Vladimir Putin and Tucker Carlson: The Geopolitics of Dialogue

Why is Tucker Carlson’s interview momentous for both the West and Russia?

Let us start with the simpler part—Russia. Here, Tucker Carlson has become a focal point of convergence for two different—polar—segments of Russian society: the ideological patriots and the elite Westernizers who nevertheless remain loyal to Putin and the Special Military Operation (SMO). For the patriots, Tucker Carlson is simply ours. He is a traditionalist, a right-wing conservative, a staunch opponent of liberalism. This is what walking to the Russian Tsar looks like in the 21st century.

Putin does not often interact with the brightest representatives of the fundamentally conservative camp. And the attention that the Kremlin pays him kindles the heart of a patriot, inspiring him to continue the conservative-traditionalist course in Russia itself. Now it is possible and necessary to do so: the Russian authorities have decided on an ideology. We have taken this path and we will not turn away from it. But patriots are always afraid that we will turn back. No.

On the other hand, the Westernizers have also breathed a sigh of relief: “Well, everything is not so bad in the West, and there are good and objective people there; we told you! Let’s be friends at least with such a West, Westernizers think, even though the rest of the globalist liberal West does not want to be friends, but only bombards us with sanctions and missiles and cluster bombs, killing our women, children and the elderly. We are at war with the liberal West; let there be friendship with the conservative West.
Thus, in the person of Tucker Carlson, Russian patriots and Russian Westernizers (already more and more Russian and less Western) have come to a consensus.

In the West itself, the situation is even more fundamental. Tucker Carlson is a symbolic figure. He is now the main symbol of an America that hates Biden, liberals and globalists and is preparing to vote for Trump. Trump, Carlson and Musk, and Texas Governor Abbott, are the faces of the impending American Revolution, this time the Conservative Revolution. And now Russia is tapping into this already quite powerful resource. No, it is not about Putin’s support for Trump; that could easily be minimized in a war with the United States. Carlson’s visit is about something else: about the fact that Biden and his maniacs have actually attacked a great nuclear power with the hands of Kiev terrorists, and humanity is about to be destroyed. Nothing more, nothing less.

And the world globalist media continues to spin Marvel-series for the infantile, in which the spider-man Zelensky magically defeats the Kremlin’s “Dr. Evil” with the help of superpowers and magic piglets. But that is just a cheap, silly TV series. And in reality, it is all about the use of nuclear weapons and possibly the destruction of mankind. Tucker Carlson has offered a reality check: does the West realize what it is doing, pushing the world towards the Apocalypse? There is a real Putin and a real Russia, not these staged characters and sets from Marvel. Look at what the globalists have done and what we are standing right up to! And it is not the content of the Putin interview; it is the very fact that a man like Tucker Carlson visited a country like Russia and a politician like Putin at a time like this.

Tucker Carlson’s arrival in Moscow may be the last chance to stop the extinction of humanity. And the gigantic billion-dollar attention to this momentous interview on the part of humanity itself, as well as the frenzied inhuman rage of Biden, the globalists, and the world’s decay-addled philistines, is evidence that this humanity is aware of the seriousness of what is happening. The only way to save the world is to stop now. And to do that, America must elect Trump. And choose Tucker Carlson. And Ilon Musk. And Abbott. And we get a chance to stand on the edge of the abyss. And compared to that, everything else is secondary. Liberalism and its agenda have brought humanity to a dead end.

Now the choice is: either liberals or humanity. Tucker Carlson chooses humanity, and that is why he came to Moscow to see Putin. And everyone in the world realized what he came for and how important it was.

The content of the interview was not sensational. Much more important is its very fact. And the photo of President Vladimir Putin talking to the hero of American patriotism, the indomitable Tucker Carlson. Conservatives of all countries united. In a multipolar world, the West, too, must have its share. But Western civilization will be the last to join BRICS.

Sleepy Joe then came to, and having watched with horror Putin’s conversation with Tucker Carlson, decided to interfere in world affairs. At first, Blinken and Nuland advised him to just declare that no such interview had even happened, that it was fake news, readily “disproved” by fact-checkers, and anyone who claims that there was an interview was a bellowing conspiracy theorist. But that initial plan was rejected, and Biden decided to honestly state that, contrary to the findings of the prosecutors’ probe, he is not a senile old madman out of his mind. “That’s not true, I’m not a senile old madman,” Biden indignantly denied the prosecutors’ findings…. And then forgot what he wanted to say next.

President Putin has spoken clearly about our Old Lands. It is important. The West will not get them. And Ukrainians live on them and will live on them, if Zelensky, Umerov and Syrsky, who have the most distant relation to the Malorussians, do not destroy all Malorussians and Malorussian women in the near future. Then there will be no Ukrainians left. And the Old Lands will have to be populated by someone else. God forbid we live to see that. On the agenda is the revolt of the Malorussians against the anti-Ukrainian puppet government, which has subjected Ukrainians to a real genocide by its policy.

The interview of Putin with Tucker Carlson is the most successful move by the Russian media strategy during the entire time of the SMO. Of course, the initiative clearly came from the brilliant American journalist himself, but responding to it and supporting it was a creative, brilliant decision by the Kremlin. Carlson hacks into the system of globalist propaganda by telling the truth of the people, of society, in spite of the systematized lies of the elites. A win-win, but difficult, a heroic move: the truth of the people against the lies of the elites. Putin has something to say to both the West and the East. And they want to hear his speech, his arguments, to know his picture of the world, his views on the future of Russia and humanity. On this depends, in many respects, whether this humanity itself will exist or not. Ask honestly, you will get an honest answer.

The number of views of Putin’s interview with Tucker Carlson on social network X has far exceeded 100 million [as of this article]. I think cumulatively the interview will be viewed by a billion.

Let us emphasize once again: Tucker Carlson is not just a journalist and not even just a non-conformist journalist, he is a well-established and consistent (paleo) conservative with a clear and well-thought-out ideology, value system and world picture. And his visit to Russia is not a pursuit of sensation, but part of an ideological program. It is a political visit. With Tucker Carlson’s visit, the conservative wing of American society (at least half of it) will come to define its attitude toward Russia and Putin. Tucker Carlson is a conservative politician, traditionalist and public figure. In his person, conservative America asked the President of Russia the questions it was really interested in and got answers. This is a double blow to the globalist liberal lobby in the US—external from Putin and internal from Tucker Carlson (read Trump). Interestingly, there is also such a thing as MAGA communism in the US—Jackson Hinkle, Infrared, etc. These are friends of conservative Tucker Carlson, yet Marxists who support Trump and call for Make America Great Again (MAGA). Thus, there are also normal leftists. And together they are determined to crush liberal hegemony.
Vladimir Putin’s interview with Tucker Carlson has already led to Biden’s unseating in the presidential race and essentially Trump’s victory in the US election. That is what real soft-power is—just one thing, and history now flows in a different direction.


Alexander Dugin is a widely-known and influential Russian philosopher. His most famous work is The Fourth Political Theory (a book banned by major book retailers), in which he proposes a new polity, one that transcends liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. He has also introduced and developed the idea of Eurasianism, rooted in traditionalism. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geopolitika.


The Taiwanese Wild Card

On January 13, 2024, from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Taiwan held an election for Taiwan’s chief executive. Three candidates ran in the election: Lai Qingde (Democratic Progressive Party), Hou Yui (Kuomintang), and Ke Wen-je (Taiwan People’s Party). Lai Qingde, whose party favors Taiwanese independence, won.

Some experts argue that as a result, Taiwan will begin to distance itself from China and Russia and move closer to the United States and its allies, which will complicate the international situation.

However, the Democratic Progressive Party has won elections many times before, and is currently the ruling party on the island, having won the previous election in 2020, which did not result in serious consequences after all. Lai himself has said in the run-up to the election that he intends to pursue Taiwanese independence; he is more radical than current leader Tsai Ing-wen.

Regarding the losing candidates, the following can be said.

The candidate of the Kuomintang party, Hou Yui, is against the independence of the island and for the normalization of relations with Beijing, but on Kuomintang’s terms. In reality, it turns out that he is supposedly against the independence of Taiwan, but in reality he cannot go for unification because he opposes the Communist Party of China. This is the traditional position of this party, which considers itself the national party of China with patriotic origins. Hou Yui has always emphasized the importance of supporting peace and stability on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and has advocated promoting dialogue and cooperation with China, believing that this is necessary for Taiwan’s prosperity and development.

Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ke Wen-je supports maintaining the current relationship with China for the sake of preserving peace; i.e.; he is essentially for a continuation of the current course of the Taiwanese authorities—not to get closer to China, but also not to make it so that China is forced to use force.

Chinese experts consider the first two politicians pro-American, and Ke Wen-je pro-Japanese, believing that in fact, whichever of them is elected, there will be no significant improvement in the situation in the island’s relations with China.

The election is attracting global attention because it is not only a struggle between Taiwan’s domestic political forces, but also a reflection of tensions between China and the United States.

The Taiwanese themselves are divided into several camps, some believe that Taiwan should avoid radical actions for the sake of peace, others are in favor of independence, counting on protection and support from Western countries, and others are inclined, if not to unification with China, then to integration with it.

The Chinese authorities intend to seek reunification by implementing the “one country, two systems” model tested when Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997 and Macau in 1999. Taiwan is expected to be within China but enjoy a large degree of autonomy. The accession of Taiwan by force would be disadvantageous to China, as the two sides would suffer serious economic damage.

Taiwan is a leader in the global semiconductor manufacturing market. As Bloomberg notes, if war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, it could result in economic losses of $10 trillion for the entire world, equivalent to 10% of the current global GDP.

China is very much integrated into the world economy, so it would suffer tremendous damage. Therefore, the Chinese leadership is trying to achieve unification through peaceful methods.

The emphasis here is on the use of soft power and traditional Chinese pragmatism. This is expressed in the fact that Taiwanese can visit China, work there and do business, use the national social policy (which cannot be used by foreigners who do not have citizenship of the People’s Republic of China); enterprises with Taiwanese capital operating on the mainland can receive tax breaks and other benefits.

According to the 13th Five-Year Plan, a high-speed railroad from Beijing to Taipei is included in the national high-speed railroad network construction program. It is expected to be put into operation in 2035.

On Jan. 8, China’s Ministry of Commerce, Taiwan Affairs Office, Reform and Development Committee and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology approved a set of measures to further strengthen trade and economic cooperation between Fujian Province and Taiwan to deepen economic integration in the Taiwan Strait. Obviously, this is to demonstrate to Taiwanese voters the benefits of establishing relations with the “big motherland.”

In March 2005, China passed the Anti-Separatism Law, which determined that declaring Taiwanese independence was a pretext for war. Therefore, decisive actions by the new Taiwanese leadership could provoke a military conflict—if Lai declared that Taiwan was now an independent state, he would leave Xi Jinping no choice but to use force.

Therefore, the Chinese authorities have been making preparations not only among the Taiwanese, but also on the international stage.

On January 8th and 9th, the 17th working meeting between the U.S. and Chinese Defense Departments was held, at which the Chinese side stressed that “there will never be the slightest compromise or concession on the Taiwan issue. The United States must abide by the ‘one China’ principle, effectively fulfill relevant obligations, stop arming Taiwan and oppose Taiwan’s ‘independence’.”

Prior to this, on January 7th, China’s Foreign Ministry announced sanctions against five U.S. military-industrial complex companies that supplied arms to Taiwan. A U.S. spokesman said on January 9 that the U.S. side “urges Beijing to stop exerting military, diplomatic, and economic pressure on Taiwan.”

The U.S. strategy is to maintain the status quo of the Taiwan issue and gradually arm Taiwan in order to periodically escalate the situation in the Taiwan Strait, causing trouble for China by “containing” it and intimidating its neighbors in the region. To this end, the U.S. recently provided $500 million in military assistance to Taiwan.

But, on the other hand, in the current international situation, when their considerable forces are drawn to Israel and Ukraine, the Americans will not benefit from a military conflict between China and Taiwan, as it will require their direct intervention, huge financial expenditures, and it is not certain that the U.S. will come out of this conflict victorious. On the contrary, it could lead to the Taiwan issue being resolved once and for all in favor of China.

Some Taiwanese political analysts draw associations between Lai Qingde, Zelensky and Netanyahu, calling them “dangerous friends of the US,” implying that their behavior could create problems for Americans, putting the US in a difficult position.

Therefore, senior White House officials periodically emphasize that the United States opposes “Taiwan independence” and supports the “one China” principle, thus preventing the Taiwanese leadership from gaining confidence in unconditional U.S. support.

At the same time, a peaceful unification of Taiwan and China would also be disadvantageous for the United States, as it would strengthen China’s geopolitical position, provide it with technological advantages, and reduce the ability of the Americans to influence the Chinese leadership.

In this regard, the United States is taking steps to “warm up” Taiwan. Thus, recently 73 senators and representatives of the U.S. Congress passed a “pro-Taiwan resolution,” promising to use all effective methods to support the “freedom” of the Taiwanese people. And on the eve of the Taiwanese elections, the U.S. sent 148 million liters of diesel fuel to military bases in the Philippines in order to use the Philippines as a springboard for armed intervention in the Taiwan Strait at any time.

Based on the above, we can conclude that the U.S. and China face complex geopolitical tasks: they need to avoid military conflict to achieve their goals, which not only do not coincide, but are opposite.

The situation is aggravated by some unpredictability of Lai Qingde. Obviously, the Americans will have to restrain him periodically to prevent him from making too serious provocations toward China.

On May 20, Lai Qingde will be inaugurated, after which we can expect some concrete actions from him that will determine the further development of the situation. If Lai does not provide an occasion to launch military action, we can expect that the Chinese leadership will continue to work to win the trust of the Taiwanese people and change their political preferences. If Lai Qingde does something rash, there will be a real danger of a military conflict that will affect not only Southeast Asia, but also the world as a whole—the world economy will face a number of fundamental changes that will affect almost all business spheres.


Konstantin Batanov holds a PhD in Economic Sciences and is Associate Professor at the Department of Theory and Methodology of Translation, Higher School of Translation and Interpretation, Moscow State University. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geopolitika.


Trump’s War on the Deep State

Donald Trump ended a recent statement with the words, “I will destroy the deep state and restore a government controlled by the people and for the people.” This ten-point statement is a declaration of war on the deep state. This state, whose existence cannot be denied, is behind the assassination of John Kennedy, and most likely behind the impeachment of Richard Nixon, not to mention the one planned for Donald Trump. To say such things is almost suicidal. What would happen if he disappeared from the political scene?

Listening to the former president’s words, two of John Kennedy’s speeches come to mind: his graduation speech at American University on June 10, 1963, and his address to the Media and Publishers Association on April 27, 1961.

In the first, eight months after the Cuban crisis, Kennedy advocated peace—by which he meant a lull in US-Soviet relations. On that day, he signed his own death warrant, even if there were other factors to consider in his assassination.

