The Genocidal Violence of Ukrainian Nationalists


The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia Ukraїns’kykh Natsiona-listiv, OUN) and its Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukraїns’ka Povstans’ka Armiia, UPA) were the most violent 20th-century Ukrainian nationalist movement. Their violence became genocidal, and it substantially influenced the history of Ukraine, the history of Ukrainian and Polish Jews, the history of the Holocaust, Polish his-tory, and the history of East Central Europe and the Soviet Union. Because the Ukrainian nationalists were anti-Soviet, resisting and being defeated by the Soviet Union, and because the German occupiers committed worse crimes in Ukraine than the Ukrainian nationalists, Cold War historians such as John Armstrong, Ukrainian and Polish dissidents, and German historians of Eastern Europe denied or marginalized the violence of this movement or portrayed them as an anti-Soviet “liberation movement.” The denial of the collaboration of the Ukrainian nationalists in the Holocaust was interrelated with the denial of the fascistization of Ukrainian nationalism and of the creative invention of a genuine form of Ukrainian fascism that fostered genocidal violence in Ukraine.

Although Jewish historians who survived the Holocaust in western Ukraine, such as Philipp Friedman, Shmuel Spector, and Aharon Weiss, were already investigating the genocidal violence of the Ukrainian nationalists in the 1950s, their research was rejected first by Cold War historians and later by the Ukrainian historians in independent Ukraine and German historians of Ukraine and Eastern Europe. While Ukrainian historians deliberately denied the violence of the Ukrainian nationalists, German historians concentrated on the violence committed by the German occupiers. These selective approaches to the histories of the Second World War and Holocaust in Ukraine did not allow many Ukrainian, German, and Polish historians to understand the nature and the extent of the violence used by the Ukrainian nationalists before, during, and after the Second World War. However, the genocidal violence of Ukrainian nationalists is essential to understand the modern history of Ukraine, the history of the Holocaust and fascism in East Central Europe, and the history of collaboration in the Age of Extremes.

A very fruitful approach to studying the violence of the Ukrainian nationalists is Saul Friedländer’s concept of integrated history. In contrast to German historians, who concentrated on the German perpetrators and the “German aspects” of the Holocaust, Friedländer pleaded for the investigation of all involved actors, analyzing their perspectives and the documents that they left. Besides me, three other historians—Omer Bartov, John-Paul Himka, and Kai Struve—have applied this concept to investigate the violence in western Ukraine in recent years. While Bartov wrote the history of Buczacz, Himka and Struve investigated the pogroms in Ukraine in 1941. All of them showed how the Ukrainian nationalists and ordinary Ukrainians collaborated with the Germans in the Holocaust. A decade before them, the Polish historian Grzegorz Moytka showed how the OUN and UPA murdered Poles in 1943 and 1944, and Jeffrey Burds and Alexander Statiev showed how the Ukrainian nationalists murdered civilians during the brutal conflict with the Soviet Union.

I will focus on the radical form of Ukrainian nationalism and explain how the OUN and UPA used genocidal violence to achieve their political goals. This outlines three central aspects of the history of genocidal violence in East Central Europe. First, it demonstrates how violence was used to establish ethnically homogenous states with fascist regimes. Second, it shows that violence was absolutely central for minor nationalist movements that claimed to “liberate” their countries. Third, it makes clear that the concentration on the main perpetrator (in this case, Nazi Germany) is insufficient to obtain a comprehensive under-standing of genocidal violence during the Holocaust.

Multiethnic Ukraine between East and West

Ukraine appeared as a state only in 1991, but the Ukrainians shaped the history of what today is known as Ukraine for centuries. Although the modern Ukrainian identity took shape only in the late 19th century, pre-modern Ukrainians, who were known as Ruthenians or Cossacks, lived in the Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Habsburg Empire, the Russian Empire, the Second Polish Republic, and the Soviet Union. Because of the numerous colonizations by and interactions with Poland, Austria, and Russia, as well as the settlement of Jews, Ukraine became a multiethnic territory. While western Ukraine was inhabited by Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews, central and eastern Ukraine was the home of Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, and Poles. Because of their political history, western Ukraine and east-central Ukraine were, by the beginning of the Second World War, two different states rather than one united country. The OUN and UPA felt at home only in western Ukraine, which can best be described as the regions of eastern Galicia and Volhynia.8

Eastern Galicia and Volhynia were inhabited by Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews for centuries. Although Ukrainians made up the majority of the population in these two regions, they were less present in cities such as Lviv than in villages and small towns. Before the Second World War, Jews amounted in both regions to about 10 percent of all inhabitants, Poles about 25 percent in eastern Galicia and 15 percent in Volhynia, and Ukrainians 60 percent in eastern Galicia and70 percent in Volhynia. As a result of the first and second partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772 and 1793, eastern Galicia was incorporated into the Habsburg Empire and Volhynia into the Russian Empire, which also held southern, central, and eastern territories of Ukraine. This geopolitical order remained until the First World War. In November 1917, Ukrainians proclaimed a state in Kyiv and in November 1918 in Lviv, but they did not succeed in keeping either of them. In 1921, eastern Galicia and Volhynia were officially incorporated into the Second Polish Republic, and almost all other Ukrainian territories constituted the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

As a result of the new political order, during the interwar period, about 20 percent of all Ukrainians lived in the Second Polish Republic and 80 percent in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. Poland was a multiethnic state which dis-criminated against Ukrainians and other minorities and treated them as second-class citizens. During the 1920s, the Ukrainians in Soviet Ukraine were exposed to the policy of “Ukrainization” and the New Economic Policy, which improved the economy, strengthened the use of the Ukrainian language, and promoted Ukrainian culture in public life. However, this changed dramatically in the early1930s. The collectivization of agriculture caused a famine, which resulted in the deaths of 2.5—3.9 million people in Soviet Ukraine in 1932/33. The OUN functioned, during the interwar period, only in Poland.

Internal Politics, Racism, Antisemitism, and Fascism

Before the Ukrainian veterans of the Great War established the OUN in Vienna in1929, they had created the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO, Ukraїns’ka Viis’-kova Orhanizatsiia) in Prague in 1920. Unlike the OUN, the UVO did not become a mass movement but functioned as a terrorist organization with aspirations to transform into a mass movement. The Ukrainian veterans who created the UVO and OUN were Yevhen Konovalets’, Andrii Mel’nyk, Mykola Stsibors’kyi, Roman Sushko, and Richard Iaryi. Before they established the UVO, they served in the Austro-Hungarian army and later fought against the Poles, Bolsheviks, and the anti-revolutionary Russian White Army as soldiers of the Ukrainian People’s Army (Armia Ukraїns’koїNarodnoї Respubliky, AUNR) and the Ukrainian Galician Army (Ukraїns’ka Halyts’ka Armiia, UHA).

The Ukrainian veterans of the First World War, who had established the UVO and OUN, were born around 1890. After the war, they lived in Germany, Lithuania, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland. The younger generation of Ukrainian nationalists involved in the UVO and OUN in the late 1920s and early 1930s were born around 1910. This generation was called the Bandera generation after Stepan Bandera. In general, they were more eager than the older generation to use genocidal violence, to transform Ukraine into an ethnically homogenous state. The most important members of this generation besides Bandera were YaroslavStets’ko, Stepan Lenkavs’kyi, Volodymyr Ianiv, and Roman Shukhevych.

The younger generation began to control the homeland executive of the OUN in the early 1930s, while the older generation kept leading the leadership in exile. The first leader of the UVO and OUN was Yevhen Konovalets’. After his assassination in Rotterdam by the NKVD agent Pavel Sudoplatov in 1938, Mel’nyk was elected the leader of the OUN. Although officially subordinated to the leadership in exile, the younger generation were pursuing their own politics. Especially after Bandera began to lead the homeland executive, they assassinated a number of Polish and Ukrainian politicians who tried to reconcile the Poles and Ukrainians. The OUN was also planning a Ukrainian revolution which was supposed to be-come a mass uprising of the Ukrainian population against the authorities of the Polish state. However, this plan failed as Bandera and 800 other OUN members were arrested in June 1934 for assassinating the Polish Interior Minister Bronisław Pieracki.

During the 1920s, 1930s, and the early 1940s, the OUN members understood themselves as both nationalists and fascists. They did not perceive a contradiction between these two notions. Dmytro Dontsov, who never belonged to the UVO and OUN but impacted them substantially, was already arguing in the early 1920s that Ukrainian nationalism and Ukrainian fascism were closely related phenomena. In the article “Are We Fascists?” (Chy my fashysty?), published in 1923 in Zahrava, Dontsov explained the nature of Italian fascism and repeated several times: “If this is the program of fascism, then according to me—we are the fascists!” Yet as much as Dontsov admired fascism, he did not want to be accused of copying it: “Because we stay on a national platform and the fascists on an international one—we cannot be fascists.” Thus, on the one hand, Dontsov claimed that Ukrainian nationalism was fascist. On the other hand, he emphasized the uniqueness of Ukrainian nationalism and argued that it should not be regarded as part of international fascism. In the early 1920s, Dontsov also rejected “fascism” as a name for the Ukrainian movement because the Italians had used it already.

Racist antisemitism appeared in Ukrainian nationalist discourses in the late 1920s and began to dominate in the second half of the 1930s. The OUN ideologist Volodymyr Martynets’ was one of the most important Ukrainian promoters of racist antisemitism. In the brochure The Jewish Problem in Ukraine, published in 1938 in London, he made it clear that he admired the Nuremberg Laws passed in 1935 and felt that Ukrainians needed similar racist regulations. Martynets’ argued that Jews were an alien race in every country in which they lived and thus were a problem for a number of countries around the globe. Those Jews who had assimilated in countries such as Italy and Germany endangered them no less than non-assimilated Jews because they could contaminate the blood of the people. According to Martynets’, no other nation had a more serious problem with the Jews than the Ukrainians because no other country had more Jews living in it than Ukraine. Martynets’ demanded that Ukrainians should begin dealing with this problem immediately and not wait until they established a state. He argued that the “Jewish problem” could be solved only by means of isolation and racial policies. Because Ukrainians did not have a state, they could not pass racist laws and thus should practice isolation and separation. Jews should have their own schools, newspapers, restaurants, cafes, theatres, brothels, and cabarets and should not use Ukrainian ones. Intermarriage between Jews and Ukrainians had to be stopped. This isolation of the “Jewish race” would allow the Ukrainians to achieve two goals. First, the “Jewish race” would not corrupt the Ukrainian race and cause the deterioration of its racial values. Second, isolation would decrease the number of Jews in Ukraine and finish their “parasitic existence.” Ukrainians would then begin taking up such professions as tavern owners, doctors, professors, and traders.

Racism in the context of Ukrainian nationalism was related to the idea of independence (samostiinist’). Racist Ukrainian thinkers argued that Ukraine should become an independent state because it was inhabited by a particular race that needed an independent nation-state to develop all of its features. In 1904, Mikhnovs’kyi presented some points of his political program in the “Ten Commandments of the UNP” for the Ukrainian National Party (Ukraїns’ka Narodna Partia, UNP). In the third commandment, he claimed, “Ukraine for Ukrainians!” and in the tenth, “Do not marry a foreign woman because your children will be your enemies.”

This discourse was brought forward by the Ukrainian geographer Stepan Rudnyts’kyi, who defined the “natural territory” or “living space” of the Ukrainian nation. He argued that “race” was, after “national territory, ”the secondmost important feature of the Ukrainian nation. He claimed that the “Ukrainian race is beautiful” and that the Ukrainians possessed some important features, such as the “ability to live and struggle for the existence of a particular race.” “The Ukrainian race,” Rudnyts’kyi continued, “is very valuable. Tall height (Ukrainians belong to the tallest nations in Europe and on Earth) and a huge chest circumference (perhaps the biggest in Europe) while being slender and agile make a Ukrainian very suitable for all physical work.”

During the interwar period, several Ukrainian nationalist ideologists dis-cussed how to use ethnic and political violence to establish a homogenous nation-state. One of the most important of these ideologists was Mykhailo Kolodzins’kyi, who trained Ukrainian nationalists together with the Croatian Ustaše in a camp in Italy in 1933/34. In this camp, Kolodzins’kyi met Ante Pavelić and began writing “The War Doctrine of the Ukrainian Nationalists,” a document that elaborated on the concept of an “uprising” against the “occupiers” of Ukraine. If, with regard to the Poles, Kolodzins’kyi assumed both expulsion and mass killings, with regard to the Jews, he planned only murder:

The OUN uprising is intended to destroy all living hostile elements in the Ukrainian territory. . . Slaughtering a half million Jews during the uprising will not be possible, as some nationalists say. Obviously, the hatred of the Ukrainian people for the Jews will be particularly horrible. We do not intend to temper this hatred; on the contrary, we should inflate it be-cause the more Jews are killed during the uprising, the better for the Ukrainian state, [and also] because the Jews are the only minority whom we will not be able to denationalize.

Genocidal Violence of the OUN and UPA

The violence of the Ukrainian nationalists can be divided into five stages: 1921–1939, September 1939, June-July 1941, August 1941-beginning of 1943, 1943–1944, and 1944–1955. The violence became genocidal only in 1941, but Kolodzins’kyi and other leaders of the OUN already anticipated ethnically homogenizing Ukraine by means of violence in the middle of the 1930s. The violence altered during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s because the Ukrainian nationalists adapted to current political circum-stances. Ukrainian nationalists were also not the only force that used genocidal violence in western Ukraine. Two other powers who did this as well were the German National Socialists and the Soviet Union. Both helped the Ukrainian nationalists to homogenize Ukraine. The latter destroyed the OUN and UPA.

During the interwar period, in the first stage of violence, the UVO and OUN tried to assassinate a number of Poles, Ukrainians, Jews, and Russians. Some tar-gets, such as Józef Piłsudski, were attacked because they were significant states-men of the “occupying” Polish state. Others, such as Tadeusz Hołówko, head of the Department for Eastern Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Henryk Józewski, governor of Volhynia, were committed to Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. Ukrainians such as high school director Ivan Babii and the journalist and political activist Sydir Tverdokhlib did not approve of the measures of the OUN and cooperated with the Polish authorities. After Bandera became the leader of the homeland executive, a number of OUN members, such as Yakiv Bachyns’kyi and Maria Kovaliukivna, were murdered by the organization. The most important person assassinated by the OUN was the already-mentioned Polish Interior Minister Bronisław Pieracki. The actual number of people killed by the Ukrainian nationalists in Poland is not known, but it was at least several hundred. By 1922, the UVO had already set 2,200 Polish farms on fire. In 1937 alone, the OUN carried out 830 violent acts against Polish citizens or their property. Of these offenses,540 were classified by the Security Service of the Polish Interior Ministry as anti-Polish, 242 as anti-Jewish, 67 as anti-Ukrainian, and 17 as anti-communist.

The second stage of violence began with the outbreak of the Second World War on 1 September 1939 and lasted until the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Unionon 22 June 1941. When Germany attacked Poland in 1939, the OUN considered be-ginning a revolution and establishing a Ukrainian state. However, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact interfered with these plans. On 17 September 1939, the Red Army attacked Poland from the East and occupied eastern Galicia and Volhynia within a few days. Nevertheless, in the first three weeks of September, armed nationalist groups assumed power locally in towns and announced their desire to cooperate with Germans. In September 1939, the OUN murdered approximately 2,000 Poles in eastern Galicia, about 1,000 in Volhynia, and an unknown number of Jews and political opponents.

In Yavoriv, a small town about 50 kilometers west of Lviv, German troops, together with Ukrainian militiamen wearing yellow-and-blue armlets, destroyed the local synagogue and humiliated, tortured, beat, murdered, and otherwise mis-treated the Jews. In the village of Sloviatyn, which was attacked by OUN troops on 17 and 18 September 1939, 49 Poles and one Ukrainian, who tried to help the Poles, were killed. Among the victims were men, women, and children. Although the main target groups of the OUN were Polish soldiers, policemen, and Poles who were settled in Volhynia after 1918 by the Polish government, many Polish and Jewish civilians, like in Yavoriv and Seliatyn, were killed by the Ukrainian nationalists in September 1939.

The next wave of violence began after the German attack on the Soviet Union. The OUN prepared for this event meticulously. When the Soviets incorporated east-ern Galicia and Volhynia into Soviet Ukraine in October and November 1939, several hundred OUN members left these territories and stayed in Cracow and other parts of the General Government. In 1940, the OUN split into the OUN-B (led by Stepan Bandera) and the OUN-M (Andrii Mel’nyk). Both factions collaborated with the German military intelligence organization Abwehr and the Wehrmacht and were involved in the preparation of Operation Barbarossa. In collaboration with the Abwehr, the OUN-B formed the battalions Nachtigall (with 350 soldiers) and Roland (with 330). Both were made up of Ukrainian soldiers led by German and Ukrainianofficers.32The OUN-B also established special task forces (pokhidni hrupy) that united about 800 members.

In April 1941, the leadership of the OUN-B organized the Second General Congress in Cracow, at which the organization was further fascistized. The leadership officially announced Stepan Bandera as the Ukrainian providnyk (equivalent to the German führer or the Italian duce), employed the fascist salute of raising the right arm “slightly to the right, slightly above the peak of the head” while calling “Glory to Ukraine!” (Slava Ukraini!) and responding “Glory to the Heroes!” (Heroiam Slava!), and introduced the red and black flag symbolizing blood and earth (Blut und Boden). The leadership also declared it would combat all democratic and communist Ukrainian parties and organizations and emphasized that Jews, Poles, and Russians were the “enemies of the Ukrainian people.”

While helping the Germans to prepare Operation Barbarossa, the OUN-B worked out the “Ukrainian National Revolution” without coordinating it with the Nazi leadership. The Ukrainian National Revolution was intended to begin on the same day as Operation Barbarossa. It had two interrelated aims. The first was to establish a Ukrainian state with Bandera as its providnyk. The second was to transform the territory of this state into an ethnically homogenous country. For this reason, the leadership of the OUN-B in Cracow wrote very detailed instructions, which were passed to Ivan Klymiv, who headed the OUN in Soviet western Ukraine. The document was called the “Instructions for the Prewar Period, the Time of War and Revolution, and the First Days of State Building.” In June 1941, the OUN-B and OUN-M counted 20,000 members and 30,000 sympathizers. The OUN-B had more members than the OUN-M.38

As Operation Barbarossa and the Ukrainian National Revolution began on22 June 1941, the OUN-B members, organized in special task forces, accompanied the Wehrmacht, which was defeating the Red Army and conquering Ukraine. The members of the task forces helped the local OUN leaders to organize the Ukrainian militia and establish city administrations in numerous cities, towns, and villages in western Ukraine. On30 June 1941, Yaroslav Stets’ko proclaimed the Ukrainian state and asked Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Ante Pavelić, and Francisco Franco to accept it. At the same time, the OUN-B, together with the German occupiers, organized numerous pogroms in western Ukraine and helped the Ein-satzkommandos of Einsatzgruppe C to conduct the first mass shootings. To involve the local population in the anti-Jewish violence, the German occupiers and the Ukrainian nationalists used the corpses of over 8,000 political prisoners whom the NKVD had murdered before they retreated from Ukraine. During the pogroms, about 20,000 Jews were murdered in western Ukraine.

The biggest pogrom in western Ukraine took place in Lviv. It began on 30 June 1941 in the afternoon, a few hours before Stets’ko proclaimed the Ukrainian state, and lasted until the evening of 2 July. The Ukrainian militiamen seized Jews on the streets and in their homes and took them to one of the four prisons in which the NKVD had left the corpses of the murdered political prisoners. The Jews were forced to carry them from the prison buildings to the yards where the Wehrmacht organized the Leichenschau (public viewing of the corpses). Both the Ukrainian militiamen and the Wehrmacht soldiers implied that the local Jews were responsible for killing the prisoners. In this way, they involved local Ukrainians in the public violence against the Jews. Angry Ukrainians forced the Jews to sing Soviet songs, hit them with all manner of objects, such as stones and sticks, or kicked them and punched them with their fists. For two and a half days, the streets of Lviv were full of angry Ukrainians, injured and dead Jews, and Wehrmacht soldiers who filmed these scenes and instructed the local population on how to kill and mistreat the Jews.

Kurt Lewin, who was forced to work in the Brygidki prison, was especially afraid of

an elegantly dressed man in a beautiful embroidered shirt, frequently worn by Ukrainian patriots, who beat with an ironclad cane. After a while, he beat only against the heads. With every hit he wrenched off strips of skin. He put some people’s eyes out, wrenched off ears. When the cane broke, he immediately took a large charred piece of wood and smashed my neighbor’s skull. The skull broke and the brain splattered in all directions, also on my face and clothes.

Eliyahu Yones, who was seized by German soldiers together with other Jews on7 July 1941 and was ordered to spread lime on the earth in one of the yards of the Brygidki prison, was overwhelmed by the extreme stench of decomposing corpses. He noticed that the ground under his feet was as soft as gum, had cracks five centimeters wide, and could not absorb the number of corpses being buried in the yard. On 25 June 1941, the Wehrmacht and the OUN-B organized another pogrom in Lviv in honor of Symon Petliura, who had been killed by Sholom Schwartzbard in Paris on 25 May 1926. A French court acquitted Schwartzbard for this murder because he argued that he had avenged his family members who had been murdered during the pogroms in Ukraine in 1917–1920. These were the largest anti-Jewish massacres prior to the Holocaust. More than 50,000 Jews were murdered in these pogroms.

The third stage of the OUN violence began in August 1941, when the Germans incorporated eastern Galicia as Distrikt Galizien into the General Government and Volhynia into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. In this stage, which lasted in Volhynia until the end of 1942 and eastern Galicia until the spring of 1943, about 800,000Jews were murdered in western Ukraine. This was half of all Jews killed in Ukraine during the German occupation, although western Ukraine was much smaller than central and eastern Ukraine. In central and eastern Ukraine, more Jews survived because they had more time to flee, the occupation was shorter, and, most important, there was no OUN or UPA in this part of the country. When the Einsatzgruppe finished the mass shootings in late 1941, the systematic murder of Jews began. Of the 500,000 Jews alive in eastern Galicia by the end of 1941, about 250,000 were murdered in the Bełżec extermination camp and about 250,000 in the surroundings of their ghettos. In Volhynia, all Jews, about 200,000, were killed in mass shootings.

The organizers and main perpetrators of the Holocaust in Ukraine were the German occupiers, but they could not have killed over 90 percent of the western Ukrainian Jews without the help of Ukrainian nationalists and ordinary Ukrainians. Although the leadership of the OUN-B, including the providnyk Bandera and his deputy Yaroslav Stets’ko, were detained in Berlin and Sachsenhausen, many Ukrainian nationalists joined the Ukrainian police established by the Germans in August 1941 and helped the German occupiers to kill Jews. They guarded the ghettos, helped to deport the Jews to Bełżec, helped to conduct the mass shootings, and searched for Jews hiding in the ghettos, countryside, and the woods. Because they outnumbered the German policemen, their assistance in the Shoah was essential. By helping the Germans to kill the Jews, the Ukrainian nationalists implemented their own goal of national homogenization through genocide—one could also say homogenizational genocide or genocidal homogenization. Ukrainian nationalists were transforming Ukraine into a homogeneous territory and eliminating the “enemies of the Ukrainian people,” as they called the Jews.

Although the Nazis wanted to purge the Ukrainian police from the OUN in August 1941 due to the political conflict with Bandera, many OUN members remained in the police, concealing their association with the organization. Volodymyr Pitulei, commander of the Ukrainian police, retained many OUN members in the police force, despite the German order to replace them. According to the OUN-B member Bohdan Kazanivs’kyi, there were even many OUN-B members among the commandants of the police school in Lviv in which new policemen were recruited. Eliyahu Yones, who worked in the Kurowice slave-labor camp, wrote in his memoirs that the Ukrainian policemen at his camp were Ukrainian nationalists who were proud to wear blue uniforms and Ukrainian caps. In the spring of 1942, there were over 4,000 Ukrainian policemen in the General Government. In 1942, there were 12,000 Ukrainian policemen and only 1,400 Germans in Volhynia.

When the majority of the Jews in Volhynia and eastern Galicia were killed in late 1942 and early 1943, the OUN-B established the UPA to expel and kill the Poles. This was the fourth stage of violence. In March and April 1943, about 5,000Ukrainian policemen deserted the police force in Volhynia and joined the UPA. The UPA kept killing Jews who had escaped the ghettos and survived by hiding in the woods, villages, and towns. In some regions, the Ukrainian nationalists were even more antisemitic than the German occupiers, causing some Jews to flee from the woods to German forced labor camps. Because the UPA intended to kill all the Jews, only a few thousand survived by the time they were liberated by the Red Army in the summer of 1944. Possibly 80,000 Jews tried to survive the last stage of the occupation of western Ukraine, but more than 60,000 were killed by the German occupiers, Ukrainian nationalists, and ordinary Ukrainians.

However, the main target group of the Ukrainian nationalist in the fourth stage of violence was the Polish population. The UPA conducted a genocide of the Poles in Volhynia in 1943 and in eastern Galicia in 1944. They murdered about100,000 Poles and forced even more to leave western Ukraine. While the majority of the Jews in western Ukraine were murdered by both the German occupiers and the Ukrainian nationalists, the killing and expelling of the Poles was a purely OUN-B project. The OUN-B and UPA applied various methods to murder the Poles. In contrast to the Jews, most Poles were not shot by bullets but hacked to death with axes and hatchets or killed with knives and pitchforks.

