Decree No. 809: The Foundation of Sovereign Ideology is Laid

In his keynote Valdai speech on October 27, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed the following thesis:

“The direct threat to the political, economic, ideological monopoly of the West is that alternative social models may arise in the world.”

Or even more sharply and definitely:

“I am convinced that real democracy in a multipolar world, first of all, implies the possibility of any people—I want to emphasize this—any society, any civilization to choose their own path, their own socio-political system.

“If the United States and the EU countries have such a right, then the countries of Asia, the Islamic states, the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, and the states of other continents certainly have such a right. Of course, our country, Russia, also has it, and no one will ever be able to dictate to our people what kind of society and on what principles we should build.”

Today in Russia it is a matter of putting forward just such an alternative social model to liberal democracy, of building its own socio-political system. It is this constructive step that is called upon to become the next stage of our strategy in the development of an acute civilizational war.

The basis of such a social model is necessarily traditional values, the Decree on the preservation and strengthening of which was signed by the President on November 9, 2022 (Decree No. 809). This is what the model should be based on.

Here is an enumeration of traditional values, which from now on acquire, in fact, a national character. These are the foundations of a sovereign ideology, which in a sense is obligatory for all citizens of Russia.

Let’s look at this most important code of the new operating system of Russian society in a little more detail. We quote Decree No. 809:

“Traditional values include:

human rights and freedoms,
patriotism, citizenship, service to the Fatherland and responsibility for its fate,
high moral ideals,
a strong family,
creative work,
priority of the spiritual over the material,
collectivism, mutual assistance and mutual respect,
historical memory and continuity of generations,
the unity of the peoples of Russia.”

These 14 points should be regarded as nodal points of sovereign ideology. The State from now on is responsible for the state of public consciousness, and the social model, alternative to the West, will be based on these 14 points. In a sense, they become sacred.

The first three points are common to the Russian tradition and to Western liberal ideologies.

Right to Life. The first point is recognized as a traditional value by a wide variety of societies, both traditional and modern. A person’s life is entrusted to him alone, and another person has no right to take another’s life at his discretion. Moreover, in religious societies, the very act of suicide (not to mention being forced to commit it) is also considered a crime.

The only exception is the State, which, under certain circumstances, has the right to dispose of the lives of its citizens—by punishing convicted persons for proven crimes or by sending them off to fight in defense of the fatherland. But if life is a traditional value, which must be preserved and strengthened, then the state must also take it into account in extreme cases—showing, if possible, mercy to criminals and protecting the lives of soldiers and combatants.

Dignity. The second point asserts the natural dignity of the human being, which must be recognized and taken into account, both by society and by the state. Again, this value is common to religious cultures and modern liberal ideologies. In religion, the dignity of man derives from his special place in creation, where he is placed in the position of representing God in the face of the rest of nature and bearing full responsibility for it. In the secular context, this responsibility before God disappears, but man’s special place in nature remains unchanged. It is only in contemporary theories of deep ecology and posthumanism (as well as in postmodernism and speculative realism) that man is stripped of his dignity and seen as a threat to the environment.

Human rights and freedoms. The third point is also not unlike the principles of liberal ideologies, which also declare human rights, although in practice they are constantly flouted and trampled upon. Ideology is not a question of practice, but of norms. In the case of norms, what matters most is not whether they are respected or not, but what they are in themselves, what their content is.

With regard to the first three points, the following should be emphasized. One might think that they all coincide with liberal ideology and therefore are not an alternative to it. But they are not.

Since we are talking about ideology, all fourteen points together make sense. And the first three principles should not be considered separately, but on the basis of the totality of all fourteen principles, on the basis of which they acquire their own special, peculiar to our civilization and tradition, meaning. And it is from the integrity of the understanding of all fourteen points that a special Russian conception of man himself reveals itself.

A person becomes normative when he accepts all 14 properties as a value. This means that rights and freedoms apply to this full person. These rights and freedoms should be interpreted in the context of Russian history—Russian law and Russian truth. And one should especially take into account here the Christian view of life, dignity, right and freedom, which is in harmony with the views in other traditional confessions.

The alternative nature of Russian civilization clearly reveals itself from point 4 onwards—patriotism, citizenship, service to the Fatherland and responsibility for its fate. Here we are dealing with a purely Russian attitude towards the state as the supreme value. Before 1917, this was reflected in the idea of the sacred nature of the monarchy. The Russian Tsar was conceived as a Sustainer; that is not just a political, but also a religious figure, preventing the arrival of the Antichrist in the world. So, patriotism in Russia acquired a partly religious character—service to the Fatherland and responsibility for its fate was a spiritual feat.

During more secular times, and especially during the Soviet era, the interpretation of patriotism changed, but it invariably remained the most important line of force holding people and society together. Accordingly, an attack on this value, an insult to patriotic feelings, an irreverent attitude toward the state and state symbols is regarded by us as a challenge to public morality.

Patriotism, elevated to a value, readily contradicts a liberal ideology based on cosmopolitanism and the conviction that social progress consists in globalization, the abolition of nation-states and the creation of a World Government. This is the first clear challenge to the ideology of the collective West that we resist. From this point on, all the other items on the list of traditional values will only strengthen the identity of our sovereign ideology, and the divergence from liberalism (as well as the convergence with other illiberal types of societies) will only grow.

High moral ideals. The fifth point establishes the value priority of morality in society. Moral ideals are emphasized as “high,” indicating their vertical nature. In the Russian tradition, the highest ideal of morality was considered holiness, which draws us to the religious cult of saints, elders, martyrs, who are models of man and his behavior. Their role in moral education should be restored. Other traditional faiths have their own models of holiness, which in no way contradict the Orthodox faith. In the secular context (especially during the Soviet period), the highest moral ideal was seen as the hero who bravely sacrificed himself for the common good, the man-soul, giving his neighbor his last and not sparing energy for the sake of a brighter future.

But for ordinary people in Russian society there had always been quite certain norms of behavior, the treatment of others, ethical attitudes, disregard of which was perceived as immorality, a challenge and subjected to public condemnation.

Here, again, is the opposition to liberalism. Liberalism recognizes only individual morality, and regards any social ideal as an attack on the freedom of the individual. This individualism triumphed in Russia after the end of the USSR, which led to an unprecedented fall in society’s morals. The fact that high moral ideals are now enshrined as traditional values should radically change the very moral climate in society.

A strong family. This sixth point is particularly important in the context of the spread of liberal ideology, which denies gender, replaces it with an artificially constructed social gender, fully legitimizes homosexual marriage and other forms of perversion, and, in effect, abolishes the institution of the family as such. Since the Russian Constitution recognizes the family as such and only in the case of a union between a man and a woman, and since homosexual propaganda is legislated, the declaration of the family as a value already assumes that it is a marriage between a man and a woman. At the same time, it is obvious that abortion and even divorce are morally condemned, since neither of these is at all a sign of a strong family. A truly strong family includes children as well as the care of the older generation.
Again, this point directly contradicts liberalism, which, on the contrary, relativizes the family in every possible way and is oriented toward its complete abolition.

The family is at its strongest in a religious context, where marriage is viewed as a sacrament, divorce is actively condemned, and abortion is considered a sin.

Anything can happen in life, but it is important that the orientation toward a strong family prevail in society as a whole. This requires the revision of educational, upbringing and cultural policies. At the same time, it is harmoniously combined with the measures on saving the demographic situation in the country.

Creative labor. The seventh point refers to an absolutely special Russian ethical system in which labor is interpreted not as a heavy (although necessary) obligation, not as a punishment, but as a spiritual endeavor, as a creative transformation of the world. The declaration of labor as a value (and not just as a material necessity for survival) runs counter to liberal ideology, which places its stakes in capital, finance, and maximum profit, and relegates labor and laboring people as such to the bottom of the social ladder.

In Russian history, the work of the peasant was thought of as a spiritualized way of life, inseparable from family, religion, rituals, society, the surrounding nature and the animal world. Russian philosophers spoke of the liturgical nature of peasant labor, of its almost religious dignity.

The value of free social labor in Soviet times was stressed even more. Russian Slavophiles, Narodniks and Bolsheviks equally hated capitalism and its vampires, who appropriated the results of toilers’ work and grew rich through exploitation and market speculation. The value of labor further contrasts Russia and our natural social system with the liberal West. But for this legally enshrined value to become effective, a great deal will also have to be changed in Russian society itself, where capitalist attitudes, paradigms and practices were crudely copied in the 1990s. Now, insofar as they oppose the value of creative labor and have the character of blatant parasitism and exploitation, they turn out to be, at the very least, reprehensible. In fact, this clause of Decree No. 809 rejects the oligarchic system by law.

The priority of the spiritual over the material. The eighth point of Decree No. 809 is the culmination of sovereign ideology, the core of its code. This provision poses a radical challenge to materialism as a whole; that is, to such a picture of the world as is based on the primacy of matter and the derivative nature of spirit, thought, and soul. Materialism in science developed in parallel with the secularization of society, the rejection of God, the Church, religion, the sacraments, belief in the posthumous existence of the soul, the Last Judgement, the general resurrection of the dead. This is called the “process of secularization,” which became the basis of a whole Western ideology – secularism. It is secularism that His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia blasted at the last session of the World Russian People’s Council as the source of all present-day troubles. Secularism is a dogmatic materialism that is being forcibly introduced by the liberal bourgeois elites into both the natural sciences and the humanities. It is what all modern Western ideologies are built on—liberalism (certainly predominant today on a global scale), but also dogmatic communism and nationalism. All of them are built on the priority of the material over the spiritual and reduce all existence—natural and social—to material factors.

