2000.

During the weeklong exercise, mock disasters were conducted to simulate a flood, an earthquake, fires, and a plane crash. In the flood scenario, some victims clinging to rooftops that had been constructed in the shallows of a lake were rescued by para jumpers from the 129th Rescue Wing, Moffett Federal Airfield, California, while others were brought to shore in landing craft, motorized boats, and helicopters. Victims suffering a variety of simulated injuries, including hypothermia, were triaged and then evacuated to other medical centers.

In the plane crash exercise, dozens of victims with moulaged injuries lay scattered about an open field near the burning hulk of a plane. A disaster relief team of Ukrainian and American military and civilian personnel provided immediate first aid, triage, and transport. Immediately afterwards, a series of explosions rocked a nearby abandoned factory building to simulate an earthquake. Fire crews quickly doused the flames with foam, while rescuers with specially trained dogs searched the rubble for other victims, and a Ukrainian helicopter landed on the roof to facilitate quick evacuation.

In all the scenarios, California Air and Army National Guard personnel, along with civilians from the Disaster Management Assistance Team, worked alongside their Ukrainian counterparts drawn from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Health, the Interior Ministry, and the Ministry of Emergencies (the Ukrainian lead agency). Also on hand-as observers -were representatives from Greece, Japan, Belarus, India, and Russia.

At Chuguyev Airfield in the Ukraine, a Ukrainian field hospital received "patients" evacuated from the previous disasters. Inside a huge orange, cross-shaped tent, complete with surgical wards, Ukrainian medical teams showed the American teams their own impressive field medical facilities. At the Mobile Aero-medical Staging Facility set up by teams from the 146th Aero-medical Evacuation Squadron (AES) from Channel Islands Air National Guard Station, Calif., AES teams demonstrated air-evacuation procedures, including litter carry and C-130 litter configuration. A National Guardsman fell ill requiring an actual air-evacuation flight with American and Ukrainian teams onboard.

The event was the most significant peacetime engagement in the FSU involving the U.S. National Guard, and it demonstrated the important role National Guard forces can play when integrated into security cooperation programs.

## **Corruption**

Allegations of corruption and diversion of assistance have been raised with regard to U.S. security assistance to Ukraine. Though largely unproven, there is nevertheless enough circumstantial evidence to suggest that it has occurred. Corruption has been purportedly associated with the following activities: construction and renovation of facilities at training areas and the MLT offices, support services for exercises -food, water, vehicle, and equipment rental, fuel, and other items and travel payments kickbacks. While it is important to note that these allegations have not been substantiated, the U.S. side has operated under the presumption that it has occurred, the U.S. has implemented several internal controls to prevent its reoccurrence. This has involved using U.S. contractors to provide supplies and other logistics support for exercises, using the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Europe, to educate the Ukrainians on the contract bidding process, and using this process to solicit bids for construction contracts projects at training areas, and contracting food. Lodging and travel expenses for Ukrainians on temporary duty are contracted and advance travel payments to individuals are limited to pocket money. It's important to note that these allegations are unsubstantiated.

### **The Special Advisor to the Secretary of Defense**

Major General Nicholas S. Krawciw (U.S. Army, Retired), an ethnic Ukrainian, fluent in the language, and with unprecedented access to the Ukrainian defense hierarchy, and having knowledge of the culture and traditions of Ukraine, was appointed by Secretary Perry as his special advisor on Ukraine. General Krawciw served in the Clinton Administration and has continued to serve under the Bush<sup>43</sup> Administration and he has provided critical advice and access on Ukraine. He was instrumental in establishing two key reforms programs, assisting in the creation of a Ukrainian NCO Corps and helping to create a three year program to restructure and reform the Ukrainian military education and training system. Both of these initiatives are considered to be the most comprehensive and successful elements of the DMC program. He is currently assisting the Ukrainian MoD to establish a contract forces, leading eventually to an all-volunteer force. General Krawciw's example, while unique to the U.S.-Ukrainian Security Cooperation Program, deserves further study to determine its applicability to U.S. security cooperation elsewhere.