Numerous supporters and random Ukrainians were involved in the murder of the Poles by the OUN-B and the UPA. One of the most common methods to kill Poles was to mobilize Ukrainian peasants and order them to surround a village while a group of Ukrainian nationalists went inside to kill the civilians. People who escaped from the village were caught by the peasants and murdered by them. The Ukrainian nationalists were prepared to murder all Poles who would not leave the “Ukrainian territories,” including women and children. They frequently returned on the second or third day after an attack and looked for survivors in order to slaughter them. The UPA regularly demanded that Ukrainians inmixed marriages kill their spouses and children. Poles had lived in Volhynia and eastern Galicia for decades or even centuries and were often bilingual. The UPA partisans frequently could not identify Poles by language. If they could not learn who was Polish from local Ukrainians, they asked the suspect to pray in Ukrainian.

Given that Ukrainian and Polish culture had been intermingled in eastern Galicia and Volhynia for centuries, murdering Poles affected the Ukrainian population. Both the OUN-B and the UPA began issuing directives requiring Ukrainian partners in mixed families to murder their nearest and dearest. Some of the Ukrainians living in such families ignored these requirements; others, however, out of fear of dire consequences, obeyed.58In order to intimidate the Poles and force them to leave Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalists committed many acts of pathological sadism. In May 1943 in the village of Kolonia Grada, for example, UPA partisans killed two families who could not escape as all the others had after they realized that the UPA was attacking the neighboring village of Kolonia Łamane. The partisans killed all the members of these two families, cut open the belly of a pregnant woman, removed the fetus and her innards, and hung them on a bush, probably to leave a message for other Poles who had escaped the attack and might come back to the village.

UPA partisans applied the skills they obtained as Ukrainian policemen during the Holocaust. They would sometimes give candy to Polish children and generally be very polite to the population in order to calm them. They would ask the Poles to go to a meeting, and then they would either take small groups from the meeting and shoot them or burn the entire Polish population of a village in a barn or other building. They would attack on Sundays when the Polish villagers were gathered for a service in a church and either throw grenades into the church, burn it down, or enter and murder everyone inside. They would dig a large grave, take groups of Poles to it, and either shoot the Poles or murder them with sharp implements beside the grave or in it. In July 1943, one of the bloodiest months of the “cleansing,” the UPA attacked 520 localities and killed between10,000 and 11,000 Poles.

Although the leaders of the UPA officially distanced themselves from fascism, forbidding the use of the fascist greeting and announcing a desire for democratization, the mass violence practiced by the UPA and their racist interpretation of nationalism indicate that no democratization occurred within the movement. The “democratization” was mainly a strategic move to start collaborating with the Allies because the Germans were losing the war and the OUN and UPA needed anew ally.

This fifth and last stage of violence began in the summer of 1944, when the Red Army came to western Ukraine and when western Ukraine became a part of Soviet Ukraine again. Ukrainian nationalists regarded Russia and the Soviet Union as their main political opponent and decided to fight against it despite the disparity of forces. Consequently, Soviet military detachments began a wide-ranging operation of liquidating the nationalist underground, aimed not only at members of the OUN and UPA partisans but also at their families, followers, orthose accused of supporting the nationalists. Whereas during the brutal conflict with the Soviet security forces, the OUN and the UPA killed about 20,000 civilians and 10,000 of the security forces, their opponents accounted to have murdered153,000 people in western Ukraine, imprisoned 134,000, and deported 203,000 into the interior of the Soviet Union. Given that Ukrainians fought on both sides, this conflict was to be considered a civil war.62

People in western Ukraine were in a very difficult situation. On the one hand, they were attacked by the Ukrainian nationalists if they took positions in the ad-ministration. On the other, they could be arrested, killed, or deported if they sup-ported the Ukrainian nationalists. The Soviet forces applied brutal methods to defeat the nationalist underground in Ukraine. In the early stage of fighting against the OUN and UPA, they recruited many local Ukrainians and Poles who served in the destruction battalions (istrebitel’nye batal’ony). From 1946, they re-lied more on the secret forces because the units of Ukrainian nationalists became smaller. They used torture to obtain information, practiced public executions, and deported the nationalists’ families to force them to surrender. This, however, only radicalized the violence of the Ukrainian nationalists and alienated them.

In the center of a village in the Rivne region in June 1944, the OUN-UPA hanged a local peasant suspected of collaboration. They then “hacked the corpse of the hanged bandit to pieces with an axe.” In the Lviv region in August 1944, OUN and UPA members gouged out the eyes of members of two whole families, one by one in front of the others, and then hacked them to pieces in front of the villagers. On 3 May 1946 in the village of Mil’s’k, the perpetrators tortured two officials to death, “taking out their eyes, cutting them with knives, burning their bodies with iron, hitting them with a ramrod.” They frequently used axes, hatchets, and other tools, as they had during the genocide in 1943 in Volhynia and in 1944 in eastern Galicia. In the town of Sernyky in the Rivne region, five people from the family of a collective farm were slaughtered with a hatchet in 1948.

The Ukrainian nationalists frequently worked with texts and symbols. On3 September 1944 in Staryi Lysets’, six people were killed. A sign was then posted on a fence: “For the betrayal of the Ukrainian nation, all will die in the same way.” On 11 September 1944, a couple named Marżenko and their four-year-old daughter were killed. The perpetrators left the following note: “Death to the informers of the NKVD—the enemies of the working people. Death to the Bolshevik fascists, imperialists, and capitalists.” On 24 December 1944 in Volia Vysots’ka, 18 families were killed. The inscription “For the betrayal of the Ukrainian nation. Death to the NKVD informers” was left on the bodies. On 31 July 1944, about 20 bandits raided the village of Verbovets’ and went to the house of Teodor Protsiuk. He was not at home, but the bandits found his wife and four children between the ages of four and thirteen. They killed all the children and fatally wounded his wife. Next, they went to the adjacent house of Ivan Ulin, strangled him, and left the following inscription on his corpse: “All traitors and NKVD employees will die such a dog’s death.” Finally, they went to the home of Ivan Kuchera, another member of the village administration, and asked him to give them a ride to the next village. They killed him 300 meters from the village and left the inscription “The Revolutionary Army” on his corpse.


The OUN and UPA were the most violent Ukrainian nationalist movement in the20th century. Their main political goal was to establish an ethnically homogenous Ukrainian state. To achieve this goal, the OUN allied with Nazi Germany, collabo-rated with Fascist Italy and the Croatian Ustaše, and conceptualized a Ukrainian form of fascism. Although it succeeded in proclaiming a state in Lviv, eight days after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, Adolf Hitler did not approve of these political aspirations and arrested the movement’s leadership, including Bandera and Stets’ko. However, despite this political conflict, the OUN helped the German occupiers to murder 800,000 Jews in western Ukraine, and it murdered about 100,000 Poles in Volhynia in 1943 and eastern Galicia in 1944 without any help from the German occupiers. By murdering Jews as Ukrainian policemen or administration staff and killing Poles, the OUN was implementing its political goal of establishing an ethnically homogenous Ukrainian state, which, however, it never achieved. Between 1944 and 1955, the Soviet authorities destroyed the OUN and UPA in western Ukraine and kept mocking the Ukrainian nationalists after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Because of Soviet propaganda and the lack of appropriate research methods, the violence of the Ukrainian nationalists was perceived as marginal for a longtime. Historians wrongly assumed that the National Socialists murdered the Jews in Ukraine alone, without or with only marginal help from the Ukrainian nationalists. Others perceived the members of the OUN and UPA as anti-Soviet and anti-German freedom fighters. Only in the last two decades have historians such as Grzegorz Motyka, Omer Bartov, John-Paul Himka, Kai Struve, Jeffrey Burds, and Jared McBride demonstrated that the violence of the OUN and UPA was genocidal and that the movement considered violence as an important instrument to implement its policy. Because the studies on the OUN and UPA were fragmented, an additional step was required to connect these studies and demonstrate that the movement did not kill just a few thousand Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians but was involved in the murder of 800,000 Jews and over 100,000 Polish and Ukrainian civilians without any help from the Germans or other powers.

The genocidal violence of the Ukrainian nationalists demonstrates that the OUN and UPA should be taken seriously when conceptualizing the history of Ukraine. The genocidal violence of the Ukrainian nationalists is also an integral aspect of the history of the Holocaust in Ukraine, the history of the Ukrainian and Polish Jews, the history of the Poles in eastern Galicia and Volhynia, Soviet history in western Ukraine, and the history of fascism in Ukraine and East Central Europe. The marginalization or denial of the genocidal violence of the Ukrainian nationalists is unjustified from an academic point of view. On the political level, the denial of the genocidal violence of the OUN and UPA, as well as of the creation of Ukrainian fascism by the OUN in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, has contributed, especially in the last two decades, to the radicalization of conflicts within Ukraine and between Ukraine and Russia, Poland, and Israel. It also hampered the process of inventing a democratic identity and emancipating from Russia.

Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe is a Lecturer at the Friedrich-Meinecke Institut, Freie Universität Berlin. His work has met with fierce condemnation from Ukrainian nationalists. This essay originally appeared in Genocidal Violence. Concepts, Forms, Impact (1923).

Featured: Monument to Stepan Bandera in Lviv, Ukraine. Photo credit: Juliëtte Dekker, 2017.

Justin Trudeau and the Banderites

A dimly lit hall. Enthusiastic crowd. A screechy harangue from the podium. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s association with Nazism was made manifest a second time!

Fresh from applauding a member of the 1st Galician Division of the Waffen SS in the Canadian Parliament, Trudeau gave a bizarre performance the following day, on September 23, 2023, at the Fort York Armoury, in Toronto.

More importantly, to his left hung a large banner.. It read in Cyrillic, ГЕРОЯМ СЛАВА (Heroyam, or Geroyam Slava), or “Glory to the Heroes!”

It’s a response to a Banderite (Nazi) call; the first part might be more familiar: СЛАВА УКРАЇНІ (Slava Ukraini), “Glory to Ukraine.” The response is, “Glory to the Heroes.”

This cry was popularized by none other than the Ukrainian Nazi, Stepan Bandera, and became his slogan. Both his organizations, the Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukraine Insurgent Army (UPA), allied with the Nazis, used this call-response and it is now closely identified only with them. Bandera established it as the “Ukrainian” version of the Nazi call-response, “Heil Hitler-Sieg Heil.”

We just need to recall that both the OUN and the UPA carried out many atrocities against Poles and Jews and the Roma and fellow Ukrainians, while the crimes of Bandera are legend, and need not be repeated here, as I have discussed all this earlier. Suffice to say that it is impossible to speak of modern Ukraine without the Nazis—current Ukrainian national life is saturated by Hitlerism.

Is PM Trudeau again going to say that he knew nothing about the banner hanging right before him? That Anthony Rota, the ex-Speaker of the House of Commons, made his way into the Armoury to hang it up? Or, more likely, in Trudeau’s mind, Putin did it?

What we are really witnessing is the barking of violent rhetoric, all justified by blurting out “Ukraine.” In other words, all manner of hatred can now be concealed by the “morality” of supporting Ukraine. This violence has become a habit of mind among all the Canadian and Western ruling elite—enthusiastically repeated by Trudeau, as this speech bears witness. This is why the members of the Canadian Parliament all stood, cheered and applauded the Nazi visiting them in House of Commons.

The Armoury performance by Trudeau was Hitlerian in delivery as well—the exaggerated gestures, the angry facial expressions, the modulated shouting (though truth be told, Hitler was better at all this than Trudeau can ever hope to be, despite his stint as a drama teacher); and then came the copium and the hopium—handing out $9 Billion is going to defeat Russia. Perhaps in a saner moment, Trudeau might want to ask himself how much winning from the Ukrainians the USA bought with $112 Billion (the real amount is likely a lot, lot more, since the Pentagon is hopeless at math)?

Worse was the applauding crowd before him, listening to his ranting (did all the 338 clappy, happy members of Parliament tag along?), and no one noticed the banner? Truth be told, it was sneaky, being in Cyrillic.

The Russophoba that Trudeau yelled out stems from the deeply neo-Nazi views of the Ukrainian regime in Kiev, and within Ukrainian society itself, which do not see Russians, or anyone East of them, as humans.

For example, on August 4, 2023, Aleksey Danilov, the head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, stated: “I’m fine with Asians, but Russians are Asians. They have a completely different culture, vision. Our key difference from them is humanity.” Ukrainians are humans, while Russians, because they are Asians, are not.

Then, on September 14, 2023, Zelensky’s top aide, Mikhail Podoliak, observed: “What’s wrong with India, China, and so forth? The problem is that they are not analyzing the consequences of their steps, these countries have weak intellectual potential, unfortunately… Yes, they invest in science. Yes, India has launched a lunar rover presently and is now trekking on the surface of the Moon, but that does not indicate that this country fully comprehends what the modern world is about… China should be interested in Russia disappearing, because it is an archaic nation that drags China into unnecessary conflicts… It would be in their interest now to distance themselves from Russia as far as possible, take all the resources it has, and take part of the Russian territory under their legal control. In fact, they will do that.” Again, Asians are racially inferior; and since Russians are Asians, ergo, etc.

On September 28, 2023, Vovan & Lexus, the brilliant Russian pranskters, posing as ex-President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, spoke with the transgender Ukraine ex-spokesman, Sarah Ashton-Cirillo (born Michael, now a creature no longer human; merely a “billboard” for Wokery), who very precisely and clearly stated what is commonly believed in Ukraine, because it is taught in their schools: “Russians are not Europeans… Russians are Asian, and ultimately, they do come from the Mongols. They do come from a grouping of people who want to be slaves and want to be led, just as it was from the days of Genghis Khan. I wish the rest of Europe and the Western world understood that Europe ends at Ukraine. We are protecting European values and Western values the same way those did hundreds and thousands of years ago when the Mongols came in…. Every Russian that supports Vladimir Putin’s decisions are not human. These people are not human. They are enemies of humanity, in fact… we’ve been asking the Western world since the days of your presidency, sir, to make certain they understood the threat of these non-humans” (transcript via KanekoaTheGreat).

These are the people Trudeau is paying $9 Billion to. These are the views that ground his own scream-fest: “…because the cost on Canadians, on our lives on our…(?) will be so much greater if Putin wins this war, we will and have to stand every single day until Ukraine wins this war.”

Ukrainians must win because they are humans; Russians are not. Notice the attempt at cleverness with the “cost” involved. If Russians win, they are going to “cost” Canada a lot more. How? Right now, it’s the Ukrainians who are costing Canadians $9 Billion, not the Russians. Rather than pointless gymnastics with economics, it is far easier to explain Trudeau’s words as an extension of Ukrainian Russophobia. For Trudeau, people like Danilov, Podoliak and Ashton-Cirillo must win, because these people can build a better world, a world that he can truly believe in. And he’s ready to put his tax-payers’ money where his mouth is.

Far more sinisterly, it’s better to pay Ukrainians to go and die so that Putin can be defeated (the only goal of the West), rather than send out Canadian troops to get the job done (laugh track, please).

Ukrainians are defending “democracy” and “our values” (Danilov, Podoliak and Ashton-Cirillo), so we don’t have to fight for both over here—and therefore the money we give them is the “best defense investment ever made,” since the Ukrainians are more than happy to die for “us.” You see, the more Ukrainians that die, the more democratic and freer we become. How much Ukrainian blood is your “freedom” worth—just ask yourself. Put another way, how many Ukrainians will Trudeau’s $9 Billion kill? How many Russians? What will Trudeau have really bought?

As noted, Trudeau’s words are an extention of Ukrainian Russophobia that in turn stems from the false assumption of racial superiority, which has been taught in Ukrainian schools for many decades: that Western Ukrainians are racially and linguistically completely different because they are direct descendents of Vikings and therefore Germanic and therefore superior. This myth was cultivated by Banderites in order to endear themselves to the Nazis (it never worked, as the Nazis rightly knew them to be only Slavs, while the Ukrainians went overboard to show assumed “Germanic” kinship, especially when it came to brutality, which often astonished even the Nazis).

More bizarely, versions of this myth are constantly repeated in all of Western media, including independent (sane) media, where Eastern Ukraine is always called “ethnically Russian,” a meaningless term which only strengthens Ukrainian self-aggrandizing racial fables. All Ukrainians are “ethnically Russian.” There are no other kind.

The truth is that the Ukrainian language (previously, and correctly, known as “Little Russian” or Ruthenian) is best understood as a dialect of Russian, therefore firmly and only Slavic. Russian and Ukrainian today are mutually intelligible. Ukrainian is not a Germanic language; no part of it is. It has no Germanic traces; no vestige of Old Norse, the language of the Vikings. In other words, the Vikings left no trace in the Ukrainian language (unlike English, for example, which is richly marked by Old Norse, as is Norman French). Nor is there any Viking (Germanic) DNA to be found among modern-day Western Ukrainians (who claim to be Viking descendents). They are all purely Slavic like their Eastern kinsmen whom they despise for being racially inferior Asians (Russians). Ironically, for these Western Ukrainians, Russians proper have greater racial kinship with Germans than they do. So, it would seem Western Ukrainians deeply hate themselves and take this hatred out on Russians in order to “feel” superior. A variant dialect has been mythologized into a “racial difference;” and, sadly, it is this mythology that is the ideological fuel driving the war being waged by the Kiev regime.

And it is this muddled Banderite mentality that Trudeau wants to win. For him, Banderites embody the “truth” that he can back with other people’s money. This is the world that all of the West is supporting with its money and arms. Why should the Russians, therefore, not see this conflict in Ukraine as the West’s new Operation Barbarossa?

Do we still need to wonder where Nazism is thriving the most in Canada? It is thriving among people like Trudeau and the entire ruling class that stood clapping and adoring an old Waffen SS veteran, because their minds find affinity with the Nazis when it comes to Ukraine, since the entire Western endeavor is founded upon Russophobia, upon a deep racial difference (Russians are not Europeans); and because the West is indeed engaged in a war to annihilate Russians. The longer this war goes on, the more Nazi Canada and the West will become. This is the same Cold War mindset that forgave the Nazis everything because they made good allies against the new enemy, the Russians.

But this overwrought exhibition by Trudeau is also best viewed for what it is—alongside the brilliance of Charlie Chaplin’s Adenoid Hynkel, because Charlie knew how to skewer such types.

So, here’s to Justin Adenoid Hynkel, who can’t seem to get enough of the Nazis… Geroyam Slava, Mr. Prime Minister!

C.B. Forde writes from rual Canada.

Monuments to Ukrainian Nazis in Canada

Given the fact that Ukraine and Nazis are again making news, it is important to point out that there are indeed commemorative monuments to Ukrainian Nazis in Canada, located where the Ukrainian populations are the greatest. The reasons for such monuments are known to the Ukrainian community alone, but so it is essential to make a record of them here, along with a hint at what those being commemorated did back in the days of World War Two.

Roman Shukhevych

Statue of Roman Shukhevych. (Outside of the Ukrainian Youth Unity Complex, north Edmonton, Alberta. Source).

“Ukrainian partisans and their allies burned homes, shot or forced back inside those who tried to flee, and used sickles and pitchforks to kill those they captured outside. Churches full of worshipers were burned to the ground. Partisans displayed beheaded, crucified, dismembered, or disemboweled bodies, to encourage remaining Poles to flee… It was this maimed OUN-Bandera, led by Mykola Lebed’ and then Roman Shukhevych, that cleansed the Polish population from Volhynia in 1943” (The Reconstruction of Nations).

1st Galician, 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS

Monument to 1st Galician, 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (St. Volodymyr Ukrainian Cemetery, Oakville, Ontario. Photo: Sam Fleming/RSJ)

“The 14th Division of the Ukrainian SS surrounded the village Huta Pieniacka from three sides… The people were gathered in the church or shot in the houses. Those gathered in the church—men, women and children—were taken outside in groups, children killed in front of their parents. Some men and women were shot in the cemetery, others were gathered in barns where they were shot” (British archives).

Monument to the Glory of the UPA

Monument to the Glory of the UPA
(St. Volodymyr Cemetery, Oakville, Ontario)

“One of their major tasks as UPA partisans was the cleansing of the Polish presence from Volhynia. Poles tend to credit the UPA’s success in this operation to natural Ukrainian brutality; it was rather a result of recent experience. People learn to do what they are trained to do, and are good at doing what they have done many times. Ukrainian partisans who mass-murdered Poles in 1943 followed the tactics they learned as collaborators in the Holocaust in 1942: detailed advance planning and site selection; persuasive assurances to local populations prior to actions; sudden encirclements of settlements; and then physical elimination of human beings. Ukrainians learned the techniques of mass murder from Germans. This is why UPA ethnic cleansing was striking in its efficiency, and why Volhynian Poles in 1943 were nearly as helpless as Volhynian Jews in 1942. It is one reason why the campaign against Poles began in Volhynia rather than Galicia, since in Volhynia the Ukrainian police played a greater role in the Final Solution” (The Reconstruction of Nations).

Monument to the 14th Waffen SS Grenadier Division

14th Waffen SS Grenadier Division (St. Michael’s Cemetery, Edmonton, Alberta).

“On that day, early in the morning, soldiers of this division, dressed in white, masking outfits, surrounded the village. The village was cross-fired by artillery. SS-men of the 14th Division of the SS ‘Galizien’ entered the village, shooting the civilians rounded up at a church. The civilians, mostly women and children, were divided and locked in barns that were set on fire. Those who tried to run away were killed. Witnesses interrogated by the prosecutors of the Head Commission described the morbid details of the act. The crime was committed against women, children, and newborn babies” (The Institute of National Remembrance. Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation).

Hunkagate, or How “Inglourious Basterds” Eat Crow

Note to self: The Nazis are no longer the bad guys, the Russians are.

So, why is it so surprising that Justin Trudeau honored a former Waffen SS veteran (Yaroslav Hunka), in parliament, on September 22, 2023? There is no point in insulting our own intelligence by even considering that it was solely the fault of one man (Anthony Rota), and no one else even knew what Rota was up to. The fact is, Canada has long protected and nurtured Ukrainian Nazis and many other extremists. It is a venerable Canadian tradition.

As well, it is also a long tradition that Ukrainians very closely police their history, to make sure that their Nazism is played down, and Russia’s is always vilified. So, Mr. Trudeau’s honoring of Hunka is the way things are done in Canada. Hunka was honored back in 2007, by the Canadian Congress of Ukrainians, which is closely associated with Mr. Trudeau and Chrystia Freeland, his Deputy Prime Minister and Canada’s Minister of Finance:

So, the whole drama of never knowing who Hunka is, that he was foisted upon the well-meaning, unsuspecting parliamentarians by Rota is simply false. The man was moving about a lot in government circles.

This honoring of a Ukrainian and Canadian “hero” appears to be carefully scripted to please the neo-Nazis in Ukraine who are the real powers broker in that sad country. Hunka was Trudeau’s bowing to that power.

As well, it is an old custom among Ukrainian nationalists to mitigate the Nazis and deflect to Russia as evil. This is something that the West has been doing ever since the war in Ukraine began, where it has become an attempt to rewrite history: not all Nazis were bad, while all Russians are evil, always have been and are the natural enemy of mankind, ever since Adam and Co wended their way east of Eden.

This sort of re-imagining of history has been done before (and successfully) with ancient Egypt, which has been transformed into a sub-Saharan (Bantu) civilization, which it most certainly never was. In the same way, the Nazis are being re-imagined as fighters against the Russians, the new bad guys.

Mr. Trudeau’s honoring of Hunka was mirrored later in Mr. Anthony Blinken’s recent Tweet, in which he mentioned the slaughter at Babiy Yar—in order to vilify Russia. Here is what he said:

The Nazis are being erased from atrocities so that Russians can be photo-shopped in, because the past is fluid, like gender. Therefore, like Mr. Trudeau, Mr. Blinken must de-emphasize the truth of history in order to traduce the Russians—even though it was Ukrainian Nazis (men like Hunka) who played an integral role in the slaughter at Babiy Yar.

Maria Zakharova, representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, gave the perfect response to all this re-imagining:

Anthony Blinken allowed himself to lie about one of the most horrific tragedies of the Second World War: the execution of the civilian population of Soviet Kyiv on September 29-30, 1941 in the Babi Yar tract. Then the Nazis, having occupied the territory of the city, began “cleansing” operations. Within a few days, tens of thousands of Jews, Gypsies, and Soviet prisoners of war were killed. On the 29th and 30th alone, the German fascists brutally literally destroyed 34 thousand people – this is exactly what Blinken remembered, cynically lying (more about this below) about the memory of this tragedy in the USSR, and also “forgetting” that executions continued until the liberation of Kiev by the Red Army in November 1943.

Also, on September 20, 2023, Ursula von der Leyen gave a speech to the Atlantic Council, in which she indulged in the same re-imagining of history:

Distinguished guests, there is a Japanese proverb that tells a lot about the country and about its prime minister. It says onkochishin and it means “explore the past to learn new things.” You, dear Prime Minister, showed me the meaning of this proverb during the G7 summit in Japan last year. You brought us to your hometown of Hiroshima, the place where you have your roots and which has deeply shaped your life and leadership. Many of your relatives lost their life when the atomic bomb razed Hiroshima to the ground. You have grown up with the stories of the survivors. And you wanted us to listen to the same stories, to face the past, and learn something about the future.

It was a sobering start to the G7, and one that I will not forget, especially at a time when Russia threatens to use nuclear weapons once again. It is heinous. It is dangerous. And in the shadow of Hiroshima, it is unforgivable.

Onkochishin, indeed. “Russia threatens to use nuclear weapons once again.” This time the USA has been erased and Russia photo-shopped in. In Ms. von der Leyen’s mind, the Russians dropped two bombs on Japan, and we cannot let them do that again, can we. And the USA comes out smelling like a proverbial rose, like the Ukrainians. This is not historical revisionism at all, but a complete erasing the recent past, all played out for a public that is brainwashed by Hollywood as per fare like Inglourious Basterds.