In the second speech, he bluntly described his loneliness in the face of what he calls “a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy that relies primarily on secret practices to increase its sphere of influence.” Faced with this deep state that had to be destroyed, he asked for the media’s assistance: “I ask for your help in the face of this immense task in order to inform and alert the American people.” With the benefit of hindsight, we are tempted to think that this was an innocent, even naive step on his part.

Trump’s words are reminiscent of Kennedy’s. Like Kennedy, he seems to have taken a great risk. Underneath the apparent calm, tensions are extremely high in the United States. Some analysts do not hesitate to evoke the possibility of a new civil war. But what then? Fortunately, the worst is never certain.


Jean-Luc Basle is a former Vice President of the Citigroup New York (retired).


The Economics and Ethics of Rape

I recently received this message over the transom from a disaffected reader of mine who shall remain anonymous. It was sent to a friend of mine, I received it indirectly from her. This writer was not a happy camper. (You young pups, if you don’t know what a transom is, or its significance look it up.)

Here is the message: “Did he (that is, me, Block) say, for example, that there is an ‘optimal level of rape in every society?’ I don’t know, that’s one example someone shared with me. To illustrate relative harms, did he write, for example, that a parent could justify giving one’s young child up for sexual acts with an adult benefactor to save their life? I am not making any judgements about these claims, their philosophical merit, or whether they fairly represent what Walter said (or didn’t say). If he did say and write these things there may have been good reasons to frame them in the way that he did. I am just reporting the responses I received when I started asking around…” (which were very negative).

This does sound horrendous. Reading in between the lines, it can be construed as attributing to me the view that I favor rape and child molestation. Let us consider each of these charges in turn.

Of course there is an optimal amount of rape. From an ethical point of view, that amount is precisely zero. Rape is a horrendous crime, second, only, to outright murder. All men of good will must wish it to be entirely banished from the human condition. (I write at a time when this despicable crime is now being committed in Israel). It should be banished forever.

However, from an economic point of view, the optimal amount of rape is not zero. Let me explain, lest it be thought that I am now taking back what I just about this heinous crime.

Of course, there is an optimal number of rapes (murders too, ditto for all other evil vicious crimes) and the optimal number is greater than zero – from an economic as opposed to an ethical perspective. For our society to try to ensure zero rapes would take the entire GDP, and I doubt that even this herculean effort would succeed in full eradication. That is, to somehow, doubtfully, achieve this good goal would take more than all of our wealth. If we devoted all of our economic efforts to entirely ending rape, we would thus all die of starvation, cold, disease, etc. That is no way to run a railroad.

So, what, then, is the optimal number of rapes from an economic point of view?

It would be the number that would ensue if we privatized the police forces and thus employed the “magic of the market” so as to most efficiently combat this scourge. In similar manner, what is the optimal amount of cookware, or carrots, or cars? It is the quantity of each that emanates from the free enterprise system.

Under present statist institutional arrangements, the optimal number would be at the point when the full cost of stopping the marginal or last rape just equaled the harm done by this crime. This of course it totally theoretical, since none of these statistics are available to us.

Now, let us consider the second issue, allowing children to be raped in order to save their lives.

“Death before dishonor” is all well and good for adults who can chose for themselves. But guardians of children are supposed to guard them! If a guardian of a child were confronted with the choice of allowing the child entrusted to him to die, or to be raped, and he chose the former, he should be considered a criminal. And not just a slight malefactor; rather an outright abettor of murder.

I have two children, they are adults now. If I were ever faced with such a dire choice, I would unhesitatingly choose the latter. My kids could always get therapy if they were alive. If they were dead, due to my choices… well, it would never happen.

Yes, in some cultures, “Death before dishonor” is widely accepted. But justice is justice. Allowing a dependent to be put to death when the alternative was a far lesser rights violation, should be severely sanctioned. Even the Godfather, in the movie of that name, drew a sharp distinction between these two crimes rape and murder.

My first point; it is a veritable staple of the dismal science; the optimal rate of rape or any other such heinous crime, is not zero, paradoxically. The second is a basic libertarian point; the optimal amount is precisely zero. The critic cited above is not a good economist, nor a libertarian. He is an economic and an ethical illiterate.


Walter Block is the Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Endowed Chair and Professor of Economics at Loyola University, New Orleans. Read more of his work on his Substack.


Featured: The Rape of Proserpina; artist unknown; painted ca. 17th century. Nizhny Novgorod Art Museum, from the collection of Fyodor Mikhailovich Kamensky (1836 – 1913).


The Indo-Pacific Mega-Basin: Japanese Security and Defence

Japan is key actor in the geopolitical region, fundamentally maritime, which extends from Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean, known as the Indo-Pacific. In broader, geostrategic context for Japan, the Indo-Pacific is a space of connectivity between Asia and Africa (and from there to Europe), as expressed in the conceptual keystone of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. It was the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who, announced it, while addressing the Indian Parliament in 2007. The stability of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and the preservation of safe and open sea routes for navigation in the region, is a goal shared by Japan and India.

Almost a decade later, during a visit to Kenya in 2016 and before the UN General Assembly in 2018, Abe reaffirmed Japan’s role as a champion of free trade in the region, as stated in the strategic document, entitled, Vision for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) whose main objectives are:

  1. Promotion and establishment of respect for rules, freedom of navigation and trade, as the first, main parameter;
  2. Incentive for the economic prosperity of the region;
  3. Development of a framework of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific which would guarantee both the aforementioned freedom of commercial transit;
  4. Free economic activity of the countries involved.

The last concept is greatly relevant, given that this region includes more than half the world’s population and a large part of the planet’s economic activity and commercial exchanges.

For Japanese security architecture, the Indo-Pacific and its stability is the key to its own future as a country, a perspective even more established at the risk of the increasingly frequent maritime incidents in certain conflicts that really started decades ago and where China always constitutes one of the competitors and disruptor of stability. Observing the Chinese presence in the surrounding seas, more aggressive with respect to other Southeast Asian countries, Japan, with its own open conflict with China around the Senkaku Islands, looks for guarantees. Maritime security and freedom of navigation of the “FOIP Vision” are a priority, and the outbreak of a conflict near the Sea of Japan, whether a minor incident or one of major relevance around Taiwan (and the direct involvement of US forces against China), would have a massive impact on Japan, since it owes its economic and energy survival to the maritime routes through the Indian Ocean and the South and East China Seas.

The FOIP Vision is the cornerstone of the Japanese security policy, which not only determines its foreign policy but also mediates its defence policy, with the need for a robust reinforcement of national capabilities which appears to be understrength to face possible regional challenges. The fundamental alliance with the US and the growing cooperation in security matters with other states/ organizations, not necessarily located in the region (like EU and NATO), are crucial for Japan to respond in proportion to possible threats to the FOIP.

In the internal debates within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that has governed Japan for decades, with few intervals, there are contending outlooks. The Abe governments set up a new defence concept with an intense diplomatic agenda, gathering support from other countries in the region and, above all, getting the US aligned with the FOIP Vision. The impact of Abe’s assassination in July 2022, although he was officially out of politics, had the consequence of presenting the Vision of the FOIP as his legacy, but also of the LPD; and it is firmly maintained by the other Japanese governments.

A FOIP Vision, symbolically renewed after a visit by Kishida to India last March 2023, has become the cornerstone of Japan’s economic and foreign policy and, therefore, the country’s security objectives. Thus, FOIP highlights the existence of an even more de-constructive scenario for the Indo-Pacific, especially after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This pushed Japan further in its search for a security network. Likewise, attention is paid to previously present but secondary issues, such as attention to climate change, food security, health, prevention of natural disasters and the cyber scenario (New Plan for the FOIP, 2023). In conclusion, the FOIP Vision may be considered Japan’s greatest effort to expand its strategic horizon, laying the foundations for a regional order in the Indo-Pacific, in a context marked by the growing expansionism of China.

The Other Pillar

But the FOIP is not alone. The other doctrinal pillar of security policy of Tokyo is the National Security Strategy (hereinafter NSS), another legacy of Shinzo Abe era.

In 2013, the National Security Council, in a concept very similar to the US one, was established and it published the first NSS, in which the original guidelines of the National Defence Programs were reflected. The debate soon arose, when restrictions on the export of weapons were progressively relaxed and, above all, a legislative change was promoted in order to reinterpret the peace clause of the 1947 Constitution, in which Article IX renounces war as means of resolution in disputes between countries, and consequently for the armed forces on land, sea or air. Abe’s reforms enabled a change in Japanese foreign and defence policy. In 1954, the Self-Defence Forces Law allowed the establishment of the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JDSF), with many limitations and in order to prevent any worrisome memory from the past, with very limited powers and without the possibility of acting outside the country, according to the Basic National Defence Policy adopted in 1957, which made national security subject to collaboration with the United Nations (Japan joined the organization in 1955) and preserving internal security in the face of any possible aggression.

However, in June 1992, the Diet (Parliament) approved the Law on Cooperation in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, which allows the JDSF to participate in missions outside the country under the UN flag (in accordance with the International Peace Cooperation Law issued in 1992, the Japanese troops participated in a number of peacekeeping operations, such as in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, the Golan Heights and Timor-Leste; JSDF dispatched disaster relief teams to Rwanda, Honduras, Turkey, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Thailand, Indonesia, Russia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Haiti, Chile and Nepal). In 2004, Japan sent a fully combat unit abroad for the first time, specifically to Iraq.

In 2015, with Abe as prime minister, the so-called “Three New Conditions for the Use of Force” were introduced, a covert reform of the spirit of the Constitution from the Legislation for Peace and Security, which in essence authorized the government to intervene militarily outside the Japanese borders, either in self-defence or for relief of an ally attacked by third parties, thus suppressing the exclusivity of the UN for peace missions. This possibility of acting outside of Japan is the key in the new Japanese defence architecture, which also entails new needs, included in Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security, adopted in 2016. The main lines of Japanese security policy are reflected in the Defence White Paper, an annual document prepared by the Ministry of Defence, starting in 2014. It is an informative instrument for public opinion on the priorities of internal and external security, analyzing the status of strategic objectives and alliances with third countries, but without committing to any specific initiative.

On December 16, 2022, the Japanese Ministry of Defence published the latest NSS, National Defence Strategy (NDS) and Defence Program. The importance of this NSS is evident, given that the latest dated back to 2013, during the Abe era. There are notable differences between the documents in consideration of the perception of increasing external threats, such as, in order of priority, China, North Korea and Russia. The concerns of the Tokyo government are reflected in the NSS itself by defining Japan’s strategic environment as the most “severe and complex” than at any time since WWII. This is due to the unilateral risks that threaten the sovereignties of the countries—pointing to Russia with respect to Ukraine—the importance of scenarios that in 2013 did not seem central, such as cyberspace, outer space or electromagnetic space, the risk to critical infrastructures, as well as the necessary attention to issues related to global governance.

The NSS also lays down the principles of Japan’s defence architecture:

  • The commitment that it is up to Japan itself to provide sufficient initiatives and capabilities to meet its defence needs;
  • Cooperation with other countries that share common objectives, the cornerstone being the traditional alliance with the US;
  • Renunciation of nuclear means for the purposes of war.

The critical areas for Japanese security are the Indo-Pacific, its routes and the Sea of Japan regarding the threats posed by China, North Korea and Russia. Other documents, such as the National Defence Program, justify security spending priorities over the next decade, while the National Defence Strategy, which replaces the traditional National Defence Program Guidelines (that dated back to 1976), appears to be set very much in harmony with the national security strategies of the US, which proves the Japanese intention to deepen the alliance with its ally in terms of security, but also how the keystones of the FOIP Vision are adopted to the US; and Japan’s NDS and the US National Defence Strategy are well aligned and prioritize preventing unilateral changes to the status quo by force, integrating all approaches and means. Indeed, from the US, both in its Strategic Internal National Security Guide (issued on March 2022), and the National Security Strategy (October 2022), the current international system of countries is presented as a coalition of liberal democracies, where Japan is a key partner well beyond the Indo-Pacific or Asia, reaffirming Washington’s commitment to collaboration in its defence and giving Japan the status of being the cornerstone of this global alliance.

The Perception of Threats to Japan’s Security

In the December 2022 NSS, the government of Japan defined the main threats facing the country, namely, China, North Korea and Russia, in that order. With all these states, Japan has had a traumatic past, with the war against China in 1894, the war against Russia in 1904-1905, the occupation of Korea, the emergence of Tokyo as military power and its expansion in the region, followed by Japanese atrocities against civilian populations, the defeats in Manchuria by Red Army, the war against KMT (Kuomintang) and the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) forces, and the attack of Soviet Union in 1945. Despite this problematic past, the Japanese relationship with Moscow and Beijing was stable enough, while being positive and promising (with Pyongyang the relations were consistently bad). The scenario changed progressively in the 1980s and the 1990s, with the collapse of the USSR and the appearance of China as a formidable challenger, increasingly threatening the interests of Japan, India and several Southeast Asian countries.

China

Japan and China are the two largest economies in East Asia, and world leading economies, despite several problems which affect, in different way, their performances. Communist China was officially recognized by Japan as a state as late as 1972. Thereafter, then-PM Kaukei Tanaka became the first to visit Beijing, leaving behind the fiction of recognizing Taiwan as a state. Also relevant is the continuation of the row about the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu, for China), an archipelago halfway between both countries, but under Japanese sovereignty and Chinese claims, in addition to being located less than 200 kilometers from the Taiwanese coast (Taiwan too claims these islands, but it a pure fiction or just flag-waving).

The Japanese national defence architecture unequivocally points to China as the main obstacle to achieving both security as a country and regional order in the Indo-Pacific. The FOIP Vision, with the need for an international system based on cooperation and rules, is in a blatant contrast with the methods, aims and objectives of Beijing, aware of the rising geopolitical containment led by the US, which considers the present scenario as not acceptable.

For Japan, China is defined as the main threat to the peace, security and stability of the country, literally constituting an “unprecedented strategic challenge,” showing growing concern about Beijing’s military capabilities, which are highly superior to the current ones of Japan; together with China’s belligerent narrative towards Taiwan, Japan is worried that any intervention on the island could trig a major crisis, involving not only the Indo-Pacific (Tokyo also has its own history regarding Taiwan. Japanese imperial possession, after the end of WWII, the US and its allies transferred the sovereignty of the island to the Republic of China, then in a civil war between nationalists and communists. Later, at the San Francisco Conference of 1951, the fate of the territories previously occupied by Japan was decided, without any Japanese, Chinese or Koreans participating in the discussions. Thus, Japan definitively renounced sovereignty over Taiwan, although it did not officially transfer it to any country). Also symptomatic was the Chinese reaction to the publication of the Japanese NSS, considering it a fake document, a mere repetition of the US conceptualization which demonizes China not only with respect to Japan, but at a regional and global level, poisoning the Sino-Japanese relations that had existed in previous decades, including a cordial meeting between Prime Minister Fushida and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Forum in Bangkok in November 2022, which occurred just before the publication of NSS.