### **The U.S.-Ukraine Joint Working Document (JWD) on Bilateral Defense and Military Cooperation**

In an attempt to corral the various engagement actors and activities and to provide guidance and focus to DMC, OSD led three interagency working groups to create a framework document for policymakers, planners, resource managers, activity managers, and action officers. The JWD's main purpose was to ensure that the efforts and resources committed by both sides support mutually agreed upon priorities and specific objectives of cooperation. Once the JWD was approved by the U.S.-side, it was staffed with the Ukrainians. The approved document is guidance and not legally binding on either side. It contains a strategic vision statement, seven major focus areas for cooperation each with long term goals, short term objectives, and specific actions to achieve each goal and objective. The seven major focus areas are:

- Non-conventional Threats
- Military Interoperability
- Force Professionalization
- Civil-Military Relations
- Defense Structuring and Resourcing
- Defense Support Issues and,
- Military-Scientific and Military-Technical Cooperation

An example, as outlined here, will provide a better understanding of the JWD:

Focus Area: Civil-Military Relations.

Goal: Ukraine's MoD is managed by civilians.

Objective: Ukraine develops a cadre of civilian defense specialists

Action: Create an intern program within the MoD

Action: Establish a scholarship program for university students studying national security affairs

Action: Send civilians to IMET-funded defense management courses.

Using the JWD, an activity manager has specific guidance from the policy makers on goals and objectives, but there also is the flexibility to select the means. Using the above example, JCTP may conduct an event to familiarize the MoD with defense intern programs in OSD. The ODC might dedicate several IMET seats to courses on defense management. Rather than "guessing" and conducting random events, activity managers have clear guidance. Policy makers can influence activities without micromanaging. Both governments have accepted the JWD as policy guidance. The JWD is intended as a living document, and it can be updated and revised as necessary.

### **Combined Defense Analysis**

OSD and EUCOM have conducted defense assessments (defense analysis in the Ukrainian case) in most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Georgia. These assessments are second-party examinations of a host country's military. The assessments involve on-the-ground sampling of the host country's military forces, examination of the national security structure, a review of the national defense concept and military doctrine, and an examination of the threat and the defense budget. The assessments are intended to provide the host country a blueprint for creating a rational military force, given the threat and the defense budget. These assessments also provide a means to focus U.S. security assistance towards this goal. The first NIS country to undergo a defense assessment was Georgia where this assessment was carried out in February 2000.

OSD and EUCOM first approached Ukraine in July 2000 during the U.S.-Ukraine bilateral working group. EUCOM representatives briefed the concept, which received a lukewarm reception from the Ukrainians. However, both sides agreed to have a U.S. team visit Kiev to explain the concept in greater detail. In November 2000, the EUCOM DCINC visited Kiev. During a meeting with the CHOD, the defense assessment was discussed, but it was not well received. The CHOD's response can be paraphrased as "when you are building a house, and you are well along, the last thing you need is your neighbor telling you

where to move the plumbing and how to redesign the rooms." In March 2001, a delegation headed by the DASD RUE and the U.S. Ambassador briefed the Ukrainian National Defense and Security Council, the Supreme Rada, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of the General Staff. The U.S. side's desired outcome was to obtain Ukrainian concurrence on one of three options. The first option was a full assessment of the Ukrainian armed forces, including the uniformed forces of the other ministries. The second option was an assessment of the MoD alone, and the third option was to assess select units. The assessment proposal was favorably received by the National Security and Defense Council and the Supreme Rada, but it hit a stumbling block when it was briefed to the MoD. The Ukrainian MoD rejected the assessment outright and instead offered to have a panel of experts meet to work out the methodology for an assessment. By the end of the year, a compromise was reached, and both sides agreed to conduct a Combined Defense Analysis of Ukraine's nascent Rapid Reaction Forces in the spring of 2002. Given Ukraine's reluctance to agree to a defense assessment, whether from a lack of transparency or pride, this assessment will be a useful first step to build confidence and trust in the process and the product in spite of being less than complete.