Returning to our “hero,” notice how carefully he was scriped: seated, front-and-center in the gallery where all could easily see him. Notice the Canadian army officers, smiling and clapping (impossible that even they knew no Canadian history).

The careful packaging of Hunka is also evident in the introduction that the now ex-Speaker of the House, Anthony Rota, gave before the yappy seals, aka, members of Parliament. Here’s the script that he was handed, and which, to his great credit, he read very awkwardly. These were not words that he was not comfortable with, but was forced to perform them:

We have here in the Chamber today a Ukrainian-Canadian World… veteran, from the Second World War, who fought for Ukrainian independence against the Russians, and continues to support the troops today, at the venerable age of 98 (spontaneous standing ovation and cheering). His name is Yaroslav Hunka. And I was going to say that he’s in the gallery, but I think you beat me to that (self-congratulatory laughter). But I am very proud to say that he is from North Bay and from my riding of Nipissing-Timiskaming (more applause). He’s a Ukrainian hero, a Canadian hero, and we thank him for all his service. Thank you. (More applause).

The official state propagandists, the CBC, blithely reported that while Zelensky’s “speech received at least a dozen standing ovations. There was also one for this man (a shot of Hunka sitting in the gallery), a 98-year-old Ukrainian-Canadian who fought for Ukrainian independence against the Russians during the Second World War” (CBC News). Notice the same careful scripting: dim the Nazis and in order to asperse the Russians.

And this packaging nearly worked. Who wouldn’t feel grateful to a 98-year-old war veteran? And the general public wouldn’t even know when World War Two happened.

Enter Warren Thornton, in Britian. It was he who first noticed as to what had happened in the Canadian Parliament. He just pointed out the obvious: in World War Two, the only ones fighting the Russians were the Nazis and their ilk, because the Russians (or Soviets at that time) were “our” allies. Ergo, Hunka could not be anything other than a Nazi.

Unwittingly backing up Mr. Thornton was AP, which non-chalantly noted that Hunka had been a member of the “First Ukrainian Division.” Sounds harmless enough and armyish, as befits a veteran. AP just threw this bit of information out there, confident that their readers would nary blink an eyelid.

Those who know a little about such things will immediately spot the problem: “First Ukrainian Division” was a later name for the 1st Galician Division , or the 14th Grenadiers of the Waffen SS. The Division had a lackluster career as a fighting Nazi unit, and it was involved in various atrocities, largely against Poles, Jews and other Ukrainians.

Back in the day, there was also much controvery when these Ukronazis were brought into Canada in the late 1940s and 1950s; for various reasons, the government supported and protected them (the Cold War, in which Nazis were now friends and the Russians the enemy). With great loyalty, Canada has always protected Ukrainian Nazis. For example, in 1986, a Commission, looking into the “alleged” crimes of the 1st Galician, concluded: “If the only allegation against a resident of Canada is that he was a member of the Galicia Division that is not an individual which we consider should be made the subject of an investigation by your Commission. If the allegation is that while he was a member of the Division, he committed atrocities at such-and-such a place, if there is evidence of the committing of atrocities alleged in the information which was conveyed to us, then that person becomes of interest to your Commission.”

The logic of this conclusion is still prevalent, where simply being a member of the Waffen SS does not automatically make you a criminal. Crime has to be proven first, since we all know that the majority of the SS were just regular guys doing doing charity work. And the Banderite stalwarts at the BBC agree: “The Galicia Division has been accused of committing war crimes, but its members have never been found guilty in a court of law.” So, there. What’s the problem of honoring a Waffen SS veteran? They were doing great work in Europe against the Russians, and they still are!

Back in Britian, Mr. Thornton was rewarded for all his hard work by being promptly arrested for spreading “malinformation.” This is information that is true but which the government feels can cause “harm.” So, British authorities were busy protecting Hunka, since we can’t have anyone maligning the Nazis, can we? Thankfully, Mr. Thornton was released because he hung tough.

Having been caught in the ensuing ruckus that Mr. Thornton started, the Canadian MPs, including Mr. Trudeau, gave vent to all manner of condemnation—of an event that they themselves planned and implemented, and in which they themselves enthusiastically participated.

Video evidence clearly shows that they were all applauding—including Pierre Poilievre, the leader of the Conservative Party (and all his MPs) and Jagmeet Singh, the leader of the lefty New Democratic Party (and all his MPs), and of course Trudeau and all his crowd.

In fact, all 338 MPs (no matter what their affiliation) were on their feet applauding Hunka of the SS, who, it must be said, rather masterfully controlled his instinct to give a “proper” salute from the balcony, and went instead with a raised, clenched fist.

Yarosalv Hunka in the Canadian parliament (September 22, 2023).

And this same Mr. Poilievre, now so outraged, had this to say to Christine Anderson of the German AfD, who was visiting Canada back in February 2023: “Frankly, it would be better if Anderson never visited Canada in the first place. She and her racist, hateful views are not welcome here.”

But Mr. Poilievre gave Hunka two standing ovations, because Hunka’s “racist, hateful views” are perfectly welcome, and belong in Canada’s House of Commons, since they are against a common enemy (Russia). Like Mr. Trudeau and Mr. Singh (the less said about him, the better), Mr. Poilievre understands perfectly which side his globalist bread is buttered on.

The concerted outrage came two days late and a dollar short, because it was so convenient and thus contrived.

Why did all these now-outraged MPs not loudly boo and hiss the presence of Hunka on September 22nd? Why did none of them angrily storm out of the chamber? Why did none of them refuse to stand up? Why did none of them refuse to clap? Why did none of them denounce Hunka precisely when Rota introduced him? Why only after Mr. Thornton’s revelations? Only when their gamble failed, for they were rightly counting on the public’s ignorance. Notice it was only Mr. Thornton who noticed. No one else.

The Government House Leader, Karina Gould, explained what truly, truly (honestly) happened:

Mr. Speaker, like all members of this chamber, I am incredibly disappointed in the fact that this individual was invited, as you yourself, Mr. Speaker, have confirmed by you, was recognized in the gallery. I found out just like every other member in this house at that time that this individual was present. This is deeply embarrassing for us as parliamentarians, as Canadians, and it is something that I think all of us take extremely seriously, and I would ask my honorable colleagues not to politicize this moment. Thank you, Mr. Speaker… Mr. Speaker as a descendant of Jewish Holocaust Survivors, I am personally very hurt by the fact that this chamber recognized this individual, and I am sure that everyone feels the same way in this chamber. The Parliamentary Protective Service had the appropriate screening in place to ensure the security of last Friday’s event and that is what I was referring to. Mr. Speaker. But what I can continue to say is that we all must take this seriously because it is hurting many communities.


Look. We’re all guilty as Hell. We all clapped like trained seals. But since we’re all birds of a feather, let’s put this behind us, and let’s just stop talking about it, and soon the Great Unwashed will forget that any of this ever happened. Why pee and pooh in the trough where we all feed. The more you talk about this, the more Putin wins. Is that what you really want? Let’s move on and do what we’re really here to do, which is to bring about the New World Order. Besides, can you imagine what it’s going to be like for me at my synagogue now? Have a heart. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Her claim of not knowing who Hunka is, is very odd, since there is a selfie of her warmly clutching Hunka’s hand and smiling with much joy (a selfie that she has since deleted… and which is now being scrubbed from the Internet, so we’re saving it). Ms. Gould’s Jewishness was not an issue at the time of the selfie.

Can anyone still argue with a straight face that there are no Nazis in Ukraine because Zelensky is a Jew?

And if Ms. Gould is now so upset, why not simply resign? In fact, the entire 338 members of Parliament should resign—starting with Trudeau, and they all should never be allowed to set foot inside the Parliament buildings again. They have thoroughly sullied them.

Karina Gould, a relative of Mr. Hunka, Anthony Rota, Mr. Hunka (seated).

Later, Ms. Gould introduced a motion to strike Hunka from the parliamentary records—to wash the slate clean; nothing happened. Zelensky came, we gve him tons of cash, and he left. Yawn. Cancel culture is a Canadian “value.” And how quiet is Zelelnsky about all this…

Another egregious example of this outrage is one Ya’ara Saks, a Liberal MP from a Toronto riding, and who is also Jewish. Back when the Truckers’ Protest was labeled a “Nazi-rally” by Trudeau, Ms. Saks (a Trudeau stalwart), angrily stood up in parliament and declared that when truckers honked their horns, it actually meant “Hail Hitler.”

So, what does Ms. Saks applauding (thrice) for Hunka actually mean for Ms. Saks? There are other MPs who are Jews (including Melissa Lantzman, a Conservative)—all of them applauded. Only after being exposed are they now outraged. Ah, yes, Jews can’t be Nazis.

Some context: Back in April 7, 2022, Zelensky was invited to speak, via video, to the Greek parliament. Part of his speech included exhortations by two members of the neo-Nazi Azov battalion. All the Greek parliamentarians at once condemned what Zelensky had done, since he had foisted Nazis upon them without forewarning. They did not applaud and did not take two days to be outraged.

Why did the Canadian parlimentarians not behave this way? In fact, why did Zelensky say nothing; instead he was fist-pumping and beaming, since he knows who keeps him in power; or rather who holds him hostage.

One might wonder, why was this done? The official version—it was entirely Rota’s doing, and Hunka is from his riding. And, dutifully, Rota assumed the posture of the scapegoat, apologized and resigned (doubtless he will be amply rewarded down the road). Of course, had Trudeau and his MPs known what Rota was up to, they would have kiboshed the whole thing at once, because Mr. Trudeau’s moral compass is second to none when it comes to spotting Nazis, especially among people he dislikes.

But this “defense,” this evocation of ignorance by all 338 MPs, just does not wash. Rota very clearly announced what he was about to do—and only then did all 338 of them leap to their feet in Russophobic zealotry, and before Rota could even finish the introduction proper, which even he found a tad surprising: “You beat me to that.” What, a Ukrainian “freedom fighter” battling the evil Russians from long ago, living right here in Canada? Huzzah!

This appeal to ignorance is given the lie by a photo, taken by a granddaughter of Hunka’s, in which she explains that he is waiting to meet both Zelensky and Trudeau. Who are we to believe? Trudeau or the rather innocent remark of granddaughter? What a tough choice!

The image in full, in case the photo also disappears:

But then, the Nazis and the Trudeaus are old acquaintances. His father (Pierre Eliot), during the Second World War, rode around on a motorbike wearing a Nazi helmet to stick it to the Anglos, since their war against Hitler was not his war. And the current Deputy Prime Minister (the eminence grise behind Justin), Chrystia Freeland, her grandfather ran a pro-Nazi newspaper in Ukraine during those years in which Hunka was a “hero.” And her uncle (Myroslav Shkandrij) has just published a book defending the actions of the 1st Galician Division and whitewashing all their atrocities as “unstantiated,” unproven in any court of law (see BBC above), and therefore claims of Ukrainian brutality are nothing but… you guessed it, “Russian propaganda.”

In Trudeau’s Canada, the government has also been busy removing and, yes, destroying statues that might be reminders of the many achievements of Old Stock Canadians—but try defacing a monument to Roman Shukhevych, the man deeply involved in the Holocaust in Ukraine, and you will be arrested and charged. There are various Ukronazi monuments in Canada, a country in which 4 percent of the population is of Ukrainian origin: after the Second World War, 45,000 Ukrainians were brought into the country, and many thousands of these were from disbanded Nazi units.

Trudeau’s affinity for Nazsim gets darker yet. Why does he believe that to say there are Nazis in Ukraine is Russian propaganda? In his visit to Ukraine, in June 2023, he met with Andrij Melnyk, who is the lead proponent of this school of thought, where history must be reimagined in order to malign the Russians and who has famously said: “That is the narrative [Nazi-Ukraine] that the Russians are pushing to this day, and that has support in Germany, in Poland, and also in Israel.” History is just a narrative. History has no facts. From his actions in Parliament and elsewhere, it would seem that is is also what Mr. Trudeau believes.

Mr. Trudeau further echoed Melnyk when he came out in his own defense in Hunkagate: “It’s going to be really important that all of us push back against Russian propaganda, Russian disinformation, and continue our steadfast and unequivocal support for Ukraine.” We will soon discover that it was the Russians who brought Hunka to the House of Commons; it was the Russians who forced Mr. Trudeau to clap and nod his head approvingly; it was the Russians that forced all 338 MPs to jump to their feet and applaud wildly. The depth of Russian connivance knows no bounds, but they’re also weak and stupid.

This statement by Trudeau is also a directive to the Canadian legacy media, which he richly funds. He is tellng them to now drop the whole matter, bury the story and move on. If you keep repeating this story, you are working for Putin. Many have gotten the message: “Canada just made Vladimir Putin’s day, a chance for him to try to claim he’s fighting Nazis in Ukraine, an idea dismissed as nonsense by most of the world but a favourite topic of the Russian leader” (Rick Bell, Calgary Sun). Notice the lie, which is not even subtle… “dismissed as nonsense by most of the world.” Amazing how one reporter, in one Canadian newspaper, can speak with authority for “most of the world.” Ignorance—the most vital ingredient for success in propaganda.

So, the message to the legacy media is that if you keep repeating this story, you will prove Putin right—Ukraine does indeed have a serious and deep-seated Nazi problem. Stay on narrative… In Mr. Trudeau’s world, the only Nazis are the Trucker Protestors, and anyone else who disagrees with him. Therefore, “honk-honk” really does mean, “Hail Hitler,” and it’s OK for a Jew to clutch a Nazi’s hand for a heart-warming selfie. This is why Hunka is a Canadian hero—for the real enemy of Canada is not the Nazis, they never were; it’s the Russians. The jig might be up for Hunka as Poland wants him extradited for crimes his Division committed there. But Hunka need not worry. Canada will never extradict him.

And by the time elections come around (2025), all this will be long forgotten, and Canadians will once again blithely vote for the Uniparty agenda: climate change and gender equality. Hunka can live out his days in peace. But who will speak for the victims of his SS Division?

In the meantime, in the words of Melnyk:

C.B. Forde lives in a small community, in Ontario, Canada.

Is Canada now a Nazi State?

Canada today is a monstrous Woke machine, finely calibrated to yield the globalist new world order of green economics and eugenics (aka, gender equality, transgenderism, euthanasia). This machine was constructed by the wildly popular Canadian prime minister, Pierre Eliot Trudeau, the father of Justin.

Political systems do not really disappear; they may fall into disuse for a while, until someone finds a use for them, and they reappear in a fresh iteration. Globalism is a fresh iteration of Nazism, for the two have the same core; they vary only in detail, because they must fit into the time-period in which they exist. Thus, the mistake often made by commentators is a lazy one, whereby Hitler and his Germany become the blueprint for comparison, while the core is never noticed, which defines both. What did Hitlerism seek to achieve? A purified humanity (eugenics), inhabiting a purified earth (environmentalism), a process facilitated by the state.

And what is the core of globalism? Less and better humans (eugenics), on an earth purified from the pollution of human activity (environmentalism).

Both Hitlerism and globalism function on the perfection-imperfection relationship—the former must continually seek out and destroy the latter. This is labeled “progress;” a better definition is the “great replacement,” in which anything marked as “imperfect” is to be replaced by the “perfect.” The agency doing the marking and the replacing is the state.

Eugenics for globalism is the marking of imperfect humanity (European, aka, “white”), which must be severely husbanded so that it can only exist on the margins. The perfect humanity is non-white, which must be given to dominate the earth. The only difference between Nazism and globalism is in the marking: “Jew” is now “white.” The end result is the same—the annihilation of humanity.

Canada is the chief architect and conniver in this globalist program—and thus Canada is now a Nazi state by another name (“democracy” and “our values”), for it seeks to achieve what eugenics and environmentalism will bring about—a green Hell—inhabited by non-white peoples bunched up from all over the world. The original Canadians of British and French origin (Old Stock Canadians), who built the Canada whose reputation whose glow yet lingers in people’s minds, have largely disappeared, having been drowned in legalalized, mass migration (the government imports 1,000,000 people every year, from the third world into Canada; a vast number, given Canada’s small population). And the finest enthusiast that this program has is Justin Trudeau.

To be clear, in the current Canadian political scene, all parties are complicit in the broader program of globalism—all will actively work to serve it well. It matters little whether the label is “liberal,” “conservative,” “green,” “socialist,” and even “communist”—none can escape the machine; rather, none want to. And Canada is eager to take this machine worldwide, for it has just launched a UN declaration to fight “disinformation.” Only people applauding Waffen SS veterans can really know what the truth is. Everyone else is the enemy.

In Canada, politically, there is only one glimmer of hope—the People’s Party of Canada, and its leader Maxime Bernier. But their biggest challenge is how to overcome the monstrous machine.

W.O. Munce writes from Canada.

Ukrainian Nationalism: Russian Special Operation— Denazification of Ukraine


This paper presents the results of the analysis of relevant aspects of the history of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in comparison with the policy of the Kiev regime in 2014-2022, using the secrets revealed with the beginning of demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine during the special military operation of the Armed Forces of Russia. These revelations have increased the amount of evidence that the destruction of Russia is the invariable strategic goal of radical Ukrainian nationalism—Ukronazism—throughout its history and in our times, along with the continuity of goals, ideological positions, anti-people policy and crimes of the Banderites and their modern followers. Attention is drawn to the fact that the OUN actively participated in Hitler’s atrocities against Russia and its people. Their leaders and many other Ukronazis were agents and executors of the will of Hitler’s special services, after the victory over fascism, and of special services of the USA and the West. Maidan usurpers of power under the control and with the participation of the United States and their NATO satellites robbed and destroyed Ukraine, turned it into an anti-Russian bridgehead of the United States and NATO and together with them crossed the red line in creating a military threat to the Russian Federation and preparing aggression against it. Russia has therefore taken measures adequate to this threat to protect its national security, to save the people of the Donbass from genocide and to free the fraternal people of Ukraine from neo-Nazism. The most significant common features of radical Ukrainian nationalism in the 1920s-1940s and 2014-2022 are identified. The main elements of the Russian leadership’s decisions to recognize the Lugansk People’s Republic, Donetsk People’s Republic and to conduct a special military operation in Ukraine are summarized. The necessity of the denazification of Ukraine, including the holding of an international military tribunal, is confirmed by numerous facts and the results of preliminary investigations, which have established the involvement of more than 220 persons in crimes against peace and security of humanity.

Introduction: Decision to Conduct a Special Operation. Its Goal and Objectives

On February 24, 2022, a special military operation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine (special operation) was launched to prevent further civilian casualties and a humanitarian catastrophe in the Donbass, to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine, to prevent Ukraine from becoming a nuclear power and, as a consequence, to protect the state interests and sovereignty of the Russian Federation.

The decision to carry out the special operation was preceded by the Resolution of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation No. 743-8 GD, unanimously adopted by the deputies of the State Duma on February 15, 2022.

The decision to conduct a special operation was preceded by the Resolution, unanimously adopted by the deputies of the State Duma on February 15, 2022, of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, No. 743-8 GD: ” “On the appeal of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to the President of the Russian Federation, V.V. Putin, on the need to recognize the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic. The appeal noted:

Residents of Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine at the all-Ukrainian referendum on March 27, 1994 agreed to the federal-territorial structure of Ukraine and the consolidation of the Russian language as the state language of Ukraine, along with the Ukrainian language, and also supported the use of the Russian language in the territories of Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine, in the sphere of labor relations, office work, documentation, education, and scientific activities.

The new authorities of Ukraine, glorifying the fascists Bandera, Shukhevych and their followers, became intolerant of the historically established norms of life, as well as the will and religion of the inhabitants of these regions. The actions of the Ukrainian authorities forced residents of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine to initiate a referendum and vote, in May 2014, for the adoption of the Act of Self-Determination of the Donetsk People’s Republic (89%) and the Act of Self-Determination of the Luhansk People’s Republic (96%).

For eight years, residents of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine lived under shelling of small- and large-caliber weapons. According to the United Nations, more than 10,000 people have died, more than 50,000 have been injured, more than 1.4 million people are internally displaced within Ukraine, and more than 2.5 million people have arrived en masse in the Russian Federation, seeking emergency asylum. The Ukrainian authorities had stopped paying pensions and social benefits to residents and had established a complete economic blockade of the population and enterprises of certain regions of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine. The actions of the Ukrainian authorities can be regarded as the genocide of their own people.

As it became known from the originals of secret cipher telegrams captured by Russian military personnel during the special operation, on January 22, 2022, the commander of the National Guard of Ukraine, Colonel-General Mykola Balan, ordered the heads of the northern Kiev, southern Odessa and western territorial departments of the National Guard of Ukraine to prepare one of the strike groups for offensive operations in the zone of the “Joint Forces Operation” (JFO) in the Donbass. All activities of combat coordination of the nationalists were ordered to be completed on February 28, 2022, in order to continue to carry out combat missions as part of the Ukrainian “Joint Forces Operation” in the Donbass.

By February 2022, Ukrainian forces multiplied the shelling of the Donbass with prohibited large-caliber artillery weapons. Against the background of false statements about the desire for peace, Kyiv had begun large-scale artillery preparations for an offensive by a strike group of troops pulled into eastern Ukraine, with the support of aviation and missile systems.

On February 21, the leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) Denis Pushilin and Leonid Pasechnik addressed the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin with a request to recognize the republics:

  • Denis Pushilin, head of the DPR: “On behalf of the entire people of the DPR, we ask you to recognize the Donetsk People’s Republic as an independent, democratic, legal, social state. We also ask you to consider the possibility of concluding an agreement on friendship and cooperation between the DPR and the Russian Federation, providing for cooperation in the field of defense;”
  • Leonid Pasechnik, head of the LPR: “Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich, in order to prevent the mass death of the civilian population of the republic, 300 thousand of whom are citizens of Russia, I ask you to recognize the sovereignty and independence of the Lugansk People’s Republic.”

On the same day, an unscheduled meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation was held in the Kremlin, under the leadership of the head of state, to discuss the appeal and the situation that had developed in the Donbass. Each gave his proposals to the President regarding the appeals of the leaders of the DPR and LPR to Russia, with a request to recognizing their sovereignty, and the resolution of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, calling on the head of state to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the DPR and LPR.

On February 21, the President of the Russian Federation signed Decrees No. 71 “On the Recognition of the Donetsk People’s Republic,” and No. 72 “On the Recognition of the Lugansk People’s Republic.”

On February 22, the State Duma adopted, the Federation Council approved, and the President of the Russian Federation signed and promulgated federal laws No. 15-FZ “On the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Donetsk People’s Republic,” and No. 16-FZ “On the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Lugansk People’s Republic.”

On the same day, the President of the Russian Federation submitted to the Federation Council a proposal to adopt a resolution of the Federation Council on consent to the use of the Armed Forces outside the territory of the Russian Federation. On February 22, the Federation Council adopted Decree of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation No. 35-SF “On the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside the territory of the Russian Federation.” The decision of the Federation Council was aimed at establishing peace, preventing the continuation of bloodshed and shelling of citizens.

All these acts were adopted in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and in compliance with the necessary procedures provided for the activities of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

On February 23, the Heads of the DPR (Denis Pushilin) and LPR (Leonid Pasechnik) appealed to the President of the Russian Federation, with a request to provide assistance in repelling aggression from the Armed Forces of Ukraine (APU), in order to avoid civilian casualties and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in the Donbass. The appeals emphasized the following:

… at present, due to the aggravation of the situation and threats from Kyiv, the citizens of the republics are forced to leave their homes, their evacuation to Russia continues. In the context of ongoing military aggression by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the republics, the destruction of civilian and industrial infrastructure, schools, hospitals, kindergartens and, worst of all, the death of the civilian population, including children. The actions of the Kyiv regime testify to the unwillingness to stop the war in the Donbass;

Kyiv continues to build up its military presence on the line of contact, while receiving comprehensive support, including military support, from the United States and other Western states. The Kiev regime is focused on the forceful solution of the conflict.

Taking the above into account, the heads of the two republics, in connection with the current situation, as well as in order to prevent civilian casualties and a humanitarian catastrophe, on the basis of Articles 3 and 4 of the treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the Russian Federation and the republics, asked the President of Russia to assist in repelling the aggression of the armed forces and formations of Ukraine.

On February 24, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, V.V. Putin, the Russian Armed Forces launched a special military operation to protect the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics.

The President announced his decision in an address to the citizens of Russia on February 24 at 06:00 Moscow time:

Circumstances require us to take decisive and immediate action. The people’s republics of Donbass turned to Russia with a request for help.

In this regard, in accordance with Article 51 of Part 7 of the UN Charter, with the sanction of the Federation Council of Russia, and in pursuance of the treaties of friendship and mutual assistance, ratified by the Federal Assembly on February 22 this year with the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic, I have decided to conduct a special military operation.

Its goal is to protect people who have been subjected to bullying and genocide by the Kyiv regime for eight years. And for this we will strive for the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, as well as bringing to justice those who have committed numerous murderous crimes against civilians, including citizens of the Russian Federation.

In doing so, our plans do not include the occupation of Ukrainian territories. We are not going to impose anything on anyone by force.

When making decisions, as reported by the Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Colonel General Sergey F. Rudskoy, two possible courses of action were considered. The first, to confine ourselves to the territory of the DPR and LPR within the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, which is enshrined in the constitutions of the republics. The first was to limit the territory of only the DNR and LNR within the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which is enshrined in the constitutions of the republics. But at that time there was a high probability that the Ukrainian authorities would constantly support the group involved in the so-called joint forces operation. Therefore, the second option was chosen, providing for actions on the entire territory of Ukraine, with the implementation of measures to demilitarize and denazify it.

