The Church in America: Vatican I, the Catholic Meltdown, and a Bright Tomorrow

I am not a Catholic. Odds are if you consider yourself a serious member of the Church of Rome you are not one either. The more Marys and John Pauls you have in the backseat of your transit van, the more scapulars and rosaries you use, the more you rack up those Latin Masses and novenas, the less likely you are in fact a Catholic, according to how that organization defines its membership. In this, we have much to unpack.

If the following essay is unpleasant to read, it is just as unpleasant to write. It will mean putting to death many illusions we have cherished. At the core, we must understand that a Catholic is exactly what the owners of that corporation define a Catholic to be at the present moment, and not whatever definition we fancy. This essay is disillusioning. To be disillusioned is a good thing. It is a blessing to be free of one’s misapprehensions.

To shoulder our task, we must look at history both sacred and profane, we must come to grips with the consequences of Church councils past and Church happenings present, and we must sound out the spirit of legalism, a tool which the Fathers of Rome have embraced for some time.

More than anything we must extricate from our conversation that fondest of fallacies, dear to men in general, dearest of all to conservative sorts: we must cease speaking of things as we would like them to be. We must speak of things as they are. Lastly, we will break out our divining rods as we look towards the future of Catholicism. This future may yet be bright, but only if Catholics—or rather Catholic-ing people—accept the stark impasse they are at. It’s a checkmate so adamantine and painful that even the most ardent traditionalists will not acknowledge it.

And towards what end do we do this? Towards the love of the Church of Christ, the Catholic Church.

The Impasse

Things are deadlocked. They are at such an impasse that I need only mention “The Crisis,” and I am likely to be understood. Some men make careers detailing the blow-by-blow decomposition of Catholicism in the Postmodern West. They plumb villainous and criminal activity of villainous and criminal men, and they expose the mediocrity of forgettable men; from an endless well of indignation as loud as it is innocent, they critique the oatmeal thoughts of oatmeal-brained men; and these commentators have an endless store of indignation towards banal suburban liturgies attended by banal suburban men. But you shall not put a stumbling block before the blind, Leviticus says, and you shall not flog a normie for being unimpressive, I say. Given these obvious dynamics I do not see why the Catholic meltdown forever renews itself in outrage from the devout. At the end of the day, for all their verbosity, there is little value in punditland.

It is remarkable that for half a century Roman Catholics have thrashed about concerning the state of the Church. The topic has filled a lot of conference halls, it has sold gobs of books, and it has gotten many, many clicks online. This talk has solved precisely nothing. However, in this exercise papists are not different from the secular conservatives they so often get used and duped by. In both instances, and many others besides, people are not grasping the dynamics of the communities they associate with.

In response to The Crisis people have developed certain solutions. These express themselves in a spectrum of formal and corporate works which include everything from participating in online forums and radio shows, to establishing congregations complete with seminaries, schools, pilgrimage agencies, and even rest homes. Beyond these efforts, printing houses and websites advertise bushels of theories about Vatican II, who is the real pope, and, especially, why the older liturgical books are allegedly better than the new ones. The diversity of these solutions are superficial. While these perturbed people exert their efforts in different directions, sometimes heroically be it said, their appraisal and solution to The Crisis is ultimately the same.

Namely, to some extent or other these people, these orthodox Catholics, or devout Catholics, or traditional Catholics, or conservative Catholics, these flattering-adjective Catholics, believe that Catholicism is occluded by the Church hierarchy at present. However, mirabile dictu, they say, real Catholicism can be accessed merely by doing old Catholic things. If one does these things enough, and if one gets enough people doing them, then soon or late The Crisis will be over. Problem solved. Crisis solved. The entire spectrum of Catholicisms (sic) believe these points and adhere to this approach. Their denominations only differ in degrees and methods.