By legislating to the contrary, that is, the priority of the spiritual over the material, Decree No. 809 declares a break with the soulless materialism of the collective West—readily at its very roots, in the realm of causes, not just effects. All prevailing value systems in the contemporary West, and the political, cultural, educational, and economic superstructures based on them, are wholly materialistic, utilitarian, appealing to quantity rather than quality, placing the lower, corporeal aspects of existence above the higher, spiritual ones. Even the Western view of the individual as the basis of society is nothing more than the application of the atomistic principle of physics to man. Liberal democracy, based on social atomism and materialism, is precisely the creation of a political system from below.

Since in our case we overturn this basic ratio and swear to the Priority of the spiritual over the material, which is peculiar to Russian ethics, Russian tradition, Russian culture, we thus lay the foundation of our own, alternative to the West, social model. From this point you can deduce everything else; it is it from the standpoint of ideology the most important; it is central; it is key.

Humanism. The ninth point again seems to refer to liberal ideology and does not contain anything fundamentally Russian and alternative. However, here, too, things are not so simple. First of all, by this value we mean the humanism that is specific to Russian culture. And this humanism has always included not only body and psyche, but also the soul and the moral core of the human being. Russian humanism responded to those thoughts about man that revealed his depth, his moral freedom, his tragedy and sacrifice, his personality in an ongoing dialogue with God, people, and the world. This is an intense “maximal humanism,” quite different from liberal individualism, which, on the contrary, seeks to free the individual from all forms of collective identity.

Secondly, the modern West, which began with humanism (though in its individualist interpretation) has now reached a point where the abolition of the individual himself is on the agenda. In seeking to free the individual from all forms of collective identity—religious, class, national, class, and finally gender—the West has come close to transhumanism, in which what remains is to free man from his humanity (human optional). Singularity as the final transfer of power over humanity to a strong Artificial Intelligence logically follows from the whole liberal value system and completes the ideological path of Western civilization. We, however, remaining faithful to humanism, that is, to man—in all his spiritual, moral existential volume—again challenge the West and swear to a different vector of development.

Mercy. Tenth on the list of traditional values is mercy. Again, we are talking about a profound feature of Russian religious tradition, where mercy, compassion, care for the weak, the poor, the sick, the unfortunate, and the dispossessed were seen as indispensable aspects of a well-rounded person. The very recognition of this property of the soul as the highest value stems from Russian culture, which is deeply alien to cruelty, vindictiveness, selfishness, and disregard for the needy and suffering. Of course, mercy is a deeply personal feeling. But society, having recognized it as a value, shows how it should be treated—immensely respected, encouraged and cultivated in every way, turning it into the most important axis of culture and education.

Mercy is the direct antithesis of selfishness, which liberals systematically foster, and the resulting indifference to near and far.

Justice. This eleventh point resonates deeply with the Russian tradition and culture, with our past and political history—the building of socialism in Russia was an attempt to build a society based on the principles of justice. The West usually contrasts justice with freedom, claiming that socialism, by restricting freedom in the name of justice, condemns people to poverty and scarcity, while capitalism, by rejecting justice altogether and cultivating egoism, makes society prosperous and comfortable. If, for Russia, justice is recognized as a value, then this linear liberal logic is completely rejected. A just society does not necessarily have to be poor; equally, among capitalist countries with free markets, there are countries that are both prosperous and deprived, mired in poverty and corruption.

Russia cannot imagine itself without justice, which is the most important feature of our social identity. Consequently, this eleventh point already rejects capitalist dogmatism and opens up the possibility of exploring social alternatives in non-capitalist ideologies, not necessarily dogmatic Marxist: there are models of Christian, Chinese-Confucian and Islamic socialism. The term “socialism” itself is by no means necessary, but an orientation toward justice overrides the dogmatic status of capitalism as a particular political and economic order, which the West regards as having no alternative, although this is not the case.

Collectivism, mutual assistance and mutual respect. This feature of the Russian tradition, put forward as the twelfth point, encompasses various levels of the social order of Russian life. This applies to the organization of life on the land, the peasant way of life, where the rural community initially dominated—the “world.” Later urban industrial artels were built on exactly the same principle. The minimum unit of society in Russia was traditionally a family (primary collective), and then a large family, clan and so on up to the community (village, hamlet, etc.).

In the church structure the principle of sobornost’ corresponded to it. It was by gathering together that people performed worship, rituals and sacraments. And here the minimal unit was the collective, the parish.

In Bolshevism, the glorification of the peasant community by the Narodniks was transformed into the principle of collectivism, which was extended to the working class. But again, it was solidarity, mutual assistance, and mutual respect among workers that were elevated to the moral ideal. Therefore, collectivism as a priority of social ethics remained unchanged in spite of the differences in formal ideologies.

The sovereign ideology of contemporary Russia should not only take into account all these historical forms, but also create new ones. The main thing is to put collective identity above individual identity. Only then will the individual acquire his true content and his life will be full and meaningful, since an identity is formed only in a dialogue with others.

Historical memory and intergenerational continuity. The thirteenth thesis actually elevates identity to the status of a value. Identity is historical memory and continuity, which is what makes people a people and society a society. It is impossible to create a nation from an arbitrary set of atomic individuals (contrary to the claims of liberal ideology). It is created over centuries in the course of a difficult, sometimes tragic and sacrificial journey through the trials of history. Each generation contributes its own identity and passes it on to the next. This is how the nation is constructed: through deeds, remembrance, and continuity in the fulfillment of the designs begun by the ancestors. Cutting off the connection between the generations and cutting out the individual from his historical context is killing the nation. This is exactly what the globalists and the collective West are leading to. And this is what the nations of the world are increasingly rebelling against. If identity is a value, then the process of continuity, the transmission of the image, including the image of the future, should be treated with the utmost attention.

The unity of the peoples of Russia. The fourteenth point is the statement that the peoples of Russia, despite their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, constitute an organic whole. And this whole is one and indivisible. The Russian people is the axis, the core around which all others are united. But the peculiarity of Russian culture is that it does not impose itself on others, does not extinguish diversity in favor of a single national example, but carefully preserves the identity of each society and supports and helps each local culture to develop. The fact that this is precisely a value was first proclaimed by the philosophers of Eurasia. In the USSR, the principle of the brotherhood of peoples was justified differently, but in general it came down to a combination of unity and diversity in a common inconsistent socio-cultural ensemble. Such unity reflects the principle of an empire uniting different peoples and cultures on the other side of any nationalism, large or small.

So, putting together all the points of Decree No. 809, we get the framework of an original and completely original ideology. Its main features, however, are the following:

it sharply diverges from liberal democracy, which the collective West seeks to impose on all mankind (to contain, block the free development of other civilizations—V. Putin in Valdai speech) and represents an alternative model of socio-political system;
it succeeds in Russian history what are cultural and ideological constants (both in traditional society and in the Soviet era);
at the same time, it does not coincide with any previous ideology, each of which is historically limited, but offers a distinctive and original synthesis of what was most essential in each of them;
it invites all citizens of Russia to freely and creatively build a truly just, spiritual, honest moral society on the other side of narrow dogmas and artificial axiomatics—in a sense, it is an open ideology aimed at the future;
Revealing the essence of Russia’s civilizational peculiarity, it dialogues with other civilizations in the context of multipolar order (“The development must take place in the dialog of civilizations, based on spiritual and moral values”—Vladimir Putin in his Valdai speech).

In the complex situation in which Russia finds itself in the course of the Special Military Operation, which has turned into a full-fledged conflict of civilizations, Decree № 809 is the most important conceptual weapon, the value of which can hardly be overestimated. The Decree has been drafted, signed and adopted. There is only one thing left: to draw all the relevant conclusions from it. And as soon as possible.

Alexander Dugin is a widely-known and influential Russian philosopher. His most famous work is The Fourth Political Theory (a book banned by major book retailers), in which he proposes a new polity, one that transcends liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. He has also introduced and developed the idea of Eurasianism, rooted in traditionalism. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geopolitica.

Featured: “The appeal of Minin to the People of Nizhni Novgorod,” by Konstantin Makovsky; painted in 1896.

Dromocraty: Speed as Power

In today’s world, speed plays a huge role. In everything. In the Special Military Operation (SMO), we found that in war—in modern warfare—it is also one of the key factors. How soon you can get intelligence, report it to the firing squad, and make the decision to strike, as well as quickly change where the firing assets have just been located, determines a great deal—almost everything. Hence the enormous role of UAVs and drones, satellite communications, and the time it takes to transmit enemy coordinates, the mobility of combat units, and the speed with which orders can be relayed to the firing unit. Clearly, this was underestimated during preparations for the SMO; and now we have to make up for it in a critical environment.

Similarly, we underestimated our dependence on the West for digital technology, chips, and precision manufacturing. Preparing for a frontal confrontation with NATO and at the same time relying on technological elements developed and produced either in NATO countries or in Western-dependent states is not evidence of great intelligence.

But this is not about Western-dependence now, but about the speed factor. The French philosopher Paul Virilio, who studied the importance of speed to modern technical civilization, proposed a special term: dromocracy. From the Greek dromos (speed) and kratos (might, power). Virilio’s theory is based on the assertion that under the new civilizational conditions, the winner is not the one who is stronger, smarter, or better equipped, but the one who is faster. It is speed that decides everything. Hence the desire to increase by any means the speed of processors; and, accordingly, all digital operations. This is what most of the technical innovative thought is focused on today. Everyone is competing for speed.

The modern world is a struggle for acceleration. And whoever is faster gets the most important prize—power, in all its senses and dimensions (political, military, technological, economic, cultural).

In this case, the most valuable in the structure of dromocracy is information. It is the speed of information transmission that is the concrete expression of power. This applies both to the functioning of the world’s stock exchanges and to the conduct of military action. Whoever is able to do something faster, gains complete power over the one who hesitated.

At the same time, dromocracy as a consciously chosen strategy, that is, the attempt to dominate time as such, can also lead to strange effects. The factor of the future comes into play. Hence the phenomenon of futures transactions and related hedge funds, as well as other financial mechanisms of a similar vein, in which major transactions are made with something that does not yet exist.