Ukrainian Nationalism: Origins, Essence and Content

How did nationalism develop so radically in Ukraine that the Russian army has to solve the task of its denazification? What are the essence, content and origins of nationalism in modern Ukraine?

First of all, let us define the concept of “nationalism.” In the West, it is widely used in the same sense as patriotism. And in Russia these concepts have different content. The patriotism of the multinational Russian people is traditionally combined with respect for the interests, culture and patriotic feelings of the peoples of other countries, and nationalism, especially in extreme, radical forms—chauvinism, fascism, Nazism is condemned as an ideology that opposes peoples and states to each other, sowing enmity and serving an aggressive policy. These features are inherent in radical Ukrainian nationalism. Under the slogans of self-determination and independence, Ukrainian radical nationalists, Ukronazis, throughout the history of their movement have pursued the goal of selling their native Ukraine to foreign colonizers in order to become a privileged collaborationist caste of overseers over their compatriots.

In the early 1930s, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) declared the goal of creating its own “self-styled” state. But realizing that these aspirations were impossible and unattainable, it limited its dreams to being the Ukrainian colony of Germany in the hope of serving the role of henchmen of future colonizers. For the sake of this the OUN fought against full-fledged Ukrainian statehood and for its replacement by the false tinsel of a puppet, self-styled “independence”—and against the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, a full-fledged Ukrainian state, equal among equals with the Soviet federation, and one of the founders of the USSR and the United Nations. And the OUN’s descendants sold for foreign money and cookies the independence of their native Ukraine, obtained with the help of Russia in 1991, together with the huge territories given to it by Russia during the time when both of them were in the United Federation. And the US with its NATO satellites bought Ukraine—along with the sellers—in order to fight against Russia and destroy it.

The roots of terror and genocide in Ukraine in the 21st century are in the ideology and bloody experience of Ukrainian nationalism. In 1900, the “ideologist of Ukrainian sovereign independence” Mykola I. Mikhnovsky, called “the forerunner of strong-willed Ukrainian nationalism,” in a speech, later published in Lvov as a program of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP), in the pamphlet Independent Ukraine, proclaimed ultra-radical racist slogans:

  • One, the only, indivisible, free, independent Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caucasus.
  • Everyone who is not for us throughout Ukraine is against us. Ukraine is for Ukrainians, and as long as at least one foreign enemy remains on our territory, we have no right to lay down our arms” [M. Míkhnovsʹkiy, Samostíyna Ukraí̈na. B/m, 2012. (in Ukrainian). p. 17, 18].

The most amazing maxim of this opus is the assertion that “God himself has become a stranger and does not know (in the original “is not able,” apparently, in the meaning “does not know how”—V.K.) the Ukrainian language.

Having created the Ukrainian People’s Party (UNP), even more radical than the RUP, Mikhnovsky published its “code”—”The Ten Commandments of the UNP.” Some of these later became the basis of the ideology of OUN Ukronazism:

  • One, united, indivisible from the Carpathians right up to the Caucasus, independent, free, democratic Ukraine;
  • All people are your brothers, but Muscovites, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians and Jews are the enemies of our people;
  • Ukraine is for Ukrainians. So, drive out the foreign oppressors from everywhere in Ukraine;”
  • Everywhere and always use the Ukrainian language. Let neither your wife nor your children defile your house with the language of foreign oppressors;
  • Do not take a wife from strangers, because your children will be your enemies. Do not be friends with the enemies of our people, because you give them strength and courage. Do not act (in the original Ukrainian—“do not mess around”—V.K.) together with our oppressors, for you will be a traitor.

Mikhnovsky’s RUP program was published in Lvov. There, as early as 1897, he established close contacts with pro-Ukrainian figures in Galicia. In Galicia, which was part of Austria-Hungary, the anti-Russian, Russophobic orientation of Ukrainian nationalism was formed. From there, the doctrine of aggressive Galician Ukrainianism began to be planted in Malorossiya, even before the emergence of Italian fascism and German Nazism, in their misanthropic, racist spirit, incited hatred. In 1912, the Ukrainian-language magazine Ukrainska Khata (Ukrainian House), published in Kiev, urged:

If you love Ukraine, you must sacrifice your love for other geographical areas. If you love your language, hate the language of your enemy… Know how to hate. If we are talking about Ukraine, we should operate with one word—hatred of its enemies… Revival of Ukraine is synonymous with hatred of your wife—a Muscovite, to one’s children—Katsaps, to one’s brothers and sisters—Katsaps, to one’s father and mother—Katsaps. To love Ukraine means to sacrifice your Katsap kin… If you love Ukraine, if you want it to be—be with it, do not be with its denial” [Ukraí̈nsʹka khata, 1912, No. 6 (in Ukrainian)].

The predecessor of the OUN, the Ukrainian Military (Army) Organization (UVO), founded in 1920 and headed by Yevhen M. Konovalets, responded to the Polish oppression of the indigenous population of Galicia with terror. The most notorious action was the unsuccessful assassination attempt of the chief of the Polish state Józef Pilsudski, on September 25, 1921 (V. Kruzhkov, “Ukrainskiy natsionalizm v Rossiyskoy imperii i na yeyo oblomkakh,”—”Ukrainian nationalism in the Russian Empire and its ruin,” in Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ (9)2021).

Soon Konovalets established cooperation with the German intelligence, and the UVO began to receive money from the Germans for espionage against Poland. The headquarters of the UVO was located in Berlin. With the help of German money, the UVO unleashed terror and sabotage in Poland (explosions, attacks, robberies-expropriations, etc.) [Ukrainskiye natsionalisticheskiye organizatsii v gody Vtoroy mirovoy voyny. DokumentyUkrainian nationalist organizations during the Second World War. V 2 (T. 1. M.: ROSSPEN, 2012), pp. 335, 776; 5].

According to one researcher, “The UVO, in which the OUN originated, was a criminal organization. In the criminal sense, this criminality consisted in terrorist murders. Politically, the crime of the UVO, and later of the OUN, was the usurpation of the representation of the entire Ukrainian people. Neither the UVO nor the OUN received such a mandate from the people… never in their activities received the support of the Ukrainian people” (OUN-UPA: mif i real’nost: “Ukrainstvo”—OUN-UPA: Myth and Reality: “Ukrainianness.” Chap. XVII., pp. 142, 143, 143, 143, and V.V. Polishchuk, Gor’kaya pravda. Prestupnost’ OUN-UPABitter Truth. Crimes of the OUN-UPA (Kiev, 2011), pp. 142, 143).

With the establishment of the UVO in 1929, its intelligence service played the dual role of its intelligence and counterintelligence (I.K. Patrylyak, “Sluzhba bezpeky OUN(b),” Entsyklopediya istoriyi Ukrayiny—Security Service of the OUNb. Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine. Vol. 9. Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 2012, pp. 658-660). Separate from the UVO, the OUN created a control and intelligence reference office in 1932. In Western Ukraine, there was an intelligence branch in the regional executio (Latin “executio”: execution, executive body of the regional wire—the OUN governing body), and intelligence and communications services in the districts (S. Hrab, Sluzhba bezpeky Orhanizatsiyi ukrayinsʹkykh natsionalistivSecurity Service of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Voyenna Istoriya, 2008, No. 5).

Some Ukrainian authors directly link the explosive growth of terror of the UVO-OUN in the early 1930s—more than 60 attempts and murders, hundreds of acts of sabotage, and dozens of robberies (“expropriations”)—to the formation of nationalist security structures )D. Vyedyenyeyev, V. Yehorov, Mech i tryzub. Notatky do istoriyi Sluzhby bezpeky Orhanizatsiyi ukrayinsʹkykh natsionalistivyu CH.1. “Z arkhiviv VUCHK, HPU, NKVD, K·HB”—Sword and Trident. Notes on the history of the Security Service of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. “Part 1. From the archives of the Vuchk, GPU, NKVD, KGB.” 2(4) 2000, pp. 485–503).

According to the conclusion of one of the researchers, “the UVO, in which the OUN was born, was a criminal organization.” In the criminal sense, the crimes consisted of terrorist murders. Neither the UVO nor the OUN received such mandates from the people; never in their activities did they receive support from the Ukrainian people” [6, pp. 142, 143].

With the creation of the UVO intelligence agency in 1929, the OUN played the dual role of its intelligence and counter-intelligence [7, p. 658-660]. They created a separate control-reconnaissance service in the OUN in 1932. In Western Ukraine, the regional executive (from the Latin “executio”—“the executive organ of the regional branch”—the governing body of the Ukrainian government) had intelligence services, and in the districts—intelligence and communications services.

Some Ukrainian authors directly link the explosive growth of UVO-OUN terror in the early 1930s with the establishment of the security structure of nationalists—more than 60 attempts and murders, hundreds of acts of sabotage, dozens of robberies (“expropriations”).

In 1932, the Galician national clerical newspaper Tsel (The Goal) murderously proclaimed:

Ukrainian nationalism must be prepared for all methods of struggle… not excluding mass physical extermination (annihilation), even if only at the cost of sacrificing millions of human existences (essences, lives) [Tsel’, April 17, 1932, 11, p. 6; V.I. Maslovsky, Z kym i proty koho voyuvaly ukrayinsʹki natsionalisty v roky Druhoyi svitovoyi viyny—With whom and against whom Ukrainian nationalists fought during the Second World War (M.: Slavyanskyy Dyaloh)].

The OUN “Military Doctrine of the Ukrainian Nationalists” of 1938 demanded:

Against the hostile element it is necessary to issue such cruelty… so that the tenth generation would be afraid to look in the direction of Ukraine.
In the future Ukrainian state, there must be a pure national composition… Poles, Russians and Jews must be destroyed.(“Arkhivy OUN: ukrainskiye natsionalisty stavili tsel’yu vyseleniye i unichtozheniye vsekh polyakov—”OUN archives: Ukrainian nationalists aimed to evict and destroy all Poles.” TASS. 01.12.2016)

In the spring of 1941, Bandera and Co. with the briefing, “Struggle and Activities of the OUN During the War,” specified the tasks of genocide and terror: to destroy “hostile” national minorities—”Moskals,” Poles, Jews. They demanded: “Our power must be terrible for its opponents, terrorize foreign enemies and their traitors… The Ukrainian ruler of his own land must from every rank, at every step be promoted.”

The section, “Organization of the Security Service,” listed the enemies of the OUN to be destroyed: “Moskals,” Jews,”outsiders, mainly various Asians, with whom Moscow is colonizing Ukraine, Poles in the western Ukrainian lands”. The Security Service was given “executive power… to destroy elements hostile to Ukraine… as well as… to control social and political life in general” (“OUN v 1941 rotsi.” Dokumenty. V 2-kh ch. CH. 1. Kyiv: Instytut ictopiyi Ukrayiny NAN Ukrayiny—”OUN in 1941.” Documents, in 2 parts. Part 1. Kyiv: Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2006, pp. 102, 103, 129, 159).

Roman Y. Shukhevych, the SS Hauptsturmführer, and leader of the UPA and the OUN “on Ukrainian lands,” who was elevated to “hero” of the Banderized Ukraine (“Yushchenko awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine to Shukhevich, one of the UPA leaders,” RIA Novosti. 14.10.2007), demanded: “Not to intimidate, but to physically destroy! There is no need to be afraid that people will curse us for our cruelty. Let half of the 40 million Ukrainian population remain—there is nothing terrible in this” (“Kakiye geroi—takaya i derzhava”—”What heroes-such a power,” in Odna Rodina, 04.01.2016).

Ideology of Nationalism in the Service of the Kiev Regime in Modern Ukraine

The anti-Russian hysteria in Ukraine, which began in the years of perestroika, based on Bandera templates, along with the glorification of the OUN-UPA butchers, became the ideological justification for turning the Ukrainian regime into a puppet and anti-Russian tool of the United States and the West. It has intensified since 2004, when one of the leaders of the first Maidan, head of the “Batkivshchyna” party, people’s deputy of Ukraine (this is the constitutional name for the deputies of its Verkhovna Rada, hereinafter, Nardep), future Prime Minister of Ukraine (in 2005 and 2007-2010), Yulia V. Tymoshenko, demanded that the Donbass be with barbed wire and napalm poured on it (A. Moskval, “‘Molyashchemusya’ Poroshenko o nachale voyny v Donbasse”—“’Praying’ Poroshenko about the beginning of the war in Donbass,” in Odna Rodina, 01.06.2018). Back in 2014, she stated: “…it is necessary… to kill these bloody Katsaps together with their leader… so that, damn it, there is not even a scorched field left of this Russia! …it is necessary to shoot them with atomic weapons.”

In December 2014, MPs Yuriy M. Bereza, Andriy M. Levus, and Igor V. Mosiychuk justified the terrorist attack in Grozny and called for similar crimes in Russia with the help of the media (“SK RF vozbudil delo protiv trokh deputatov Verkhovnoy rady za prizyv k terrorizmu”—”Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened a case against three deputies of the Verkhovna Rada for calling for terrorism,” in TASS, 12/06/2014). Ex-prime minister Iryna D. Faryon made criminal (according to the forensic conclusion) calls “to destroy Russia as a state and Russians as a group of people on the basis of nationality,” to carry out genocide (“SKR reshil nakazat’ eks-deputata Rady Farion za prizyvy ‘unichtozhat Rossiyu'”—”TFR decided to punish the ex-deputy of the Rada Faryon for calls to ‘destroy Russia,'” in NTV, 08.07.2015). Tyahnybok’s neo-Banderite Svoboda also called for it:

No matter how qualitatively the Russian-speaking amorphous biomass of living stomachs lives—they will not start singing on October 14 (the date of the alleged formation of the UPA, and since 2014 the holiday, “Day of Defenders and Protectors of Ukraine,” which legalized the substitution of the concepts of “heroism” and “betrayal,” the abuse of the memory of the fallen in battles with fascism and the victims of the Banderites: “Gossovet Respubliki Krym prinyal zayavleniye v svyazi s situatsiyey na Ukraine”—”The State Council of the Republic of Crimea adopted a statement in connection with the situation in Ukraine,” in Sayt Gossoveta Respubliki Krym, 22.10.2014—V.K.).” “Oh, there’s a red viburnum in the meadow…” (since 1914, the song of Ukrainian Sich Sagittarius, which is also sung by the UPA: —V.K.), will not pass in torch procession on January 1 (Bandera’s birthday—V.K.). This herd should be liquidated, somewhere around 5-6 million individuals… For 45-million of Ukraine, the disappearance of 6 million will be imperceptible” (“Iz FB Marii Zakharovoy”—”From FB Maria Zakharova,” in Antimaydan, 19.03.2022).

On Maidan 2014 and afterward, neo-Banderites shouted: “Knife the Moskals!” They called for them to be hanged and made their own meme: “Slit Russians!” This was shouted by two-legged predators, with SS symbols, accompanied by shouts of “Sieg Heil!” and raising of hands in the Nazi salute, by children zombified by them. Oleksandr Turchynov, “Bloody pastor,” ex-speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, by whose decree the acting president began the genocide of the people of the Donbass, proclaimed:

We are ready to destroy the Russians wherever we can. It is necessary to beat Russians not only in Ukraine, but also beyond its borders—on the territory of Russia (“Byvshiy spiker Rady Turchinov prizval k genotsidu russkikh—Former speaker of the Rada Turchinov called for the genocide of Russians,” in Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 01.03.2022).

This position of the Ukronazis was declared even during the special operation, on the Ukrainian Channel24, by its employee Fakhrudin M. Sharafmal (“Operatsiya po zakhvatu natsistskogo prestupnika Adolfa Eykhmana (1960)”—”The operation to capture the Nazi criminal Adolf Eichmann (1960),” in RIA Novosti. 11.05.2020). Eloquently and literally, he quoted the words of the Nazi criminal, one of the organizers and executors of Hitler’s holocaust policy:

Eichmann said… to destroy a nation, it is necessary to destroy first of all children, because by killing their parents—children will grow up and will definitely take revenge. If you kill the children, they will never grow up and the nation will disappear (“V Ukraine net natsizma”—”There is no Nazism in Ukraine,” Pikabu).

And Sharafmal continued, flouting the Geneva (and other) conventions, that

when I get a chance to kill Russians, I will… observe the Adolf Eichmann doctrine and make sure that neither you nor your children will ever live on this earth…. you must realize that this is about victory for the Ukrainian people, not peace. We need victory. If that requires slaughtering all of your families, I will be one of the first to do it… And I hope that there will never be another nation like Russia and the Russians on this earth…. If Ukrainians have the opportunity … to crush, slaughter, kill, strangle the Muskalnaya, I hope that everyone will contribute and ‘mop’ at least one Muskal.

Note: Sharafmal threatened to destroy not Russians, but the nation itself—a set of citizens of one state with a common self-consciousness (identity). All citizens of Russia of all nationalities. (In Ukrainian, “Russians,” the nationality and “Russians,” citizens of Russia of all nationalities are referred to by one word – “Russians”). And it is possible to fulfill this threat only by massacres all over Russia. In fact, he called for a total terrorist war in Ukraine and Russia, desired by the United States. But Sharafmal did not go to the front himself. He “fought” on the air.

These incitements were condemned by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (“V UVKPCH OON osudili prizyv ukrainskogo zhurnalista k genotsidu russkikh,”—”UN OHCHR condemned Ukrainian journalist’s call for genocide of Russians, in RIA Novosti, 03/17/2022). The Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened a criminal case against Sharafmal on the grounds of the crimes stipulated by para. “b” part 2 of article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, “Incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity,” subparagraphs “a,” “c,” part 2 of article 354.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, “Rehabilitation of Nazism.” Ukrainian judiciary is obligated to judge Sharafmal’s incitement under the Criminal Code of Ukraine—Article 2582, “Public calls to commit a terrorist act” (up to five years of imprisonment) and under Article 442 “Genocide,” which provides for up tofive years of imprisonment for public calls for it (Criminal Code of Ukraine, effective from 03/16/2022). But it did not. It seems that justice has disappeared in the Bandarized Ukraine. Acts recognized as crimes by international law, laws of different countries, including Ukraine, have become unpunished demonstrations of “national opinion” (conscience).

It is important to note one more circumstance. The main striking force and organizer of terror, the participation of the Banderites in the fascist genocide of our people was Bandera’s inquisition—the Security Service (SB) of the OUN and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) banned in Russia. (The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, banned in Russia, was an anti-Soviet armed group of Ukrainian nationalists that operated mainly in Western Ukraine, from December 1941 to July 1943—created by Taras-Bulba Borovets. In 1943, the OUNb gangs merged into the UPAb, the Borovets UPA ceased to exist, its members joined the OUNm and UPAb gangs. From 1944-1949, the UPA committed acts of terrorism, sabotage. It was completely liquidated in the early 1950s). The brutal traditions of Bandera’s executioners are continued by their modern-day descendants in Ukraine. Back in 2015, the then head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) Valentyn O. Nalyvaichenko stated that the SBU should be reformed on the model of the Banderite inquisition: “it is important to take as a basis the traditions and approaches to the work of the Security Service of OUN-UPA” (A. Sidorchik, “Inkvizitsiya Bandery. Kak ‘Sluzhba bezpeki’ sozdavala ‘Ukrainu dlya ukraintsev,'”—”Bandera’s Inquisition. How the ‘Security Service’ created ‘Ukraine for Ukrainians,'” in Argumenty i fakty, 02.04.2015).

Tyahnybok of the far-right nationalist party, Svoboda argued:

The Security Service of Ukraine remains the only carrier of the Ukrainian state idea in the 21st century, a kind of link between its past and future. And, accordingly, the leadership of the nationalist movement should be formed primarily from officers of the security services, because there is no other personnel reserve (I. Matveyev, “SSHA i YES rukami VO «Svoboda» gotovyatsya unichtozhat’ russkikh na Ukraine,”—”The US and the EU are preparing to destroy the Russians in Ukraine with the hands of the VO ‘Svoboda,'” in Voyennoye obozreniye, 26.02.2014).

According to the assessment of the Belarusian analyst, the Banderization regime, starting with President Viktor A. Yushchenko, turned the SBU into the “Service of Ukraine’s Banderization” (N. Malishevsky, “Sluzhba banderizatsii Ukrainy”—“The Banderization Service of Ukraine,” in RIA Novosti. 12/01/2014), and with its atrocities in the Donbass has likened the Ukrainian security forces to the OUN and UPA, which were recognized by the Court of Peoples—the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal—as accomplices to the crimes of Hitler’s Germany, which according to Article 6 of the Statute of the Tribunal are responsible for them (Statute of the International Military Tribunal for the trial and punishment of the main war criminals of the European Axis). As the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation pointed out on November 17, 2014, in its decision to declare the UPA and four other Ukrainian organizations extremist and ban their activities in Russia, the Nuremberg Tribunal recognized the OUN and UPA as collaborators. (From the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, in case No. AKPI14-1292C of November 17, 2014: “…to recognize the Ukrainian organizations ‘Right Sector,’ ‘Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian People’s Self-Defense’ (UNA-UNSO), ‘Ukrainian Insurgent Army’ (UPA), ‘Stepan Bandera’s Trident,’ and ‘Brotherhood’ as extremist and ban their activities on the territory of the Russian Federation.” See: Official website of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation).

Denazification of Ukraine

To compare the goals and deeds of Hitlerites and accomplices of their crimes—the OUN-UPA and usurpers of power of the Maidan-2014, organizers and participants in the genocide of the people of the Donbass, allow evidence collected by law enforcement and the civilian researchers (Obyknovennyy fashizm: voyennyye prestupleniya ukrainskikh silovikov (2014—2016)Ordinary Fascism: War crimes of the Ukrainian security forces (2014-2016). Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, 2016, p. 431), and the media. These are the documents from archives, investigations and courts.

A lawsuit on the facts of genocide of the population of the Donbass and other acts in Ukraine, based on copies of criminal case files handed over by the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, has been considered by the European Court of Human Rights since July 2021.

“The nationalists who have seized power have unleashed a persecution, a real terror campaign against those who opposed their anti-constitutional actions… A wave of violence swept Ukrainian cities, including a series of high-profile and unpunished murders,” Russian President Vladimir V. Putin stated in an address on February 21, 2022. “One shudders at the memories of the terrible tragedy in Odessa, where peaceful protesters were brutally murdered, burned alive in the House of Trade Unions. The criminals who committed that atrocity have never been punished, and no one is even looking for them. But we know their names and we will do everything to punish them, find them and bring them to justice.”

By February 10, 2022, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation initiated 467 criminal cases, on the grounds of numerous crimes of the Maidan usurpers of power and their friends against dissenters, on the grounds of genocide of the population of the Donbass, killings and torture of its inhabitants by the agencies of the SBU, the Interior Ministry, the Ukrainian army and nationalist battalions (the Natzbat), which were of a large-scale and systemic nature (Obyknovennyy fashizm. Ukrainskiye voyennyye prestupleniya i narusheniya prav chelovek. 2017-2020Ordinary Fascism. Ukrainian war crimes and human rights violations. 2017-2020. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 2020, p. 452). Thus, in 2014, a criminal case was opened on suspicion of crimes of the then head of the SBU, V.A. Nalyvaichenko. In April 2022, another criminal case was opened against Nalyvaichenko for calling for violence against the Russian military. 103 perpetrators were prosecuted in absentia. Among them are the former head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Arsen B. Avakov and the former governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region, Igor V. Kolomoisky. Former Deputy Interior Minister Anton Y. Gerashchenko, was sentenced to six years in prison in absentia. Criminal cases were investigated against ex-Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Oleksandr V. Turchinov, ex-ministers of defense Anatoliy S. Hrytsenko and Valeriy V. Heletey, and ex-Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Victor M. Muzhenko.

On March 18, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov explained the meaning of Ukraine’s denazification. In his opinion, it implies the abolition of not only laws that encourage Nazi ideology and practices, but also laws that discriminate against the Russian-speaking population.

As the course of the special operation confirmed, the strongholds of the Kyiv regime are nationalist units, such as Azov, Aidar, Right Sector and others recognized in Russia as terrorist organizations. In Mariupol alone, they had more than 7,000 militants who “fought” under the cover of civilians, using them as human shields. The Azov militants drove women and children out of basements, threatening them with weapons and directing them towards the advancing DNR units in order to impede the advance of the People’s Militia. This has become a common practice for them.

Russian investigators found out that the Azov unit is made up of people of different ages, education levels and life experiences. But they are united in their unwavering determination to kill innocent people. This is the essence of Azov nationalists. To understand this, it is enough to give a few examples. In early March, in Mariupol, Azov member, Sergei Mikhailenko, and his colleague with the call sign “Drone” were near a residential building. A passenger car with “Children” written in large letters was moving in their direction. Despite this, they opened fire on the car, killing the four family members in it, including a three-year-old child. Another example. Alexei Mozgovoy and his brother Yuri took positions in a five-story building in Mariupol. There were 15 civilians in the basement, among them a man suffering from a serious illness. The nationalist brothers, threatening to kill, forbade civilians to leave the basement, even to bring medicine to the sick man. As a result, the man died. And when civilians, having seen what had happened, wanted to leave the place, the Mozgovs started shooting at them—four more people died. And, unfortunately, there are many such examples.

The testimonies of civilians who came out of the blockaded settlements and of captured Ukrainian servicemen show that the Ukrainian armed forces’ ability to resist is based on fear of reprisals from neo-Nazis. Their representatives are embedded in all troop units.

On 30 March, Russian Education Minister Sergey Kravtsov said that more than 50 experts, teachers and historians had analyzed textbooks and teaching aids used by teachers and children in Ukraine. It turned out that whole pages of history were rewritten in them. All this was financed by foreign countries.