Alas, this is a dead-end. You see, the same Catholic tradition these commendable people believe they are maintaining in fact forbade their methodology 150 years ago. Doing and believing and living holy Christian lives does not make one a good Catholic. Being in perfect legal submission to the regulations and teachings of the Diocese of Rome makes one a good Catholic. To wit, I adduce Canon 205 of Rome’s Codex, “Those baptized are fully in the communion of the Catholic Church on this earth who are joined with Christ in its visible structure by the bonds of the profession of faith, the sacraments, and ecclesiastical governance.” Again, this is how the Roman Catholic Church defines its membership, and it is only their definition which matters. A man acting under any other definition is holy and wholly LARPing. This is the dark wood of legalism.

As we proceed there are some nuances I ought to address so that I am understood correctly. I have no substantive disagreement with the spread of approaches found in the so-called traditional groups mentioned above, their quirks, egos, theological blind-spots notwithstanding. However, because I apprehend the conclusions of Vatican I and the entirety of 19th Century ecclesiology, without a shadow of a doubt neither I nor the sects above are Catholic. Post-1870 the Church is whatever the Churchman say it is at the moment, and there is no doubt from the pope down to the Curia down to the college of bishops, the presbytery, and the vast bulk of the Christian people that likely you and certainly I with our mantillas and our missals are not a faithful representation of the mind of that community.

Until the legalism which has copper-fastened the Bride of Christ to barritry is dissolved The Crisis will not change. It may ameliorate for a season, perhaps a Pius XIII or a Benedict XVII may toddle along, but as long as legal path prevails The Crisis will return soon or late. Yes, I am saying that your conservatives and your traditionalists and your orthodox Catholics are not part of that religion, but I am saying the same of myself.

Also, it is not my purpose in this essay to change people’s beliefs. Those who adhere to any denomination of flattering-adjective Catholicism may believe what they wish. It is my intention to establish in triplicate that a man who chooses to operate a Roman Catholic municipal person, what the Vatican’s Codex calls a “faithful,” does not have the liberty to entertain, even mentally(!), the type of critical discourse which has become mother’s milk to many of the devout, much less does such a municep have leave to publicly act on this discourse.

Furthermore, I assert that if we wish to continue this critical tone we must respect the Catholic Church enough to admit we do not fit their definition of a Catholic, particularly concerning the canonical clause on “government” above, and that appeals to anything before 1870 are totally moot for reasons I will lay out below.

I am in hearty agreement with the general conclusions of the so-called traditionalist so-called Catholics. They are correct in discerning any number of ruptures. Furthermore, they are correct in comprehending the gravity of these ruptures in “the big picture” of things, and that these breaks undermine the authoritative claims of Catholicism. I believe the traditionalist critique is correct, but I remind myself that beliefs are worthless. Only what is matters. Alas, neither I nor any who hold such traditional positions match the definition of the Catholic Church’s canonical “faithful” status, a designation which is identical to the “citizen” status in those lands ruled by the Bar Association. Recall the Church’s definition of itself (not yours),

[The one Church of Christ], constituted and organized as a society in this present world, subsists in the Catholic Church, governed by the Successor of Peter and by the Bishops in communion with him, although many elements of sanctification and truth can be found outside her structure; such elements, as gifts properly belonging to the Church of Christ, impel towards Catholic unity.

This quotation hails from part eight of Lumen Gentium. The clear division between the Mystical Body of Christ and the juristic, structural Church may startle many lay Catholics who assumed the realities were one and the same. But there you go. One will often find in the documents of legal-land a remarkable honesty. Perhaps the Vatican’s attorneys were just unconsciously blunt and illuminative (and all Roman priests are attorneys).

Oddly enough, while this part of Lumen Gentium is one of the stock faults traditionalists see in the late Council, they have internalized that selfsame bipolar thinking. In their mental edifice it forms a necessary lynchpin. Keep your ear to the track long enough and you will hear from them, as perhaps you’ve said yourself, mention of “the Church as it” and “the Church as her.” In other words, I can ignore the Novus Ordo and Pacha Mama and St. Paul VI at the United Nations because that’s only the structural Church (“the Church as it”). I may ignore all that jazz in favor of what I believe is real, old-timey Catholicism (“the Church as her”). Alas, alas, not so fast. As Lumen Gentium instructs,

The society structured with hierarchical organs and the Mystical Body of Christ, are not to be considered as two realities, nor are the visible assembly and the spiritual community, nor the earthly Church and the Church enriched with heavenly things; rather they form one complex reality which coalesces from a divine and a human element.