The ideal of media dromocracy is to be the first to report an event that has not yet happened, but which is quite likely about to happen. This is not just fake, it is working with the realm of the possible, the probable, the probabilistic. If we take a probable future event as something that has already happened, we buy time, and thus gain power. Another thing is that it may not happen. Yes, that it is possible; but sometimes the failure of expectation is uncritical; and vice versa, a confirmed forecast, taken as a fait accompli beforehand, offers enormous advantages.

This is the essence of dromocracy: the element of time is not simple, and the one who manages to subdue it gets total global power. In the development of supervelocity, reality itself is warped, and the laws of non-classical physics—anticipated in Einstein’s theory of relativity and to an even greater extent in quantum physics—come into play. Ultimate speeds change the laws of physics. And it is in this realm that the planetary struggle for power plays out today, according to Virilio.

Similar theories are found in a more applied and less philosophical field—the theory of network-centric warfare. And it is precisely this kind of network-centric warfare that we encountered in the course of the SMO in Ukraine. The main feature of such a war is the rapid transfer of information between individual units and centers of command. For this purpose, soldiers and other combat units are equipped with numerous differently oriented cameras and other sensors, the information from which converges to a single point. To this is added data from helicopters, UAVs and satellites. They are integrated directly with combat and firing units. And this full network integration provides the most important advantage—speed. This is exactly how the HIMARS, mobile group tactics and DRGs work. Starlink satellite communications was also used for this purpose.

Theories of network-centric warfare recognize that speed of decision-making often comes at the expense of their justifiability. There are a lot of miscalculations. But if you act quickly, then even after making a mistake, there is always time to correct it. Here the principle of hacking or DoS-attack is used—the main thing is to pound on the entire location of the enemy’s troops, looking for weaknesses, the back door. The losses can be quite high, but the results, if successful, are quite significant.

Further, network-centric warfare includes as its integral component open channels of information—primarily social networks. They do not simply accompany the conduct of hostilities, communicating, of course, only what is beneficial and what is not, hiding or distorting beyond recognition, but also operate with a probabilistic future. The principle of dromocracy again. What we perceive as fakes today is nothing more than probing and artificially stimulating a possible future. A lot of fakes turn out to be empty, just as attempts to break through hacking defenses are often futile, but occasionally they reach their goal—and then the system can be hijacked and subjugated.

Dromocracy in the political sphere allows for deviations from rigid ideological rules. In the West itself, for example, racism and Nazism are, to put it mildly, not openly encouraged. But in the case of Ukraine and some other societies, sharpened to defend the geopolitical interests of the West, an exception is made. Anti-Russian Nazism and Russophobia flourish there, but the West itself does not notice it, cleverly avoiding it. The fact is that for the rapid construction of a nation where none ever existed, and if there are in fact two peoples on one territory, you simply can’t do without nationalism. In order to do this as quickly as possible, we need extreme forms, including outright Nazism and racism. And this is again a question of dromocracy. It is necessary to create a simulacrum of a nation quickly. This is done by taking a radical ideology, any images and myths of our own exceptionalism, even the most ridiculous ones, and putting it all into practice quickly (with complete control of the information sphere; in the end, Western societies simply do not notice it).

Then comes the equally rapid propaganda of these ideas, which have nothing to do with Western liberal democracy. What follows is war, and the aggressors are portrayed as victims and the saviors as executioners. The main thing is to control the information. And if everything goes according to the plan of the globalists, then a quick resolution follows, and after that the neo-Nazi structures themselves are cleaned up just as quickly. Almost the same thing we saw in Croatia during the breakup of Yugoslavia. First, the West helped the Croatian Nazis, the neo-Nazis, and armed them against the Serbs; and then it cleaned them up so that there was no trace of them. The important thing is to do everything very, very quickly. Neo-Nazism quickly appeared, quickly fulfilled its role, quickly disappeared. And it’s as good as gone.

That’s exactly the secret of Zelensky. The Mercurial comedian was not chosen as the ringleader by accident. His psyche is volatile and prone to rapid change. The perfect politician for a fluid society. Now he says and does one thing; in a moment he is doing something else. And what was a second ago, no one remembers, as the speed of the information flow is steadily increasing.

And against this background, how do we look like? As soon as we began to act swiftly, decisively and almost spontaneously (the first phase of NWO), tremendous success followed. Almost half of Ukraine is under our control.

As soon as we began to slow down the operation, the initiative began to go to the enemy. This is where it turned out that the network-centric nature of modern warfare and the laws of dromocracy had not been properly taken into account. As soon as we took a reactive stance, switched to protection and defense, we lost the speed factor. Yes, the Ukrainian victories are mostly virtual; but in a world where the tail wags the dog, where almost everything is virtual (including finances, services, information, etc.), this is hardly enough. The anecdote about the two Russian paratroopers in the ruins of Washington, D.C. lamenting—”we lost the information war”—is funny, but ambiguous. After all, this is also something virtual, an attempt to probabilistically encode the future. When it comes to reality checks, however, not everything is that smooth. Here it is necessary either to bring down all dromocracy, virtuality, the whole network-centric postmodernity; that is, all modernity and the entire vector of the modern West (but how can this be done at once?); or to accept—even if in part—the rules of the enemy, that is, to speed ourselves up. The question of whether we Russians will be able to enter the realm of dromocracy and learn to win network-centric (including informational!) wars is not an abstraction. Our Victory depends directly on it.

To this end, we must first of all comprehend—in the Russian, patriotic way—the nature of time. The slowness with which we understand everything, the slowness with which we lag, and the slowness with which we put things into practice, even disproves the adage that “Russians harness long, but ride fast.” This is the point at which, if we don’t go very fast, the situation could become very dangerous.

The faster we do it, the faster we fix it. I am not even talking about outfitting our warriors with network attributes, speeding up the command process, and implementing effective information security measures. But it is simply necessary to be at par with a well-equipped enemy.

And again, if the “Voentorg” speculation on the price of minimum uniforms for the mobilized has not been immediately followed by a rapid wave of direct repression from the authorities, this is a very bad sign. Somebody in the government is imagining that we are still harnessing up, although we are already rushing at full speed. We need to come to grips with this as a matter of urgency. Otherwise, it may turn out that we are racing—how shall I put it gently—a bit in the wrong direction.

Dromocracy is no joke. It is not about overtaking the West. It should be swept up in its dizzying hubris. But to do that we have to act with lightning speed ourselves. And sensibly. Russia no longer has the right or the time for slumber and lethargy.

Alexander Dugin is a widely-known and influential Russian philosopher. His most famous work is The Fourth Political Theory (a book banned by major book retailers), in which he proposes a new polity, one that transcends liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. He has also introduced and developed the idea of Eurasianism, rooted in traditionalism. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geopolitica.

Featured: “Espansione x velocità Velocita d’automobile” (Expansion x Speed Velocity of a Car), by Giacomo Balla; ca. 1913-1914.

The Need for a Sovereign Language

Alexander Dugin gave this speech on October 26, 2022, at the Federation Council, where a round-table discussion was held on the topic, “Countering Hostile Narratives in the Information, Cultural and Educational Environment.”

When we talk about narrative, it is a philosophical category that must first be understood, because the notion of narrative is a particular element of postmodern philosophy, which is built on structural linguistics, on structuralism, on Ferdinand de Saussure, the structural linguist who separated discourse and language. This is very important.

What is language? Language is all rules. We don’t speak, we use language; but language never speaks itself. It’s in dictionaries, in syntax—it’s on the level of paradigm; and a narrative, or discourse, is what’s built around language—its vocabulary, its syntax, its laws.

There is an infinite number of narratives. Language is one.

When we talk about spiritual, cultural, civilizational sovereignty—and this is what President Vladimir Putin talks about in his addresses—this becomes more and more relevant every day. We are not talking about narratives of sovereignty—but about a sovereign language, in which billions of narratives of sovereignty can be expressed.

If language is sovereign, then discourse will be sovereign. By using the liberal, globalist, Western European language, it is possible to formulate a sovereign Russian discourse, or two, or three, or ten, in that language. But this is for immediate tasks, for import-substitution within the narrative, in the very short term. And here it matters whether and for how long we say goodbye to the collective West. Or do we want to go back to this global language by letting the smokescreen of sovereign narratives lift for a bit?

I think that’s what the elite want to do—talk for a while and then back off, saying, “Okay, we’ll accept your language and globalism; but not like this—give us a place in it.” It’s doomed, not because we’re ready and they’re not.

We have been cut out, sawed off completely from the West. And we will only be taken back into this West—and only to speak their language—after we have been pushed back to the final margins, so that we say, “We give up.” Our defeat will be a condition of taking us back into that language. Because whether we want it or not, whether we understand it or not, we are doomed to develop a sovereign language. That is, Russia is an independent civilization. It is not part of the Western civilization. It does not resemble others either—neither the Oriental, nor the Chinese, nor the Islamic. But it is as equal as Western or Chinese civilizations. This roughly outlines the structure of our sovereign language, not our narrative of sovereignty.

If we speak this language, everything we say is sovereign. And what a narrative means in this sense is not just a narrator talking on television, not just the structure of education, not just the expert community that will be forced to speak this sovereign language—it is also our science; it is our humanities science today and natural science tomorrow. Because natural science, as the greatest scientists know, such as Schrodinger, Heisenberg, is also a language, in the view of natural science.

So, we need a civilizational language. But our own civilizational language. We do not yet speak it. We do not know it. We now speak “pidgin English,” which is the basis of our terminology, our experts, our iPhones, our technology in our rockets—it is “pidgin English.” That is, even if these technologies are in Russia, the structure of these processors and codes is, alas, taken from a different paradigm.

This is a huge challenge that we face. This task is beginning to be recognized by our authorities.