“We could see that this is deliberate work, fabricating a system that distorts historical truth. This is not only aggression and readiness for a military operation against our country, but also the zombification of teachers, schoolchildren—and often violently—against Russia. We will never allow history, geography to be distorted, the facts of the Great Patriotic War, our friendship with Ukraine and other countries. Our country is always open, has always helped brotherly nations, including Ukraine,” emphasized Sergey Kravtsov.

“History textbooks emphasize military topics. The education minister drew attention to the fact that the authors of the manuals emphasized that “modern Ukraine needs a compact mobile army in the conditions of aggression by the Russian Federation… History textbooks name Bandera and Shukhevych as heroes, which are thus cultivated. The children’s nationalist organization “Plast” has been revived—Bandera and Shukhevych were its members. In it, Nazism is directly elevated to an absolute,” said Kravtsov.

After the investigation, the textbooks were handed over to the museum of the “Russia—My History” park, where a corresponding section of the “Liberation” display will be created. Everyone will be able to familiarize themselves with the facts of the distortion of history and geography in Ukrainian educational materials.

On April 2, the Investigative Committee of Russia, continuing to investigate crimes committed by the Ukrainian military and nationalists against the civilian population of the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics, on the basis of the collected evidence, in addition to the earlier charges under Article 356 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (use of prohibited means and methods of warfare), brought charges in absentia against 22 high-ranking Ukrainian military officers for genocide of the civilian Russian-speaking population (Article 357 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) of Donbas.

In violation of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and other international legal instruments condemning genocide, Ukrainian military officers in leadership positions gave orders, and others followed them, to completely destroy a national group of Russian-speaking citizens living on the territory of the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics.

For eight years, Ukrainian security forces have been shelling populated areas in the Donbass using Grad and Uragan multiple-launch rocket systems, cluster-headed unguided aerial missiles, Tochka-U tactical missiles and other types of heavy offensive weapons with indiscriminate effects. As a result, a large number of civilians were killed and injured and civilian infrastructure and life-supporting facilities were destroyed.

Among the Defendants

High-ranking Ukrainian military charged in absentia for genocide of the Russian-speaking population in the Donbass:

  • Ukrainian Defense Minister, Valeriy Geletey (from July 2014 to October 2014);
  • Ukrainian Defense Minister, Stepan Poltorak (from October 2014 to August 2019);
  • First Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Ivan Rusnak (since September 2014);
  • Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Oleksandr Dublyan (from October 2015 to December 2016);
  • Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Igor Pavlovsky (from 2015 to 2019);
  • Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Oleg Shevchuk (from November 2016 to September 2019);
  • Viktor Muzhenko, chief of the AFU General Staff (from July 2014 to May 2019);
  • Commander of the 13th Army Corps of the AFU Ground Forces (subsequently First Deputy Chief of the AFU General Staff, 2019), Igor Kolesnik;
  • Deputy Chief of General Staff of the AFU, Vladimir Khizhiy (2014);
  • Deputy Chief of General Staff of the AFU, Sergey Bessarab (from 2015 to March 2020);
  • Vasyl Burba, Head of the Main Intelligence Department of the AFU (from 2016 to 2020);
  • Commander of the AFU Ground Forces, Sergey Popko (from 2014 to 2016);
  • Commander of the Air Force of the AFU, Sergey Drozdov (from 2015 to 2021);
  • Commander of the High Mobility Airborne Troops of the AFU, Mikhail Zabrodsky (from 2015 to 2019);
  • Commander of the AFU Special Operations Forces, Igor Lunev (from 2016 to 2020);
  • Commander of the AFU Naval Forces, Igor Voronchenko (from 2016 to 2020);
  • Commander of the troops of the Operational Command “East” of the AFU Ground Forces, Sergey Naev (from 2018 to 2019);
  • Deputy Commander of the troops of the Operational Command “West” of the AFU Ground Forces (since March 22, 2017—commander of the troops of the Operational Command “West” of the AFU Ground Forces), Oleksandr Pavlyuk;
  • First Deputy Commander of the Operational Command “North” of the AFU Ground Forces, Andriy Grishchenko (2016);
  • First Deputy Commander of the troops of the Operational Command “East” of the AFU Ground Forces, Oleksandr Krasnook (2017);
  • First Deputy Commander of the AFU Ground Forces, Oleksandr Lokota (2016);
  • Commander of the 30th separate mechanized brigade of the AFU, Ivan Garaz (2015).

In total, as of July 25, 2022, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation had opened more than 1,300 criminal cases, in which more than 400 persons are being prosecuted. The preliminary investigation has already established the involvement of more than 220 persons, including representatives of the high command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and commanders of military units that shelled civilians, in crimes against peace and security of humanity that have no statute of limitations. A total of 92 commanders and their subordinates have been charged. A total of 96 individuals, including 51 AFU commanders, are wanted.

On April 3, the chairman of the Investigative Committee of Russia, Alexander I. Bastrykin, supported the initiative of the LPR representatives on the need to hold a tribunal on the war crimes of the Ukrainian regime in Donbas, expressing readiness for its establishment. He noted that the Investigative Committee of Russia has been recording all unlawful actions of the AFU and other Ukrainian nationalist military formations against the peaceful population of the Donbass for eight years. Each fact is given a legal assessment. In future, the evidence gathered by the Russian investigation will be presented to the public, and those involved in committing these crimes will be brought to trial.

Numerous war crimes by Ukrainian nationalists have already been recognized at the international level. For example, on April 6, the American publication The New York Times confirmed the authenticity of a video showing Ukrainian nationalists shooting wounded Russian servicemen, and on April 7, at a press conference in Brussels, the NATO Secretary General called for an investigation into all reports of war crimes in Ukraine, but refused to comment on video footage of Ukrainian nationalists killing Russian prisoners of war—”because he knew nothing concrete about it.”

On June 1, 2022, the chairman of the Committee on Criminal and Administrative Legislation of the People’s Council of the DNR, Elena N. Shishkina, stated that the composition of judges at the international tribunal against Ukrainian militants may include representatives of European countries “who will respond and will not be afraid to openly oppose Nazism, which thrives on the territory of the state of Ukraine,” invitations to which have been sent. She also admitted that the first meeting of the interim “Mariupol tribunal,” whose charter is being drafted, might take place before the end of the summer.

At the same time, as Bastrykin noted on July 25, 2022, “given the position of the ‘collective West,’ which openly sponsors Ukrainian nationalism and supports the Kyiv regime,” the establishment of an international tribunal, under the auspices of the United Nations, “is extremely doubtful in the current perspective. It would be more appropriate to work on this issue with Russian partners in such organizations as the CIS, CSTO, BRICS and SCO. The establishment of the court and its statutes could be formalized by an agreement between Russia, member countries of these organizations and the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. At the same time, it would also be advisable to involve other countries demonstrating an independent position on the Ukrainian issue, based on the norms of international law, in particular Syria, Iran and Bolivia. The establishment of an international judicial body would demonstrate to the entire international community the inevitability of punishment for crimes against the peace and security of mankind and the determination of Russia and our country’s true partners in eradicating Nazism, nationalism and xenophobia.”

However, the inevitability of the complete denazification of Ukraine and the holding of an international tribunal against the war criminals of the Kyiv regime does not stop the succession of their madness, which extends not only to the civilian population of the Donbass but also to civilians in Ukraine and Russia. Thus, on April 27, at around 11 p.m. Moscow time, the Ukrainian armed forces launched a massive missile strike with Tochka-U ballistic missiles and high-powered multiple-launch rocket systems against residential neighborhoods in the central part of the city of Kherson. The targets of the indiscriminate missile strike by the nationalists were residential neighborhoods near Ushakov Avenue, where kindergartens, schools and many social institutions are also located. Russian air defense units repelled the missile attack by Ukrainian troops on residential areas of Kherson. Twelve high-powered multiple rocket launchers and two Ukrainian Tochka-U ballistic missiles were shot down in the air above the city. Fragments of one of the downed Ukrainian Tochka-U missiles fell in Shevchenko Park. The indiscriminate missile strikes by the Kyiv nationalist regime against residential areas in Izium and Kherson constitute a war crime and a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law.

Another example is the shelling, by units of the Ukrainian armed forces, of the liberated villages of Kiselevka and Shirokaya Balka in the Kherson region on May 1st. The Ukrainian nationalists were firing at purely civilian objects. A school and a kindergarten, in the village of Kiselevka, came under artillery fire. Also, artillery fire was purposefully directed at the cemetery located on the outskirts of Shirokaya Balka, where there were people at that moment. As a result of the shelling, civilians were injured and killed. The buildings of the school, kindergarten and private houses were seriously damaged. Because of the consequences of the shelling by the AFU, the residents of these settlements were partially deprived of electricity.

Since February 25, Ukrainian nationalists have been subjecting civilian infrastructure facilities on the territory of Russia—the Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kursk and Rostov regions—to artillery and rocket fire and air strikes. On May 11th, such a criminal act ended in tragedy for the first time: one person was killed and six others injured when Ukrainian troops shelled the village of Solokhi in the Belgorod region of the Russian Federation. Subsequently, instances of death of the population of Russia, as a result of the use of firearms by Ukraine, have been recorded on numerous occasions.

On the territory of the LNR and DNR, nationalists destroyed and partially damaged more than 7,000 civilian infrastructure facilities, including residential houses, schools, kindergartens, and vehicles. During the entire period of investigation in the criminal case of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation by mid-July 2022, more than 216,000 people were questioned; more than 91,000 people were recognized as victims, including 14,072 minors.

It is likely that after the publication of this article, other crimes of the Kiev nationalist regime will be uncovered. The investigation and decisions of the courts and the International Tribunal on the genocide of Russian people during the Great Patriotic War and, in 2014-2022, of the population of Donbass, on terror, murders and pogroms in modern Ukraine will provide new arguments to expose Hitlerism, the OUN and their modern followers, and to carry out the denazification of Ukraine.


Banderites in the service of the Third Reich and their pro-American followers in modern Ukraine are united by a single ideology—radical Ukrainian nationalism, Ukronazism, and its anti-Russian orientation; as well as, immorality and inhumanity; venality and service to foreign suzerains for the sake of benefits, along with a cynical trade in the interests, fates and lives of compatriots, of Ukraine and its people; grave crimes against Ukraine, which have had a massive and systemic character, namely, terror and genocide—fascist terror with the participation of the Banderaites against the people of Russia and neo-Nazi terror against the population of Donbas, and terror against the inhabitants of Odessa (Odessa Khatyn), other towns and villages, in which the Ukronazis left a bloody trail.

After the Great Victory, Ukraine was cleansed of OUN gangs and the underground in a matter of years, because the effective struggle of law enforcers against Ukronazism was accompanied by widespread popular support. The betrayal of Soviet elites in the mid-1950s (the “Adenauer-Khrushchev Amnesty”) allowed former nationalist collaborators to return to Ukraine with a completely clean reputation, almost as heroes and even martyrs.

In 2022, Russia, by giving the lives of its loyal sons for the liberation of Ukraine from nationalism, by destroying and capturing neo-Nazis, by revealing the truth about their crimes and criminal plans, is creating the conditions for the final eradication of Nazism. On July 3, as a result of successful combat operations by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, together with units of the People’s Militia of the LPR, the liberation of the Luhansk People’s Republic was completed. The military victory in the DNR and the international tribunal against the war criminals are approaching.

Both in the liberation of the Donbass and in the denazification of Ukraine, the timing and results of their completion, guarantees against recurrences of Ukronazism and the conditions for reliably ensuring the sovereignty and security of the country, the interests and rights of its population, and the sustainable development of the Ukrainian state and society largely depend on the active participation of the people of Ukraine, their awareness of the danger of radical ideologies and their open condemnation.

Vladimir G. Kiknadze is a Russianhistorian, associate professor and a Colonel in the reserves. He is the author of over 200 published works. This article appears courtesy of Nauka, Obshchestvo, Oborona journal.

Featured: Members of the Azov Battalion, March 11, 2022.

Did the Deep Ecologist Pentti Linkola Meet Heinrich Himmler?

For more than thirty years, Mikko Paunio (MD, MHS) has studied the new-old nature pantheism that was born in the UN framework, with its partners, the Club of Rome and the World Economic Forum. This religion has largely replaced Christianity in Western countries. Nature pantheism specifically draws upon the “wisdom” of theosophy, the esotericism and occultism of the world’s most famous con-artist, Madame Blavatsky, who claimed to have discovered the lost “truth” that unites world religions. Linkola’s extreme writings on population control—especially his promoted “life boat analogy”—have already probably inspired mass shootings around the world, including one in Finland.

Pentti Linkola’s Writings were Deeply Influenced by German Romanticism

Pentti Linkola, a deep ecologist, an amateur ornithologist, a fisherman and a university drop-out, was a very famous cultural figure in Finland. He has also gained a fair amount of international interest. He died in April 2020 at the age of 87 years. Outside of Finland, there is very little recognition of the fact, that he was an ardent Nazi.

Thus, it is time to revisit the dark undercurrents of German romanticism. It can be done by exploring the horrendous thinking of Linkola, whose whole extended family was strongly influenced by German culture and idealism. From his mother’s side, Linkola’s grandfather, Hugo Suolahti was a professor in German philology, who eventually became the Chancellor of the University of Helsinki. Young Pentti was very close to Hugo. Hugo’s brother Eino Suolahti was a doctor, the Chairman of the Duodecim Society and the Finnish Medical Association, with close ties to Germany. During WWII, Eino was the Chief Surgeon of the Defence Forces as a Major General of Pharmacy. He had had military training in Germany during WWI. He—as well as many other members of Pentti’s mother’s family—were actively involved in the far right political activities in the pre-war era, and were supporters of the Suur-Suomi idea (Great Finland i.e., Finland’s territorial expansion to the East) and devoted supporters of Finland’s brothers-in-arms alliance with the Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union. Pentti Linkola himself wrote in 1999, in his essay “Animal Rights in the Bible,” about his relationship with German romanticism, which readily reveals the very essence:

“And I’ve also had the kind of a flimsy idea that the cornerstone of the Western culture, Judaism, has been wholly human centered (even urban) and negative and cold towards nature and animals. I’ve even assumed I’ve seen one partial reason here for the clash between natural romantic Nazism and chillingly rational Judaism.”

August 1942: The Guest Heinrich Himmler

According to Pentti Linkola, Hugo and Eino were very close to each other. Both of them had a summerhouse in Tyrväntö. Both summerhouses were situated on the shores of Lake Vanajavesi. As a child, Pentti spent summers, from June 1st until August 31st (except late summer 1941), in Hugo’s summerhouse. Pentti’s father, Kaarlo Linkola a professor in botany, who later became rector of the University of Helsinki, died in late April 1942 at the age of 53. Thus, in 1942 Pentti had an ever-closer contact that summer with his beloved grandfather Hugo, who had just retired.

The notorious SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler came—in secrecy—to spend three nights in early August 1942, in Hugo’s brother’s Eino’s summerhouse. Himmler, his party, and his hosts spent a lot of time rowing on Lake Vanajavesi, or wandering in the wilderness picking berries and mushrooms on August the 3rd. The summerhouses of the Suolahti brothers were situated five kilometers apart and were easily accessible by boat.

Before going more into details of the early days of August 1942 in Tyrväntö, it is worth noting that a systematic review of Pentti Linkola’s adherence to Nazi ideology is available in Finnish. Later on, I will translate four excerpts from this review. These writings—to my understanding—have not been translated to English before. My idea is to give readers in the English-speaking world, an idea of how deeply Pentti Linkola was influenced by the Nazi ideology, and this might have a lot to do with his personal or otherwise intimate contact with Himmler as a nine-year-old boy, in a fragile state of mind, in early August 1942.

But before going to those excerpts, a few words of my own stance in regards to Mr Linkola and his thoughts and some words about the German Greens, the violence incited by Linkola’s thoughts, and his possible posthumous emergence in the Anglo-Saxon world.

Pentti Linkola’s Finland’s Green Party Program was Based on Nazi Ideology

I wrote an essay in the monthly journal of the Social Democratic Party of Finland in 1989. In that essay, I noted that the Green Party program, written by Pentti Linkola around that time, was directly copied from the Third Reich and it was not just about nature conservation, but also something else and very sinister [see, M. Paunio, “Eikö Historia opeta meille mitään—Johdatus vihreän ympäristökritiikin kritiikkiin” (“Does History not Teach us Anything—Introduction to the Critique of Environmentalism), Sosialistinen Aikakauslehti, 4 (1989), pp. 10-17]. I also predicted in this essay that authoritarian societal developments would be the result of the then already heated ecological debate. This seems truer than ever. Anna Bramwell’s famous book, Ecology in the 20th Century: A History, was published that year. In this book, Bramwell revealed that the Nazis were deep ecologists, inspired ultimately by German Romanticism.

I wrote my essay in the aftermath of the biggest-ever committee set up by the Finnish Government—namely, the Energy Committee (1987-1988). It was set up after the Chernobyl nuclear accident. The report of the Committee, possibly the essay and my later writings influenced the developments that led to Finland’s decision to continue building new nuclear reactors.

In 1987, the Prime Minister’s office hired me to give input to the committee’s work as a young public health researcher. I was responsible for the comparative life-cycle analysis of the public health effects of different primary energy sources. I was horrified—and still am, even more so—at the non-evidence-based fearmongering of the green ideologues, such as Pentti Linkola, when it comes to energy policy, and their hatred of energy production, their total disrespect of the great importance of the uninterrupted functioning of the power grid. These ideas and their promotion in mass media has had a devastating and poisonous effect on young people’s minds in the European Union and in the US. This all ultimately leads to a deep dishonesty and eventually to a catastrophe, largely the result of the deep ecologists’ widely disseminated unscientific, romantic worldview of the soon-collapsing earth, for their worldview has become an imperative for the current mad and irrational green policies in the European Union and the US.

Germany’s the Greens were Established by the Far-Left and Old Nazis in Offenbach, in 1979

According to Anna Bramwell, the German Green Party was established in 1979, in Offenbach, largely by two factions: Disappointed Marxists and old Nazis. The latter were often protégés of the occultist (anthroposophy) and Vice-Führer Rudolph Hess. Both of these factions shared many common positions, such as an anti-nuclear and anti-American stance, pro animal rights, pro nature conservation, pro organic farming, etc.

The old Nazis were ultimately expelled from the German Green Party. However, it is remarkable to notice how similar the contemporary EU green policies, promoted especially by the German Greens, are when compared to those promoted by the Nazis: Wind power, animal rights, vegetarianism, even the EU-2000 Natura directive had a predecessor in the Third Reich, namely Das Reichnaturschutzgesetz (26th June 1935), adopted by Adolf Hitler. Furthermore, although European greens are disguised in the mainstream media as liberals, they share the same authoritarian mentality of the Nazis and communists, by demanding strict obedience to everything they stand for: climate change alarmism, nature conservation, open borders policies, LBGTQ+ rights, animal rights, etc. Even the ever-rising anti-Semitism among the woke red green left is not a coincidence.

Pentti Linkola is Well-Known among English-Speaking Crackpots

Pentti Linkola has been and still is a well-known figure among English-speaking ecological thinkers, as well as both the real and the potential violent mass shooter crackpots. In 2014, Pentti Linkola even received a letter from the notorious Unabomber, i.e. Ted Kaczynski, who is serving life-imprisonment in the US.

In 1994, The Wall Street Journal (European edition) published Pentti Linkola’s population policy and anti-technological views on its front page. In this interview, Linkola said his number one enemy is the United States of America as it stands for everything he hates: economic growth and freedom. He stressed that everything humankind has created in the past 100 years must be destroyed. He said, that he was for a radical reduction of the world population, and he was quoted concerning a possible future world war:

“If there were a button I could press, I would sacrifice myself without hesitating, if it meant millions of people would die.”

Linkola’s promoted lifeboat analogy, published first in Finnish (1990), is now widely read by the crackpots on the internet:

“What to do, when a ship carrying a hundred passengers suddenly capsizes and there is only one lifeboat? When the lifeboat is full, those who hate life will try to load it with more people and sink the lot. Those who love and respect life will take the ship’s axe and sever the extra hands that cling to the sides.”

In early November 2007, Pekka-Eric Auvinen, an 18-year-old Finn, shot seven of his fellow pupils, his headmistress and then himself in a school in southern Finland. Brendan O’Neill wrote an accurate op-ed of it in The Guardian explaining how Pentti Linkola’s thoughts were behind the killing spree. At the beginning of the shooting-spree, Pekka-Eric shouted: “The environmental revolution has started.”

Pekka Eric’s mother wrote for Elonkehä, the magazine for deep ecologists, as did Pentti Linkola. They both sat on the editorial board of the magazine. Pekka-Eric published a manifesto on the Internet before his killing spree. It was similar to those manifestos published by the shooters before the Christchurch and El Paso mass killings. Pekka-Eric was strongly influenced by Pentti Linkola. In his manifesto Pekka-Eric Auvinen portrayed himself as “an Uebermensch.” The shooting and Linkola’s connection with it, became taboo in Finland fairly soon after the incident, as Pentti Linkola enjoys widespread respect among the intellectuals, artists, writers and even among the clergy. The Bishop of Helsinki, Irja Askola (The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, a State Church), symbolically donated 10 ares from Pentti Linkola’s forest sanctuary to Pope Francis in January 2016. However, very soon after the shooting, one journalist asked Linkola, if Pekka-Eric Auvinen acted upon his ideological advice? Linkola replied:

“Hardly any philosophy has been behind it. If that act had been more systematic and effective, then maybe then.”

Linkola’s Posthumous Emergence in the English-Speaking World?

A new book, The Later Philosophy of Pentti Linkola (almost 400 pages), was published in English by an American (who lives in India) deep ecology philosopher and peak oil activist Haag A Chad. In this book, the author admits that Linkola is an authoritarian thinker who condemns democracy, but Chad remains silent about Linkola’s adherence to Nazi ideology. All morality—according to Linkola—is based on the sanctity of nature and the idea that we are one species among others. This is in line with Nazi ideology. Chad praises Linkola as the most important contemporary philosopher in the world, because of Linkola’s extreme anti-technological stance, which is close to the stance of the notorious eco-terrorist and serial murderer the Unabomber. Before writing the new book on Linkola’s philosophy, Chad wrote similar book about the Unabomber’s thinking.

Excerpts from Pentti Linkola’s Non-Translated Work, Revealing His Blatant adherence To Nazi Ideology

These four short excerpts (both comments and direct quotes) make the connection clear. To my knowledge they have not been translated into English before. So, they have not been available to the English-speaking readers before:

“Are the nature conservationists able to take the lead?” Linkola considers them far too soft. He urges to look at the model of the Nazis. “The Nazis were brisk when it came seeking power. They utilized the power of the word and the power of the fist so skillfully and effectively that they received great support.”

“Hitler’s dream was wildly romantic and aesthetic; he was fascinated by bold German heroism; he dreamed of healthy, powerful, self-conscious, beautiful and blue-eyed, forever young people who, in the midst of hard work, walked along to sports festivities as Wagner’s music roared.” (“Introduction” to Thinking, p. 220).

“One example is fascism. Linkola thought, that the two of them could recognize the service that fascism did, when it freed the planet from the burden of tens of millions of Europeans. And even so, that six million left “in an almost ideally painless, unharming manner” (Diary of a Dissident, p. 133).”

“In 2011, Linkola returned to the environmental impact of the Holocaust. He compares the Nazi gas chambers, the persecution of Stalin and the destruction caused by Britain and the United States by bombing German cities. He estimated—based on a memoir by the Auschwitz Commandant, among others— that the Nazi performance was the best, most ecological and humane. The victims’ houses and belongings were not destroyed. Rail transport was eco-efficient. The victims were reassured. The gas killed quickly. “Ideal for the eco-balance sheet was still the utilization of bodies, including hair.”

Heinrich Himmler’s Summer Vacation at Pentti Linkola’s Grand Uncle’s Summerhouse in early August 1942

Now back to the late July of 1942. On July the 29th Heinrich Himmler flew to Finland from war-ravaged Ukraine, in secrecy, on a Junkers Ju-52 airplane. He spent the first three days discussing with the Finnish military and civil leaders. There is still debate about what was discussed by Himmler and the Finnish political and military leaders. It has been argued, though not fully verified, that Himmler asked the Finnish authorities to send all Finnish Jews to Germany. Whatever the truth is, Finland did not deport her Jewish citizens to Germany, though 74 Jews did end up being deported to Nazi Germany. These individuals were either prisoners of war (up to 66) or refugees (eight, of whom all except one perished) from other parts of Europe.

One of the peculiarities of WWII was that Finnish Jews served as brothers-in-arms with the Germans against the Soviet Union. There was even one occasion, when a Jewish military physician., Major Leo Skurnik, heroically safeguarded and evacuated one German field hospital, which was under heavy Russian shelling. He also alone brought one German soldier from no man’s land. Germans awarded the Iron Cross to him for his heroic actions. However, after hearing that he would receive the Iron Cross, he told the Finnish General Hjalmar Siilasvuo to convey a message to the Germans authorities, that he would not accept their Iron Cross and that he would rather wipe his ass with it. General Siilasvuo conveyed Skurnik’s messages to the Germans. They demanded that Skurnik should be turned over to them for punishment, but Siilasvuo declined.