North Korea

The second major threat to the perspective of Japanese security is North Korea, which in recent years has intensified the launch tests of ballistic missiles that end up falling in Japanese waters, increasing the perception of the nuclear threat for a country like Japan, which is perhaps the most sensitive in the world regarding this issue. Tokyo’s concerns about North Korean nuclear capabilities are reflected with concern in the December 2022 NSS, both in the quality of its development and its rapid evolution.

North Korea’s military activities and the possible nuclear threat represent an unprecedented event for Japanese national security and the most severe and complex moment than any other after the end of WW II. Reports on the development of the North Korean programs reveals that Japanese seismometers collected evidence of tests at up to 60 kilotons. These tests are accompanied by the already mentioned launches of ballistic missiles (the year 2022 reached the peak with 59 launches), some of which fell into Japanese sovereign waters after flying over its airspace. Other concerns are that some of these tests are also being carried out with hypersonic missiles; the presence of North Korean submarines missile/drone capable launchers sailing in the Sea of Japan; and North Korea’s announcement of the launch of spy satellites into orbit, considering Japan one of its objectives.

Russia

Until 2022, Russia was not a cause of particular concern for Japan’s security perception, despite the dispute over the sovereignty of the Kuril Islands that has been open since 1945, when the then USSR claimed those as its own. There is also no official treaty that put an end to the conflict between both countries after WWII. While in years past China and North Korea were already considered the main threats to Japan’s defence, this was not the case at all with respect to Russia, at least until 2014 and its annexation of Crimea. In the 2021 Japanese Defense White Paper, only a brief section is dedicated to Russia as a country responsible for certain cyber-attacks, and its alliance with China, and the growing development of the capabilities of the Russian armed forces and some other threats. such as the deployment of new generations of ballistic missiles. A year later, this perception has changed and Russia is gaining attention as a direct threat to Japanese security.

As of now Tokyo does not believe that a direct confrontation between both countries will happen. However, after the attack against Ukraine, from the Japanese perspective, Russia now is a country willing to break the established international system and this could happen also in the Indo-Pacific, a perception affirmed by the spectacular Russian-Chinese rapprochement; and that this could imply a potential change of the status quo in the region. Similar to what was seen for China and North Korea, the Japanese Ministry of Defence issued, in February 2023, a report analysing the development of the Russian Armed Forces in the area, underlining the air raids in the area of the Sea of Japan (multiplied since 2019), as well as the Russian-Chinese naval manoeuvers in the vicinity of Japanese territorial waters and the deployment of long-range missiles in the Kuril Islands.

Japan, as member of the G7, remains aligned to the position of the other members regarding Russia and the war in Ukraine, being one of the countries most involved in sending humanitarian aid to Ukraine—never war aid—and positioning itself very clearly in the condemnation of the United Nations and the sanctions against Russia. However, this position is showing a shift: Japan says it will send its own Patriot air defence missiles systems to the US to be later dispatched to Ukrainian forces after changing its arms export rules, in an important step away from its pacifist policies (the White House has welcomed the move, which could free up the US to send its own stockpile to Ukraine).

Japan is a regular guest at high-level NATO meetings, as part of the so-called AP4 group (with Australia, New Zealand and South Korea). At the Madrid Summit in June 2022, where the Strategic Concept of the Alliance was reworked, whit the definition of Russia as the direct threat to the security of member countries, PM Kishida was present at several of the meetings, consolidating the firm support of Japan to this line. More recently Japan’s candidacy was announced as a platform for a NATO mission with powers throughout the Indo-Pacific, which demonstrates the country’s alignment with the organization’s postulates. In April 2023, very significantly and at the same time that Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Moscow and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kishida visited Kiev and met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, committing Japan as an important partner in aid and future reconstruction of Ukraine. This trip was also interpreted as a way to make visible the greater Japanese international activity in matters of first order, after decades of preferring to place itself at a lower level on the world stage and in a political line clearly hostile to China and Russia.

The Russian response regarding the Japanese position has been to consider Tokyo a belligerent country based on the publication of the NSS and the increase in defence spending. For Russia, there are still cases with Japan that have not been closed for more than eighty years. From Moscow, in April 2023, manoeuvers of the Russian fleet took place at the highest battle level and included the Kuril Islands in their radius of action. In reality, these exercises have been carried out from time to time, but this time were read as a warning signal towards South Korea and Japan.

Renewal of Old Alliances and Consolidation of New Ones

Japan’s alignment with the US is total, as testified by the NSS of December 2022. Also, the National Security Strategy of October 2022 and the Strategy for the Indo-Pacific of February 2022 coincide with the FOIP Vision, and the consideration of China, North Korea and Russia as common threats to both. For this reason, the Kishida government considers it essential to strengthen itself in terms of security, beyond increasing its own capabilities, through the renewal of the traditional alliance with the US, within the framework of the Mutual Cooperation and Security Agreement (signed in 1951). The other path is the search and consolidation of other alliances with third countries that share objectives in the Indo-Pacific, mainly India, South Korea, Australia, UK, France, EU and Southeast Asian countries

USA

After a devastating war and the American occupation of Japan, collaboration between both countries strengthened. A bilateral security treaty was added to the Mutual Security Agreement in 1960, but it was not yet a true alliance, given that Japan’s role was to be the main base of US power in the region and Tokyo was not yet a real military partner. Once again, thanks to Abe’s decision, real cooperation between the SDF and the US Forces began. In 2015, President Trump wanted to review this alliance with Japan, not because of the benefits it represents for both countries, but because of its imbalance, since on the basis of the Mutual Security Agreement, Washington maintains and pays for the presence of some 55,000 troops in the country (Japan now is the first in the world in terms of the number of US military established).

It should be remembered that since 1978 Japan paid for part of this deployment, reaching an amount nine billion dollars for the period 2016-2020. The Trump Administration asked the Japanese government to pay eight billion annually (a request partially stopped by President Biden). In January 2023, during a bilateral meeting between Kishida and President Biden, it was a massive reinforcement of Japanese defence was agreed upon, leading to the consequent increase in spending, gradual year after year until it reaches 2% of GDP, part of which will be used to purchase weapons from the US defence industry, such as attack ballistic missiles or unmanned vehicles.

In addition, the military dimension of the agreement wants to strengthen the capacity to carry out integrated operations, setting up a new C3 (command, control and communication) architecture between both countries, and to achieve deeper levels of information exchange; and, as in the Trump presidency, a review of costs. One of the critical areas is cybersecurity. There are speculations that Japan could join the Five Eyes group, a shared information and intelligence network between US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It does not seem to be a priority for Japan, which also has to develop its means in this regard, while however it does seem to be a notable actor in the Initiative against Ransomware, an international project launched from the US in October 2022, which tries to prevent and prosecute cybercrimes.

Washington is also interested in Japan being able to get involved in security issues in the Indo-Pacific; another reason to promote new capabilities and investment in the Japanese country, which is already working intensively within the framework of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) along with Americans, Indians and Australians. As in the case of the Five Eyes, some media speculate about the possibility of an invitation to Japan to participate in AUKUS (the alliance between Australia, UK and US) on a scale to be defined and with the marked red line, which would entail, for example, the acquisition of nuclear submarines that Australia has decided upon.

India

Abe was the symbol of the alliance between India and Japan in order to emerge as leading countries within the Indo-Pacific, sharing similar political visions, in line with the FOIP Vision, and with clear implications in security, like QUAD (initiated in 2007, paralleled by joint military exercises of an unprecedented scale).

For India, the Indo-Pacific is a natural extension of a strategy that was already reflected in the Act East Policy (2014), with the aim of boosting the Indian presence in Southeast Asia. China’s influence in the Indian Ocean and its relations with countries like Pakistan and Sri Lanka are perceived as a threat to India’s attempt to become a regional power with global aspirations. Also, India shares the Japanese views vis-à-vis China, and in 2015 both signed the Special Strategic and Global Partnership, corroborated by the massive participation of Japanese firms in the infrastructural projects of India, starting with the nationwide network of high-speed trains.

Following Abe views and actions, in March 2022, Prime Minister Kishida travelled to India to meet with Modi. Of the importance of the meeting, it is enough to remember that Kishida announced the new FOIP Vision plan and also a Japanese investment in India of 38 billion dollars. Japan’s collaboration with India seems decisive in boosting the latter at the regional level. While India is the westernmost part of the Indo-Pacific megaregion, Japan is the easternmost part of it; positive relationships and the common advantages are promoted with a special look to the security of trade routes. In this regard, a recent example has been the institutional and economic crisis in Sri Lanka since July 2022. The restructuring of Sri Lanka’s external debt has involved both India (mainly), and also Japan, creditor of 9% of the same and a country that promotes various humanitarian assistance initiatives. Without a doubt, it is important for Japan to preserve the stability of Sri Lanka, first of all as an important point for Japanese investments, but also from a security perspective in the region, since Sri Lanka is a key country on the maritime routes that connect the Indian Ocean with the Sea of Japan, with its port infrastructures that are of vital importance for Tokyo (especially the strategic container terminal of the port of Colombo, a colossal Indo-Japanese joint venture launched in 2021).

South Korea

Seoul is an ally (more or less) with which Japan wants to strengthen relations. South Korea, along with China, is the country with the most problematic past vis-à-vis Japan. In 1910, Korea was formally annexed by Japan after years of wars, intimidation and political machinations. In order to establish control over its new protectorate, Japan waged an all-out war on Korean culture and the country suffered a brutal domination, symbolized in the so-called “comfort women” and their demands for justice to Japan—a past about which Tokyo is still timid.

The suspicions between both countries do not remain limited to the controversial past, but the divergences are also open over the islets of Takeshima, in Japanese, or Dokdo for the South Koreans, who hold a sovereignty that the Japanese in turn claim as a part of their country. Some frictions of varying intensity periodically arise around this archipelago, such as in 2019. Relations between Seoul and Tokyo deteriorated greatly during Abe’s term due to disputes over compensation to forced labourers by Japanese companies during the colonial period. Today, however, the situation has changed radically. Since 2022, the South Korean government under Yoon Suk-yeol has been working with that of PM Kishida to resolve this issue, while both countries seek to cooperate in other areas, such as commercial or military, including meetings between both leaders.

The Japanese NSS of December 2022 positions South Korea as a strategic neighbor for Japan with which it shares common interests. For its part, South Korea’s Security Strategy contains the same perception regarding Japan, even if Seoul has expressed its concern about Tokyo’s planned rearmament, especially its medium- and long-range ballistic capabilities. But the excesses of Pyongyang have had a positive impact on the rapprochement between Seoul and Tokyo, on the way to being closer unlike previously—a complicated architecture for two countries allied firstly with US, and secondly with their neighbour. This situation is witnessed by the multiplication of trilateral aeronaval exercises and the joint communiques blasting the tests of North Korea.

United Kingdom

Brexit brought back the UK as individual actor on the international scene, even if with the status of small-medium size power, and the close relationship between London and Tokyo has spilled over into common interests in the Indo-Pacific; also there is no territorial presence of the UK in the area with the exception of Chagos Islands (British military presence is recorded in the UN Command in Korea, small teams in Singapore and Brunei and liaison personnel in Australia and New Zealand).

There has long been a non-formal alliance between the UK and Japan since the beginning of the 20th Century, something that has been growing in recent years and in several areas, such as security, trade or energy supply, including after Brexit. The signing of an agreement in 2020 that granted the UK even more advantageous benefits than those existing with the EU. Both countries clearly align with a shared commitment to the region, in line with the FOIP Vision and with respect to a world order led by the US, the basis of a partnership and which also determines the British strategy for the region, taking into account Japan as an essential ally, as shown by the historic defence agreement in January 2023, which allows for the deployment of British forces in Japan to carry out large-scale military exercises. Another example of the extensive cooperation of both countries is that the UK and Japan partnered, together with Italy, to develop the next generation of combat aircraft.

EU

The Indo-Pacific region, with increasing tensions between the United States and China, is beginning to be a priority in the common foreign and security policy of the EU, including the publication of a Strategy for the region (2021) and a platform for some diplomatic approaches and initiatives, and collaboration with its partners.

Japan, as a key country in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific, is a pivot partner for EU, a partner with which it shares values and interests, seeking a closer strategic partnership that the Japanese country finally perceives the EU as a reliable partner in security, something beyond trade, the economy or technological cooperation. Since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, together with the tensions around Taiwan, the EU, through its member countries, has participated more closely in security matters with Japan. This cooperation translated more into the naval realm; but since mid-2022 it has also increased in terms of aeronautical exercises.

French and German ships operate in Indo-Pacific waters and participate in various maneuvers with Japanese ships and other countries, as well as combat aircraft (also French and German); they also share aerial exercises with participation from the US, Japan, and South Korea. South or Australia. Other ships from European countries have been participating in various naval maneuvers with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force for more than five years; in the case of Spain, for example, since 2016 and in various scenarios.

Thus, EU wants to convince Japan that it is a relevant partner in terms of security, transmitting the message that in a situation of tension, European countries can also provide valuable help. Relations with the EU and Japan have doubled the bilateral network that has existed for many years. However, it was in 2019 when the EU as a whole signed two basic agreements with Japan for its current commercial and strategic relations: the Strategic Partnership Agreement and the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, to which was added, in 2022, the Agreement of Digital Cooperation. In this case, Japan is the first country with which such an agreement on cyber matters has been signed by the EU (at the EU-Japan Summit, 2022).

France is perhaps the European country with the closest relationship with Japan, sharing the same security strategy for the Indo-Pacific region and the values of the Japanese FOIP Vision. France includes Japan as a priority in its strategic documents, and bilateral aeronaval maneuvers and exercises are common and frequents, as well as periodic meetings at the highest level between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs of both countries.

NATO

In consideration that NATO also labels China and Russia as potential and future enemies, the relationship with Brussels, existing for many years with a formula of security conferences in the 1990s, in the Netherlands, saw a massive growth in recent time, coinciding with the Chinese, Russian and North Korean pushes.

NATO and Japan signalled their commitment to strengthening cooperation in a joint political declaration signed in April 2013. From 2014, work was taken forward through a NATO-Japan Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme. Currently, the cooperation is guided by an Individually Tailored Partnership Programme that NATO and Japan agreed to in July 2023.

Practical cooperation is being developed in a wide range of areas, including cyber defence, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, non-proliferation, science and technology, human security, and Women, Peace and Security. Japan is one of NATO’s partners in the Indo-Pacific region, together with Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand. The Indo-Pacific region is important for the Alliance, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.
Japan has participated in NATO’s cyber defence exercises Cyber Coalition and Locked Shields and is a contributing participant at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, in Tallinn, Estonia.