Interestingly enough, the people are ready, much more than the elite. The people simply do not deeply grasp the impulses that come from above. If they are told “communism,” they think something of their own. If they are told “liberalism,” they think something of their own. If they are told “patriotism,” they think something of their own—which means that they have not gotten used to these narrative games as deeply as the elite have; whereas the elite, once they are told to go West, off they go.

So, the question of language change is actually for the elite.

In order to make a system of sovereign narratives, the parameters of this sovereign language must be established. What are those parameters? We (Russia) have a very different conception of the human being. In every culture, in every language, there is a “man.” There is the Islamic man, there is the Chinese man, and the Western European man who is that post-gendered man who is transitioning into artificial intelligence, into a mutant, into a cyborg—a beacon of transformation and liberation. The Western European man frees himself from all forms of collective identity—this is his goal, his task: to stop having religion, nation, community, gender, and then tomorrow, belonging to the “human race.” Such is the program of the West-European language.

The Chinese have it differently, in general. In the Islamic tradition, too, where it is the relationship of the individual to Allah, and the Islamic man does not understand everything else as freedom or as a person—it is a very different anthropology in that entire billion-dollar Islamic world. The Islamic man may formally agree with some Western models, but in reality, he either does not understand or he reinterprets, because he has his own language—it is very deeply rooted in him. We continue to promote it in the Volga region and in the North Caucasus. So, the Islamic man is immune to the West. India, Africa, Latin America have their own “man,” too.

We need a conception of the “Russian man,” a substantiation of the “Russian man.” And this is Dostoevsky, this is our philosophy, this is Florensky, this is the Slavophiles, this is Solovyov, this is also Berdyaev. But the Russian man, first of all, of course, is a sobornyi (a collective man)—this is the most important thing. Not the individual. For us, man is family, clan, nation, relationship with God, personality. Not an individual, but a personality.

This is where our presence at the European Court of Human Rights ends, because we have a divergence regarding the basic concept of the human being. For the European Court of Human Rights and the liberal Western ideology of human rights, there is only the individual. For us it is not so, in terms of sovereign language.

Can you imagine how human science (that is, the humanities disciplines) changes after we change the basic component? For everything now is different; and there will be the necessity of rewriting all textbooks of sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology in the Russian manner.

Yes, we had our philosophy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to do this. But we need to form an idea of the Russian man who will be different from the rest, and immediately a different language.

The second thing is the idea of the world. This is the most difficult thing. We think that the natural sciences are universal. Not at all; they are Western-centered. This cosmos we are dealing with has been introduced and integrated into our consciousness, beginning with the New Age in the West, ignoring all other pictures of the world.

The Russian cosmos is similar to the medieval European cosmos—and completely unlike the modern West. The Russian cosmos is different, starting even with Feodorov or Tsiolkovsky. Our research is the most interesting and avant-garde in the natural science disciplines, having been based on fundamentally different intuitions about the structure of reality.

If in the humanities we take our philosophical tradition, and throw out everything liberal, all liberal language, and put the Russian man in the center, we get a new language. And in the physical sciences, this task is much more difficult. Here we are just at the beginning; and we have a great deal of work ahead of us.

And, of course, the action is the verb. If we talk about language, we have a completely different understanding of action than the Western European tradition. It is more of an Aristotelian praxis than a techné. It is Sergei Bulgakov’s philosophy of the common cause, because Russians don’t do things the way everyone else does. The Aristotelian notion that praxis is the result of the free creativity of the master and not the technical execution of someone else’s commission suits us. This is the main idea of the philosophy of the economy, which means that our economy is also different. So, we have a different science and a different praxis. It means we have an ethical dimension in action, not a pragmatic utilitarian, optimistic one; i.e., we do something for an ethical purpose. That is, we do, because, it is good—to make it better, more beautiful, to make it fairer.

Changing the narrative in the face of the fundamental challenges our country faces will be impossible without changing the language.

Alexander Dugin is a widely-known and influential Russian philosopher. His most famous work is The Fourth Political Theory (a book banned by major book retailers), in which he proposes a new polity, one that transcends liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. He has also introduced and developed the idea of Eurasianism, rooted in traditionalism. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Actual Comment.

Featured: “Easter Table,” by Mikhail Shankov; painted in 2005.

The Third Period of Russia’s Modern History: War

What is happening now in Ukraine is war. There is no more Special Military Operation (SMO)—what we have is called “war.: Not a war between Russia and Ukraine, but a war of the collective West against Russia. When U.S. trackers direct missiles at Russian territory, it can only be called “war.” And it doesn’t matter whose arms they are fighting with. When they aim HIMERS at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant it can be interpreted as an attempt to deliver a nuclear strike on Russia. If the US, NATO and the collective West had not sided with the terrorist regime in Kiev, all the goals of the SMO would have been successfully accomplished long ago. But the real war began. The West has crossed all red lines. This is irreversible.

Russia—both the government and the people—cannot fail to comprehend this. Hence the first steps toward declaring martial law and mobilization—in Chechnya, in Crimea, and then, I think, in other regions as well, especially the border regions.

What is going on requires, above all, reflection. There are three geopolitical periods in modern Russian history.

The first is the 1990s. The USSR collapsed and Russia capitulated to the West. The price for capitulation was the dismemberment of the great power (Russia as the USSR = Russian Empire), and the delayed disintegration of the Russian Federation, a fragment of the USSR. Up front, the West planned the final, smooth disintegration of the Russian Federation. Admittedly, Yeltsin tried—albeit clumsily and inconsistently—to resist this—hence the point of the first Chechen campaign. If Russia had lost that campaign, it would have had only one choice: what modern Western ideologists call “decolonization;” that is, complete disintegration and the final transfer of power to a pro-Western occupying administration, the so-called “liberals.”

The second period began with Vladimir Putin’s accession to power. The new course was to stop the inevitable (as it seemed at the time) collapse and restore Russia’s sovereignty, which had received a severe, almost life-threatening, blow. The government’s main policy was not to directly confront the West, to lull it into a false sense of security, and to create the illusion that Russia agreed with the globalists’ basic demands but only insisted on a postponement. It worked. The second Chechen campaign was won, and the Chechens, once separatists and Russia’s enemies, became Russia’s most loyal sons and defenders. Separatism was also eradicated in other regions. Russia strengthened its independence and began to actively influence international processes. At some point Putin’s strategy and his focus on sovereignty was recognized by the West, and it began to prepare for a serious confrontation.

In 2014, the globalists made a breakthrough in Ukraine, and organized and supported a coup d’état and brought to power in Kiev a neo-Nazi Russophobe terrorist clique, slavishly loyal to the United States and NATO. Moscow responded by reuniting Crimea and supporting the long-suffering people of Donbass. But it was a compromise. The denouement came on February 24, 2022.

This is a purely racist approach: Whoever thinks differently than we do should be wiped off the face of the earth. It is not new to the West. The only thing new is its fusion with liberalism, with the LGBT agenda, with the radical desire of the modern West and its elites to destroy all the structures of traditional society—religion, state, family, ethics, man himself, by fusing him with a machine and placing him under total surveillance, under total control. Welcome to the Matrix, to the “brave new world.”

Russia—and above all, sovereign Russia—does not fit into this context at all. That’s why the West openly supports all terrorist and extremist organizations and direct terrorist acts if they are directed against Russia, against the Russians, against the Russian civilization itself and its bearers.

We are in a war. It is already impossible to avoid it. From the very beginning it was impossible, because that is the underlying logic of the history of things: some powers want to keep the unipolar world and their planetary hegemony at any cost, while others revolt against it and openly proclaim a multipolar world order. The future will depend on who wins this war. If there will be future at all.

Russia has already entered the war. China, another powerful sovereign pole, is about to enter.

So, it should come as no surprise that Russia is in a ring of fire. The escalation of hostilities between Russia’s allies, Azerbaijan and Armenia, the conflict between other allies—Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the promise by some political forces in Georgia to open a second front against Russia, the artificial stirring up of the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova, growing threats to Belarus and the policy of its sovereign leader Alexander Lukashenko, and finally, the attempt to isolate the Kaliningrad region and direct attacks on Russian regions (Crimea, Belgorod region, Voronezh, Kursk, Rostov regions, Krasnodar region)—all these are elements of the Western Anaconda strategy, customary for the US, to strangle Russia. Legitimately, we are looking for an answer. And this explains the true meaning of the last SCO summit. We need allies in a multipolar world. And we have a chance to find them—but this time outside the West.

In essence, we are in World War III.

What to do in such a situation?

We have entered the third period of Russia’s modern history—a war with the West, which it managed to impose on us.

This period is the most difficult and decisive. But we were unable to prevent or avoid it. The price was surrender. The geopolitical war of the West against Russia is ongoing. In it only the stages that change—cold or hot. Right now, it’s hot. There is nowhere hotter.

The West does not even allow the very possibility of the existence of a sovereign, independent, autonomous Russia. The same is true of China, as well as other countries that take their sovereignty seriously. From the point of view of the globalists, only those states have the right to exist that agree with the ideology of liberalism, with the general line of the United States and NATO, with the movement towards World Government. All those who are against it are subject to destruction.

The first and most important thing is to accept things as they are. This is very important. Public consciousness does not keep up with the course of events, does not understand the meaning of history, is not aware of the irreversibility—fatality—of change. Suppose a murderer enters a house, while the owners are asleep. Or another situation: he sneaks in and they, aware of the threat, are awake. Of course, that too could end badly, but there is a chance of a good outcome. When everyone is asleep, there is no chance of salvation. Russia, wake up.

Secondly, we must declare martial law in the country and act accordingly. Not everywhere, but in the most vulnerable key areas, especially the border regions. In those areas that are already at war. Or in those areas, where the authorities understand objectively and soberly the situation in which the country finds itself. Remember how the regions behaved during the covid epidemic? Some imposed more stringent measures, others less. And the Kremlin was watching, noting, monitoring. It’s the same now. We impose martial law and modify our policies according to the clear motto: “Everything for the front. Everything for victory.” And we are responsible for this. If we were too hasty, we will be corrected. And if we are too late?