Late in the evening, on August the 2nd in 1942, Heinrich Himmler and his party—personal masseuse Felix Kersten, SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, SS-Hauptsturmführer Werner Grothmann and SS-Obersturmführer Josef Kiermayer came to Eino Suolahti’s (Pentti Linkola’s grand uncle) summerhouse in Tyrväntö. The accompanying Finnish hosts included three State Police officers, who were ordered to provide security to Himmler and to make a report of Himmler’s whereabouts during his visit to Finland. A copy of this report was available from the National Archives. I read it with my daughter, to see if any there was mention of a nine-year-old boy being close to or being introduced to Himmler. If so, Pentti Linkola, in a fragile state of mind after his father’s death, would have met personally Himmler.

State Police Report of Himmler’s whereabouts in Finland and Tyrväntö

The State Police report did not provide any evidence that Hugo Suolahti or his grandson were present at Eino’s summerhouse when Himmler was visiting, nor was there evidence that accompanied Himmler and his party when they walked in the forest and rowed on the lake all day on August the 3rd. However, Hugo Suolahti—very close to his brother, Eino—and a professor in German philology would have been an ideal companion to join the visiting Nazis that day, with his language skills and knowledge of the German culture. The report does not mention Pentti Linkola’s uncle Eino “Nenno” Suolahti’s presence that day. He was very close to Pentti, his younger brother Martti and older sister Airi. “Nenno” was also close in age to Pentti’s mother, Hilkka. Regardless, “Nenno” Suolahti did accompany Himmler and his party that day and during the entire visit, taking photographs.

Even if Pentti Linkola didn’t have any direct contact with Himmler, he must have had the opportunity to see the photographs taken by his uncle. They are still in the possession of the family. With certainty, Pentti Linkola was in Tyrväntö in early August 1942. Even if he didn’t have the opportunity to meet Himmler personally, he might have been greatly influenced by the visit. Obviously, he did at least have very intimate indirect connection with the visit as well as direct family ties. These ties could well have contributed to the grandiose, violent thoughts about his significant role in world history. He brags in his writings of the elite status and prominence of his extended family (“Thoughts and Memories—About the Old Educated Class—A View into the Century’s Ideological History,” 2006). Thus, as his extended upper echelon family was chosen to host this extremely influential but notorious historical figure, it could have contributed to his grandiose and sick thinking. On December 5, 2007, in the aftermath of the Jokela school-shooting, Helsingin Sanomat (the largest newspaper in Finland) asked Pentti Linkola on his 75th birthday, if he had met Heinrich Himmler? Pentti Linkola denied it by saying:

“No, Himmler was my grand uncle’s guest.”

In 1946 Pentti Linkola went to see a photograph exhibition in the Helsinki Art Hall of the just freed concentration camps and saw the horrific images. He came home upset and shouting. He was firmly convinced that what he saw was blatant war propaganda.

Pentti Linkola’s Monumental Failure to Live according to His own Teachings

Pentti Linkola tried disingenuously to show by his austere way of living as a simple fisherman in Tyrväntö, by Lake Vanajavesi, that he lived as he taught. This was his trademark. Pentti Linkola’s extreme stance against technology had only one exception—nylon fishing nets. They were the only things he would accept publicly as fruits of modern technological and scientific advancement. Because of this extreme anti-technological stance, as already mentioned, Pentti Linkola received a letter in 2014 from the notorious eco-terrorist and a serial murderer Ted Kaczynski, i.e., the Unabomber. Linkola never replied, as he deeply hated not only English-speaking countries, especially the US and England, but also the English language as well. To Pentti Linkola, “Germany was the country where culture was born and England was a despicable country in the North Sea covered by fog.”

Although Pentti Linkola has gained wide recognition in Finland and many other countries for his attempts to live as he taught, he failed this test miserably and monumentally. For example, he contracted juvenile diabetes, when he was 63 years of age. For the next 25 years, he received insulin three times a day, most of which was paid for by the National Health Insurance (KELA). Insulin for human therapeutic use was originally derived from the pancreases of cows and pigs and was produced and harvested from these animals for decades. However, by the time Linkola contracted the disease, biosynthetic human insulin for clinical use—manufactured by recombinant DNA technology—was already available for him. Thus, thanks to the advancements in science, there has not been any need to use animals to produce insulin since the 1980s.

Pentti Linkola chose the benefits of the Western science he so deeply hated and chose to live another 25 years instead of living as he had taught. At the end of the day, he was a phony imposter celebrated by the corrupt elite and even by the State Church of Finland, and apparently even by Pope Francis when he accepted Linkola’s symbolic forest sanctuary donation. He still is a celebrated disgrace of the Finnish elite class.

Pentti Linkola did everything in his life to throw Finland—including our National Health Insurance—under the bus. If he had lived according to his own rules, based on deep ecology, he should have chosen a shorter life-span. But he did not.

National Health Insurance can pay healthcare costs only if we manage to safeguard our vibrant export industry, sound energy system and sufficient economic growth, i.e., everything Pentti Linkola hated sincerely. He was able—along with the mainstream greens—to delay investments in the primary energy production in Finland for at least for 20 years. We thus now face an almost certain era of grid collapses in large areas of Europe, including the UK. Pentti Linkola and people like him have played an important role leading to this derailment process, which has ultimately resulted in the utopian and destructive European Union and the Green Deals of the US government.

Do Globalists have something even more Sinister waiting for us than Just the Crackpot Great Reset?

Two years before his death, a biography of Pentti Linkola, Ihminen ja legenda (A Human Being and a Legend), written by Riitta Kylänpää, a journalist, was published. It got the Finlandia Award in 2019 in the non-fiction book series. The prize was awarded by YLE’s (Finland’s BBC TV) news anchor, Matti Rönkä. YLE TV-news has repeatedly disseminated disinformation about acute public health effects of the Chernobyl accident. Five years ago, YLE-TV news was condemned by the industry’s own watch dog (JSN) for doing just that, 35-years after the Chernobyl accident; and YLE-TV news did it again this year 40 years after the accident. I have commented on similar false claims made in the recent popular HBO Chenobyl miniseries, in a British outlet, Reaction. The new biography by Kylänpää does not mention Pentti Linkola’s indirect role in the school shooting and remains silent about the excerpts given here above, in an apparent attempt to protect Pentti Linkola’s glorious reputation.

Reviewers and intellectuals praised the biography, and the newspapers, radio and TV were full of stories glorifying Linkola.

After Linkola’s death, the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Pekka Haavisto, and Minister of the Environment and Climate Change, Krista Mikkonen, both from the Green League, expressed their condolences and praised Linkola’s significant efforts for nature conservation. Haavisto said that Linkola had influenced generations of environmentalists; and as Linkola did not defend human rights, there never was any disagreement about the conservation. Pekka Haavisto further tweeted:

“The news that Pentti Linkola has passed away stopped me. My own thinking was strongly influenced during school by Linkola’s pamphlet Dreams of a Better World. Linkola was creating a green movement. He lived as he taught. The great conservationist is gone.”

Pekka Haavisto and Krista Mikkonen are ardent globalists. Similar red-green politicians are in power both in the European Union and in the US. These politicians support the global sustainable development agenda of the United Nations, which is increasingly influenced by the ultra-rich oligarchs and Pope Francis, with their strange ideas of dismantling capitalism with the Great Reset program and making it more humane. I cannot escape the thought that the globalists have something even more sinister in their minds for us than just the Great Reset. We ordinary people have to stay vigilant now.

The reader can visit the photo gallery of Heinrich Himmler’s 1942 visit to Finland. Pentti Linkola’s beloved uncle Eino “Nenno” Suolahti took these photos.

Mikko Paunio, MD, MHS is Adjunct professor at the University of Helsinki, Department of Public Health. This article was originally written in May 2021 when the Greens in Germany peaked in polls before Bundestag Autumn elections and it for a short period it seemed that they would get the First Green Chancellor since 1945.

Of Collective Security: An Interview with Michael Jabara Carley

Michael Jabara Carley is a specialist in 20th century international relations and the history of Russia and the Soviet Union. His research focuses on the Soviet Union’s relations with Western Europe and the United States during the years 1917 and 1945. This research has come together in a three-volume study, first of which, entitled, Stalin’s Gamble: The Search for Allies against Hitler, 1930–1936, will be published by the University of Toronto Press.

He is the author of 1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II, Silent Conflict: A Hidden History of Early Soviet-Western Relations, and Une Guerre sourde: l’émergence de l’Union soviètique et les puissances occidentales.

Professor Carley has also written many essays on French intervention in the Russian Civil War (1917-1921), on Soviet relations with the Great Powers between the two world wars, on questions of “appeasement,” the origins and conduct of the Second World War, and on major current issues. He is a Professor of history at the University of Montreal. It is a great pleasure and honor to discuss his work with him in this interview.

The Postil (TP): You have written a trilogy on the Great Patriotic War, that is the Second World War as experienced by Soviet Union. The first part of this magisterial study will be published soon. What is your overall aim?

Michael Jabara Carley (MJC): My trilogy, as I call it, deals with the origins and early conduct of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War (Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina). The VOV is the name given to the war in Soviet and Russian history arising from the German invasion of the USSR on 22 June 1941. My work runs from January 1930 to December 1941. My project was first entitled “A Near-run Thing: The Improbable Grand Alliance of World War II,” supported by an “Insight” research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. My initial objective was to write a narrative history of how the USSR, Britain, and the United States, powers hostile to each other during the interwar years, became allies against Nazi Germany and the Axis. The work evolved from an envisioned single volume into three dealing with Soviet relations with the great and lesser European powers and the United States.

Michael J. Carley.

TP: Is there a difference between a Western historiography of WWII and a Russian one?

MJC: Oh yes, the difference is enormous. During the war, it was clear to all who had eyes to see that the Red Army played the key role in smashing the Nazi Wehrmacht and winning the war in Europe. The United States and Britain played supporting roles. After 1945 the war became an important object of propaganda in the Cold War. The new narrative was that the United States or Churchill single-handedly won the war in which the USSR was practically invisible.

In the western media, histories, iconography, Hollywood films, comic books, more recently video games, the Red Army is invisible. The key moment in the war was operation Overlord, the Normandy landings, when in fact, they were an anticlimax, grand to be sure, in a war whose outcome had already been determined by the Red Army. In the context of the Cold War, it was normal that the United States would seek in various ways to rub out the memories of the Soviet role in the war, for otherwise how could you portray the USSR as a menacing communist enemy.

TP: Would you tell us about the other two volumes in the trilogy?

MJC: Volume 1: Stalin’s Gamble: The Search for Allies against Hitler, 1930–1936, explores the Soviet Union’s efforts to organize a defensive alliance against Nazi Germany, in effect rebuilding the anti-German Entente of the First World War.

Volume 2: Stalin’s Failed Grand Alliance: The Struggle for Collective Security, 1936-1939 covers the period from May 1936 to August 1939. These were the last three years of peace in Europe during which occurred the great crises of the pre-war period (the Spanish civil war, Anschluss and the Munich sellout of Czechoslovakia) and the last Soviet efforts to organise an anti-Nazi alliance.

Volume 3: Stalin’s Great Game: War and Neutrality, 1939-1941 covers the first phase of the war in Europe, notably the disappearance of Poland, the Winter War between the USSR and Finland, the fall of France, the battle of Britain, and the Nazi build-up and invasion of the USSR. All this occurs within the broader framework of Soviet diplomacy and intelligence operations and Stalin’s failures to interpret correctly the signs of Hitler’s intention to destroy the Soviet Union.

TP: Your work has focused on Russian archival records. Were there any surprises, which made you rethink your position(s)?

MJC: My work has focused on Russian archival sources and western archival sources (inter alia French, British, US, etc.). The Russian sources indicate—and this will be a surprise for some people—that Soviet foreign policy as conducted by the Commissariat for foreign affairs (NKID) functioned like that of any other foreign ministry. It sought to define and protect Soviet national interests, as perceived by the NKID, and promoted amongst the Soviet leadership, especially in the Politburo (in effect the Soviet cabinet), which over time became synonymous with a single person, Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin. In the 1920s this meant seeking to improve political and economic relations with the main western powers. No country was too small to escape NKID attention and wooing. In the 1930s it meant seeking to build an anti-Nazi alliance to contain Hitlerite Germany or to defeat it in war if containment failed. The first generation of Soviet diplomats were well-educated (or self-taught), multilingual, sophisticated, and good at their jobs.

So? What is so surprising about these “discoveries?” Several generations of western historians have maintained that Soviet foreign policy was made by the Communist International or Comintern and intended to pursue world socialist revolution and not the protection of Soviet national interests. These did not exist. My previous book Silent Conflict deals with the complicated interaction of the NKID, Comintern, Stalin, and the Politburo in the 1920s. Suffice it to say that traditional western historiography requires revision based on the study of Russian archives. We now have histories before the opening of Soviet archives and histories after their opening.

TP: The Soviet era is largely dominated by Joseph Stalin. Are there aspects about him that are ignored or misconstrued by Western historians?

MJC: People have been writing books about Stalin since the interwar years. His recent biographer Stephen Kotkin reminds us that he was a “human being.” He was that, but of course human beings can also be serial killers. Stalin was what he was, amongst other things, crude, cynical, vengeful, murderous. He placed little value on human life and freely dispensed with it.

In the realm of foreign policy, he had a more or less normal relationship with the NKID and its leadership until the purges. In the 1930s his principal NKID interlocutor was Maksim M. Litvinov, the commissar or narkom for foreign affairs. Stalin’s interactions with Litvinov were those of a head of government with his/her foreign minister. There was give and take on both sides, but most of the time until 1939 Stalin supported Litvinov’s policy recommendations. Not always but most of the time. It is a “normal” side of Stalin that we sometimes miss because of his ruthlessness and the purges.

TP: In the years leading up to WWII, how did the West view, or understand, Stalin and Soviet Russia? And, likewise, how did Stalin view the West?

MJC: The “west” did not have a uniform view of Stalin. There was the mainstream media view of him as bloodthirsty communist. In some government circles, in the British Foreign Office, for example, he was perceived as a ruthless “realist” looking to secure his own power. Western iconography, political posters, cartoons, etc., are rich in their portrayal of Stalin, amongst other roles, as a vampire feeding on the blood of innocents. This was a consistent view of him during the interwar years with some moderation in the 1930s when western realists—Winston Churchill is the best known of these people— recognised the need to cooperate with the USSR against Nazi Germany. The “realists” were always a minority amongst western governing elites and were never able to impose this policy in government until the Nazi invasion of the USSR. Of course, western communists were more disposed to recognise Stalin as the great leader of the USSR. They had to or were expelled from European parties or purged when Stalin got his hands on them. There were however exceptions to the rule when communists (in France for example) could initiate policy changes accepted in Moscow.

As for Stalin, he remained a communist, but he was willing to cooperate with the western powers against Hitler both in the 1930s and after June 1941. We operate under different social systems, he often said, but this should not prevent us from recognizing common interests and cooperating against common foes.

TP: Then, there is the notorious year, 1932, with its Great Famine, in which 5 to 7 million died. Was this famine “political strategy,” ethnic cleansing (Holodomor), a natural disaster, or something else?

MJC: I only deal in passing with this issue in my work because the famine did not affect foreign policy, but the best recent treatment of the famine is in the second volume of Kotkin’s biography of Stalin. Kotkin argues that the famine was the result of various factors, political, economic, weather, and insect infestations. It was not aimed at the Ukraine as a form of genocide or “ethnic cleansing.” The famine affected the entire Soviet grain belt with Kazakhstan being the hardest hit.

TP: The next year, 1933, brought Adolf Hitler to power. How did Stalin and the Soviets view Hitler?

MJC: The initial Soviet reaction to Hitler’s assumption of power in early 1933 was to try to maintain the “Rapallo” policy of tolerable relations with Germany. Nazi hostility to the USSR in 1933 was so intense that the maintenance of Rapallo became impossible and in December 1933 the Politburo approved a shift in policy to collective security against Nazi Germany. This meant in effect the rebuilding of the World War I Entente against Wilhelmine Germany. Litvinov became the great Soviet spokesperson for this policy, but it was not his personal policy, it was that of Stalin and the Soviet government. Stalin was the Soviet government. No policy, large or small, could pass without his approval.

TP: The years leading up to 1939 are complex and often little understood, especially in regards to the motivations and concerns of Soviet Russia. Did the Soviets see a war coming?

MJC: There is not the slightest doubt that the Soviet leadership saw war coming. Nazi Germany was the great danger to European peace and security. Litvinov and other Soviet diplomats liked to quote to their western counterparts Mein Kampf, Hitler’s best-selling book, outlining his plans for European conquest. France and the USSR were identified as targets of German conquest. Germany needed Lebensraum, additional living space in the USSR. Slavs, Jews, Roma were lower species of human being good only for slavery or death.

TP: What was the role of Britain and France in this regard? Were they more suspicious of Hitler or of Stalin, or of both equally? And why could they not form an alliance with Stalin against Hitler?

MJC: The answer to this question is complicated and is the subject of Stalin’s Gamble, vol. 1 of my trilogy. In France and Britain anti-communism was a driving force, though its intensity fluctuated from time to time during the interwar years. Political and economic elites were largely anti-communist, but not entirely, as I have noted above. This was especially true during the 1930s after Hitler became German chancellor. One Soviet diplomat noted that the great question of the 1930s was who was enemy no. 1, Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union? Western elites, with important exceptions, got the answer wrong to this question. Fascism was the great bulwark against communist or socialist revolution, the ideology arising from the crisis of capitalism during the interwar years. Remember, Germany was not the only fascist state, the Duce Benito Mussolini had taken power in Italy in 1922. In France and Britain there were tolerant attitudes toward Italian fascists. If only Hitler would soften the hard edges of Nazism and adopt the “softer” fascism of Mussolini, it would be easier to accept him. For numerous European conservatives Hitlerite Germany was not an enemy but a potential ally against the left.

When Soviet diplomats tried to warn of the Nazi danger, many western counterparts did not buy the argument that Hitler was the problem. This was especially so after the eruption of the Spanish civil war in July 1936. It looked to many conservatives that communism might take root in Spain and then spread to France. What a catastrophe! So, when Soviet diplomats warned of Hitlerite Germany, conservatives, the political right, but also spreading into the political centre and centre-left, saw this as a ruse de guerre to spread communism into Europe. Collective security and mutual assistance against the common foe, did not work as an argument, because European elites did not see or did not want to see Hitler as a common foe. The British Foreign Office was against collective security and against anti-fascism as arguments for unity. Anti-communism was a major impediment to an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance against Hitler, even in 1939 when war looked increasingly inevitable.

TP: Then there is Poland. How would you characterize the Polish view of Hitler, especially given that Poland was allied with Nazi Germany until 1939 (a little-known fact)? What were Poland’s ambitions and motivations?

MJC: Yes, then there was Poland. I call it the skunk in the woodpile of collective security, but it was not the only one. A Polish state reappeared on the map of Europe in 1918 at the end of World War I. It was intensely nationalist. During 1919-1920 Poland sought to reestablish its frontiers of 1772, as a great European power. This led to war with Soviet Russia and a white peace, signed in early 1921 which satisfied neither side. Poland did not re-establish its 1772 frontiers, but obtained important Ukrainian and Byelorussian populated territories, which Soviet Russia saw as lost because of military weakness.

The Polish leadership saw itself situated between two potentially hostile great powers, and so explained its foreign policy as neither one or the other. But when push came to shove the Polish leadership always leaned toward Germany. In January 1934 Poland signed a non-aggression pact with Germany. Soviet offers of rapprochement were rejected. In following years Poland acted as a saboteur of collective security and worked against Soviet diplomacy. Everywhere in central and eastern Europe, diplomats warned that Poland was marching toward its ruin if it continued to pursue a pro-German, anti-Soviet policy. I would not say Poland was a Nazi “ally” but it was certainly an accomplice in 1938 when it cooperated with Germany to bring about the dismemberment of the Czechoslovak state. For its troubles Poland got a small portion of Czechoslovak territory. Incredibly, in 1939 it continued to sabotage attempts to conclude an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance. It did so until the very day the Nazi Wehrmacht invaded Poland on 1 September 1939.

TP: Was the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 the Soviet attempt to thwart war, or was it a reaction to the Munich Conference of 1938, in which the West thought it had won “peace in our time?”

MJC: The Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact was not a Soviet attempt to thwart war, it was an attempt to stay out of the war and to remain neutral. Yes, in part, it was a reaction to the Munich accords, but it was more than that. It was the direct result of six years of failed Soviet attempts to construct an anti-Nazi grand alliance. One by one, the prospective members of this failed grand alliance fell away: the United States in the spring-summer 1934, France paradoxically in late 1934 (in a more complicated process), Italy, yes, fascist Italy in 1935, Britain in February 1936, and Romania in August 1936. One after the other they fell away; and Poland of course, the spoiler of collective security, the proverbial skunk in the woodpile, never contemplated an alliance with the USSR against Germany. Moscow was always the undesirable ally, the greater enemy, even though, paradoxically, it was Poland’s only option for salvation.

The Soviet Union could not, on its own, organise mutual assistance against Nazi Germany. Collective security had to be a grand political coalition from left to centre-right, a World War I union sacrée, of all-in national defence of all political parties against a common foe. In the west no one wanted it; no one wanted the Soviet Union as an ally (with the exception of communists and “realists”; a Soviet ambassador called them “white crows”) in a potential war-fighting alliance, in a situation where there was no agreement on the common foe. Even Czechoslovakia, the most needy potential ally, would not go all-in with the USSR. No eastern European country would without France and Britain, but France would not march without Britain, and Britain would not march at all.

This is a complicated story related in volumes 1 and 2 of my trilogy. In the great cover-up of the genuine history of the origins of World War II after 1945, it was the necessary corollary of Cold War propaganda to rub out the primary role of the Red Army in the destruction of the Wehrmacht. Early on, revisionist historians began to put the story together, starting with the “Guilty Men,” the appeasers, who prepared the way to catastrophe. It was the release of Soviet government papers in the 1990s, however, which has allowed the emergence of a more complex narrative, constructed with the assistance of Soviet eyes. In this narrative Stalin, the “human being,” understandably could not trust the British and French governments, conniving, manipulative, unwilling, to be all-in allies against Nazi Germany even in August 1939.

As it was, the British and French left their ally Poland to blow in the wind when Germany invaded it. Stalin correctly assumed that France and Britain would sit on their hands while Germany and the USSR fought it out in the east. Would they have been more loyal to the USSR than they had been to Poland? Of course not, if you asked Stalin. However, war is full of the unexpected. The USSR ended up fighting a ground war practically alone against Nazi Germany from June 1941 to September 1943 and even after the Normandy landings still carried the main burden of fighting on the ground. That of course is another story.

TP: World War II, when it broke out, was the result of diplomatic failure on the part of Britain, France, and Poland. Is this a fair assessment?

MJC: I have answered this question in my above responses, but yes, Britain, France, and Poland bear a large responsibility for the failure to organize an early grand alliance in Europe against Hitler.

TP: Could the Allies have defeated Hitler without the Soviets?

MJC: No, and this is not a conclusion made in hindsight. The main argument of western “realists” was that without the USSR, France and Britain could not win a war against Nazi Germany and would certainly lose it. Britain had no army to speak of, two divisions could at once be sent to France in the event of war. The French army could not alone fight off a German invasion. On the other hand, the Red Army could at once mobilise 100 divisions, in fact, more, against Nazi Germany. Churchill and former prime minister David Lloyd George said it plainly in the House of Commons during the spring of 1939. Victory was impossible without an alliance with the USSR. Do the math of relative contributions to boots on the ground: Britain, two divisions; the USSR, 100. This is not to mention 35 Czechoslovak divisions prior to the Munich betrayal. The French and British governing elites liked to count every enemy twice over and potential allies not at all.

TP: In your book, Silent Conflict: A Hidden History of Early Soviet-Western Relations, you discuss Soviet relations with the West. How would you categorize these? And did these early years set the tone for the Cold War?

MJC: With the notable exception of Soviet-German relations and the conclusion of the treaty of Rapallo (spring 1922) which regularised Soviet relations with Weimar Germany, Soviet-western relations were poor. Anti-Communism was an insurmountable obstacle to better relations even though there were “realists,” notably in France, who advocated rapprochement. The Comintern was active in China where a great revolutionary movement was underway. Britain especially had important commercial interests in China threatened by the revolutionary movement. I see this period as the early (or stage 1 of the) Cold War which ended in 1941. Western-Soviet hostility in the 1920s was an impediment to building an anti-Nazi alliance in the 1930s.

TP: The West has long had deep-seated Russophobia. What accounts for this?

MJC: Russophobia is not really a subject directly treated in my work. It is a form of western racism against Russia, motivated these days by the Russian threat to US world domination. This is a topic for another discussion.

TP: Are there other projects that you are researching?

MJC: I am getting on in years, and the publication of my trilogy will take up my time, inshallah, for the next couple of years. I see the trilogy as the capstone of my work as historian and author. After the trilogy is published, as I hope it will be, who knows?

TP: Professor Carley, thank you so much for your time.

Featured: “Europe will be Free!” Poster by Viktor Koretsky, 1944.

The Tolerated Nazi Cult

In recent years, the word “Nazi” has been completely gutted by its inflationary use like no other. Today, “Nazi” is anyone who is not on the top of the tree of political correctness. Accordingly, it seems bizarre when the grave of a genuine Nazi collaborator, namely Stepan Bandera, becomes a place of pilgrimage in Germany. There is no outcry. On the contrary, since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the grave of Stepan Bandera in Munich’s Waldfriedhof has been very crowded. If in previous years one Reich flag among a thousand peace flags was enough to declare an entire demonstration a Nazi mass demonstration, here homage is being paid to a Wehrmacht collaborator—without this being criticized in those circles that otherwise suspect a Nazi behind every tree.