Japan participated, for the first time in a NATO-led humanitarian assistance operation, following the devastating 2023 earthquakes in Turkey. NATO and Japan are enhancing their cooperation in the area of emerging and disruptive technologies through Japan’s participation in the activities of NATO’s Science and Technology Organization (STO).

Japan is also engaged in the framework of the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, particularly in activities in the fields of counter-terrorism and the detection and clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance. Ongoing research and multi-year projects with Japan are aimed, for instance, at advancing procedures and technologies for the safe detection of landmines. Expanding on the results of previous cooperation, Japanese scientists are researching a semiconductor-based sensing device that will facilitate the identification of explosive chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials or special nuclear material at ports and border crossings.

Japan has had a longstanding cooperation with the Alliance on maritime security. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force trained with NATO ships in the Mediterranean in 2022 and in the Baltic Sea in 2018. Japan has designated a liaison officer to NATO’s Maritime Command. Always in the military dimension, since 2014, under the NATO’s Partnership Interoperability Initiative, Japan has been participating in the Interoperability Platform. Japan has made generous contributions to NATO Trust Fund projects in various partner countries.

Most recently, Japan has provided significant support to Ukraine, including through a contribution to NATO’s Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine. Previous important contributions by Japan were designed to enhance stockpile management and the physical security of ammunition in Afghanistan and Tajikistan; to destroy dangerous stocks of pesticides in the Republic of Moldova; and to clear an ammunition depot in Georgia, as well as contaminated land in Azerbaijan.

As of now, however, the political dimension of the relation with NATO remains predominant. At the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, Allies agreed to increase dialogue and practical cooperation between NATO and existing partners, including Japan as one of the partners in the Indo-Pacific region. This commitment was reiterated in the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, the Alliance’s core policy document. Cooperation with partners in this region is key to addressing the increasingly complex global security environment, including Russia’s war on Ukraine, the shift in the global balance of power and the rise of China, and the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.
In June 2022, the Prime Minister of Japan participated in the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, together with the Leaders of other partners from the Indo-Pacific region (Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand). This was the first-ever participation of Japan in a NATO summit. In July 2023, the country participated in its second meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government, at the 2023 Vilnius Summit. In April 2022 and April 2023, Japan participated in the NATO Foreign Ministers’ meetings. This followed Japan’s first-ever participation in a NATO ministerial meeting, in December 2020. Japan also regularly participates in meetings held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels between NATO Allies and the four partners in the Indo-Pacific region at the level of Ambassadors. Recent meetings have focused on climate change and security, arms control, and maritime security.

Japan provided support for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and for wider reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan. It helped to mobilise international support for Afghanistan by organising the Tokyo Conference in July 2012 and pledging USD 5 billion to this end over a five-year period (2009-2013). Earlier, Japan supported efforts to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate former combatants, and to reintegrate insurgents under the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme. It also supported various initiatives, including human security projects at the grass roots level in several regions of Afghanistan, and contributed to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund. In the 1990s, Japan played a role in stabilising the Balkans, where NATO led several peace-support operations since the mid-1990s. As a major donor country, it has contributed to the successful recovery of the Balkans region and its reintegration into the European mainstream.

ASEAN

Despite the centuries-old historical reluctance about Japan’s projection in East Asia by the countries of the region, which in turn make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), there are common interests from both areas. The first is the confrontation with the Chinese threat, since recently there have been confrontations of different intensity with ASEAN States, such as Vietnam, the Philippines or Indonesia, always in relation to sovereignty disputes in the waters of the South China Sea, but of which Japan draws conclusions about its own disputes with the Chinese giant.

After WWII, Japan was stripped of all primacy in Southeast Asia and until recently has not shown much interest in the international order in the region. Its FOIP Vision, plus the evolution of the security posture, mean that a shift is also taking place in this regard. Collaboration with ASEAN becomes essential for this, including support for the Association’s initiatives since 2015 and bilateral dialogue to create common institutions and initiatives, despite the challenge that Southeast Asian societies’ perception of the past continues to pose.

The Vientiane Vision (2016) is the initiative that Japan has published for security cooperation with ASEAN, being a document that establishes the Japanese approach regarding the future of the bilateral relationship and where an annual follow-up is made of the common activities proposed in military matters, with exercises and common exchanges of media and information, as well as the Vice-Ministerial Defence Forum and the promotion of multilateral cooperation through regional frameworks, Japan is involved in the factory of other infrastructures in the Indo-Pacific and Southeast Asia, in various countries such as Myanmar or Indonesia; the sale of patrol boats to Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Maldives or the Philippines; assistance in the control of illegal fishing, airspace or ship maintenance again in Sri Lanka, Vietnam and the Philippines, and also in Thailand, Brunei, Indonesia or Malaysia. Japanese activity in relation to security in the region and in line with the FOIP Vision, has reached Africa, providing coast guard vessels to Kenya or Djibouti, establishing a tie that is the beginning between this framework and the TICAD (Tokyo International Conference for African Development), the historical tool of relations between Japan and the African continent.

Australia and New Zealand

Regarding Australia, it is a regional actor with which Japan shares objectives within the framework of the QUAD, but with which it has also advanced in an unprecedented bilateral relationship in terms of security and military cooperation, which is also reflected in the industry: defence, reciprocal access agreements in research and development sectors, cybersecurity and matters within energy security and renewable energies. The Australian Defence Force and the SDF have developed several exercises, only surpassed by those carried out together with the United States in the Australian case.

The new government (and chambers) of New Zealand shows that Wellington has changed the approach vis-à-vis with the AUKUS and will be more coordinated with Canberra in security and defence policies and, by consequences, also the ties with Japan will be reinforced furtherly.

Conclusion

Article 9 of the 1951 Constitution theoretically limits Japanese war capabilities, within the framework of necessary self-defence tasks. Possession of weaponry consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, or aircraft carriers would exceed this level of necessary self-defence and would not be constitutionally permitted.

In the new NSS of December 2022, the commitment to increase defence spending annually until it reaches 2% of GDP in 2027 appears explicitly—since 1976 the limit was 1 percent—for which it is estimated that a total of 43 trillion Yen, almost 304 billion euros over the five planned fiscal years from April 2023 to March 2028. Based on current global trends, this would make Japan’s defence budget at the end of the decade the third largest worldwide, only behind those of the US and China. Indeed, at the end of 2021, a record defence budget was approved for 2022. Spending will be 5.4 trillion yen (42 billion euros/46 billion dollars), for the eighth consecutive year in history, the largest figure allocated to Japanese defence. An alternative would be to use for military purposes certain programs created to provide humanitarian and civil aid to countries in need, including from now on some defence-related expenses for the first time in history. Thus, the Kishida government plans to expand a program called Security Assistance with the objective of providing aid to third countries, including those within the military sphere and speculating that some beneficiary countries of the program, such as the Philippines, Malaysia and Bangladesh, could spend said aid on purchases from the Japanese defence industry.

Japan’s strategic shift requires more budget and the development of a defence industry that can meet new demands, among other measures. As we saw in the section dedicated to the alliance with the United States, defence industrial cooperation is also of interest to both countries. Japan can contribute its cutting-edge technology in areas such as aerospace, autonomous systems and artificial intelligence. There has also been talk of other products, such as ammunition, a need that now appears critical in the current war in Ukraine.

In line with the sustainability and resilience objectives of the NSS, Japan not only needs to reactivate a defence industry, but has developed projects in the field of security, and more specifically in union with other countries that can provide very valuable help (the main example being the Global Combat Air Program which, together with Italy and the United Kingdom, would help stimulate the Japanese aeronautical defence industry).

Finally, there are other critical points, first of which is the reluctance of the Japanese public opinion in the military universe, revealing that the stigma of the lost war and the devastating human losses and physical damage are not yet fully absorbed. Paradoxically, the pressures of China, North Korea and Russia are the strongest dismantling components for the reluctant stance of the Japanese people.


Enrico Magnani, PhD, is a retired UN official and expert in military history and international politico-military affairs.


Conflicts: A Short Interview with Richard Black

The following is a brief interview with Richard Black, former member of the Virginia State Senate and one of the very few, if not the only Western politician, to openly speak out against U. S. proxy wars in the Middle East.

Costantino Ceoldo (CC): What does the American citizen think about the confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians?

Richard Black (RB): Most Americans felt that Israelis were justified in fighting back after Hamas attacked them… But global protests demonstrated that Israel has lost support because of their mistreatment of Palestinians, particularly on the West Bank.

CC: And in other countries, in your opinion?

RB: Open borders immigration is pushing millions of Arabs and Muslims into the U. S., the UK, and Europe. The new immigrants reject the West’s long-standing consensus that Jews had the right to force the ancient inhabitants of Palestine from their farms and homes. Current immigration policies will unquestionably lead to the eventual demise of Israel once Muslims grow sufficiently numerous to overpower support for Israel. Current immigration policies rest on the UN 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Although nations can withdraw from those treaties, only Great Britain, which is being flooded with Rwandan immigrants has seriously begun working against them thus far.

CC: What fate awaits the Palestinians?

RB: The Palestinian people cannot simply vanish from the Earth; they must live somewhere. Since 1948, Israel has pushed millions of Palestinians out of what is now called Israel, and other countries are loathe to accept any more. It is time for Israel to carry out their end of the bargain.

CC: It seems that the fate of the Biden presidency is tied to Israel…

RB: The violence in Gaza has split the Democrat Party, and that threatens Joe Biden’s reelection… According to the Jerusalem Post, over half of the Democrat Party’s campaign contributions come from wealthy Jewish contributors. They insist on Biden supporting Israel’s deadly bombing in the Gaza Strip. That pits Jewish-Americans against Muslim Americans, and both are vital Democrat voting blocks. Biden has angered Muslim voters, who see the Gaza attacks as war crimes. In 2020, Jews voted 75% Democrat, and Muslims voted 65% Democrat. But this year, Muslims were already irritated with Biden over education. His Education Department encouraged schools to expose children to homosexuality. They encouraged transgendered men to read suggestive books to schoolchildren while wearing highly-sexualized female costumes. This perverse agenda had already hurt Democrats with Muslim voters, who are protective of their schools. On October 31st, Reuters reported that Arab American support for Biden and the Democrats had plunged to 17% in recent polls, which could cause Biden to lose in Michigan, a state that is essential to winning the national vote in the electoral college.

CC: Is it not in the interest of Israel and its incumbent government for the US to openly enter the conflict?

RB: Since the Gulf War of 1990, the U. S. has fought Arabs continuously for 34 years. The wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and Yemen have been disastrous, both for them and for us. The U. S. has lost power and prestige from needless wars in Ukraine and the Mideast. Now, violence in Gaza has further shaken our fragile alliances in that region. America is prepared to expand its military involvement to support Israel, but our military power has eroded, and the Pentagon would prefer to contain the conflict in Gaza. There’s little question that Netanyahu would like to see Americans fight Hezbollah’s battle-hardened army in Lebanon. But although the U. S. could defeat them from the air, Hezbollah is a substantial military power that cannot be brushed off lightly. They are well armed, highly disciplined, and battle hardened. They are among the world’s finest urban fighters today.

CC: So what?

RB: The U. S. treasury is depleted, and the U. S. cannot afford another war. I doubt that Biden will seek to expand this one. He does not need to fight another highly-unpopular war as Election Day approaches in November. Ukraine is yesterday’s news. When its counteroffensive failed, the war left the front pages. Today, all eyes are on Gaza. After many months of friendship with Russia, Netanyahu foolishly sent intelligence operatives to fight for Ukraine. As a consequence, Russia harshly criticized Israel’s attack on Gaza, and Israel can’t help Zelenski any longer because of war in Gaza.


Costantino Ceoldo writes in the areas of geopolitics; his work is published in many journals. This article appears courtesy of PRAVDA.ru.


Vietnam and USA: Old Enemies, New (Possible) Friends against China

The global push of Beijing is a major reshuffle for the international community, with unexcepted and, till now, unthinkable repositioning dynamics, approaching even old enemies, more and more worried of plans and actions of China.

On 10 September of 2023, US and Vietnam have agreed to elevate their diplomatic relations to the highest level by signing a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” agreement, which put Washington together with PRC (China), Russia, ROK (South Korea), and soon, India. Considering that for Vietnam this kind of framework is the higher level in its foreign relations, this step represents the culmination of a historic shift between both signatories.

2023 marks fifty years since the closing of one of the international chapters that transformed global reality; 1973 marked a turning point in the conception of the foreign policy of the hegemonic power of the 20th Century, the US suffered a disruption of the global map of its interests and relations of forces between international powers.

With the signing of the Paris Agreement between US and Vietnam in 1973, hostilities between both parties ceased, even there was not an official beginning, but a slow escalation from Washington initiated with the deployment of the 342 advisers of MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group), Vietnam in 1955, which replaced MAAG, Indochina, set up in 1945 in order to assist the French forces against the communist- backed Vietminh uprising and worked till the signature the Geneva accords of 1954 (2023 saw also the death, at 100, the Washington-maker of this agreement, Henry Kissinger). The withdrawal of the US forces from Vietnamese territory meant the growth in power of the regime to the communist spectrum (represented in the war by North Vietnam), whose greatest supporters were USSR and PRC. In this way, what for the Communist Party of Vietnam was an unprecedented victory (even obtained with an enormous human cost for Hanoi), for the opposing side marked a turning point in the military supremacy self-conception.

The US was affected not only by its international profile, but also by its internal resilience, due to the deep divisions that the Vietnamese conflict generated among the country’s society, population and culture. With the development of the Cold War, the relations between both actors were characterized by maintaining a certain distance and focusing on their most immediate issues. For US, the confrontation with the USSR and developing ties with PRC were a high priority. For the Vietnamese perspective, the consolidation of its state structure and the forging of alliances took up most of the efforts of the government of Hanoi for years.

However, the present situation is a deeply different from this context. Vietnam is today an emerging regional power with a developing economy, important signs of strength and a foreign policy dominated by its neighborly relations, mainly with PRC, with which it shares around 1,400 kilometers of border. In addition, it plays a fundamental role in the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), a very important platform for Vietnam in terms of the economy and relations with its Asian neighbors in terms of security, finance or foreign trade (not yet for defense, but there are the first steps in this direction as well). Finally, in 1995 diplomatic relations between Vietnam and US were normalized. On the other hand, Washington is witnessing a crucial moment for its global hegemonic position while having to address countless internal challenges, from high public debt to the questioning of its social model, face a competitor that poses one of the most complex and difficult challenges to its international dominance since the Cold War such is PRC. Far from the confrontational models of the last century, the current competition between both powers is characterized by being fought in a totally broader and interconnected worldwide scenario, where military force has been transformed in more lethal and mobile, while new areas of confrontation have emerged, such as cyberspace and outer space, without naming the classical search of influences in other countries, the brutal trade competition, the scientific rivalry and the setup of renewed and new international and regional organizations. Thus, global dynamics have been strengthening PRC’s role as the main rival for the US and many other states. Vietnam, for its geostrategic collocation, see the important changes ongoing in the Indo-Pacific with growing concern. The assertive stand of Beijing put Washington and Hanoi in a common front in this scenario: counteracting China’s weight and push in the region. Because of the above, their relationship, historically marked by conflict, evolved to reach high levels of cooperation in economic and security matters.