Third: the restructuring of the economy in a warlike manner. Maybe I will be condemned by the patriots who hate our government’s economic bloc, but I can see that in Russia the economic situation is more or less the same, given such radical conditions. We thought it was the weakest link, but it turns out it is not. I do not want to and cannot go into details any further, but the main thing is the following: we need to put industry and the financial system on a war footing. It is everyone’s job to equip our troops with everything they need. From weapons, transport, UAVs, body armor and secure communications to clothing and medical supplies. This is a matter of life and death today. Army and volunteer supply. And here, perhaps, for sabotage and corruption, the worst penalties should be imposed. The excesses we are all hearing about in terms of supplies for our soldiers make our blood run cold.

Fourthly: the mobilization of society. Most competent people and those who are fighting say we don’t need a total mobilization; we need a full complement and an influx of qualified reservists with military experience and a vocation. People are ready, but they need to be provided with the proper conditions, both material and psychological. in order to change from peace (or, more precisely, the illusion of peace) to war, there needs to be a compelling reason. Russia’s information machine needs to provide them with that reason.

Fifth: a culture of awakening. Society needs to wake up to the war. This requires a tremendous amount of effort—in education, in the arts, and in reorganizing the information sphere.

Who are we? Who is our enemy? Where does this conflict come from? What are its reasons? What are our traditions, ideals and values for which we are now shedding blood, enduring hardship, receiving blows?

Who are they? Where did their hatred for us come from? Why have they decided to destroy us? What kind of world do they want to build?

In a thousand ways, scientists, artists, philosophers, journalists, and teachers must give clear answers to these questions over and over again.

The culture of awakening is the ideology. The ideology of our Victory.

One last thing. Many already awakened are still thinking in the categories of loyalty/traitor. This is already behind us. There are no more conditions for betrayal. The die is cast, and there is no turning back. Those on our side are condemned by that side. Those who try to go over to the side of an enemy intent on destroying us are signing their own sentence.

Yes, we are not on an equal footing. While the collective West fights for its planetary supremacy, we fight only for our being, for our life, for the right to be what we are. They can retreat, as long as they have a place to go. We don’t. We are backed against the wall.

The West is attacking us on our own native Russian soil.  And no one can count on the forgiveness of the enemy. Everyone will be reminded of everything.

It remains to be won. In the name of the fallen. In the name of the living. In the name of those who have yet to live—and who may not get such an opportunity to be born. Everything depends on us.

Alexander Dugin is a widely-known and influential Russian philosopher. His most famous work is The Fourth Political Theory (a book banned by major book retailers), in which he proposes a new polity, one that transcends liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. His most recent book is Eurasische Mission: Eine Einführung in den Neo-Eurasianismus (Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism). This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geoolitica.

Featured: “The People’s War,” by Andrei Gorodnichyov; painted in 2009.

Come, True Light!

Today (August 6th/August 19th) is the Transfiguration of the Lord, in the Twelve Great Feasts. The Feast of the Transfiguration, popularly called “the Apple Feast Day,” has great significance for the very structure of Orthodox time. It is not just the end of summer; it is the ultimate spiritual dimension of what can be called the harvest.

Just as the pure and sacred work of the peasantry—the sunny, regal labor of tilling the land and caring for domestic animals—gives its concrete visible fruit each year in the form of grain, milk, wine, eggs, meat, and apples, so too must the spiritual life of the Christian be crowned with the highest possible contemplation—the contemplation of the Transfiguration of Christ on the Holy Mount, Tabor. Visions of the immaterial Light of Tabor, in which the Lord transfigured Himself before His chosen disciples, is the pinnacle of the spiritual journey of the Christian, the highest of gifts, the end of the journey—strictly upwards, to the Son of God, the Light.

The theological meaning of the feast is connected with the moment of the meeting of the two Covenants, the Old and the New. Christ and His three apostolic disciples, Peter, James, and John, ascended the mountain. While the disciples slept, Christ addressed a prayer to God the Father and this chosen place was flooded with Eternal Light. When the disciples awoke, they were startled and awe-struck to see their teacher, Jesus, conversing in the Divine Light with the two elders, Moses and Elijah the prophet. If Jesus Christ had been a prophet, He would have proved His prophetic dignity by this encounter. And this is exactly what the terrified disciples thought: let us, they said, set up three sanctuaries here, a sanctuary for each of the prophets.

They were apparently right in the logic of the Old Testament: the higher righteous ones met on the other side of life and death in the Light of Truth. But this was not the case. Jesus Christ is not a prophet nor a continuator of the Jewish tradition. He is much, much more than that. He is God and the Son of God. And the Light in which He spoke to the righteous of the Old Testament was not ordinary—but Divine—the one that shone then, when there was nothing at all—neither light nor darkness. And He, the Light of Tabor, was already there. And when the world is gone, it will still shine. And that the apostles, who will build the Church of the New Testament, the Church of the Son of God, the Church of the Holy Trinity and the Uncreated Light of Tabor, would have no doubt, a Voice was heard from heaven: “This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.” Thus, on Mount Tabor the highest Christian truth was unveiled—the truth about the Son, about God the Word.

One of the participants in this universal mystery, the Apostle John, will write in his Gospel, “In the beginning was the Word.” He learned what the Word was and what the beloved Son of God was at this very moment on the Holy Mount, Tabor. The New Testament recognizes and honors the righteous and the prophets of the Old Testament. But Jesus Christ is not one of them. He is our True God—and this is what distinguishes our Christian age of Grace from the former Jewish era of the Law.

On Mount Tabor, at the moment of Transfiguration, this was revealed to the three Apostles, and through them to the rest of mankind. The Athonite monks and Russian elders believed that to see the Light of Tabor was the goal of the entirety of Christian life. The vision of the Light of Tabor begins the monastic life of the Russian saint Sophronius Sakharov, who, after this gift, went straight from modern, comfortable Paris directly to the wild cave of Athos. After all, there is nothing more precious and higher than contemplating eternity. But in order to see this Light, the Hesychast starets taught, one must put his mind into his heart and cleanse his heart from the darkness of matter, of sins and of all the ugliness with which our heart is most often filled. For as the Elder Sophronius said, “The true way to see the Divine Light is through the inner man.” Until we discover and cultivate the inner man, until we examine and purify our essence, we will remain in darkness. After all, everything that is not the Light of Tabor is, by and large, one continuous, impenetrable darkness.

Today the words of Simeon the New Theologian, quoted by the elder Sophronius Sakharov, are most appropriate: “Come, Light of Truth. Come, eternal life. Come, the rising of the fallen. Come, the rising of the deposed. Come, the resurrection of the dead… Come, O holy King, Come and dwell in us, and abide in us without ceasing, And reign undivided in us—The One for ever and ever. Amen.”

Alexander Dugin is a widely-known and influential Russian philosopher. His most famous work is The Fourth Political Theory (a book banned by major book retailers), in which he proposes a new polity, one that transcends liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. He has also introduced and developed the idea of Eurasianism, rooted in traditionalism. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geoolitica.

Featured: “Transfiguration of Jesus,” by Carl Bloch; painted in 1872.

The Battle for the End of History

On the Philosophical Meaning of the Special Military Operation (SMO).

The SMO is inseparably connected with the concept of “the end of history.” And it is not only because Francis Fukuyama (who wrote the famous book, with the same title, The End of History), from the first day of the SMO, actively joined the ideological struggle against Russia and on the side of Ukrainian Nazis and even personally joined the terrorist organization Bellingcat, which tried to hijack a military plane in Russia—though this fact on its own is very telling. The fact is that globalism, which President Putin has openly also said, is an ideology; and “the end of history” plays a fundamental role in its structure.

The fact is that globalism (which is best represented by such international organizations as Klaus Schwab’s Davos Forum with its “Great Reset,” the Trilateral Commission, the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) or George Soros’ Open Society Foundation) insists on a complete unification of humanity under a World Government, with liberal ideology and a system of rules and norms based upon it—including gender politics, LGBT+, extreme individualism and transhumanism—spreading everywhere. And this is the “end of history,” which is clearly premature, but still quite logical and was described back in the early 1990s by Francis Fukuyama. The end of history is the victory of liberalism and the West on a global scale; which implies the abolition of any ideological, geopolitical, economic and socio-cultural alternatives. Fukuyama was writing at a time when the USSR had collapsed and Russia seemed no longer able to rise, and China was obediently following the strategies of Western economic centers as it accelerated into globalization. Fukuyama later admitted, including in a conversation with me, that he had been hasty. But the end of history, no matter what, was and remains, the goal of the globalists.

Russia, under Putin, became an obvious obstacle to the end of history; and after the beginning of the SMO, it challenged this project directly. Hence Fukuyama’s rage—in front of his very eyes the project of the end of history was not only postponed, but had collapsed for good. This also explains the frenzy and the extreme intensity of the rabid Russophobia of Western elites. Putin and the Donbass dealt a blow to the global civilizational plan—the planetary dominance of the liberal West.

However, the concept of the end of history is not the domain of liberals. Moreover, they adopted it quite late.

The philosopher Alexandre Kojève was the first to clearly describe the coming global victory of the liberal West, while Fukuyama only borrowed it from him. But Kojève, for his part, borrowed it from Marx, replacing the triumph of global communism (the Marxist version of the end of history) with global capitalism, a planetary civil society and the ideology of “human rights.” In fact, the entire communist movement, including the USSR, fought for the Marxist understanding of the end of history in the 20th century. In the Cold War, the dispute over the interpretation of the end of history—whether it would be communist or capitalist—unfolded. It is no coincidence that Fukuyama wrote his programmatic-text when the USSR collapsed. It seemed at that time that the question was settled and liberalism had won definitively.