A year before the start of the Ukrainian war, the colors of the Ukrainian flag caught my eye during a walk through Munich’s Waldfriedhof cemetery. In the distance I saw a gravestone decorated with blue and yellow flags. My curiosity was aroused and so I approached this grave. In the inscription of the gravestone, I read the name “Stepan Bandera,” which is additionally engraved above it in Cyrillic. The name immediately rang a bell in my memory. I knew roughly about the importance of Bandera, his collaboration with the Nazi regime, the cult around his person in Ukraine, which continues to this day, and that he was murdered in the 1950s in Munich by the Soviet foreign intelligence service KGB.

Nevertheless, I was surprised to suddenly stumble into a piece of dark European history during a walk, when I actually wanted to clear my head of political issues. At that point, in the spring of 2021, Covid was crowding out all other issues, so Ukraine and the conflict there were more on the periphery of media attention.

With the winter of 2021/22 and the start of the Ukrainian war, that changed with breathtaking speed. A veritable Russophobia and Ukraine cult developed. These developments also left their mark on Bandera’s grave. In fact, during my walks, I pass by there again and again and observe how this grave is increasingly turning into a place of pilgrimage. Since March 2022, showy SUVs with Ukrainian license plates can be seen around the cemetery grounds, and where a year ago only a solitary Ukrainian flag hung and rather beautiful flowers planted, the grave is now overflowing with offerings and mementos that visitors lay to their icon. In a way, the selection is very bizarre. On the surfaces of the grave lie Ukrainian hryvnia bills and coins, candy—some even from McDonalds—and labeled (FFP2) masks.

Bandera’s grave [Photo: Nicolas Riedl].

The question, who in Germany (!) decorates the gravesite of a Nazi collaborator in such a way, was answered—even if not completely—over days when visiting the grave on a Sunday. Almost every minute visitors come to stand devoutly in front of it, to take photos or to lay down more of the “gifts” listed above. But who are these people? Are they some skin-head types unmistakably identifiable as Nazis?

Offerings at Bandera’s grave. [Photo: Nicolas Riedl].

At one point I pretended to stand at Bandera’s final resting place myself, in memory of him, to get a more accurate picture of the visitors. To my astonishment, each time it was a thoroughly inconspicuous, outwardly completely harmless citizen—parents with their children or young people in tracksuits.

I could not make any sense of this. In this country, anyone who claims to take a warm shower every day is soon considered a Nazi. And yet, in the middle of Munich, without scandal or outcry, the grave of a Nazi collaborator is virtually transformed into a pharaoh’s chamber.

At that moment it even occurred to me whether I was simply misinformed about Bandera. But no—no matter where I looked, whether in older mainstream reports or in alternative media—I could twist and turn the image of Stepan Bandera as I wished—his involvement in Nazi crimes is undisputed and sufficiently proven.

As the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and part of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), he participated in numerous crimes and atrocities against civilians that shocked even SS generals.

Although Bandera was a German prisoner from July 1941 to September 1944—after his plans to declare an independent Ukraine went too far for the Nazi regime—he served his time comparatively comfortably as one of the SS’s so-called special and honorary prisoners. Shortly before the end of the war, parts of the OUN were even reinstated in the Waffen SS. In short, Bandera’s vest is so bloodstained that no change of perspective can wash it clean.

Even after the end of the war, Bandera remained the chairman of the OUN in his Munich exile until he was assassinated in October 1959 by KGB agent Bogdan Staschinski, right on his doorstep with hydrogen cyanide gas.

While reading about Bandera’s death, I got the idea to visit his former residence on Kreittmayrstrasse in Munich’s Maxvorstadt to see if it had also been transformed into a pilgrimage site. Once there, I found that nothing reminded me of Bandera. All around the multi-story building, there are hip cafés and restaurants; there are no flowers on the doorstep; there are no Ukrainian flags anywhere to be seen. The only noticeable thing I took note of was that the facade of the house at number 7—quite as if to mock the anti-communist post-mortem—was the only one in the whole street with a red coat of paint.

No Peace for the Dead at Bandera’s Grave

Even before the Ukraine war, Bandera’s grave kept finding its way into the public eye.

Desecration of the grave in 2014
Shortly after the start of the Maidan coup in 2014—if today’s Ukraine flag-wavers can still remember it?—the gravestone was knocked over and the grave vandalized. The perpetrators were never caught.

Ukrainian Ambassador Andriy Melnyk visits Bandera’s grave
In 2015, Melnyk laid flowers at Bandera’s grave. Sevim Dağdelen, a member of the Left Party, then asked the German government whether it was aware of this. The federal government answered in the affirmative and condemned the acts of the OUN in its response.

2018 sees the arrival of the “cemetery fact checker”
British blogger Graham Phillips visited the grave in 2018, removed the flag of Ukraine—as well as that of Ukrainian nationalists—and attached a sign to the gravestone reading, “Ukrainian Nazi Stepan Bandera lies buried here.” On the net, he was partly celebrated as a true anti-fascist, others accused him of desecrating the grave.

2021 State security investigates after repeated desecration of grave
A year before the start of the Ukrainian war, the grave was desecrated again when it was doused with red liquid. In the course of this, the State Security Service began an investigation, so far without results.

Parallel World

It really is bizarre. While in this country everything and everyone is pushed into a right-wing corner if they say one wrong word—at the same time in the middle of Germany the grave of a Nazi collaborator is decorated, adorned and visited with devout looks of the visitors. Meanwhile, police patrol by at regular intervals to check for further possible grave desecrations. It is even rumored that a hidden camera is installed in the grave light vending machine directly opposite.

In a sense, Bandera’s tombstone is a monument to double standards, showing us that all destructive forces are fine with the rulers as long as they serve their purposes. While local demonstrators with peaceful intentions are defamed as Nazis—in Ukraine unmistakable Nazis are equipped with heavy weapons.

How much more blood must be senselessly spilled before history is learned?

Nicolas Riedl is a student of political science, theater and media studies in Erlangen. He got to know almost every type of school in the German education system from the inside and, during a commercial apprenticeship, also the interpersonal coldness of the working world. The media and Ukraine crisis in 2014 was a caesura for his world view and perception. Since then, he has been dealing in depth and self-critically with political, socio-economic, ecological as well as psychological topics. As far as his technical skills allow, he produces films and music videos. This articles appears through the kind courtesy of Rubikon.

Alfred Delp: Resistance and Theology

Is there a connection between Alfred Delp’s theology and his resistance, between his thought and his martyrdom?

I would like to address this question by comparing key statements of pro-Nazi Catholic theologians with Alfred Delp’s theological and philosophical reflections. This raises, however, another question: was Delp a “modern” or a “traditional” theologian? For it was precisely the “moderns” among German theologians, those who sought a contemporary theology, who wanted a reform of the liturgy, and wanted to strengthen the position of the laity in the church, who were likely to justify Nazism and theological and practical collaboration. Among them were, for example, Karl Adam, Joseph Lortz and Michael Schmaus, whose approaches left their mark on Catholic theology long after 1945. They did not appreciate the reactionary or traditionalist elements of National Socialism, but saw in it an enormous potential for innovation that they wanted to use for their reform projects in church and theology.

An understanding of Delp’s history is fundamental to the explanations that follow; this is followed by the theological themes of “Nature and Grace” and “Image of the Church and Understanding of the Church,” complemented by a presentation of the effects of the heroic ideal in theology. Each of these three points begins with a brief presentation of the statements of pro-Nazi theologians, among whom Karl Adam is especially prominent.

1. Delp’s Conception of History

The basis of Delp’s conception of history is his confrontation with Heidegger’s work Sein und Zeit (Being and Time), which he was one of the first to conduct within the Catholic Church. After the war, when a Catholic Heideggerian school was formed with famous representatives, Delp’s criticism of Heidegger was laughed at and rejected—he did really understand Heidegger and argued not philosophically, but according to his worldview. In particular, the interpretation as heroic tragedy was a misinterpretation. In view of the recent and still difficult discussion about Heidegger’s relation to National Socialism or about the relation of his philosophy to National Socialism, Delp’s criticism takes on a new acuity. However, I do not wish to discuss here whether Sein und Zeit already contains traces of Heidegger’s later adherence to National Socialism, but only to present Delp’s analysis and critique and the importance both acquired for his understanding of man and history.

In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger wants to question being and its meaning without restriction, without committing himself to anything from the outset. The question of being presupposes something that has an understanding of being: this is what Heidegger calls the Da-Sein (= the subject that asks the question). The latter notes that both the questioning of being and the understanding of being are part of itself. The Dasein must therefore only look at itself in order to be able to answer the question about being. This is done with the help of the phenomenological method as description and interpretation of the facts of consciousness. Heidegger calls this the existential analysis of Dasein—it serves to describe and unfold Dasein’s understanding of itself. Dasein thus interprets itself—and the explanation of this interpretation is, for Heidegger, ontology, the doctrine of being. Metaphysics is thus less a doctrine on Dasein than the event of the self-interpretation of Dasein. Now, for Heidegger, the essence of Dasein lies in existence.

The analysis of Dasein leads to the recognition that being means being in the world; that is to say being active in the sense of “being concerned.” The subject is confronted with an object; but the world cannot be grasped from the objects, it must be understood from the subject: the active being-in-the-world is thus the foundation of knowledge.

An important part of being-in-the-world is the existential of sensibility, which means the mood or the being-tuned. Dasein learns there that it is and must be—its origin, however, remains hidden from it. Heidegger speaks here of the being-ness of Dasein.

Heidegger then asks whether there is a state of being that makes being manifest as a unity, and finds the answer in anguish. This anguish prevents Dasein from being completely absorbed in its being-activity and directs the gaze towards the whole, towards the extreme that awaits Dasein: death. Dasein is being-to-death; this shows to Dasein that it goes towards nothingness and that it comes from nothingness.

Thus, Dasein is radically temporal and finite, thus also being as such is finite. Time is the last determinateness of being. The meaning of being is that it becomes. Now, when the radical contingency of Dasein appears, Dasein decides on its destiny and is “determined” to perform its task. From the confrontation with nothingness, Dasein jumps back into a positive conception of life. It becomes its own lawgiver; it gives itself a meaning beyond being-to-death: the mastery of life. This “determination” is for Heidegger the revelation of the inner absoluteness and divinity of Dasein.

It is precisely this, says Delp, this proclamation of courage, strength, and determination, that Heidegger carried to the hearts of young people, because it supposedly took them out of insecurity and existential angst and into a heroic existence.

Delp’s philosophical critique starts at this turn from the experience of nothingness into determination. This turn is a leap, not only in real life, but also in thinking, because there is nothing in the being of Dasein that could provide the reason for such determination. Delp calls this courage to live a great deception, because it is without content and without reason, i.e., also ultimately without meaning. Moreover, this “heroism of finitude” becomes dangerous because of its aesthetics: “Over all these analyses of sorrow: contingency, thrownness, determination, last crash into nothingness, death—over all this lies a somber beauty” (II, 121).

The tragedy of this philosophy, he argues, is that it sought to gain the meaning of being, but can only point to the lifelong preoccupation with mastering life. Moreover, it shows a striking resemblance to the Germanic myth, interpreted in a folk-religious way, of the hero who faces the struggle with full commitment and determination, even if his downfall is sealed—a resemblance that the representatives of the Catholic Heidegger school did not notice or did not want to notice.

At this point, Delp now brings his worldview argument into the field. Heidegger’s claim to make ultimate statements about being cannot be free of worldview, because in the claim to ultimate validity metaphysics and worldview touch each other. Heidegger presents a closed system of a world view, which also implies a certain understanding of man. This understanding is characterized by an ideal of existence, namely the heroic existence, which is carried by the decision to master life.

Delp himself is fascinated by this philosophy of decision, as well as by its departure from finitude and from man—but in the propagation of a total finitude it is for him a myth, dogged immanence that cannot look beyond the world. Delp criticizes Heidegger for not even remaining faithful to this principle of finitude, but for making man absolute in his determination; for this, after all, reveals the divinity of Dasein.

“Where finitude would become practical, one prefers to remain infinite and autonomous. There one puts, on one’s own authority, over this ‘nothing,’ a self-made ideal. The determination, the heroicity of nothingness, is nothing but a denial of the finitude that one had previously emphasized with so much pathos” (II, 137).

[John May, in his commentary in the online edition of theologie.geschichte, points out an interesting parallel that has come to light in the Christian-Buddhist dialogue. The absolutization of finitude in Heidegger can be compared to the re-ontologization of nothingness in Buddhist philosophy. Nothingness, which was understood as the place where non-self becomes True Self (Kyoto School), where non-self means self-forgetfulness and selflessness, becomes in the wider reception a “something” inherent in every being – the Buddha-nature, which is considered the highest realization of nothingness. Just as Heidegger’s absolutization of finitude represents a denial of finitude for Delp, so Buddha-nature as reontologized nothingness can be understood as a denial of nothingness. See also John D’Arcy May, Transcendence and Violence. The Encounter of Buddhist, Christian and Primal Traditions.]

Delp’s judgment, then, for all its fascination, is clear: Heidegger’s philosophy cannot be interpreted or assimilated to Christianity in its consequences. It is not a propaedeutic of Christianity. Nevertheless, this does not prevent him from receiving the concept of Dasein’s decision to master its task in life for his conception of man and his understanding of history. However, he is careful not to transfer any of it to God or Jesus Christ. This area of transcendence, of the supernatural of the Christ-revelation, is determined for him by tradition, revelation and its interpretation. On this basis, his theological critique of Heidegger’s radical concept of the finitude of being is also articulated. The critique of the lack of justification of the leap into determination and of the conflation of philosophy and worldview, on the other hand, is a philosophical critique that could also have been formulated by a follower of critical rationalism.

[Cf. the so-called Münchhausen trilemma, according to which the attempt of an ultimate justification leads either to a regressus in infinitum, a circular reasoning or a dogmatic positing.]

Delp’s engagement with Heidegger left a lasting mark on his understanding of history. The question of the meaning of history and the historicity of man occupied him until his death, and the answers he gives in his more theoretical writings are reflected in his sermons and spiritual writings and ultimately in his fate in imprisonment and death. [See Delp’s Folgenden Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschichte (Following World History and Salvation History (1941); Der Mensch und die Geschichte (Man and History) (1943); Das Rätsel der Geschichte (The Riddle of History) (Bequest)); Die Welt als Lebensraum des Menschen (The World as Man’s Habitat) (Bequest); Der Mensch vor sich selbst (Man before Himself) (Bequest), in Gesammelte Schriften, II, 321-557].

The question of history arises from the subjective experience of history. This can be the turning point or the solidification of a condition caused by an act or event. In the experience of history, the becoming character of the world is revealed. This change of history results in the decision of man, whether he is a maker of history or one who must endure and master it. History thus constantly reminds people of their responsibility, refers them to their conscience.

The question now is, does history have a meaning at all? Does it run according to a plan? It is not the final place of man’s perfection; its meaning is not man’s salvation. Also, God is not to be experienced directly in history; God does not intervene constantly in the history. On the other hand, history has a plan from creation; namely, the task of being the image and re-enactment of the Absolute. The meaning of history is the unfolding of the “order of imagery.” In this sense, there is a development of history—it goes towards a final state; but it also finally has an end, because it does not itself represent salvation.

People are bound by ethical orders as well as by substantive orders. The former imply a direct commitment to God; the latter to the real itself. On both levels people are required to decide; and on both levels they can fall short—in the ethical decision or in the factual one. The former misconduct is sin; the latter disregard and abuse of being, caused by error, sloppiness, arrogance, or the like.

History places humans into always “new situations,” in which they are to prove themselves. Independently of the supernatural order, history has a double meaning—it is to realize the image that God had of it in creation; that is, to fulfill the order of imagery; and it is the place of probation for man; the probation of faithfulness to God and of factual competence and readiness for responsibility.

Are salvation and salvation history now on a completely different level than world history?

Independently of the meaning of history discussed so far, there is for Delp a second word of God that brings about an immediacy of God within history that history does not have of itself. This is the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ. In the incarnation, God once again breaks through the order of history and establishes the order of Christ. This is superhistorical, but historically effective; it has its beginning in the election of Israel and the proclamation of the prophets. However, the Christ order does not suspend the “normal” order of history; it is not another level apart from worldly history. Thus, in addition to its double natural sense, history acquires a third—that of being a space for the encounter with God in the Christ order. Natural and supernatural order, however, remain separate in the medium of history. As John May aptly puts it in his commentary: the Christ order works itself out in history and not as history.

Is not the idea of a progressive realization of the “order of imagery” much too optimistic in view of the supremacy and fertility of evil? The ethical decision of man is always demanded even under these circumstances; every historical hour is suitable for it. But there are also historical situations or constellations which must be recognized and tracked down as such, in which the signs of the times must be recognized. In these situations, both the morally good and the factually appropriate decision must be made. Now the fruitfulness of evil often stems from the fact that those who do not shy away from the ethical wrong decision, that is, those who are prepared to take the greater risk, are often “more clear-sighted and finer-nerved” in identifying such situations.

“There may be many reasons to understand, but few to excuse. And this then is the most seductive mask and the most demonic power of evil, that it tackles the posed problems, represents (and corrupts) genuine progress, and in the name of the genuine also and profoundly does, and demands, the unreal. Only this brings about the always occurring confusion of heads and hearts, through which evil rules and remains in regency. Evil is so fruitful in history not because it is more historical or more historically real than good, or because all history is of the devil; it is fruitful because good is so barren, because it misunderstands tradition as conservative sleepiness and habit, because it trivializes ethical neatness into Biedermeier bravado and carelessness; because it so often places the probation of life not in the space of life but beside it” (II, 412).

This is a relatively clear critique of National Socialism, addressing precisely its innovative or perceived innovative character. But Delp exposes this as spurious, as a pretense of progress that spoils real progress. At the same time, it is a harsh criticism of the Church and of Christian piety, which have not recognized that what is decisive is probation in this life and in this history.

For Delp, evil is not something superhuman or superhistorical, but comes from the highest reality of man—from his freedom. It becomes effective only through man himself—that is why its combat must also be done through man’s engagement in this history. Even the suffering of history must be something active:

“Where man strives for this [ethical orderliness—LS] solely by bypassing the bond to the historical probationary space, he misunderstands himself, misses history, leaves it unilaterally to the uninhibited and unopposed forces of the other, possibly erroneous view; violates the law of imagery, and endangers even transcendent faithfulness. Man is just not only there to stand in history or to suffer history. Even this must still be an active engagement, a conscious consummation. Man must make history” (II, 416f).

Therefore, people must not turn away from history, even when it is far from what God intended for them. But they must not sacrifice to it their transcendent bond and their conscience.

“When history or one of its moments of reality degenerates, then the hour has come in which man must not betray history, but in which he must also not sacrifice to it the freedom and God immediacy of his being. If the two directional indicators of his life no longer coincide but cross each other, man must take them both as his cross. Neither the flight into the ‘eternal’ nor the betrayal in history will save him; but only the tremendous effort to hold both together at least in his own will and commitment. This is the first law of human freedom, and to this law freedom must stand, even at the price of personal-historical catastrophe” (II, 381).

Heidegger’s traces are thus unmistakable in Delp’s understanding of history. The human being thrown into existence is determined by his historicity; he is faced with the decision to prove himself; he accepts his finitude. But as a Christian, unlike the tragic hero in Heidegger or in Germanic myth, he knows why he is doing this. It is about the realization of God’s plan of creation and about his salvation, which he cannot find beside history or past history.

Delp is equally “contemporary” and “traditional” in his understanding of world history and salvation history. He receives the most modern philosophy for his anthropology, but remains in more traditional waters with regard to the relationship between nature and grace. “Modern” is his synopsis of world history and salvation history—for him there are no parallel levels of history, but only one; and the order of salvation does not override the natural order of history. At the same time, the traditional Neo-Scholastic distinction between nature and supernature shines through; and ideas of natural law also play a role. With regard to his ethical decision, man is bound not only to the biblical revelation, here the Decalogue, but also to the natural law, which here is not to be understood in natural scientific terms, but as natural law.

Even if some of Delp’s writings at the beginning of Nazi rule betray a certain fascination with the new things that were on the move there, in his later writings on history he is resistant to understanding National Socialism as an innovative force and wanting to use it to drive changes in theology and the church. It is precisely this impression of progress that he exposes as a dangerous and demonic mask of evil.

[This concerns above all Delp’s book project Der Aufbau. Die Existenzmächte des deutschen Menschen (The Construction. The Existential Powers of the German Man), the draft of which is found in I, 195-202, and also the texts under the title, Männerapostolat: Die Katholische Aktion des Mannes (Men’s Apostolate The Catholic Action of Man), in: I, 69-109.]

2. The Relationship of Nature and Grace

By nature, Neo-Scholasticism understood the creative endowment of a being with all that is necessary for its natural development and destiny; but it completely disregarded man’s relationship with God. Grace was strictly separated from this nature in order to preserve the gift character of grace. God was not allowed to be presented as someone obligated to grace because human nature demanded it.

Nature in this context is a philosophical term that does not contain any biological meaning; nor does it correspond to the colloquial use of the word “nature.”

In contrast to Neo-Scholasticism, pro-national socialist theologians regarded nature and grace as belonging together, and organically assigned the two to each other.] Becoming a Christian was regarded by them as a synthesis of nature and supernature—therefore grace needed an empirically tangible basis. The carrier of this synthesis was human nature, specifically German nature. For nature never existed abstractly, but always in a specific imprint through “blood and soil.” There is an intimate connection between German nature and grace, so that the life of grace is formed according to the German national character. Piety and theology, for example, were always völkisch for Adam; and he vehemently opposed all attempts from the Catholic side to deny this connection. The general human was secondary compared to man’s belonging to a certain community of blood and destiny. A universalistic or humanistic view could only find his derision. Adam went so far as to say that if German blood is the basis of grace, then the bond between people of the same blood is also stronger than that between Christians of different blood.

But what happens to the concept of nature in this interpretation? A purely philosophical concept that refers to the nature of a living being is biologized and racially charged. Purely externally, the concept of nature has not changed in this transformation process. Therefore, Adam could keep the scheme of the togetherness of nature and grace unchanged after 1945. He only had to disguise the völkisch and racist interpretation.

Delp, on the other hand, emphasizes the twofold revelation through creation and through grace. [Cf. Kirche in der Zeitenwende (Church at the Crossroads), III. Offenbarung (Revelation), in: I, 126-13.]. In these two orders God speaks to man. In the order of creation, people recognize God through created things; in the order of grace, God breaks through the narrow confines of nature and places himself in a personal relationship with people. The order of nature includes the division of people into peoples, whereas the order of grace transcends time and history, and is—as Delp says—”übervölkisch.”

This distinction between nature and grace is a classical (new) scholastic argumentation. By way of it, Delp attests to völkisch religiosity that it remains purely in the realm of the natural; that is, it can at best be a kind of true natural religion, which it also fails to be due to wrong starting points. Supernatural religion does not come into view at all in the völkisch religiosity.

Delp applies the relation of nature and supernature also to the question whether the ecclesiastical and the “völkisch” man are necessarily in contradiction to each other—and here his interest seems to be rather to bring the two areas together. This is done in the context of a series of sermons on the contemporary service of the German man in the years after 1933, in which Delp reflects on the signs of the times and the foundations of Catholicism in order to give Catholic men help for their current lives in the context of the male apostolate.

The problem of “völkischer Mensch—kirchlicher Mensch” was ultimately the problem of the relationship between nature and supernature. The völkisch man stemmed from creation; the ecclesiastical man from the new creation in Jesus Christ. The natural possibilities of man were decisively weakened by the Fall, but not completely abolished—the traditional Catholic position. Thus, the natural man could no longer accomplish what he actually could by his nature and what he was obliged to do.

The ecclesiastical man had never left creation, the world, the people, because the order of grace did not abolish nature and history. The natural world is elevated in it to the new creation. This means that the “völkische” man can actually realize himself fully only in the ecclesiastical. Only from the supernature can a pure nature be lived. But if the “völkisch” man does not want to go beyond nature, and limits himself to it, then, however, ecclesiastical and “völkisch” man would not come together; which means doom for the latter and his people from Delp’s perspective.

Delp does not seem to be completely uninterested in the völkisch idea. His diction is also quite alienating in parts. Jörg Seiler interprets this in his commentary in such a way that Delp tried to explain the power of the Christian message in the understanding horizon of his time—a closeness to the völkisch thinking should not be attested to the writing about the male apostolate. In the end, national thinking is absorbed by the bond between man and supernature, which does not allow any one-sidedness on the level of nature. Delp makes no secret of the fact that the strength of the ecclesiastical man for the service to the people comes from the Church and not from the blood. Service to the people without leading the people back to God would not be true service to the people for Delp. This means that everything Delp says about the “people,” which may be reminiscent of völkisch thinking, is determined by the binding of the natural order to the supernatural one.

In that this bond is the decisive thing, Seiler is absolutely right. But in my estimation, a certain fascination of Delp with the “new age” cannot be denied. Delp emphasizes the readiness of the will, which now—unlike before—is to be found everywhere: a readiness to think and act beyond one’s own ego. That Delp does not understand this in a “national-monistic, völkisch or collectivistic” (Seiler) way is to be admitted, but he considers it possible to build on this attitude, which others, after all, interpret precisely in a völkisch and collectivistic way. Thus, there is something about the “new age” that lends itself to building the Christian message on it, but then also setting it apart from it. This is similar to Delp’s treatment of Heidegger’s thought, which he fundamentally criticizes, but also accepts in one crucial point: in the topos of man, who is called into the decision to master his life. This human being, however, does not stand in a meaningless space, as in Heidegger, but is—like the “völkische Mensch“—bound to the supernatural order. The fact that Delp sees the possibility of a connection at certain points is certainly also connected with his assessment of modern times and modernity in comparison to the Middle Ages, in which “ecclesiastical and völkisch man” still formed a unity for him.