After fifty years of the Paris Agreement and twenty-eight of the normalization of their diplomatic ties, on September 10, 2023, US and Vietnam raised their relations to the highest level that the system of foreign relations of Hanoi sets. This new framework of cooperation is reflected in greater cooperation in areas as basic as science and technology, climate change or trade. However, it is necessary to highlight a key aspect for the role that both actors play in the region: cooperation in security and defense. Since Presidents Obama and Truong Tan Sang signed a strategic partnership agreement in 2013—a step prior to reaching the highest level of ties sealed in September—relations between the US and Vietnam have been marked by deepening in all aspects. Currently, the US has become one of Vietnam’s main partners in terms of security: since 2017 it has invested more than 100 million dollars in military aid for the country through the FMF (Foreign Military Financing) Program, aimed at strengthening its defensive and military capabilities. Likewise, the Obama Administration lifted the arms embargo on Vietnam in 2016, the year after which the US permanently export to Hanoi defense material worth more than $30 million annually. Added to this are the 108 million dollars in products and services that the US has received from Vietnam since that year. Another reflection of the improvement in relations in this area was the visit to Vietnam in March 2018 by the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson: the first of it in more than forty years. Later, in March 2020, it was the turn of another aircraft carrier. The improvement of connections in military and defense matters is also reflected in Vietnam’s participation in the GOPI (Global Peace Operations Initiative), established by US to contribute to the international missions of the UN. The development of relations in the field of defense and security is manifested in the perception of Washington by the Vietnamese society has today. According to ‘The State of South Asia 2023’ survey (a poll survey organized by the ‘ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC) at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’), almost three quarter of the Vietnamese trusts the US as a guarantor of international peace and security with little bit more than ten percent do not (sic!).

On the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement, both parties have recognized the interdependence of their relations by expanding the areas of cooperation (investment, management of the legacy of war, promotion of security, promotion of prosperity, crisis climate, health cooperation and management of the Mekong River). This expansion reflects the positive status of the relations between Hanoi and Washington.

​Vietnam: Bamboo Diplomacy and its Obliged Ties with China

The foreign policy of Hanoi has been marked by a peculiar approach, applying Marxist-Leninist principles (an essential ideological axis for the country) to foreign policy. The combination of firmness in ideological elements and the required flexibility in diplomatic methods, set up the so-called “bamboo diplomacy”, putting together the strong roots of the ideology and the flexible stems of the methods.

However, the aforementioned foreign policy is being challenged by regional drive, strongly marked by geopolitical competition, led by China and its ambitions. Along these lines, Vietnam and its society are aware of the threat posed by Beijing, and Hanoi had ties with China that are very difficult to break, even if, as the above-mentioned survey states, more than three quarter of the population distrust China. This situation run from the historical rivalry to the recent crisis, worsened by the claims of Beijing to around 85% of the South China Sea, and which affects multiple countries, including Vietnam. For China, the control of the aforementioned area is vital for its survival and hegemonic plans: without it, Beijing consider that the naval projection capability of the US would block the access and control of key points for the national supply, like the Strait of Malacca. The magnitude of the issue for China is reflected in an increased actions to undermine any initiative that poses a threat to her interest and priorities.

For Vietnam those claims means that the country will remains sea locked, without access to international maritime spaces and this is a not acceptable situation and the most severe attempt to its national sovereignty. The claims of China existed since years, but the tensions raised in recent times (see the regional destabilizing effect of the claims; Philippine and Chinese coast guards are in face-off situations in South China Sea since weeks). The claim of sovereignty of the Paracelsus and Spratly islands, the implementation in 2014 of a Chinese oil platform in the waters of the EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) of Vietnam or the maritime clashes between both nations motivated by drilling activities carried out by Vietnam in 2017 exemplifies the confrontation between both geopolitical strategies. However, the relationship between Vietnam and China, more than a threat, entails a series of historical and economic ties. To begin with, both countries have a similar historical evolution: their respective systems, based on communism, entered a stage of financial openness and iron fist in internal repression, that led them to political and economic dualism. On the other hand, it is worth highlighting key differences in terms of governance. For example, the secretary-general of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, is a different figure from the head of state, Vo Van Thuong, while in China power is concentrated in one person, Xi Jinping. Giving the relevance of the ideological dimension for Vietnam, the Communist Party still have a pivotal role in the country’s policy making, but the state keeps a separate nature, a counterbalance the power of the party; this, avoiding the disfunctions that emerge more and more in China, which appear increasingly in trouble to manage the challenges of sophisticated society with the total overlap between state and communist party.

Despite the above-mentioned problems, old and new, China remains Vietnam’s first economic partner, where around 40% of its imports come from. Through the signing of more than thirteen economic agreements, Vietnam has become China’s sixth largest trading partner. Consequently, the economic aspect is a fundamental link in these relations, which places Vietnam in a complex position in the face of commercial and geopolitical imbalance. As a sign of their wish to keep as possible good relationship in this area, in October 2022 the Vietnamese President was the first foreign leader to travel to Beijing after the designation of Xi Jinping’s as supreme leader of the country’s third term. Given the situation described, Vietnam has decided to establish some distance with its partner in foreign policy, while seeking not to take actions that could irritate the important neighbor. This ambivalence has been put into practice in the foreign policy of Vietnam through the principle of the “three nos”: no to foreign military bases, no to forming part of military alliances and no to supporting a country in struggle with another. This principle once again reflects the character of ‘bamboo diplomacy’, which is committed to sovereignty and international peace while granting a certain margin of action to the country in its relations with other states, covering itself from any accusation by China regarding its links with other nations in the military field. Now, Vietnam is aware of the threat that China represents in the region and, directly, to its relations. Consequently, Vietnam has begun to promote certain agreements with other actors that seek to serve as a counterweight to the influence of the PRC; and in the US, despite a controversial past, it has found a partner that may support the re-opening of an old framework. To face China, one of the most mentioned geopolitical concepts in the Cold War has been put back on the table: the policy of containment. For Vietnam, the rapprochement with the US, indirectly, try to compensate the decisive alignment between Moscow and Beijing especially after the beginning of the war in Ukraine; this major shift worried Vietnam for a possible weakening of Russian support vis-à-vis the Chinese push and the need of an alternate security provider and guarantor become an imperative for Hanoi.

This situation has many points in common with the one that affect India, once strong partner with Moscow in anti-Chinese drive; but now the axis between Russia and China forced New Delhi in re-orient its strategy in double track, reinforcing its strategic autonomy and getting closer to US, Australia, France and Japan; this without entering in direct, major, confrontation with Beijing, giving that China remains the most important economic partner of India, and co-member of SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and BRICS.

In the light of enhanced regional (and transregional) solidarity policy, Vietnam has repatriated over 1,000 citizens from Myanmar due to looming crisis there, as well as helping certain Egyptians, Malaysians and Singaporeans leave the country amid the conflict between states forces and the government ones.

The Return of the Old: Towards a New Containment

The origins of the containment policy date back to the ‘long telegram’ written in 1946 by the then US ambassador to USSR, George F. Kennan. This notion became the center of the political debate in the following decades after the publication of “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” in ‘Foreign Affairs’. Based on the need to contain Soviet expansion through the so-called spheres of influence, this policy found its motivation in the reality exposed by Kennan’s text, where it was highlighted that the idiosyncrasies of the Soviet communist system would not allow peaceful coexistence with the American political ideology and praxis.

US structured the world into Moscow and Washington zones of influence on which its foreign and security policies protected their stability and interests. The conceptual framework that this policy provided for the development of both political and military resistance to Soviet-led expansionism is fundamental to understanding US actions throughout the Cold War. Without being exempt from criticism, the containment policy was shaped by the different ideological currents that marked each US Administration. Under its protection, important events occurred that still have a fundamental weight on the international stage, such as the creation of NATO in 1949 or the Vietnam War, which ended in 1973. Therefore, when talking about expansion intentions Chinese in the Indo-Pacific and the rest of the world, numerous political analysts and scholars have rescued the USSR-focused terminology and approaches of containment and shifted it to the confrontation of the challenges that the PRC poses both regionally and globally to US hegemony.

For Washington, the Indo-Pacific megaregion is a fundamental point for its foreign policy. The US foreign strategy is aware of the importance of China’s push actions in the region, as well as its ambitions and already known intentions. Consequently, Washington has found a possible partner in Vietnam. In this framework, Hanoi is aware about the importance of using multiple approach to its strategy, seeking not to raise tensions with Beijing and not miss the opportunity to have the deterrent element that Washington represents.

Giving the relevance of the sub-region, the US is working to build strong relationships with Southeast Asian countries that also find common ground in this endeavour. Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines (all ASEAN member states) are among the nations with which Washington has signed specific security and defense cooperation agreements. As example, along the same lines is the renewal of defense cooperation between the US and the Philippines after both parties showed their concern about the PRC’s actions in the South China Sea, which caused serious concerns for Manlia. Therefore, the Chinese pressure is evident, and the sub-region’s countries are fully aware of it, even though they keep strong economic ties with Beijing, they seek and find in the US a partner in the defense of their stability, despite the economic partnership with Washington is much less attractive.

Another element of high importance is security and defense cooperation between US and Vietnam, especially in naval dimension, as it is strongly related to the joint objective of encircling China by sea (someone could say that Washington looks for a ‘sea’ containment), and this a critical point because the Vietnamese Navy and Coast Guard are not especially strong. In its Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement, the US mentions that it will pay special attention to strengthening Vietnam’s naval capabilities in terms of security and defense so that the country has the necessary resources to enforce international law and its sovereignty.

The above-mentioned Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program includes the progressive increase in the US Government’s investment in this sector, which is so elemental at a geopolitical level for both parties. As the case of Vietnam focuses, the essential axis of the program is to support, transfer, reinforce and promote the resources of the country’s Navy and Coast Guard supporting her stance in the South China Sea. Along these same lines, Vietnamese Navy has participated since 2018 in the RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific), the largest naval military exercise in the world, which the US holds biannually with its allies.

​For its part, Vietnam has its own strategy regarding its relations in the region, whose ultimate goal is to contain Chinese actions. Unlike the US and its containment policy, which forces it to choose those points where it can exert pressure on its rival to reduce its influence, Vietnam is naturally part of the Indo-Pacific countries that form a counterweight to Chinese expansion, as happens to India, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand.

In common Washington and Hanoi have points but also differences vis-à-vis in the use of the containment policy in this specific context. While US make efforts into building a politico-military-economic fence around China, Vietnam is more linked to the dynamics of its regional alliances and first ASEAN (except for Cambodia and Laos, openly considered puppet states of Beijing, and Myanmar/Burma, considered under heavy influence of China).

Whether or not they share a vision of the application of the containment policy, the ultimate goal is valid for the strategic objectives of both Vietnam and the US trying to reduce the influence and expansion of China in Southeast Asia. In the case of the US, this objective is vital for the preservation of its regional first, and secondly, the global hegemony; for Vietnam, it is a matter of political independence and survivability.

Ties and Obstacles

The broadening and deepening of the bilateral relations between Vietnam and US mean leaving the past behind, but there are still points of friction. Firstly, is the ideological distance between both countries, but their common needs have managed to overcome it to make cooperation possible. In this sense, the development of this new stage in US-Vietnamese relations can be reflected with another global actor of high importance and influence and, of course, a vital enemy for the Washington: Russia.

Vietnam has maintained a special relationship with Moscow, starting from ideological brotherhood, but also the support of Russia during the prolonged military efforts, first against France and then against US, with more than 350 million dollars annually during the period, without mentioning the support provided in 1979, during the Chinese invasion.

That connection has not been lost, since the historical ties have been maintained to this day, Russia continues to be a fundamental partner for Vietnam: it is its main importer of weapons (despite the problems originated by the needs originated by the war in Ukraine) and a key player in energy supplies. For Moscow, Vietnam is a key due to its role in maritime trade and in the projection of power in the South China Sea (and from there to the Pacific, Singapore straits and Eastern Indian Ocean). This access provides Russia with an important presence in regional dynamics.

In this context, it is plausible that Vietnam does not reject totally its relationship with Russia, considering it a key pillar in its foreign policy. As an example of the needs of Vietnam to keep a wide window of dialogue with Moscow, Hanoi is one of the few countries that has not condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the UN General Assembly, which represents a point of friction with Washington. Said that, Vietnam monitor with silent restlessness the rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing would affect her security.

However, the strong economic ties with China, are other elements that, as above mentioned, oblige Vietnam to not extremize the relations. Through the export of microchips, semiconductors, integrated circuits, etc., China provides Vietnam with everything necessary to achieve technological capacity at the level of global demands. Finally, despite the internal problems, the unstoppable growth of Chinese military capabilities constitutes a deterrent against the enlargement and the deepening of the military alliance with the US.

There is no doubt that Vietnam does not want to be a satellite country of Beijing. Hanoi’s strategic autonomy requires the liberation from any ties and the ambitions of the neighboring country. For its part, Russia, aware that its relationship with Hanoi is fundamental and requires attention and care, is also aware of China’s strength in Southeast Asia, so it cannot be of great tool to Vietnam either.

Consequently, even if the alliance between the US and Vietnam can be considered fundamental for the region and for the geopolitical strategies of both actors, it takes place in a framework where the possibility of dangerous escalation is very easy a tactical error can lead to an escalation of tensions that is difficult to control afterwards.

Conclusion

Geopolitical trends determine the importance of Southeast Asia in the XXI Century. Any actor who seeks to occupy a global hegemonic position must have a strong presence in the area and to reflect his geopolitical interests with his actions in the region. The historical tour of the relationships between US and Vietnam, two antagonistic actors, is understandable even if it is unusual. Both were able to overcome their interests thanks to a geopolitical analysis with a key common element: holding the expansion and ambitions of China in Southeast Asia. In this context, the continuing and growing friendship US-Vietnamese relations gain greater significance for the international community, since the two parts represent a counterweight to China, which the rest of the actors in the region can benefit. The growing level of commitment with US implies for Vietnam the adoption of a geopolitical focus in accordance with the traditional principles of its external politics, considering this in balance with China and, Russia ASEAN, and then Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand with which it shares the goal of safeguarding national interests in front of Beijing objectives. Directly or indirectly, the geopolitical dynamics of Southeast Asia imply the intention of Washington to generate a space of containment for China’s expansion and the association of Vietnam is vital for this objective. Consequently, the intensity of the Washington-Hanoi relationships will have a decisive impact on the Chinese dynamics and ambitions which look not only in Southeast Asia, but also reflect in an uncertain global scenario in the coming decades.


Enrico Magnani, PhD, is a retired UN official and expert in military history and international politico-military affairs.