### **Trilateral Cooperation (Ukraine-Poland-United States)**

Attempts since 1999 to encourage trilateral cooperation with Poland have been largely unproductive. The guiding principals behind this initiative are to garner Polish experience in reforming and restructuring its defense establishment from a Warsaw Pact model to Western and NATO standards and to take advantage of cultural, ethnic, historical, and linguistic ties between Poland and Ukraine. The U.S. has enjoyed limited success encouraging trilateral participation in JCTP events, Marshall Center conferences, and the now defunct Harvard Ukraine National Security Program. The one success is the Ukrainian-Polish Battalion, currently operating in the U.S. sector of KFOR as previously described. In addition to combined operations and training in Kosovo, all sides have agreed to conduct combined peacekeeping training at the Yavoriv PFP Training Center. The United States is considering several material and technical assistance projects, including developing simulation capabilities, a lessons learned database, and language training to develop interoperable skills and capabilities. There appears to be an interesting dynamic at play, in that the Ukrainians (former members of the Soviet Armed Forces) may resent having to learn from their former Warsaw Pact pupils. The Polish historical role in the region and latent Polish irredentist claims to Ukraine's western lands may also play a subconscious role for the Ukrainians. Whatever the reason, trilateral cooperation has progressed slowly.

### **Assessment**

As the number of military contacts between the U.S. and Ukraine grew eventually to exceed 100 events annually, there were increasing calls from the leadership of both sides to pursue quality and not quantity. In this regard, there has been much U.S. interest in developing a system of metrics to assess the progress of engagement. Unfortunately, many activities cannot be objectively measured, assessments and after action reports are often not completed, and no organization is currently staffed to review and evaluate them. In November 2000, an attempt was made to give this mission to the Joint Staff J5 at the U.S.-Ukrainian Joint Staff talks, but the process was not carried over into the following year. The

JWD attempts to provide distinct goals, objectives and actions that may or may not be met. But, again, there is no institutionalized after action process.

There are several programs that can be objectively assessed as to their effectiveness and value. IMET is one example. Surprisingly, the U.S. does not have good data on how Ukrainian officers are placed and promoted after completing U.S. military schools, although the limited evidence available indicates that they do not fare well. Unlike the new NATO members who have IMET graduates in high positions, Ukraine seemingly does not view attendance at Western senior service colleges and staff colleges as a vehicle for advancement. A complicating factor is that Ukraine imposes no service obligation on these individuals, so many leave the service and take their newly acquired skills with them into the civilian economy. Consolidating responsibility for security cooperation in a single organization, the ODC in country and a staff directorate at EUCOM, will also aid the assessment effort. Assessing subjective events can be accomplished using the JWD model, in which individual events are intended to accomplish specific tasks and broader actions that can be assessed in terms of their contribution to the attainment of identified goals and objectives. Several programs, notably exercises, have very distinct after action processes, but these processes pertain to the exercise itself and do not address how the exercise fits into the greater program of bilateral cooperation. Finally, use venues such as the RWG, Joint Staff talks, and Bilateral Working Group to report the results of the program assessment to leaders and to adjust the specifics of future programs.

### **Other Key Issues**

The U.S. program of military contacts with Ukraine presents several challenges:

- **Organization:** OSD should be responsible for department and ministry-level activities: Civil-Military Relations, Defense Economics, Defense Reform and Restructuring, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Military Technical and Military Scientific Cooperation. The Joint Staff has a minimal role in security cooperation. Joint Staff talks with the Ukrainian General Staff on strategic issues can be productive, involving discussions of ongoing U.S. military operations, national military strategy, doctrine, reorganization and restructuring efforts, base visits, etc. The Services can support OSD-level initiatives, but the unified command service components should represent the services at the operational level and below. The principal actor is the unified command. However, EUCOM's current structure is not as conducive to managing security cooperation programs as it might be. Engagement activities are spread out among the command's staff elements and the component commands. Management, administration, and execution of the program are overly complicated. In-country U.S. military organizations have different masters and varying roles and missions. The Ukrainians have split bilateral and multilateral cooperation programs between the MOD and General Staff and assigned bilateral programs to an office that serves to control foreign interaction rather than promote cooperation. If security cooperation is to be focused on results, activities need to be planned, executed and assessed by a single organization with a staff at EUCOM and subordinate implementing units located in country. The same applies to Ukraine.