However, Marx himself, for his part, also borrowed this concept from a completely different political ideology—from the deeply conservative monarchist and imperial thinker, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. If we dig even deeper, we will come to Christian and even pre-Christian (first of all, Iranian) eschatology—to the doctrine of the end of times. But this would take us too far. It was Hegel who proposed and substantiated the thesis of the end of history in modern times; and it plays a key role in the system of his philosophy.

According to Hegel, history is the process of the unfolding of the Spirit, which passes through nature, the change of religions and civilizations, until it reaches its climax—the end meets the beginning, the alpha with the omega. Through many trials and dialectical twists and turns, the Spirit that drives humanity will finally incarnate in an Absolute Monarchy, in a world empire that will become the Empire of the Spirit. Its power will be given to a supreme autocrat, an enlightened monarch-philosopher. Capitalism and civil society are only a stage in the unfolding of this process, and scientific materialism will move to an angelic, purely spiritual, science. Hegel believed that this would happen in Germany (the German Empire did not yet exist then) and it would be a triumph of German spiritual culture and philosophy. In the philosophical sense, Hegel was the basis of Bismarck, who created the Second Reich.

So, the authentic interpretation of “the end of history,” by the creator of this concept, is the triumph of the World Spiritual Monarchy. And the Right Hegelians—Russian Slavophiles or followers of Giovanni Gentili in Italy—believed exactly so. The Germans themselves believed in the mission of their Reich. The Slavophiles interpreted it as a prediction of the fate of the Russian Empire, when it would become spiritual and popular. The Italians linked the end of history to the revival of the Roman tradition and the greatness of Italy.

Marx, who turned Hegel’s spiritual dialectic into his historical materialism (significantly perverting the original), agreed that liberal capitalism was only an intermediate stage, but put communism and a materialist worldview in place of the Empire of the Spirit. The eschatology remained—everything the Communists did was directed exactly to the future; that is, to the end of history.

The Soviet victory over the Third Reich in World War II removed the German interpretation of the end of history from the agenda. Left Hegelianism defeated Right Hegelianism. And on another level—the Russian Empire (albeit implicitly) defeated the German Empire.

That’s when Kojève appeared with his liberal interpretation of the end of history. This theory had been waiting in the wings; and after the collapse of the USSR, Fukuyama reminded the West of it; and the globalist centers picked it up and began to put it into practice. The unipolar world order was based on a liberal version of Hegelian eschatology.

And then there was Putin. Putin is a philosophical phenomenon; a turning point in the history of thought, in the complex battle of ideas and worldviews. From his first moment in power, he began to restore Russia’s sovereignty. But this meant postponing the end of history, opposing liberal totalitarianism, globalism and World Government. Putin pursued this line cautiously, often disguising his intentions and plans—as a Chekist and as a staunch realist. Sometimes he seemed ready to meet the globalists; but the next moment it turned out to be just a maneuver once again. Hence the perplexing question, “Who are you, Mr. Putin?”

It wasn’t until February 24, 2022 that the start of the SMO in Ukraine put things in their proper place, with complete clarity. A new era of philosophy had begun. A new phase of world history. Putin challenged the liberal interpretation of the end of history—that is, the main globalist project: World Government. But here begins the most important thing: to refute the liberal reading of the end of history does not mean to reject Hegel. After all, everyone knows that Putin likes to quote Ivan Ilyin, who was a Right Hegelian, a supporter of the Russian Monarchy and the great Empire. The theories of the Slavophiles are also clearly close to Putin. You can’t deny a philosophical idea with reliance on some purely practical, down-to-earth factors, such as purely economic ones. This is not serious. An idea can only be defeated by an idea. And that means….

This means that the SMO as a philosophical phenomenon marks the return of the Empire. The return of Russia to the Empire, the full restoration of our messianic, futuristic destiny. Germany in its present state is no longer a competitor. The German version of the World Reich is irreversibly off the table. The communist project of the end of history has also been abandoned, and in its best aspects could easily be incorporated into a new imperial synthesis (like “right-wing Stalinism”). We are opposed only by Kojève and Fukuyama, who are based on the same sources, which are much closer to us. We are the Orthodox bearers of the Eurasian Empire of the End; they are the usurpers. And if we remember the Third Rome and the role of the Russian Tsars as bearers of the mission of Katechon, the Restrainer, everything becomes even more fundamental than the most orthodox, than Hegelianism read in a Russian (Slavophile, monarchist) context.

This is precisely how the “Solntepec” [flame=thrower] philosophizes.

The SMO is a battle for the meaning of the end of history. A great philosophical battle. It is time to close the page on exclusively materialistic, energetic and economic interpretations—it is not just vulgar, it is fallacious. History is the history of ideas.

People will ask, what does Ukraine have to do with it? It has nothing to do with Ukraine. It does not exist. But it will be part of our new empire. Only there, in the philosophical kingdom of the unfolding of the Spirit, in the empire of meanings, will it revive and flourish. In the meantime, what do we want from a terrorist regime, led by a comedian? But Ukraine itself is destined to become the theater of a fundamental metaphysical struggle. I think it’s all about geography. We are fighting for the return of our historical cradle of Kiev—from under the power of the globalists to the power of the Empire of the Spirit. Kiev is the beginning of our history. And hence the end of it.

Alexander Dugin is a widely-known and influential Russian philosopher. His most famous work is The Fourth Political Theory (a book banned by major book retailers), in which he proposes a new polity, one that transcends liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. He has also introduced and developed the idea of Eurasianism, rooted in traditionalism. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geoolitica.

Featured: “The Fall of the Titans,” drawing by Pieter Coecke van Aelst, ca. 1540-1544 (retouched by Pieter Paul Rubens).

Russia needs Wartime Public Figures

We cannot fully understand what happened on February 24, 2022. Although everything has been going towards it for quite a long time, ever since Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin first came to power back in 1999. But now that that future has come, everyone refuses to believe it, from sheer inertia.

And here is what happened—Russia finally abandoned its strategy of integration into the world system; that is, into the global West, while retaining its sovereignty, because the two orientations proved incompatible.

The reign of Trump, who was mainly focused on domestic problems and on fighting the globalist elites (“Swamp”) inside the United States, still left some hope that the West would peacefully recognize a multipolar world and agree to a form of partnership more or less acceptable to Russia without critical damage to its sovereignty. But after Biden came to power in the US, along with the globalist forces behind this elderly politician (who is in a state of obvious dementia), this possibility was destroyed.

As President Putin admitted in his address to the State Duma, the West managed to impose war on us. And by doing this, any prospects for cooperation with them have been destroyed—if not forever, then at least for a long time. The level of confrontation is so high that even Trump’s return will not be able to change the situation. After all, even in his first term as president, the globalists accused him of not being active enough in escalating conflict with Russia. His hands in this matter will be even more tied if he leads the U.S. again, which is quite possible due to the complete failure of the policy of Biden and the Democratic Party, rapidly losing all its power.

Then, there is the fate of one of the most Russophobic leaders in the West, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who was recently kicked out of power with a bang. But not so much because of his policy toward Russia as because of his blatant idiocy and total inadequacy, which sickened even the British. Of course, the question may be put to them: why did they have to elect a crazy clown who is far beyond the limits of reality and common sense? But you can ask the same question to a lot of people. About the clown—to the Ukrainians; about the senile degenerate out of his mind—to the Americans; about the insane, arrogant narcissist – to the French; about the mafia swindler—to the Italians.

But they will probably be replaced by no better figures—by the totally incompetent women of the Erasmus generation, brought up in the new gender feminist paradigm.

Russia is clearly not on a path with the current Western elites or with those to come. Not in the short, medium or long term. Yes, at some point the acuteness of the confrontation will subside; but in principle this will not change anything. Especially since it may not subside, but may escalate.

In any case, the time has come to focus on ourselves and on the world which remained open to us after the removal of the European vector.

In my view, a new principle of sovereign efficiency comes to the fore in this situation. It will require a qualitative change in the structure of government.

Before the NWO, the criterion of effectiveness was two factors:

  • Success in integrating into the global world economy, and this implied movement toward the West and the global institutions it controls;
  • Success in strengthening sovereignty—primarily in the issue of political governance and military capabilities.

Now, the first criterion has been abolished; leaving the second. Note: only the second. The first one is gone. And what is to be done by that part of our power elite which threw all its energies into the first criterion and reported on it? The question is very difficult. I do not want to gloat, but everything here is quite deplorable. What yesterday you could be proud of, today you have to explain yourself for. Some couldn’t stand the pressure; some didn’t realize the seriousness of the change; and some took a wait-and-see attitude. Maybe things will change again.

President Putin clearly made it clear that things would not change, and that this was only the beginning. But Westerners and liberals are still hoping—but what if…

The new conditions will also affect those high-ranking officials who were in-between—in-between Westernism and sovereignty. Formally, they are in a better position, if only their priorities have shifted towards sovereignty. But here we discover the following: balancing between one and the other created comfortable conditions for them, in which it was possible to do nothing at all, citing the complexity of the task at hand. Now, after the start of the special military operation (SMO) such an excuse is no good. We will have to show real sovereign successes. And there is obviously a problem with that. If there are no problems, that is fine. But something tells me that this category of the power elite will have problems.

At first glance, the best position is occupied by the military, the security forces and partly the Foreign Ministry. They are on the forefront of the conflict and were originally oriented only towards sovereignty. But here, too, certain difficulties may arise. Now it is necessary to be sovereignly effective to the fullest extent, so that failure, laziness and incompetence can no longer be blamed on the “fifth column.” Liberals and their networks are simply outlawed, and that makes perfect sense.