“Armageddon Lobby”: How Christian Zionists Influence U.S. Policy

Despite the fact that not only hospitals and mosques but also Christian churches were destroyed during the bombardment of the Gaza Strip by Israeli forces, many people who call themselves Christians and who are not ethnic Jews actively support Israel’s actions. Where did this phenomenon come from?

The fact is that Zionism as a Jewish political movement emerged in the late 19th century, but similar ideas appeared much earlier. And, paradoxically, they were born in a Christian environment.

The Birth of Puritan Zionism

One of the first supporters of the immigration of European Jews to Palestine were the Puritans. This Protestant sect emerged in the late 16th century and became quite influential in England and later in the American colonies. They showed considerable interest in the role of the Jews in eschatology, or end-time theology.

For example, John Owen, a seventeenth-century theologian, member of Parliament, and administrator at Oxford, taught that the physical return of Jews to Palestine was necessary for the fulfillment of end times prophecy. And in 1621, Sir Henry Finch wrote a sermon calling for the support of the Jewish people and their return to their biblical homeland.

One of the most influential strands of Christian Zionism has been dispensationalism, a system of interpretation that uses information from the Bible to divide history into different periods of administrations or dispensations and views the biblical term “Israel” as referring to the ethnic Jewish nation established in Palestine.

Dispensationalism was originally developed by Anglo-Irish preacher John Nelson Darby in the nineteenth century. Darby believed that the God-ordained destinies of Israel and the Christian church were completely separate, with the latter to be physically “raptured”—raised to meet Jesus—before the period of upheaval predicted in the Apocalypse, called the Great Tribulation.

According to Darby, the Great Tribulation will begin after the construction of the Third Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. During the Great Tribulation, according to this teaching, 144,000 Jews will convert to Christianity, and this will reveal to them the true intentions of the Antichrist. Thus, they will become the epicenter for the conversion of all unbelievers who have not been raptured to the Christian faith.

It is these 144,000 converted Jews who will meet Antichrist in the final battle known as Armageddon and defeat the Antichrist. After this battle, the seven years of tribulation will end and Jesus will return to imprison Satan and establish a thousand-year Messianic Kingdom on earth.

Despite its absurdity and lack of any reference in the Bible, the concept of physically moving Christians to heaven on the eve of Armageddon has been enthusiastically embraced by some churches in England and especially in the United States.

Darby’s approach to Christian eschatology coincides with similar developments in Jewish eschatology, namely, the ideas of Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer and the creation of a new branch of Jewish messianism. Its representatives believed that Jews should actively work to hasten the coming of their messiah by immigrating to Israel and building the Third Temple on the site of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, where the Al-Aqsa Mosque is located.

Darby himself traveled throughout North America and several other countries to popularize his ideas, meeting with several influential pastors throughout the English-speaking world. Among them was James Brooks, Cyrus Scofield’s future mentor, who later disseminated the concept; and his interpretation was published widely in the United States and is known as the Scofield Bible.

Another figure influenced by Darby’s doctrine was the American preacher Charles Taze Russell, whose church later gave rise to several different sects, including the Jehovah’s Witnesses (an organization banned in Russia). Decades before the founding of modern political Zionism, Russell began preaching—not only to Christians but also to Jews in the United States and elsewhere—the need for mass Jewish immigration to Palestine.

Russell wrote a letter in 1891 to Edmond de Rothschild, a member of the Rothschild banking family, as well as Maurice von Hirsch, a wealthy German financier of Jewish descent, about his plan to settle Palestine. He described his plan as follows: “My proposal is that wealthy Jews buy from Turkey at a fair value all her property rights in these lands: that is, all public lands (lands not belonging to private owners), provided that Syria and Palestine are formed as free states.”

The book, The Jewish State by Theodor Herzl, considered the founder of Zionism, was published only in 1896.

American preacher William E. Blackstone, greatly influenced by Darby and other dispensationalists of the era, also spent decades advocating Jewish immigration to Palestine as a means of fulfilling biblical prophecy. His efforts culminated in the Blackstone Memorial Petition, which called on then-United States President Benjamin Harrison and his Secretary of State James Blaine to take action “in favor of the return of Palestine to the Jews.”

Signers of the petition included bankers J. D. Rockefeller and J. P. Morgan, future President of the United States William McKinley, Speaker of the House Thomas Brackett Reed, Chief Justice Melville Fuller, the mayors of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Boston, and Chicago, the editors of the Boston Globe, New York Times, Washington Post, and Chicago Tribune, as well as members of Congress, influential businessmen, and clergy.

Although some rabbis were included among the signers, most American Jewish communities opposed the content of the petition. In other words, the primary goal of Zionism, even before it became a movement, was widely supported by the American Christian elite.

Modern Rise

Yet for the first half of the twentieth century, Christian Zionism was not very widespread or influential in the United States.

However, then preacher Billy Graham enters the arena and had close relationships with several presidents, including Dwight Eisenhower, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon. Finally, dispensationalism entered the mainstream of American political discourse with evangelical preacher Jerry Falwell, who founded the Moral Majority organization in 1979.

Another prominent dispensationalist of great political and literary influence was Hal Lindsey. Ronald Reagan was so moved by his books that he invited Lindsey to speak at a National Security Council meeting on nuclear war plans and made him an influential adviser to several members of Congress and Pentagon officials.

To this day, the Republican Party still leans heavily on Christian Zionists for both cash and votes. They have a profound influence on party ideology.

Christian Zionists in the United States now have many names. Some call them the “Armageddon Lobby,” others call them the “Christian AIPAC” (American Israel Public Affairs Committee).

Christian Zionists themselves number about 20 million in the United States, and they sponsor the migration of Jews to Israel from Ethiopia, Russia, Ukraine and other countries. That is, in fact, there are more of them than ethnic Jews around the world, although not all Jews support Zionism.

During the administration of George W. Bush Jr. and especially on the eve of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the administration was also heavily influenced by Christian Zionists in the form of neoconservatives. During a 60 Minutes interview in October 2002, Jerry Falwell even stated, “I think we can now count on President Bush to do the right thing for Israel every time.”

Falwell was referring to President Bush’s actions in April 2002 when he turned a blind eye to Israeli actions in the West Bank during Operation Protective Wall. Falwell met with President Bush several times during his first term, specifically to discuss United States support for Israel. According to him, the president’s views on Israel were in line with his own.

Christian Zionists also helped oust Democratic Congressman Jim Moran, who suggested that it was done for Israel’s benefit by the Jewish lobby. And the Apostolic Congress and the group Americans for a Secure Israel effectively derailed Bush’s plan to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians by flooding the White House with petitions.

There is also an organization in the U.S. called United Christians for Israel, which was founded in 2006 by Pastor John Hagee and has more than seven million members. Its members include former CIA head and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, former Vice President Mike Pence and well-known hawk John Bolton. All of them were quite active during Donald Trump’s presidency.

During a speech in Kansas in 2015, Pompeo openly stated that he believes in the “rapture of Christians,” and in an interview said that as a Christian he believes that “God chose Trump to help save the Jews from the threat of Iran.”

It was Christian Zionists who lobbied Donald Trump to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and its sovereignty over the occupied Golan Heights. Pastor Robert Jeffress of First Baptist Church in Dallas and Trump supporter led a prayer for peace in Jerusalem during the relocation of the United States embassy from Tel Aviv on May 14, 2018. He called it “a momentous event in the life of your nation and in the history of our world.”

Another entity from the U.S. called, Proclaiming Justice for the Nations, also lobbies for Israel’s interests. At the end of October 2023, they began calling for the resignation of the UN Secretary General for his criticism of Israel’s actions towards the Palestinians.

As we can see, the issue of support for Israel has a longer and more complex history than even that state’s creation in 1948.

Whereas many Jews deny even the very statehood of Israel, calling it a violation of Talmudic commandments (e.g., the Hasidic Naturei Karta movement), there are ardent supporters of Israel among the followers of Christian denominations, including justifications for any of its government’s actions, including repression of Palestinians.

And, of course, American Protestants, who link Israel’s fate to their eschatological worldview, play a huge role in this. And among them are influential political figures who make decisions on U.S. foreign policy.


Leonid Savin is Editor-in-Chief of the Geopolitika.ru Analytical Center, General Director of the Cultural and Territorial Spaces Monitoring and Forecasting Foundation and Head of the International Eurasia Movement Administration. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geopolitika.


An Act of State Terrorism

Introduction

In Part One of “An Act of State Terrorism,” our article examining the decision by the United States to drop a plutonium bomb on the largest Catholic community in Japan in 1945, we explored five aspects of this tragedy and this crime.

We discussed the 400 year old Catholic heritage of Nagasaki; the frightful death toll and ghastly material devastation wrought by the detonation of the 21 kiloton Fat Man bomb over that city; the unresolved question of how Nagasaki appeared, suddenly, almost at the last minute, and by an anonymous hand, on the target list for nuclear incineration; the opposition of many American military leaders to the use of atomic weapons against civilians; and, finally, the false narrative of bomb proponents who claimed that the Soviet declaration of war against Japan was unexpected, reactive and opportunistic.

In Part Two, I propose to begin the examination of those, in the United States government, who were responsible for the unprecedented decision to terrify an enemy into surrender, by utilizing the then unimaginable destructive force of nuclear weapons, and using it on civilians, resulting in the deaths of perhaps two hundred thousand innocent human beings.

Our focus in this installment will be on the Cabinet official under whose authority the bomb was developed and deployed, the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson.

An Act of State Terrorism, Part Two

At the end of 1945, following the conclusion of the Second World War, the Armed Forces of the United States of America had eight five star officers, four Fleet Admirals — William Leahy, Ernest King, Chester Nimitz and William Halsey — and four Generals of the Army — George Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, Henry “Hap” Arnold and Dwight Eisenhower.

Leahy and MacArthur would later express moral objections to the atomic bombing of civilians. Halsey called it “a mistake.” Eisenhower thought the first use of such weapons by America was inexpedient. All, with the exception of Marshall, thought their use was unnecessary.

Even Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, who would later defend the dropping of the two atomic bombs, initially advocated for their deployment against military targets only. After the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Marshall urged that the atomic bombing of cities be halted, as America’s limited supply of these new bombs needed to be conserved as potential tactical weapons, for battlefield use, in the invasion of Japan.

It was America’s political leadership, not its military and naval commanders, who wanted and decided to use nuclear weapons in 1945.

A Very Different Government

Hilaire Belloc warned of the danger of “reading history backwards,” of assuming that the standards, structures and practices of today obtained in the past. Compared to 2023, America had a profoundly different federal government in 1945.

At the end of the Second World War, the vast civilian architecture of the modern national security state had not yet been created. That creation would come in two phases, the first in the immediate post-war period, and the second, after the 9/11 attacks.

When the U.S. government considered the military application of atomic power in 1945, those advisory, policy making, and executive institutions so preeminent in our own time — the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council and the Department of Defense — did not yet exist.

There was no Cabinet level Ambassador to the United Nations, and there was, certainly, no all powerful Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who could, like Henry Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski, rival or displace the Secretary of State in influence.

The National Director of Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security would be 21st century constructions.

That contemporary Colossus of centralized power, the Executive Office of the President, with its cabinet department size and its myriad councils and agencies, was unknown in 1945. Nor was there a prime ministerial White House Chief of Staff, who could treat Cabinet secretaries as functionaries, and control, or even restrict, their access to the President.

In 1945, the Vice-President had no voice in the counsels of the Executive branch, and no presence or staff in the White House. In fact, he had, virtually, no staff at all, only a small office in the Capitol, from which he would emerge to discharge his constitutional obligation to preside over the Senate.

As the 25th Amendment, governing presidential and vice-presidential succession, was only proposed after the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963, the office of Vice-President was vacant during the first Truman administration.

In the eighty-two days, from January 20 to April 12, 1945, during which time Harry Truman served as Vice-President of the United States, he only met with President Franklin Roosevelt, alone, on two occasions. On neither of those occasions, did FDR bother to tell him about the Manhattan Engineer District Project, a.k.a., the atomic bomb.

Three Civilian Advisors

At the end of the Second World War, the President of the United States had just three principal civilian advisors in matters of foreign policy and national defense. These were the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy.

Their significance in the government was underscored by their proximity to the President. Their offices were located in the Old Executive Office Building, colloquially referred to, simply, as the State, War and Navy Building — that great, 19th century Second Empire edifice next to the White House, and connected to it by an underground passageway. It is now called the Eisenhower Executive Office Building.

In 1945, the U. S. Secretary of State was James F. Byrnes. The Secretary of War was Henry L. Stimson, and the Secretary of the Navy was James Vincent Forrestal. Both Byrnes and Forrestal were baptized Catholics. Only one however, still adhered to the religion of his baptism.

The Grey Eminence

The actual management of the atomic bomb project was in the hands of the War Department.

Seventy-seven years old in the summer of 1945, Secretary of War Henry Stimson was the U.S. government’s most distinguished and experienced grey eminence. Harry Truman was the sixth American President whom he served.

By birth, ancestry, religion, economic status and education, Stimson was an archetypical member of the American nomenklatura, sometimes called the Eastern Establishment.

Born in New York City in September of 1867, to a family of pious Presbyterians, he was the son of a surgeon and the grandson of a banker. His father sent him to Phillips Andover Academy, Yale University (where he joined Skull and Bones) and Harvard Law School.

A successful Wall Street attorney with the white shoe firm of Root and Clark, Stimson, by the time he was in his mid-thirties, was earning an annual income of $20,000, the equivalent of nearly $700,000 per year today.

Appointed, by President Theodore Roosevelt, as United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York in 1906, Stimson served until 1909, prosecuting antitrust cases. In his only attempt at elective office, Stimson became, with Roosevelt’s endorsement, the Republican nominee for Governor of New York in 1910, losing in the general election to Democrat John Dix.

From 1911 to 1913, Stimson served in the Cabinet of President William Howard Taft as the U.S. Secretary of War, the same office he would hold thirty years later in the Second World War. As a Regular Army Colonel in the Field Artillery in the First World War, he spent nine months in France, from 1917 to 1918, at the American General Staff College in Langres.

After the war, Stimson resumed his law practice, was made a Brigadier General in the Reserves, and became, in 1921, one of the founders of the Council on Foreign Relations.

In 1927, President Calvin Coolidge named Stimson an Envoy Extraordinary to the Republic of Nicaragua — then a de facto American protectorate — to settle that country’s electoral dispute. Later that year, Coolidge appointed him Governor-General of the Philippines.

In 1929, President Herbert Hoover recalled Stimson to Washington to confer upon him the highest gift in the providence of the Presidency. Hoover appointed him U.S. Secretary of State.

Serving until the end of the Hoover Administration in 1933, Stimson was the American delegate to the London Naval Conference in 1930, and would later proclaim the Stimson Doctrine, a policy of sanctions and non-recognition, aimed at containing Japanese aggression in Manchuria.