- **Funding:** There are too many funding sources, each with its own arcane set of rules and restrictions. None are flexible enough to support a meaningful and integrated program of cooperation. Various funding sources require elements in the field to manage differing accounting and resource management practices. Guidelines and funding rules are often in contradiction with and at times even preclude achieving the desired results. Funding, therefore, instead of desired outcomes, drives engagement activities.
- **Exercises:** The trend at EUCOM is to conduct fewer bilateral ISO-PfP exercises and more NATO PfP exercises to reduce OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO because these exercises do not provide U.S. forces with adequate training. Relying on NATO PfP exercises, however, forfeits opportunities for the United States to achieve its goals and objectives in favor of NATO objectives. Likewise, the U.S. presence is subordinated to NATO, or it even may be non-existent if the United States does not participate in an event. Still, to demonstrate U.S. commitment to national sovereignty and regional stability there are times when a U.S.-led exercise is needed.
- **The Role of the U.S. National Guard:** The National Guard is often an afterthought rather than an integral component of a program of DMC. The National Guard lacks sufficient man-days and funds to participate fully in DMC and operates outside of DMC planning cycles.
- **Planning cycles:** The various activity managers and funding programs operate on different planning cycles. Activities such as exercises are on two year cycles, JCTP is planned on a one year cycle, CTR planning has been based on the calendar year, and TCA funds and WIF are on the U.S. fiscal year cycle, which has no significance for the Ukrainians.
- **Ukraine's failure to prioritize assistance:** Ukraine has several bilateral security cooperation programs, most notably with the United States, the United Kingdom, Poland, the Netherlands, and Germany. Rather than prioritize, synchronize, and deconflict this assistance, the defense bureaucracy instead conducts events randomly to support special interests and generate hard currency. Ukraine's division of responsibility for security cooperation between the MoD and General Staff and decentralized planning conducted by the Services and separate staff elements is a telling comment on the MoD and General Staff. Both contribute to Ukraine's submission of a haphazard list of events each year and having to rely on U.S. suggestions rather than focusing the plan on Ukrainian priorities.

### **Recommendations**

The foregoing discussion and analysis of the past eight years of U.S. security cooperation with Ukraine suggests several actions for consideration in continuing U.S. engagement with Ukraine and emerging security cooperation programs with other militaries.

- **Organization:** EUCOM is already taking measures to disband the JCTP and combine all security cooperation activity into the ODC. This is a good first step, but organizing for security cooperation needs to be much more comprehensive. Department/Ministry-level cooperation must be managed by a single OSD POC who integrates the activities of other OSD staffs, the Joint Staff, and the Services. The OSD in-country interlocutor with the host nation is logically the USDAO.

With this in mind, the USDAO should be formally recognized as the direct representative in-country of the Secretary of Defense. Personnel assignment, administration, logistics, and operations for the attaché system can still be conducted by the Defense Intelligence Agency, but the representation mission should be paramount and attaches should wear the OSD staff badge as a visible sign that they are the Secretary's representative. Military cooperation programs should continue under the CINC. Instead of spreading security cooperation activities across the unified command staff, security cooperation should either be given in toto to a single directorate, the J4 or J5 logically, or a new directorate should be created to encompass all these personnel and missions. Rather than create new personnel requirements, however, a new directorate may actually reduce the total number of billets by reducing management overhead and combining similar missions. In-country, the ODC and MLT should combine as planned. The ODC should be headed by a Colonel (O-6), preferably an experienced foreign area officer. The rest of the ODC should include officers and NCOs with duties in security assistance, facilitating attendance at Marshall Center courses and conferences, PfP, exercise support, and preparing assessments, and a National Guard State Partnership representative. The ODCs should be tailored by service and specialty to each country—for example, no naval personnel should be involved in these activities in the Czech Republic because it has no naval force. In-country elements should also match up against the host country military in composition. For example, a country in which ground forces predominate should have an ODC staffed predominantly by ground forces personnel. Host nations should be encouraged to establish a counterpart staff element to focus on and prioritize both bilateral and multilateral engagement. In the case of Ukraine, responsibility for NATO and UN cooperation programs should be within the same staff element as bilateral programs. Borrowing from the MLT concept, the ODCs should be augmented by a host nation liaison officer(s) and, if practical, located at an MOD or General Staff facility to ease coordination.