However, Delp also draws clear boundaries. When he brings nature and supernature together, he is not concerned, like Karl Adam, with creating a völkisch-racist basis of theology, i.e., a particularistic theology, but with asserting and defending the greater right of supernature. That he does not want to create a particularistic theology, for which the German national is closer to the German Catholic than the baptized foreigner, becomes clear from the fact that he emphasizes the universal character of the order of grace and, based on natural law and the doctrine of creation, speaks of universal human rights. The latter in particular is beautifully demonstrated in the sermons for the feast of St. Elizabeth and for All Saints’ Day in 1941, both of which address the topic of “euthanasia.”

For Delp, St. Elizabeth, who is, after all, a princess, reveals a message of the meaning of “the noble man.” This meaning consists in the bond between power and right: the bearer of power is at the service of right and must guarantee right to men. Elizabeth recognizes, in Delp’s words, that man is in possession of rights which no prince or ruler may touch. Further, power must be understood as service to all. Elizabeth’s diaconal activity is not a personal quirk, but a lived worldview.

“Those that gathered around Elizabeth were not the people who stepped forth with important, these were not the people with blazing eyes and the straight backs, these were not the people of great positions, these were the cripples and the sick and the brooding and the poor and the outcasts of life and of existence” (III, 291f).

Even in these people, despite all misery and decrepitude, the image of God becomes visible as something worthy of promotion and protection. Delp thus connects the idea of human rights with the image of God. In this, he articulates a serious message to the German people:

“And who would take it upon himself to destroy an image and likeness, a thought, a will, a love of the Lord God! …Woe to him upon whom a human being was destroyed, upon whom an image of God was desecrated, even if it was in its last throes and even if it was only a memory of a human being!” (III, 292)

The All Saints Sermon takes up the content of the [1941] propaganda film about euthanasia entitled, Ich klage an (I Accuse). The title stems from the fact that in this film a legal system is to be indicted that forces man to live under all circumstances, and thus indirectly a God who allows such a thing. Delp bluntly calls the statements of the film a threefold lie. First, the pure happiness of the couple and the continuing success that prevailed before the wife’s illness is completely unrealistic and pretends that without the illness everything would have remained the same. Furthermore, the appeal to the tear glands and the resulting pity lulls the audience and prevents a rational discussion. Thirdly, the eternal talk of love and redemption is a distraction from the harshness of existence which only seeks to seduce to a more comfortable solution.

Delp interprets the basic message of this film as an escape from the harshness of suffering and from the responsibility of caring. Man remains man even in the worst condition, and he remains an appeal to the ability to love and the power of sacrifice of his environment. Man is deprived of the chance of probation, because suffering is also a place of historical probation. This may seem cynical to some of today’s advocates of active euthanasia, but it means taking man and his responsibility radically seriously. Delp does not stop there, but calls euthanasia not only a lie and an escape, but also a rebellion against God and an encroachment on the inviolable rights of man.

“That people will die who let man die, whether it be man in the very extreme situation. It is indignation against man, who by his birth and existence alone has rights which no one can take from him and which no one may touch without desecrating man and desecrating himself and despising himself” (III, 268f).

That churchmen stand up for human rights may seem natural to us after the pontificate of John Paul II, but at that time it was tantamount to a revolution, since until then the Catholic Church had condemned the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man. As far as I know, a positive appreciation of human rights within the Catholic Church appears for the first time in 1941, in the context of the Catholic resistance, especially the Committee for Religious Affairs, with whose members Father Augustin Rösch and Father Lothar König Delp were in close contact. On the one hand, Delp gives a religious legitimation of human rights by invoking the image of God, but he also speaks of the fact that these rights come to man by birth; that is, as human beings. This high regard for human rights was obviously easier in National Socialist Germany for those theologians who, because of their Neo-Scholastic orientation, held to natural law.

[The Kreisau Circle used the term “ius nativum” to circumvent or overcome controversial theological problems regarding natural law; cf. Michael Pope, Alfred Delp S.J. im Kreisauer Kreis, 185-193, esp. 189-193.]

The reflections on the Immaculata, the Immaculate Conception of Mary, also belong to the theme of “nature and grace.” For Karl Adam, they belong to the context of the myth of the Aryan Jesus and form the climax of his racist transformation of the concept of nature. Adam did not go so far as to deny Jesus’ Jewishness altogether, but he did qualify it to the extent that Jesus could not have been a Judean full-blooded Jew, but certainly had some drops of other blood in him because he came from the “racially mixed” Galilee. Also, Jesus’ “racial” independence from Judaism then was due to his mother. Adam interpreted Mary’s liberation from original sin as the endowment of Mary with the noblest hereditary traits. Therefore, he said, Catholics need not worry about the question of Jesus’ Jewish ancestry.

“It is personally an uplifting thought to me that in the genetic stock, in the hereditary mass, which Mary transmitted to her divine Son, there were alive, thanks to a mysterious guidance of God supervising the development of her race, the best, noblest dispositions and powers which the human race had at its disposal. This view is based on the truth of faith that Mary was conceived without original sin—’without original sin,’ that is, also without the consequences of original sin, that is, in perfect purity and beauty, that is, with the noblest dispositions and powers. It is this dogma of Mary’s immaculata conceptio which makes all those malicious questions and complaints, as if we had to recognize in Jesus, in spite of all his merits, a ‘Jew-stemming,’ a completely absurd question from the Catholic point of view. For it testifies to us that Jesus’ mother Mary had no physical or moral connection whatsoever with those ugly dispositions and forces which we condemn in the full-blooded Jew. She is, by God’s miracle of grace, beyond those Jewish hereditary traits, a super-Jewish figure. And what is true of the mother is all the more true of the human nature of her son.” [Karl Adam, “Jesus der Christus und wir Deutsche” (Jesus and us Germans), in Wissenschaft und Weisheit 10 (1943) 73-103, here: 91.]

God thus appears as a planned eugenicist; salvation history as a process of “grafting” hereditary traits. This conflation of dogmatic teachings of the Catholic Church with Nazi racial ideology was not contained in some private paper of Adam’s, but appeared in 1943 in a theological journal, the Franciscan Wissenschaft und Weisheit (Science and Wisdom).

On the other hand, Alfred Delp’s reflections on the Immaculata in his homily of December 8, 1941, are very different. The Immaculate Conception exemplifies in a human being the exaltation of man in grace [“Immaculata” (1941), in III, 36-45.]. The Sitz im Leben for the proclamation of this dogma was, in Delp’s perspective, the struggle against the absolute materialism and naturalism of the 19th century (the dogma was defined in 1854). The Immaculata, in Delp’s eyes, stands against the law of a biologistic order, against the judgment of a person’s worth by his blood, against the law of the collective that tests people for their usefulness and eliminates them if they fail. She is an I, a person accepted by God, blessed by God and overcomer of everything demonic. In her has happened exemplarily what grace intends for all people—they only have to let themselves be blessed.

Another spiritual address of Delp about Mary, which he probably held on the eve of a Marian feast in a community of Jesuits—the exact date is not known—has a different character [“Maria,” in III, 215-219.]. Here Delp does not foreground the commonality of people with Mary, but on the contrary emphasizes the gap between the Immaculata and the guilty people standing before her, who are members of a great community of guilt—by this community is meant the German people. “Thus, we stand in this hour before the high woman, before the world of holy divine order: in everything her weak, destroyed counter-image” (III, 218).

In this context, Delp makes an allusion to Mary being Jewish, which seems almost like the reverse image of Adam’s utterances:

“Wherever Mary is venerated today, she is called by the word that concludes all her greatness and glory in itself: Immaculata! …Whatever may seem beautiful and high and desirable to men is fulfilled in her. Natural nobility, down to the most biological sense of the word: King’s daughter from the house of David” (III, 216).

So, no preservation of Mary from Jewish hereditary traits, but conscious naming of her Jewish descent. If now the impression arises that Delp does here the same as Adam only under reversed conditions, one must make clear what he actually says here. According to the testimony of the Gospels, Mary did not come from the house and lineage of David at all, but her husband Joseph; and it is very unlikely that Delp was not aware of this. If, nevertheless, he uses here the most “biological” sense of the word, and if we consider this in the context of the recognition of the great guilt of the German people, who are facing Mary, then it can really only be a matter here of making clear that Mary is a Jew (and therefore, of course, Jesus is also a Jew), and of drawing attention to the guilt of the German people, which consists in the persecution and extermination of the Jews. However, this statement remains very coded.

3. The Understanding of Church

The view of the Church as a community and the orientation to experience and encounter became important for a theology that affirmed National Socialism. However, the roots of these concepts go back further.

Even before the time of National Socialism, “community” was the defining idea of ecclesiology for Karl Adam. In the first editions of his famous book, Das Wesen des Katholizismus (The Spirit of Catholicism), he interpreted the nature of the Church as a community. For him, the divine becomes real in the Church, but only insofar as the Church is community. In the mystery of the Incarnation of Jesus, the Church was already given as an organic community. Adam took up the community ideology of the Weimar period in his doctrine of the Church. This ideology expressed dissatisfaction with the Weimar Republic and democracy and attacked the parliamentary system, rationalism and liberalism. In the background was the communitarianism of the youth movement, and especially the war experience of World War I.

Democracy and pluralism were not seen as an opportunity for a better life, but as the cause of conflict and disunity. Therefore, such a diffuse concept as “community” could become a counter-model to parliamentary democracy. This promised the solution to all problems by pretending to resolve all antagonisms in a higher third. This was the basis of the attractiveness of the concept of community for theologians who wanted to abolish the conflictual opposites of nature and grace, but also of laity and clergy, of local and universal Church. This concept allowed them to leave behind both the Neo-Scholastic individualism of salvation and the view of the Church as an institution of salvation. At the same time, it created the conditions for cooperation with National Socialism.

Closely connected with the concept of “community” was the idea of “experiencing” this community and of a community-creating primordial experience. The community thinking of the Weimar period, which continued in National Socialism, was rooted in the war experience of the First World War. Adam was also deeply influenced by it. Like many others, he interpreted the beginning of the war in August 1914 as an overwhelming experience of the unity and community of the German people. This community abolished all political, social, and confessional barriers. “Experience” and “Encounter” became at the same time an epistemological instrument. With its help, Adam rejected the claim of Neo-Scholasticism to justify faith with the help of natural reason. Adam now grounded faith in the irrational, in the encounter. This, however, was not understood as something purely subjective, but as an event that transcended individuality, within a community shaped by authority and hierarchy.

I would like to present Alfred Delp’s understanding of the Church primarily with the help of a text he wrote in prison at the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945. [“Reflexionen über die Zukunft” (Reflections on the Future), “IV. Das Schicksal der Kirchen” (Fate of the Churches), in IV, 318-323]. It is a clear-sighted look into the future of the Church. The fate of the Church would not depend on the political-tactical skill of its leaders, but on its turning to the real need of people in all areas of life. Thus, for Delp, the Church is essentially a diaconal Church. It has to return to its basic function of diakonía.

“No man will believe in the message of salvation and of the Savior until we have bloodied ourselves in the service of man who is physically, psychologically, socially, economically, morally, or otherwise sick” (IV, 319).

This may sound as self-evident as the commitment to human rights, but it is just as little so. For Karl Adam, the self-executions of the Church included dogma, cultus, and morality, i.e., preaching, administering the sacraments, and educational activity, but not diaconal commitment. Adam did propagate the unity of the truth of faith and the life of faith, but he sought it in “experience” and not in [the encounter], in turning to the world and the needs of people. The fact that Adam almost completely omitted the diaconal character of the Church from his ecclesiology enabled him to propagate a church of the strong and healthy and to dream of a Catholic “master man.”

As an example, on the other hand, let us mention Pius XII. He adhered to the traditional image of the Church as an institution of salvation, which must provide everything for the salvation of the individual soul. This means that here, too, diaconal commitment was not in the foreground. It was more important to ensure the continued existence of Church pastoral care and the administration of the sacraments through political cleverness—for it was a matter of eternal salvation—than to protest against the persecution of the Jews.

One can see, then, the importance that Delp’s determination of the Church’s task had. From its diaconal mission and self-execution, the Church must recognize the signs of the times; hear and answer “the calls of longing and of the times, of ferment and of new departures,” and not merely file away “the concerns of each new age and generation in the filing cabinets” (IV, 318). It must also do a reappraisal of its past, i.e., self-critically explore what it itself has contributed to the history of injustice in its 2000-year history.

“A coming honest cultural and intellectual history will have to write bitter chapters about the churches’ contributions to the emergence of mass man, collectivism, dictatorial forms of rule, etc.” (IV, 319).

To secular man, the Church must not meet with presumption; the lost and erring man it must pursue; it must be concerned about human dignity and human rights. “It makes no sense to be content to leave humanity to its fate with a preaching and religious license, with a pastor’s and prelate’s salary” (IV, 23).

The Church must not want to compensate for its real loss of political and social power with alliances of throne and altar of whatever kind.

By the end of these thoughts, which Delp wrote in prison with his hands tied, there are only fragmentary, but all the more forceful, sentences. The Church must turn to the world, must be the sacrament of the world, not the goal of the world. But neither must she dissolve herself in any worldly order and abandon her transcendent reference: “The force of the Church’s immanent mission depends on the seriousness of her transcendent devotion and adoration” (IV, 323).

Thus, Delp’s understanding of the Church reflects his conception of the human being—fully turned towards the world and committed to history; but always living from the transcendent reference. That he calls the Church to a return to one of its fundamental self-fulfillments, diakonia, is thus on the one hand the best tradition of the Church, but also results from his conception of man, which is shaped by modern philosophy. The fact that this view of the Church is also groundbreaking from an inner-Church point of view is something I would like to mention here only briefly and take up again at the end.

4. The Heroic Ideal

Karl Adam emphasized in his Christ books the humanity of Jesus [Christus unser Bruder (Christ our Brother) Regensburg 1926; Jesus Christus (Jesus Christ) Augsburg 1933]., but carried this out in such a way that he projected onto the earthly Jesus a heroic ideal of masculinity and sought to combine this with the traditional Christian virtues, which stereotypically appear as feminine. The product was the physically and psychologically perfect man. With the help of this favoring of the “strong” and “healthy,” Christianity was not to appear as the morbid religion of the weak, born of resentment. Christology is thus functionalized for a church of the “strong and healthy.” The fact that Adam also emphasized the “maternal” traits of Jesus may soften this impression, but in their clichéd nature (“tender, caring and ready for sacrifice”) these cannot relativize the heroic motif.

Delp, like probably most men of his time, was by no means indifferent to the heroic ideal. His youthful dream was to become a soldier and officer. But the First World War also brought a change in this respect. To his provincial, Father Augustin Rösch, he wrote before his ordination in 1937:

“Yesterday, I gave in to a secret childhood love and once again looked at soldiers on parade on the fairgrounds. As you know, I told you once in Feldkirch, I would have loved to become a soldier for my life. My godfather, who was only a few years older than me, was already a cadet and I dreamed of it. Then the war shattered everything. My godfather fell in ‘14 as a young cadet just 17 years old. And after the war everything was different. In the meantime, the divine eagle picked up the foundling and carried it to its eyrie. And now it should get the big wings… That just came to my mind during the ‘heightened combat readiness’ that was also practiced yesterday” (V, 91).

Delp never completely let go of this youthful desire: in 1939 he made intensive efforts to be drafted into field chaplaincy. When his rather impetuous approach to this question led to irritation, he justified himself by saying that he wanted to follow in the footsteps of the men in his family.

“The fact that I was so hasty in seeking my war assignment stems from the fact that I wanted to become an officer before my conversion and that I am ashamed to sit at home, while all but one of the male members of my family are in the field. Besides, precisely as a priest and Jesuit, I wanted to prove that the concerns and worries of my people are always a serious duty to me” (V, 106). Delp wrote to Vicar General Georg Werthmann on September 28, 1939.

Given this fascination with the military, it is all the more significant that Delp was completely immune to certain forms of glorification of war and combat, such as we find in Ernst Jünger or Max Scheler. Delp read Scheler’s work Der Genius des Krieges (The Genius of War) and Jünger’s Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis (War as Inner Experience) as an inner experience and rejected Jünger’s assertions that war is a law of nature and that it does not matter why and for what one fights, but only how, as well as Scheler’s automatism of purification through war, independent of moral considerations and decisions. Above all, Delp is far from “glorifying war as the ideal state of male life” (II, 247); but he calls for coping with it and mastering it. In this 1940 article from Stimmen der Zeit (Voices of the Time), entitled, “Der Krieg als geistige Leistung” (War as a Spiritual Achievement) [II, 239-248], Delp does not grapple with the question of just war or the moral permissibility of a war of extermination, although it seems between the lines that he is aware of this issue. For the sake of fairness, however, it must be said that positively uplifting articles about the war were required by the Reichsschrifttumskammer (Reich Chamber of Culture) at this time, and direct criticism of the war would not have been tolerated.

Delp had already dealt with the concept of honor and the ideal of the heroic man in the context of his critique of völkisch religiosity. [“Kirche in der Zeitenwende” (Church at the Crossroads), “VIII. Der Mensch der Ehre im Christentum” (Man and Honor in Christianity), “IX. Der heldische Mensch” (Heroic Man), in I, 165-182].

In the völkisch religious myth, honor is a central concept—honor, however, not understood as an external reputation or good reputation, but as the innermost core of man. Honor then means self-realization and loyalty to the inner self, which gives itself its own laws. This law of honor is considered the highest norm and does not tolerate any other highest value next to it, neither Christian love nor secular humanity. From this results the reproach of dishonor to the Christians; and this reproach Delp wanted to refute and to work out the true meaning of the concept of honor.

The Christian is also obliged to realize himself, to be true to himself, to listen to his innermost voice. This happens when he listens to his conscience. For Delp, the central value of Christianity is man’s likeness to God (through creation) and sonship to God (through grace)—therefore, honor is inconceivable without love. Christian life is thus compatible with the concept of honor; but Christians can have nothing in common with people whose honor does not extend beyond themselves.

The heroic person in the völkisch-religious ideology is the one who lives according to the law of honor. The heroic ideal is a fighting one. The struggle is for its own sake, not for a goal. Only by fighting does the hero realize himself, even if this means his downfall. Certainly, there is no goal that goes beyond man and the earthly world. This absolute world immanence is without goal and for Delp therefore senseless. We have here the same judgment as with Heidegger’s concept of the decision of Dasein to itself. Moreover, this senselessness, Delp criticizes, is not named as such, but concealed as tragedy.

“Thus, self-realization becomes a self-destruction; the march of hammering life a train to abysmal death. This human being must fight, must dare, and yet in the end must not ask what for. He feels the insufficiency of his personal disposition, but this is exactly supposed to constitute his heroism; that it nevertheless pulls unquestioningly and wordlessly into the twilight darkness and perishes in it. Finally, he declares the senseless and the groundless to be the meaning and reason of his commitment; he stands before the new lie of tragedy” (I, 177).

Christian heroism, for Delp, is no less achievement, spirit, and readiness to fight. But there is a great difference between the heroism of the time and the heroism of the Christian. The Christian is committed to a task which is to be accomplished in the world, but which transcends this world. Man does not give himself his goal—here the hero is quite powerless—but he must let God give him that goal.

“To the man of ‘autonomous heroism’ no other result is valid than tragedy. He must finally admit to himself that he knows no answer to the question, why and to what end. Thus, he proclaims the struggle without aim and without sense; the march without direction. The living, honest man defends himself against this worst deception, which was ever tried on people. The Christian, however, is full of certainty and confidence; that he is committed to an effort that holds out the prospect of hardship and toil and wounding and death, and yet is meaningful and productive of results—before God” (I, 180f).

Delp thus takes up, not only for tactical reasons, but out of inner affinity, the motif of the heroic, which is encountered in völkisch religiosity and Nazi ideology, and gives it an entirely different meaning: not the law of honor, not the struggle as an end in itself, not the downfall as a tragedy count; but radical commitment to the world, on the sure ground of God’s grace. Man cannot redeem himself. Any presumed autonomy on this point and any resulting tragedy would be lies.

Delp is also far from projecting the heroic ideal onto Jesus Christ. This goes hand in hand with a very traditional descendent Christology. Karl Adam fascinated many of his contemporaries, and especially young men, by his emphasis on the humanity of Jesus, and by describing this human Jesus as strong, healthy and attractive—a dream of a man. That was modern, innovative, carried people away. Delp, on the other hand, appears here, as Karl Rahner acknowledges about him in the preface to Volume I, actually rather old-fashioned [“Einleitung zu den Texten” (Introduction of the Textx, Karl Rahner), in I, 43-50; here, 46].. For him, Christ is the preexistent Word of God who became man, who descended into the lowliness of human existence—not a strong, tough of will, vigorous, male hero. Delp’s Christology is a kenotic one, a divestment Christology.

Here too, then, it is evident that he takes up and reinterprets contemporary currents, but applies them only to the situation of man, not to God or Jesus Christ.

5. Conclusion

The question of the coherence of Delp’s theology and his resistance can be clearly answered in the affirmative. In his philosophical and theological reflections on man and history, as well as in his spiritual writings, Delp foresaw what he later actively suffered and was forced to master. He not only thought of the Christian’s responsibility in history and for history, but also realized it. The fact that he did not give in to the Gestapo’s efforts to get him to resign from the Jesuit Order, even though that would probably have saved his life, but took his last vows on December 8, 1944, in Tegel Prison, was an outward expression of his decision to remain faithful both to history and to his transcendent goal.

Closely related to his resistance continue to be his diaconal understanding of the church, his commitment to human rights, and his resistance to communal ideology.

Neo-Scholastic theologians in National Socialist Germany found it easier to refer to human rights because they affirmed God-given human rights from natural law thinking and were more universalist-oriented than “völkisch” and racist theologians. This does not mean, however, that all Neo-Scholastics were by definition resisters or even affirmed human rights. In Vichy France, for example, we find the commitment to human rights more among the so-called modern theologians.

For all his interest in orders of a natural or supernatural nature and in the sociality of man, Delp repeatedly emphasized conscience, personal decision, and the responsibility of the individual for history. On the one hand, this may still reflect the Neo-Scholastic individualism of salvation, for Delp is always concerned with the question of salvation in this context, but perhaps even more strongly the reception of Heidegger’s Being and Time, to which Jürgen Habermas ascribes a critical moment, namely that which is contained in the individualistic heritage of existential philosophy. [After 1929, according to Habermas, this critical moment disappeared in Heidegger, and “historical humanity” and “collective destiny” took its place]. Delp, however, retained it; and possibly this made him resistant to the prevailing ideology of community.

Was Delp’s theology a modern, contemporary one, or a more traditional Neo-Scholastic one?

There is no single answer here. Delp was driven by a concern to engage with contemporary thought and to incorporate what he recognized as positive into Christian theology. There is, however, a clear boundary here—as long as it is a matter of illuminating the situation of man and understanding history, he was inspired, for example, by Heidegger or the heroic ideal; but even so, in determining the double meaning of history he opposed traditionally shaped views, even more so when it came to Jesus Christ or God. Delp would probably never have had the idea—not even after the notorious “Kehre”—to transfer Heidegger’s concept of being to God. With regard to Jesus Christ, he remained within the framework of a classical descendent Christology and did not go along with the fashionable trend of putting the humanity of Jesus particularly in the foreground.

Delp’s understanding of nature and grace is also rather Neo-Scholastic. He did not want to tear the two apart; but he does see them as two realms. In the understanding of history, this is shown by the distinction between a natural order of history and the order of Christ. Also, by nature, history has a goal: namely, to become what God intended in creation. These thoughts are more in the Neo-Scholastic discourse; the concept of the unity of world history and salvation history, on the other hand, in the modern. However, Seiler has made it convincingly clear in his commentary that the category of history functions as a link between traditionality and modernity in Delp’s thought. Nature is tied to supernature in a historical way. Consequently, nature and supernature, though two separate realms, are linked by history. The same is true of Christology—the mystery of the Hypostatic Union has made visible a new order of nature, and with it a new dimension of history: being the place of man’s encounter with God in the order of Christ. Everything that is human is embraced by the Christ order. According to Seiler, no Neo-Scholastic thinks in this way. In this respect, Seiler says that Delp’s understanding of nature and grace and Christology is modern in its Neo-Scholastic character.

Absolutely groundbreaking is Delp’s understanding of the Church. Here he had already overtaken the so-called modern theologians of his time, who adhered to the ideology of community. That the Church is a sacrament, i.e., a sign and instrument of the union of man with God and of men among themselves, is the core principle of the Church constitution of the Second Vatican Council. Church as sacrament means first of all service to the world. The sacramental interpretation does not point the Church inward, to a self-sufficient liturgical community, or to the piety of inner circles, but outward to the needs of the world. Whoever had such an understanding of the Church could not dream of a Church of the strong and healthy, or want to push through a Church reform with the help of National Socialism, at a time when millions had already been killed in the death camps and in the war.

Finally, let Alfred Delp himself be given the last say—with a quotation that makes it clear that Christians’ commitment to history is a matter of life and death:

“History, within its order and possibilities, is placed on the testimony and decision of men. It is, from man’s point of view, an agonal event; whoever did not fight for history should not be surprised if he lost it and if it forgot him” (II, 417f.).

Alfred Delp fought for history and lost his life—history did not forget him.

Lucia Scherzberg is Professor of systematic theology at the University of Saarland, Germany. This article appears courtesy of theologie.geschichte.

Featured image: Father Alfred Delp.