But there are no more excuses for those on whom everything depends in a civilizational confrontation. The urgency of the situation and, in fact, the state of emergency, when the country is under attack by the enemy and the confrontation is transferred at times even to our territories, requires extraordinary qualities, valor, courage, resourcefulness, boldness and even heroism. And this is an entirely different score than mere preparation for a future confrontation in peaceful conditions. Conditions are no longer peaceful and require appropriate public figures—wartime public figures.

All this leads to the conclusion that the new criterion of sovereign efficiency will soon begin to be felt in all areas—first of all in public administration, in the behavior of the ruling elites, in personnel policy, in the reform of institutions which will have to be rebuilt in a new way. All this is not fatal, but cannot help but have an impact on the selection of personnel. And, of course, it will.

Alexander Dugin is a widely-known and influential Russian philosopher. His most famous work is The Fourth Political Theory (a book banned by major book retailers), in which he proposes a new polity, one that transcends liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. He has also introduced and developed the idea of Eurasianism, rooted in traditionalism. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geopolitica.

Featured: “Peter I The Great,” by Valentin Serov; painted in 1907.

Integral Sovereignty

The country of Russia is in a very peculiar state today. It is like hovering between a past that has already ended and a future that has not yet begun; or rather, has begun, but has not yet been realized or accepted. It is about the most fundamental questions—about Russia’s relation to global processes and, above all, to the collective West.

After the collapse of the USSR, we went through two phases:

  • In the 1990s, we tried desperately to integrate into the Western world on any terms; but this was not very successful, and an external control system was established in the country;
  • After Putin came to power, we also tried to integrate into the Western world, but only under the conditions of Russia’s sovereignty. We never succeeded, but we strengthened our sovereignty, which led to February 24, 2022.

Why did we start special military operation (SMO)? Trump did not pay much attention to the growth of Russian sovereignty; he was not a convinced Atlanticist, and he judged by the modest performance of the Russian economy, which, from his perspective, was not a serious threat to the United States. He did not care about Crimea. He was far more concerned about China.

Biden, on the other hand, is a staunch Atlanticist and globalist, and he is well aware that any success of Russia in expanding its influence challenges globalization, the unipolar world and American hegemony. That is why he, having set aside the Islamic world for later, shifted his attention to confronting Russia, not forgetting, of course, about China.

By the summer of 2021, the U.S. and NATO began to prepare a military operation to seize the Donbass and attack Crimea. That is why Donbass was turned into a powerful center of future military aggression against Russia—including foreign instructors and mercenaries.

Putin did not wait until early March, when the operation was planned, and struck first. Hence the initial preponderance in the first phase of the operation, which predetermined the outcome in our favor.

But let’s leave the military aspect of the special SMO aside. After it began, the second phase of Russia’s relations with the West in the post-Soviet period came to an end. The very idea of integrating into the Western world fell away for objective reasons. Russia was left only with its own sovereignty, the protection, preservation and strengthening of which proved to be generally incompatible with Russia’s participation in global processes on Western terms.

We have irrevocably and radically broken with the West. But this has not yet been comprehended. The second phase is over, the third has not yet begun.

What is this third phase that the eyes and ears of the Russian elite categorically do not want to perceive? It represents an indefinitely long period of Russia’s existence in isolation from the West and under its rigid and purely negative pressure. If we accept as a fait accompli that this direction is forever cut off for us, the horizons of the future become quite clear. But in order to move into this future, an effort must be made. In the same way, Soviet people could not believe that the USSR and communism collapsed, and the liberals of the 1990s believed that Putin was temporary, not serious, and that everything will go back. It’s hard to believe in the new. Always. Including now.

To be without the West, and, moreover, in a sharp almost military confrontation with it, means to simultaneously implement two vectors:

  • Russian and
  • Russian and Eurasian.

They do not contradict each other; there is no need to choose between them. But they are still different.

The first one means a rapid and drastic strengthening of Russia’s sovereignty, ensuring the possibility of relying only on one’s own capabilities, if necessary. Moreover, the point is not about a limited understanding of sovereignty, which is already recognized, however nominally, for each independent state, but about integral sovereignty, which includes

  • civilization
  • culture
  • education
  • science
  • economy
  • finance
  • values
  • identity
  • the political system
  • and, most importantly, ideology

So far, apart from political and military sovereignty, all our other spheres are either partially Western or completely Western. And there is no ideology. Accordingly, the construction of a truly sovereign Russia, an integrally sovereign Russia, requires profound transformations of all these spheres; their liberation from the liberal globalist paradigms deeply embedded in our society and establishment during the first and second phases of post-Soviet history.

This will require an institutionalization of Putin’s course, not just loyalty to him personally. This will require the establishment of a new ideology, a kind of “Putinism,” in which the basic principles of integral sovereignty will be enshrined. And then other political-administrative mechanisms will have to be fitted under them as well.

Russia is inevitably passing on to the ideological stage. Without a full-fledged ideology of our own, we will not withstand a confrontation with the West. This is an absolutely objective fact, regardless of whether it makes us ecstatic or furious. The ideologization of Russia is inevitable; it is impossible to prevent it.

Russia must strengthen its identity many times over in order to survive not just without the West, but also in spite of the West. Twenty-two years ago, when Putin made a bet on sovereignty, he already predetermined the inevitability of this moment. Today it is here. And no longer halfway, but all in all.

It is either sovereignty or the West. And this is irreversible.

In this case it is not at all about the isolation of Russia from the world, as the West would like. The West, despite its claims to hegemony and universalism, is not the whole world. Therefore, Russia will have to look for new partners and friends outside the West. This should be called a Eurasian policy, a turn to the East.

Discovering the global non-West, Russia will discover that it is dealing with completely different civilizations—Chinese, Indian, Islamic, Latin American, African. And each of them is different from ourselves, from each other, and from the West. Once we were interested in it; we studied the East, and the great Russian poet Nikolai Gumilev composed inspired hymns to the glory of Africa. But then the West captured our consciousness. It is a Westernist intoxication, an addiction to the West. The Iranian Heideggerian philosopher Ahmad Fardid gave this a special name: gharbzadegi, “westoxification.”

Russian Eurasians were the first to rebel against this Westernizing turn of Russian culture, demanding, like the Slavophiles, to turn to their own Russian identity as well as to non-Western cultures and civilizations. This is now the only way out for Russia. Only BRICS+, the SCO, the development of relations with the new poles of the world, with civilizations that seem long forgotten, but today are returning to history.

Where the West ends, the world and humanity do not end. On the contrary, it is a new beginning. And Russia’s place is in Eurasia, not in the West. It used to be a matter of choice. Today it is simply unavoidable. Everything depends today on how we build relations with China, India, Turkey, Iran, the Arab states, the states of Africa or Latin America.

This is the coming/not coming future. It already exists, but the elite refuse to accept it. And the elite have no way out and no choice. Even betrayal, which is unlikely, will not change anything. What’s more, they would rather ruin Russia once and for all. Even this option no longer exists—the place of traitors and liberals is predetermined by the laws of wartime and emergency. The inevitable and absolutely necessary purges of the elite, which, incidentally, have not yet begun, but will definitely begin, is not the main thing or even secondary. In vain, our elite are worried about resignations and arrests. Anyone who does not agree with sovereignty and Eurasianism is already finished. This is no longer the question.

But the question is different—how can we defend and rebuild the new Russia, the third-phase Russia? Life dictates what we should do. But what to do, how to do it, what to start with, and what to choose as a priority are open questions. And here everything is more complicated.

I think that we need to start with the main thing. With ideology. Everything else is secondary. Something tells me that those in power who are truly responsible for the fate of the country and the people feel exactly the same way.

Alexander Dugin is a widely-known and influential Russian philosopher. His most famous work is The Fourth Political Theory (a book banned by major book retailers), in which he proposes a new polity, one that transcends liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. He has also introduced and developed the idea of Eurasianism, rooted in traditionalism. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geopolitica.

Featured: “A Bright Future, by Anastasiya Sadofeva; painted in 2021.

“Import Substitution,” and What Comes After

The authorities and society, apart from the war, of course, are now most concerned about how to adapt to the new conditions. The novelty of these conditions is that we have been excluded from the West, and we have excluded the West from ourselves. Not that this is something completely new and unprecedented—in our history, we have very often found ourselves in exactly this kind of relationship with the West. And it’s no big deal. And this time nothing terrible will happen. But still, our lives will change significantly.

The first intuitive move in such a situation is the desire to replace the West with something. And we can replace everything. In this way, we will create a certain phantom of the West, which will trickle down to us through third countries, sorts of import substitution hubs. In this way, we will reproduce the West in ourselves. In the beginning it will seem that all these measures are temporary and that the West will come to its senses. But then we will begin to realize that the break with the West is irreversible. It is not possible to return to the old relations with them at all. And a simple reconciliation is achievable either if they fundamentally change, or if we fundamentally change. It’s obvious that everyone will persist in not changing, to the end. And consequently, import substitution will indeed have to happen, too. When this becomes crystal clear, there will be a resonance—of our idea of reality with reality itself.

Here we have an important decision to make: either to import-substitute the West indefinitely, or to do something else. Both decisions are quite responsible, and both will have a huge impact on our lives.

Substituting indefinitely is, on the one hand, easier, since the West remains a beacon and reference point with which we will henceforth have to deal not directly, but indirectly. They’ll think of something there, and we’ll import-substitute it, once and for all. It’s not that hard. But this will make us dependent on the West again, albeit in a new way. Someday this will become obvious; but you can lose quite a lot of time following this path.

If we do something other than import substitution, we need to work out a new strategic plan, a new model, new ways of development. And it is theoretically possible to do this, but this is what our society has really become accustomed to. We perfectly adapt to the conditions, whatever they are; and this is our constant quality, so that we only manage to create something principally new from time to time. It is also possible and sometimes not bad, but it does not happen often.