In July of 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, intent on running for an unprecedented third term, and seeking bi-partisan support for his foreign policy of all aid to Britain short of war, returned the 72 year old Henry Stimson, after an absence of 27 years, to the War Department.

For Roosevelt’s purposes, Stimson was an inspired choice. Although a prominent Republican with an impeccable reputation, Stimson was an internationalist, and therefore an interventionist, and more significantly, was an old retainer to the Oyster Bay branch of the Roosevelt family.

A Bureaucratic Interest

No cabinet official had a more compelling bureaucratic self interest in the successful use of atomic weapons than Henry Stimson. After all, he had just spent more than two billion, in 1940’s dollars, ($33 billion today) on the Manhattan Project, and he spent it surreptitiously, without the direct knowledge of Congress.

One of the congressional officials from whom he concealed the details of the project was the Chairman of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, the junior Senator from Missouri, one Harry S. Truman.

Stimson then spent another three billion dollars ($49 billion in today’s money) on the development and production of the delivery system for the atomic bomb, the Boeing B-29 Superfortress, the most expensive weapons system in the history of the planet up to that time.

The B-29 proved to be a spectacular triumph of American aircraft design and engineering, a veritable quantum leap in aviation technology. It remained a front line American aircraft into the jet age of the Strategic Air Command, and was the principal U.S. heavy bomber in the Korean War.

In the middle of World War II however, Stimson had no way of knowing that. So, hedging his bets against the possible failure of the B-29 program, he then spent another $124 million ($2 billion in 2023 dollars) on a second delivery system, the now forgotten Consolidated B-32 Dominator.

In total, Stimson’s War Department expended $84 billion, in real dollars, to develop and deliver the atomic bomb.

Far from being an enthusiast for his own creation, Stimson was afflicted with a moral ambivalence about the bomb that bordered on schizophrenia. In policy terms, Stimson’s position was one of protracted inconsistency about the use of the weapon.

The Targeting of Civilians

In May of 1945, the Truman Administration established an inter-departmental Committee, known as the Interim Committee on the Military Use of the Atomic Bomb, to formulate policy about the deployment of the bomb, and to craft public statements explaining its existence to the American people.

The Chairman of the Interim Committee was Henry Stimson. The Committee was advised by a technical body called the Scientific Panel.

From its very beginning, the committee determined that civilian losses concomitant with the use of the bomb were not to be viewed as collateral casualties. The bomb was specifically intended to be a terror weapon which explicitly targeted civilians and maximized civilian deaths.

The second of the committee’s first three recommendations, adopted unanimously and issued on June 1, 1945, was: “It should be used on a dual target plant surrounded by or adjacent to houses and other buildings most susceptible to damage;”

The Target Committee, headed by the Director of the Manhattan Project, Major General Leslie Groves, had already come to the same conclusion. On May 12, 1945, that committee decided that the bomb should be used against “important targets in an urban area of more than three miles diameter,” — area bombing on an immense scale.

On June 6, 1945, Stimson met with President Truman to discuss the Interim Committee recommendations. According to Stimson’s memorandum on the meeting, Truman, already briefed by his aide, (and soon to be Secretary of State) James Byrnes, expressed no concerns with the committee report, beyond what to tell the Russians in the upcoming Potsdam Conference.

Nor did Stimson register any objection to the targeting of homes in a nuclear attack. At the very end of the meeting, however, Stimson, in a reference to the conventional firebombing of Japanese cities, told Truman “I did not want to have the United States get the reputation of outdoing Hitler in atrocities.”

It makes no sense, of course, to support the atomic bombing of civilians while condemning conventional area bombing as Hitlerian. Was Stimson reluctant to challenge the findings of his own committee? Why did he not raise this issue in the committee which he chaired? Was this remark a subtle means of implanting doubt in Truman’s mind?

Stimson Begins To Dissent

Twelve days later, on June 18th, President Truman held a meeting at the White House, with both his military and civilian advisors, to discuss the invasion of Japan. While most of those present supported a landing in the Japanese Home Islands in November, Stimson, seconded by his Assistant Secretary of War, John McCloy, suggested that an invasion would solidify Japanese resistance in a fight to the death.

An even more dramatic intervention was made by Fleet Admiral William Leahy, who told the President that the unconditional surrender of Japan was not necessary to the successful conclusion of the war.

Truman, revealingly, told Leahy that he could leave the issue to Congress, but he could not change public opinion in this matter.

On July 2nd, Stimson sent a memorandum to the President, entitled a Proposed Program for Japan. It is a remarkable document. While arguing, ostensibly, against an invasion of Japan, Stimson raises issues directly related to the use of atomic weapons.

Stimson told Truman that Japan was under blockade, had no allies and no navy, and was increasingly vulnerable to air attacks. He went on to say, contrary to the pervasive racial hatred of the time, that “Japan is not a nation composed wholly of mad fanatics of an entirely different mentality from ours.”

Addressing the policy of unconditional surrender, Stimson asserted that a Japanese surrender could be facilitated if we “do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty.”

In a seeming repudiation of his own committee, Stimson concluded the memorandum by stating that “Our own bombing should be confined to military objectives as far as possible.”

Stimson would lose the first of these arguments, and only prevail, belatedly, in the second. The bomb would be used on civilians, and Truman would only agree to the preservation of the monarchy after the destruction of Nagasaki.

With the successful test of the atomic bomb at Alamogordo in New Mexico on July 16th, the bureaucratic momentum for its use became inexorable. By the beginning of August, 1945, Stimson, the Administration loyalist, was busy monitoring last minute preparations for the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Saving Kyoto, Sacrificing Nagasaki

Henry Stimson’s last known intervention about the use of the atomic bomb, prior to the bombings, was his direct appeal to President Truman on July 24th to spare the city of Kyoto, the historic center of Buddhism and Shintoism in Japan, by removing it from the target list. It was immediately thereafter that Nagasaki was added to the list.

Was Henry Stimson the anonymous decision maker who selected Catholic Nagasaki for destruction to save pagan Kyoto? The archival record offers no clues, but we do know that Stimson embraced all the prejudices of his time, his class, and his religious sect.

As a young lawyer in the 1890’s, Stimson was a committed “goo-goo,” a member of the Good Government Club of New York, dedicated to stamping out patronage and corruption in local government, i.e., Irish control of municipal politics.

Stimson entered government as an appointee and a disciple of Theodore Roosevelt, a President notorious for his nativism and bigotry. As a diplomat and colonial administrator, Stimson believed that Catholic Filipinos and Latin Americans were incapable of democratic self-government, requiring, instead, the firm hand of Anglo-Saxon tutelage.

Like every other rich WASP in the FDR Administration, Stimson had a visceral animus against the Catholic leader of Free France, once telling Harry Truman that Charles De Gaulle was “psychopathic.”

In his last public comments, a few months before his death in 1950, Stimson, in a letter to the editor of The New York Times, denounced Senator Joseph McCarthy.

The Tragedy of Henry Stimson

An attorney represents the position of his client. A mandarin — a high civil servant — learns the values of obedience, discretion, compliance with the institutional consensus, and acquiescence in decisions, once made.

Stimson was both of these in his long career. The tragedy of Henry Stimson was that he was inclined to do right, in a vague, Protestant/humanitarian sort of way, but lacked the moral clarity that the Catholic Faith would have imparted.

He had principles, and personal probity, but no concept of unbreachable moral prohibitions, rooted in Divine and natural law. In the end, everything was negotiable, where compromise was permitted and expected.

Like Pontius Pilate, Henry Stimson was morally discomforted by the decisions confronting him, and like Pilate, he preferred the acceptance of a crime to the uncertainties and unpleasantness of political discord.

On two occasions in his career, Stimson rejected the elite consensus. He argued against the vengeful Morgenthau Plan, which would have destituted the German people and depopulated the country by de-industrializing Germany.

Like General George Marshall, Stimson believed that American support for a Jewish National Home in Palestine would be inimical to U.S. interests in the Middle East.

On August 10, 1945, the day after the bombing of Nagasaki, Stimson, with the support of the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, appealed to the President to halt all attacks, both atomic and conventional, on Japan, to give that country an opportunity to surrender.

Stimson and Colonel William H. Kyle (right) arriving at the Gatow Airport in Berlin, Germany to attend the Potsdam Conference (July 16, 1945). Source.

After the war, towards the end of his life, Henry Stimson’s institutional loyalties and ruling class sensibilities proved impossible to discard. In a February, 1947 article in Harper’s Magazine, Stimson not only defended the killing of innocent civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but assumed responsibility for carrying out the decision: “I approved four other targets including the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”

Ironically, Stimson, one of the few cabinet officials who expressed moral reservations about the killing of civilians in wartime, would, in this article written in his retirement, provide the official narrative justifying the use of atomic weapons on the innocent as “our least abhorrent choice.”


C. Joseph Doyle is the Executive Director of the Catholic Action League of Massachusetts. Doyle is also the Director of Communications for the Friends of Saint Benedict Center.


Featured: Henry Lewis Stimson, by Ellen Emmet Rand; painted in 1933.


Mainstream Christian Zionism

Zionism and its impact on contemporary Israel and Palestine are topics of enormous import and therefore demand careful examination, yet they are widely misunderstood. Zionism is often regarded as a Jewish movement. In fact, the vast majority of Zionists are Christian. Moreover, Christian Zionism is usually considered to be a subset of Zionism. In contrast to this popular misconception, we should understand that Christian Zionism is the majority expression of Zionism; Jewish Zionism is an outgrowth of Christian Zionism. While many consider Christian Zionism to be a phenomenon of the religious right, most Christian Zionists are mainstream, liberal Christians. For example, Reinhold Niebuhr, the iconic twentiethcentury American liberal theologian, was selfconsciously and consistently Zionist throughout his career.

Christian Zionism is generally associated with Christians from the “Christian right,” who are loosely labeled fundamentalists or evangelicals. Sometimes, Christian Zionists are referred to as “the lunatic fringe.” Understood narrowly, Christian Zionists see the establishment of the State of Israel as a necessary step in God’s plan of salvation history. This is the best known form of Christian Zionism. This Christian form attracts the most critical attention, especially from mainstream Christians. However, it represents a distinct minority of Christian Zionists. The popular preoccupation with this select band on the Christian Zionist spectrum ignores the vast majority of Christian Zionists. I will refer to this strain of Zionism as fundamentalist or narrow Christian Zionism. In contrast to this narrow view, Christian Zionism, properly understood, covers a much broader range of Christians.

As a phenomenon, Christian Zionism is older than Jewish Zionism. In 1621, Sir Henry Finch wrote a discourse calling for support for the Jewish people and for their return to their biblical homeland. Further development of its primordial form dates to the first quarter of the nineteenth-century in England and in the United States. In the nineteenth century, Christian Zionism was, indeed, a fundamentalist ideology, but it has spread far beyond the narrow boundaries of evangelicals and biblical literalists. Over the past twenty years, Christian Zionism has attracted more and more scholarly attention, but that attention has been focused almost exclusively on this select band of the fundamentalist Christian Zionist spectrum, leaving wider and more conspicuous bands of the spectrum almost totally ignored—hiding in plain sight. This preoccupation of mainstream Christians with fundamentalist Christian Zionism is both misguided and misleading. Zionism is far more pervasive among “mainstream” Christians than it is usually regarded to be. Christian Zionism is not usually associated with mainstream, progressive Christians. This error needs to be corrected.

Christian attention to the phenomenon of Zionism is appropriate, because, paradoxically, Zionism originated as a Christian phenomenon and continues to be overwhelmingly Christian. How do I arrive at this conclusion?

Estimates of the number and percentages of fundamentalist and/ or evangelical Christians in America vary depending on how one defines these terms, but most surveys estimate that about twentythree to twenty-seven percent of the US Christian population is evangelical.1 In 2014, for example, a Pew Research poll of 35,000 Americans put the Christian population of America at seventy percent (210 million Americans). It found that evangelical Christians make up about one quarter of the Christian population (52.5 million Americans).

By way of contrast, consider that the world’s Jewish population is about 14 million people, i.e., about one quarter of the population of evangelical American Christians. At the risk of oversimplification, but to help demonstrate my point, consider that if all Jews in the world are Zionist, but only half the evangelicals in the USA are Zionist, then American fundamentalist Christian Zionists would outnumber all Jewish Zionists in the world by about 2:1. Thus, even if all Jews in the world are Zionists—and we know this is not correct—and only half of evangelicals in the US are Zionists, then Zionism is an overwhelmingly Christian phenomenon. The ratio of American fundamentalist Christian Zionists to American Jewish Zionists is closer to 5:1. Once Christian Zionism is properly understood
to include many progressive Christians as well, we will see that for every Jewish Zionist, there are at least ten Christian Zionists.

The significance of this point should not be ignored, because Zionist apologists often advance the erroneous and specious complaint that criticism of Zionism is a new and evolved form of anti-Semitism.

Zionism, however, should not be overly identified with Jews and Judaism for a number of reasons, most importantly because Christian Zionists vastly outnumber Jewish Zionists, especially once Christian Zionism is properly understood. Since Zionism has had enormous and far-reaching consequences on a national and global level and because it is overwhelmingly Christian, the examination of Christian Zionism by Christians of all persuasions is an important historical and ethical enterprise. What is more, since Zionism has produced catastrophic consequences for many people, Jews as well as non-Jews, Christian examination of Zionism, especially in its Christian forms, is a moral obligation as well. In any event, Christian examination of Christian Zionism is first and foremost an examination of Christians, Christian ideology, and Christian ethics.

My own consideration of Christian Zionism dates to the mid-1990s, when I was first introduced to it in its fundamentalist form. It was about that time that the phrase Christian Zionism was coined. My first essay on the subject—and I believe the first time the phrase mainstream Christian Zionism was employed and examined—was published in Michael Prior’s last book in 2004. By that time, Christian Zionism had gained considerable media attention, including a thirty-minute segment of 60 Minutes in 2003 and feature articles in the Washington Post and USA Today. However, those segments focused on what we should consider to be only a subset of Christian Zionism (i.e., the fundamentalist version represented by John Hagee, Hal Lindsay, and the International Christian Embassy in Jerusalem). It is also illustrated in the popular Left Behind series of fiction books. Critics frequently refer to this subset pejoratively as a Christian heresy or as the “lunatic ravings” of the Christian right.

Stephen Sizer, an English Episcopalian priest, wrote his doctoral dissertation on Christian Zionism. The dissertation is exclusively preoccupied with evangelical, fundamentalist Christian Zionism, ignoring the dominant mainstream variety, and he continues to focus his critique of Christian Zionism on this subset. In 2012, Steven Paas published Christian Zionism Examined. It focused exclusively on the fundamentalist form. In 2013, Paul Louis Metzger posted at Patheos a critique of Christian Zionism that focused exclusively on the fundamentalist Christian version. In 2014, at a conference on Christians in the holy land, sponsored by the United Methodist General Board of Global Ministries in Ginghamsburg, Ohio, Alex Awad, a Palestinian American Baptist minister, lectured on Christian Zionism. He focused exclusively on its fundamentalist form. David Wildman, also with the United Methodist General Board of Global Ministries, held forth frequently on the topic of Christian Zionism, always in its narrow form.