- **Funding:** Ideally the various funding sources should be combined in a single security cooperation fund, but that is not likely any time soon due, in part, to the vested interests of the varied sources of funding. In the short term, the various monies-CTR, WIF, TCA, EIPC, ERC, etc-should be program managed at EUCOM by the directorate with security cooperation responsibilities from a dedicated budget office. The ODC should have the requisite budget analysts assigned to disburse, reconcile and account for these funds in-country.
- **Exercises:** ISO-PfP exercises must remain a vital component of security cooperation. U.S.-Ukrainian exercises should continue, but the goal set by Secretary Perry of an annual exercise with Ukraine to bolster Ukrainian sovereignty no longer seems relevant; after ten years, Ukrainian sovereignty is secure, and further “pop up” exercises should be avoided. Both sides should be encouraged to maintain the 24-month exercise planning cycle. Both sides also need to recognize that planning conferences should be viewed as engagement activities in and of themselves.
- **The Role of the National Guard:** *RR2K* demonstrated that the National Guard can be a key component of security cooperation programs. With advanced planning, the Guard can be integrated into and make substantial contributions to PfP and ISO-PfP exercises. However, the active component must come to terms

with the ability of the Guard to successfully plan and carry out events. The Guard would be well served by assigning a small planning cell to USAREUR, USAFE and the EUCOM exercise planning staffs. State partnership liaisons at the ODCs would also be helpful in planning and carrying out Guard activities.

- **Planning Cycles:** Planning cycles for all exercises and similar activities need to be synchronized. Multi-year planning would be more efficient and effective. Funding cycles should correspond to military contact plan cycles. For most of the period 1993-2001 CTR funds and the military contact plan were both effective for the calendar year. Fiscal year funds will require complex planning to make the U.S. fiscal year transparent or require the Ukrainians to accommodate the fiscal year. The Guard should develop long-term engagement plans, perhaps for three to five years, to ensure timely staffing of Guard initiatives and synchronization with funding and activity cycles.
- **Encourage Ukraine to prioritize assistance:** The JWD and the NATO PfP planning documents are beginning to bear fruit. The Ukrainian Ground Forces Command has drafted a proposal to prioritize assistance and link security cooperation to specific MoD reform and restructuring goals in accordance with the *State Plan of Reformation and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to 2005*. This proposal follows the JWD format and seeks to concentrate international military assistance in the following areas: phased transition to a professional force, military education and training development, and training peacekeeping forces for NATO/UN operations. The Ground Forces Command proposal also includes a multi-year list of activities that support goals and objectives within these areas.

While these efforts constitute a good first step, this proposal still falls short of what is required. An office at the MoD and General Staff level should be established to staff, consolidate, and prioritize all Ukrainian event proposals (including those of other ministries). Both sides still spend too much time and money in face-to-face meetings with one another just to staff proposals. After eight years, the Ukrainians should be able to come to the table with a staffed and prioritized proposed set of events that support reform measures approved by the Minister of Defense or the CHOD.

## Conclusion

The decade following the end of the Cold War witnessed a U.S. emphasis in Europe on engaging the militaries of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to promote greater understanding, threat reduction, confidence building, defense reform and their integration into Western security structures. Security cooperation at the micro-level is difficult to assess, but at the macro-level engagement has played an important role in regional stability. For a relatively small investment (less than \$10M per year for DMC and security assistance), the U.S. has successfully begun the integration of the Ukrainian armed forces (the largest in Europe) into European and Trans-Atlantic security structures, obtained an important friend in the region, and helped Ukraine to assert its sovereignty and independence. The U.S.-Ukraine security cooperation program is very complex and intricate. If we can identify and evaluate the lessons of our past efforts in this area, we will be better able to craft more

effective organizational structures, funding mechanisms, planning efforts, procedures, and activities to more effectively promote U.S. interests in the region through security cooperation.