This second way, of course, is difficult. Here we have only to begin and finish, and most importantly to decide. In this case, Russia will build its own world entirely, on its own principles and using its own methods. There are no ready-made scenarios and textbooks for this case. It is possible to rely on historical experience or on non-Western countries (some of which have achieved impressive results). But much will simply have to be created, created anew, invented. And all this without clear guarantees; by experiment.

Of course, we can assume that our cutting off from the West will be stopped by the fact that the West itself will go haywire without us. Already, the consequences of severing all ties with Russia and frenzied support for the Kiev regime are hurting the politics and economies of Western countries, contributing to the departure of leaders, the growth of mass protests, and political crises. It turns out that we cannot be forced to do anything, and many red lines have been irreversibly crossed. By a combination of factors, and in combination with some other catastrophic processes, the West, or rather the power of the maniacal globalist oligarchy, may also collapse. But it is impossible to count on this; and in the present state we are not capable of delivering a fatal blow to the West. Only as a last resort; but then no one would survive at all. Perhaps this scenario is worth considering, but only in order to avoid it.

If the West’s omnipotence ends by itself, with or without our help, then everything in the world will change. But to make the forecasts realistic, we should still assume that the West will last for some time and remain as it is now. This is the inertial scenario.

And now let’s put it all together.

In the short term, we will be intensively engaged in import substitution. This is perhaps the main and obvious imperative.

Gradually we will realize that this is for the long term, if not forever, and we will create a “simulacrum of the West.” China is partly doing just that, but without breaking with the West as sharply as we have. Although, if the crisis around Taiwan climaxes, the Chinese will find themselves in a similar position. For now, they are closely watching how we are dealing with a similar situation. And they are drawing conclusions.

And finally, either we voluntarily and right away begin to think about building in Russia an alternative and independent socio-political and economic model, or we will come to it out of necessity, when all the resources of import substitution strategy will have been exhausted.

If everything goes by inertia, it is possible to imagine these three phases as consecutive and stretched out over time. But theoretically, we can think about creating something original.

The more clearly we understand that the divorce from the West is a done deal, we will not throw a tantrum and accept the formula, “go away,” the more attention we will pay to the search for alternatives.

Of course, the rhetoric about our own way is already being heard. And it is right and good. But it can simply hide import substitution. Which is necessary and I have nothing against it. But our own way is a very serious topic. I would say too serious for the state of mind of our ruling class, which is used to living in short cycles. But here everything is more profound and fundamental.

The stupidest thing in this situation is to persist in believing that something, if not everything, can be reset to its factory settings, that is to say, before February 24, 2022. Nothing can be rolled back at all. Once we acknowledge that—welcome to reality. Otherwise, we’ll just be delusional.

Alexander Dugin is a widely-known and influential Russian philosopher. His most famous work is The Fourth Political Theory (a book banned by major book retailers), in which he proposes a new polity, one that transcends liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. He has also introduced and developed the idea of Eurasianism, rooted in traditionalism. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geopolitica.

Featured: “Horizon,” by Erik Bulatov; painted ca. 1971–1972.

Overturning Roe v. Wade: An American-style Conservative Revolution

The number one news story in the world today is not the Russian special military operation, or the collapse of the Western economy as an aside, but the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to overturn the 1973 Roe v. Wade constitutional guarantee of the right to terminate a pregnancy. Now the issue of abortion has been moved back to the states. And immediately the U.S. Attorney General of Missouri, Eric Schmitt, announced the decision to ban abortion. The decision blew up the U.S., and the whole globalist wing of that nation, having received such a blow, rushed out into the streets, howling and roaring, with an uncontrollable appetite for burning cars and looting stores. In my view, this is very serious.

The fact is that, until recently, the only branch of government in the United States that had not yet discredited itself was the courts. Their authority was indisputable for all political actors. It was believed that corruption and ideological lobbies had failed to fully seize control of the judicial system. And now the judges appointed under Trump have made their move. All of this requires the most serious reflection.

The fact is that there is not one United States, but two countries, and two nations with that name. And this is becoming increasingly obvious. It is not even about Republicans and Democrats, the conflict between whom is becoming increasingly acrimonious. It is the fact that there is a deeper division in American society.

Half of the U.S. population are supporters of pragmatism. This means that for them there is only one criterion for evaluation—things work or they don’t work. That’s it. And no dogma about the subject or the object. Everyone can think of himself as anything, including Elvis Presley or Santa Claus, and if it works, no one dares object. It’s the same with the outside world—there are no inviolable laws; do whatever you want with the outside world; but if it responds harshly, that’s your problem. There are no entities, only interaction. This is the basis of the core American identity. It is how Americans themselves have traditionally understood liberalism: as the freedom to think whatever you want, believe whatever you want, and behave however you want. Of course, if this leads to conflict, the freedom of one is limited by the freedom of the other; but without trying it, you won’t know where the fine line lies. Try it. Maybe it will work.

This is how American society was up to a certain point. And here banning abortion, allowing abortion, sex reassignment, punishing sex reassignment, gay pride parades or neo-Nazi marches were all possible, nothing was rejected from the get-go, whatever the outcome. And the courts, based on a host of unpredictable criteria, precedent, and considerations, were the last resort in problematic cases to decide if it worked or didn’t work. This is the mysterious side of Americans, completely unintelligible to Europeans, and also the key to their success—they have no boundaries at all, which means they go do wherever they want until someone stops them. And that is exactly what works.

But among the American elite, which is made up of people from a wide variety of backgrounds, at some point a critically large number of the wrong kind of people, the non-Americans, have been congregating. They are predominantly from Europe; often from Russia. Many are ethnically Jewish, but steeped in European or Russian-Soviet principles and cultural codes. They brought a different culture, a different philosophy to the United States. They did not understand or accept American pragmatism at all, seeing it only as a background for their own advancement. That is, they took advantage of American opportunities, but were not about to adopt a libertarian logic, alien to any hint of totalitarianism. In fact, it was these foreign elites who hijacked the old American democracy. It was they who rose to the head of the globalist structures and gradually seized power in the US.

These elites, most often left-liberal, sometimes outright Trotskyist, brought with them a position deeply alien to the American spirit—the belief in linear progress. Progress and pragmatism are incompatible. If progress works—great. If not, it must be abandoned. Here is the law of pragmatism—it works/it doesn’t work. You want forward, go ahead. You want backwards, no problem. That’s what freedom is in the American way. In the Old American way.

But the Old World emigrants carried with them very different attitudes. For them, progress was dogma. All history was seen as one continuous improvement, as a continuous process of emancipation, improvement, development, and the accumulation of knowledge. Progress was a philosophy and a religion. Anything was possible and necessary in the name of progress, which included a steady increase in individual freedoms, technical development, and the abolition of traditions and taboos. And it no longer mattered whether it worked or not. What mattered was progress.

But this represented an entirely new interpretation of liberalism in the American tradition. The old liberalism asserted—no one can ever impose anything on me. The new liberalism countered with—the culture of abolition, of shaming, of the total elimination of old habits, of sex change, of the freedom to dispose of the human fetus (pro-choice), of equal rights for women and races—which was not just a possibility, it was a necessity. The old liberalism said—be whatever you want, as long as it works. The new one countered—you have no right not to be a liberal. If you are not a progressive, you are a Nazi and must be destroyed. In the name of freedom, LGBT+, transgender and Artificial Intelligence, everything must be sacrificed.

The conflict between the two societies—the old libertarian, pragmatist society and the new neoliberal, progressivist society—has been steadily increasing over the past decades, culminating in the Trump presidency. Trump embodied one America, and his Democratic globalist opponents the other. The civil war of philosophies has now come to a critical juncture. And it is precisely a matter of interpretation of freedom. The old America sees individual freedom as something that excludes any external prescription, any requirement to use it only this way and not that way, only for that, and for nothing else. For example, only for abortion and gay pride, and never for the prohibition of abortion or the ravings of perverts. New America, by contrast, insists that freedom requires violence against those who do not understand it properly enough. This means that freedom must have a normative interpretation, and it is up to neoliberals to determine how to use it and how to interpret it, and by whom. The old liberalism is libertarian. The new liberalism is openly totalitarian.

And it is in this context that the U.S. Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision on abortion should be considered. It is in favor of the old liberalism and pragmatism. Note, it does not prohibit abortion, but only states that there is no clear solution at the federal level. The states can solve the problem however they want. But it means, no more, no less, that time is reversible. That it is possible to move in one direction, progressive; or it is possible to move in the opposite direction. As long as it works. So, it’s not about abortion at all. It’s about understanding the nature of time. It’s about the deepest divisions in American society. The point is that one America is, more and more blatantly, at war with the other.

The whole totalitarian dictatorial strategy of the globalist neo-liberal elite is being undermined by the Supreme Court, which is acting—somewhat like the Russian Bolsheviks—in the name of the future. Progress justifies everything. Until then, all decisions were only in one direction—in favor of individualism, egocentrism and hedonism. And suddenly the Supreme Court takes a sharp step backwards. Why was it allowed to do that? And once desperate old Americans, pragmatists and libertarians rejoice—the freedom to do what you want, not what progressives and technocrats say—to go in any direction, not just where the globalists force you to go, has triumphed again. And the brave Missouri attorney general has already shown what can be made of it. Bravo! This is a pragmatic revolution—an American-style conservative revolution.

And naturally, the whole globalist progressive rabble is about to be knocked flat on their asses. Something as important as Trump’s election has happened. The old America has counter-attacked the new America.

“Every kingdom divided against itself is laid waste, and no city or house divided against itself will stand” (Matthew 12: 25). It’s coming soon…

Alexander Dugin is a widely-known and influential Russian philosopher. His most famous work is The Fourth Political Theory (a book banned by major book retailers), in which he proposes a new polity, one that transcends liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. He has also introduced and developed the idea of Eurasianism, rooted in traditionalism. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geopolitica.

Featured: “Builders of Ships – The Rope,” George Bellows; painted August 1916.