Fundamentalist Christian Zionism An Easy Target for Liberals

It is not surprising that most contemporary attention focuses on fundamentalist Christian Zionism. Fundamentalist Christian Zionists are vocal and visible, and therefore easily identified. Due to their distinctive and sometimes bizarre biblical interpretations, they are also easily critiqued. Recent popular and scholarly assessments of fundamentalist Christian Zionism are not wrong, but they are misleading. The problem is that defining Christian Zionism as a form of biblical literalism is a mistake. If biblical literalism defines Zionism, then most Jewish Zionists, including the foundational Jewish Zionists, like Theodore Herzl, would not qualify.

That Christian Zionism does not require a fundamentalist reading of the Bible is well recognized by fundamentalist Christian Zionists. The Rev. Malcom Hedding, a spokesperson for the International Christian Embassy in Jerusalem, writes:

If Zionism is the belief in the Jewish people’s right to return to their homeland, then a Christian Zionist should simply be defined as a Christian who supports the Jewish people’s right to return to their homeland. Under this broad and simple definition, many Christians would qualify no matter what their reasons are for this support.

Understood more broadly and more correctly, the ranks of Christian Zionists include renowned mainstream Christians such as Reinhold Niehbur, Krister Stendahl, Robert Drinan, William Albright, and W. D. Davies. Public figures including John Kerry, Hillary Clinton, and the journalist James Carroll must be included among Christian Zionists. None of these are biblical literalists. All of them are Zionists. Further, almost the entire biblical academy is, if not selfconsciously and directly in the service of the Zionist agenda, then at least indirectly engaged in promoting the Zionist narrative. The same can be said for mainstream churches that promote and reinforce the Zionist narrative in their Sunday school curricula, hymnody, and liturgies. Finally, almost all so-called Christian-Jewish dialogue is dominated by sympathy for the Zionist agenda. Indeed, most forms of so-called Christian-Jewish dialogue exclude any consideration of the effects of the Zionist agenda on the peoples of Palestine. Mainstream Christian Zionists are progressive and liberal. They often do not declare their Zionist orientation. Their affinity for Zionism is often masked by a sincere and notable concern to correct past wrongs by Christians against Jews. They usually do not endorse the extreme policies of the State of Israel against the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, although their sensitivity toward Palestinians does not usually include the Palestinian experience in 1948. One might reasonably wonder how Christians can reject on moral grounds the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 and its aftermath, but at the same time accept the occupation of Palestine in 1948, which was far more devastating to Palestinians without any moral compunctions whatsoever?

What Then Defines Zionism and How Do We Recognize That It Is Mainstream Christians?

If Zionism does not require biblical literalism in either its Jewish or Christian forms, then what defines a Zionist and Zionism Zionism is a nationalist movement bearing a family resemblance to all other nationalist movements of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and containing its own idiosyncrasies. Like any nationalist movement, it is subject to critique and it is subject to the same critique to which all nationalist movements must submit. All nationalism is exclusive. All exclusivity is divisive. All divisiveness is unstable. In my opinion, to be clear and in the interests of full disclosure, all nationalism is perverse and anachronistic. The advent of the nationstate is a modern phenomenon that has resulted in unprecedented ethnic conflict and unspeakable and unparalleled violence by peoples against each other. Zionist nationalism is no more violent than, for example, American nationalism, and no less violent, either. While they are different currently, neither is exceptional in that way. It is important to note, however, that people are sympathetic to Zionist nationalism because first they are sympathetic to the concept of nationalism.

There is no simple formulaic definition of Zionism. However, any articulation of Zionism, such as the one above by Malcolm Hedding, must express, one way or another, the ideas that 1) the Jewish people are a distinct people; 2) like other peoples, Jews are, and Jewishness is, best actualized in a nation-state characterized by national institutions and distinct boundaries; and 3) that this organization into a nationstate is not only a political and historical necessity, but a moral imperative as well. None of these essentials is unambiguous and none is beyond question, but whenever you find these ingredients, you will find a Zionist, whether he or she is Christian or Jewish, religious or secular, fundamentalist or progressive. When one considers these three characteristic features—each of which involves elaborate corollaries—one begins to get a feel for mainstream Zionism in contradistinction to fundamentalist Zionism. These three characteristics—that for the Jewish people, the establishment of the State of Israel is both a political necessity and a moral imperative—are common to those who identify themselves as Zionists.

Where do we find exponents of Zionism, so defined, among mainstream Christians? Let’s start with Reinhold Niebuhr, the iconic Protestant liberal Christian. Niebuhr was educated at Yale and wrote prolifically for The Christian Century, The Nation, The New Republic, and his own Christianity in Crisis. He was eventually appointed professor of ethics at Union Theological Seminary. He was by no means a

fundamentalist. There is no hint of any reference to the fulfilment of biblical prophecy in his writings. Indeed, he denigrates such views. Niebuhr’s unwavering support for Jewish causes was nurtured by strong philo-Judaism. He was motivated not by restorationist theology and informed not by biblical literalism, but by moral outrage over the experience of Jews in Nazi Germany and throughout Europe and central Asia. For him, support for the Jewish people required support for the Jewish state and both were moral imperatives. His conscience was attuned to issues of justice and the moral obligation of Christians to respond to social challenges. He spoke frequently in support of Zionism to Jewish audiences. Leaders of Zionist organizations identified him as one who could be counted on to advance their agenda among Christians and he agreed to write a two-part pro-Zionist article that appeared in The Nation. He wrote:

The problem of what is to become of the Jews in the postwar world ought to engage all of us, not only because a suffering people has a claim upon our compassion but because the very quality of our civilization is involved in the solution… The Jews require a homeland…

Clearly, Niebuhr was predisposed by his theological orientation toward empathy for Jews. Just as clearly, he had no interest in fundamentalist biblical hermeneutics. Does that fact alone, however, disqualify him from the ranks of Zionists? On the contrary, his orientation toward Zionism perfectly illustrates that fundamentalism is not a precondition for Christian Zionism. He wrote:

Many Christians are pro-Zionist in the sense that they believe that a homeless people require a homeland; but we feel as embarrassed as anti-Zionist religious Jews when messianic claims are used to substantiate the right of the Jews to the particular homeland in Palestine… History is full of strange configurations. Among them is the thrilling emergence of the State of Israel.

Zionism and the Mainstream Academy

Turning to the arena of Christian biblical scholarship, Christian Zionism is ubiquitous. In recent years, prominent biblical scholars, including Keith Whitelam, Thomas Thompson, and Michael Prior have produced groundbreaking works demonstrating that both biblical archaeology and the broader field of biblical studies are dominated by scholars whose ideas are sympathetic to and have the effect of validating the Zionist enterprise. This is particularly obvious when one travels through Israel, where virtually every archaeological endeavor is pressed into Zionist service to reinforce the Zionist narrative of Jewish return and validate exclusive Jewish claims to the land.

Neil Asher Silberman explores this theme vigorously as it pertains to Zionist historiography. One outstanding example, among many, is the archaeological excavation of Masada. Yigal Yadin, an avowed Zionist who directed the dig and who first published its findings, is the author of the popular myth of Masada. Yadin’s findings and the Masada story were subsequently debunked, but, nevertheless, live on because they fit so well with the worldview of contemporary Israelis. Twenty-five years after Silberman published his work, Christian pilgrims, no less than Israeli school groups, are saturated with the fiction of Jewish Zealots heroically defying overwhelming odds, just as the Israeli Defense Force is said to do today in its aggressive wars of “selfdefense.” Biblical scholars reinforce this link by happily adopting Zionist language of Jewish return to the land. That Jesus and his compatriots, both those who were his supporters and those who were his detractors, belonged to one unified Jewish people is almost uncontested in biblical scholarship. English translations of the New Testament routinely refer to Jesus, his followers, and his opponents all as Jews, even though careful translation of the original languages of the texts would call for more nuanced translation.

Just as astonishingly, modern biblical scholars constantly refer to Jesus or Paul as practitioners of Judaism without nuance. The diversity of conceptions implied by the Greek noun Ioudaios and its cognates is consistently undermined in contemporary Biblical translations. In fact, the contrast between the scarcity of the unnuanced references to Judaism in firstcentury literature and its frequency in contemporary biblical scholarship is striking and well illustrates the degree to which mainstream Christian biblical scholarship helps to cement the connection between modern Zionist Jews and their claim to the territory of ancient Israel. Interpretation matters. Words not only describe reality. Words also condition the way we think about reality. The words biblical scholars use to describe the ancient past promotes an identification of modern Jews with ancient Jews and reinforces the Zionist claim of a direct line between past and present and the natural return of the Jews to their ancestral land. It should be observed that the archaeologists and historians whose historiographies are so harmonious with the Zionist enterprise, more often than not, are Christians who are neither fundamentalist nor dispensationalist.

Zionist ideology depends heavily on the idea of a distinct modern ethnic group which originated in the territory of ancient Israel and which can trace an uninterrupted lineage to ancient Israel. This historical oversimplification undergirds many modern Zionist claims to the contemporary real estate in Palestine. Such Zionism appeals to biblical archaeology to validate its contemporary claims to ethnic identity and territorial integrity. But the scholarship is not merely congenial to Zionist ideology. Biblical scholars themselves often uncritically presume the ethnic identity, territorial legitimacy, and nationalist aspirations at the root of Zionism. If the assumptions of the scholars are identical with those of Zionists, why do we not consider those scholars Zionists?

Mainstream Christian Zionism also pervades one of the most hallowed precincts of liberal, mainstream Christianity, namely so-called Jewish-Christian dialogue. It is no surprise that Jews involved in the dialogue display obvious Zionist sympathies, but their Christian counterparts are often equally and unapologetically Zionist. It is also in this realm that the challenges associated with identifying and critiquing mainstream Christian Zionism are most apparent. Unlike the ranks of fundamentalist Christian Zionists, whose opinions are often shrugged off as “lunatic ravings,” mainstream Christian Zionists are not easy targets. Not only does mainstream Christian Zionism include icons of liberal, progressive Christianity, their motivation for assuming obviously Zionist positions is motivated by and grounded in sincere moral concern.

The reality of Jewish suffering should be prominent in all Christian thinking, but in the formal circles of Jewish-Christian dialogue, it propels Christian participants to adopt clearly Zionist positions. Almost without exception, their concern grows out of sincere regard for Jewish suffering and the demands of justice and restitution. Rarely, however, does their concern extend equally to the Palestinians who experience Zionism as an instrument of catastrophe. One notable example among many is Father Robert Drinan, formerly Dean of the School of Law at Boston College and professor of law at Georgetown University. Drinan was a well-known activist in liberal social causes throughout his long and illustrious career. However, in describing Zionism, Drinan uses language that would have surprised even Herzl, whom, he says, pursued his “messianic pilgrimage” with a zeal “infused with a compelling humanitarianism combined with traces of Jewish mysticism.” The “mystery” and “majesty” of Zionism appears in its glory from Herzl’s tomb. Now that the state is established, Christians should support it “in reparation or restitution for the genocide of Jews carried out in a nation whose population was overwhelmingly Christian.” Let’s not ignore Father Drinan’s distinguished ten-year career as a member of the US House of Representatives (DemocratMassachusetts), during which he had numerous opportunities to express his enthusiasm for Zionism by voting in favor of legislation and resolutions that were staunchly pro-Israel. He is, thus, also an example of the way in which mainstream Christian Zionism pervades US political institutions.

Conclusion

Very few topics generate fervent debate, arouse passions, and evoke confusion like the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. This is because it veers into the volatile areas of religion and politics. Personal faith, interpretation of scripture, personal loyalties, moral convictions, and deeply-held political opinions overlap and collide in a confused sea of facts, perceptions, images, and realities. Notwithstanding these treacherous emotional waters, conscientious American Christians have no choice but to attempt to navigate them, because their churches and their government are both deeply complicit in the sadness and suffering of the people of Israel and Palestine.

In spite of the often repeated critiques of fundamentalist Christian Zionism, a more pervasive, pernicious, and sophisticated form of Zionism has been overlooked. I call it mainstream Christian Zionism. I believe that most American Christians should be included in this category. But if only half of mainstream American Christians are Zionists, then mainstream Christian Zionists outnumber American Jewish Zionists by 14:1. Were it not for this form of Christian Zionism, the more easily identifiable, easily critiqued, unsophisticated form of Christian Zionism would not have the effect that it has. The minority wields great influence and exerts great energy, but they still need the majority to effect policy and the majority is only too happy to play its part. Mainstream Christian Zionism does not depend on biblical authority for its legitimacy. It is rooted in genuine moral sensitivities. Its appeal is to moral imperatives and political necessity rather than personal piety. It assumes uncritically that nationalism is natural and necessary and so starts with a predisposition to Jewish nationalism. It is far better organized, far better funded, and far more politically potent than its
fundamentalist cousin

Reconsidering Christian Zionism in its mainstream form leads inevitably to vexing moral conflicts. It requires re-examination of widely held assumptions about ethnic identity and nationhood and the moral implications of these. It raises issues that are considered taboo in the Church and takes us into perilous moral and academic “no-fly zones.” But intellectual honesty requires no less.

It is, of course, quite convenient for mainstream Christians to identify Christian Zionism exclusively with evangelical, fundamentalist Christians. It is always easier to identify other people’s defects than one’s own. Mark Twain reportedly once said, “Nothing so needs reforming as other people’s habits.” Jesus said, “First take the log out of your own eye…”

Mainstream, liberal Christians cannot absolve themselves of complicity in the Zionist enterprise simply because they are not fundamentalists. If they espouse views that are identical to the nationalist assumptions of self-confessed secular and religious Jewish Zionists, then they themselves should be identified as Zionists.

Equating Christian Zionism so thoroughly with evangelical, fundamentalist Christians, or with the Christian right, is highly misleading, and ignores the reality that Christian Zionist support for the State of Israel comes overwhelmingly from mainstream Christians. Until we understand Christian Zionism in its mainstream aspects, however, we have not begun to appreciate how pervasive—and, therefore, how dangerous—Zionism really is.


Peter J. Miano teaches courses in New Testament studies, biblical archaeology, biblical geography and biblical history. He also teaches courses in missiology. He specializes in the history of the Middle East, its contemporary development and the role of the Church in the Middle East during the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries.


Featured: Engraving by Ephraim Moshe Lilien, produced for the 5th Zionist Congress, which took place in Basel, Switzerland in 1901. The Hebrew inscription at the bottom is the prayer “May our eyes behold your return in mercy to Zion.” This is an excerpt from Prophetic Voices on Middle East Peace.