You see, here’s the rub: one may not motte-and-bailey their way out of The Crisis. Municipal Catholics, those the Vatican numbers as its faithful, must acknowledge the Church as it and she are one and the same. The type of mental, vocal, and lived out picking and choosing many of us Catholic-ing people do with our faith is simply a walled-off option. We must either keep Catholic-ing and renounce representing the Vatican’s legal person, including pretending we are part of that organization, or sit down and shut up.

Lastly, so that I am understood at the outset, there is a large slice of humble pie we have to eat as we digest the thesis of this essay. It happens that the same sort of people who go in for Latin Masses and rosaries and catechisms, many of whom I am arguing are not Catholic according to Rome’s definition of its membership, are the same sorts who give the greatest grief to protestant and Orthodox sectarians. Grasping the ramifications of Vatican I, other binding 19th Century documents, and canon law, it looks like we are all schismatics now. Since many Catholic-ing people have reached the exact same conclusions and praxis as the Greeks from 1000 years ago and the protestants of 500 years vintage, perhaps we Catholic LARPers can get off our high horses. We should put a sock in our haughty Extra Ecclesiam jabber, at least until we actually join the Ecclesia we’re so fond of giving others grief for not belonging to.

Lastly, a note on punctuation. Throughout this essay, as you can see above, I refer to Christians who hail from Reformation communities as lower-case protestants. This was the original way various Reformation congregations referred to themselves, and it most accurately expresses the truth which the reformers were grasping at. Namely, protestantism is an attempt to live a Christian life outside of the legal-canonical structure which predominated East and West until that time. Statutory structures (i.e., legal systems) have many things to recommend them. Nothing has yet been found which so effectively harnesses human attention and energy. However, statutory structures are totally fictional. For the Christian this proves to be a pickle. On the one hand, how can one worship reality, Logos, while at the same time swathing the day to day functioning of the Church in the dead fictions of barrity? On the other hand, how can there be a visible, hierarchical, incarnate Christian community, the Church in other words, without something like a legal system? It is not our work to answer that question here. What I will point out, however, is that because every single legal word, statute, jurisdiction, and person is make-believe it is therefore dead.

There is an entropy here which has consistently worn down every vital reality which has bellied up to legalism. Every community, every religion, every philosophy, every nation, every man which has put itself into barritry irresistibly begins compromising their principles. Find me one man or community in legalland which 10 or 20 or 100 or 500 years in has held to their original idealism. The living cannot be wed to the dead. This is a pickle indeed. Like “christian,” “protestant” was a verb, then it became an adjective; 500 years on it ends its days as a noun. This is the way of all flesh. In fact I suppose every spiritual community in history has known this sadsome slide from lived reality to dead object. Nihilominus, in no sense does protestant appear lower-cased in this essay in a pejorative fashion. Insofar as traditional Catholics are in no uncertain terms protestants, I believe the antique usage of protestant captures the reality both Reformation Christians and traditional Catholics hunger for: Christianity, a verb once more!

You see, flattering-adjective Catholicism is a hodge-podge of expectations which have largely developed in response – always in response, like all failed conservatism, never proactively – to The Crisis. It is so much a creature of discourse and argument that orthodox Catholicism has unwittingly wandered down alleys trod centuries or millennia ago. To wit, the spectrum of traditionalisms has arrived at an ecclesiology which is substantively somewhere between Eastern Orthodoxy and American hoedown protestantism. Aesthetically they are surely closer to the former, logically they are closer to the latter. These dear Catholicish souls, commendable for their loyalty to a religious structure which has done them great pastoral wrong, tragic for their inability to understand the governing principles of their nominal religion, essentially have created an ideal Church, i.e., a Church of the romantic heart, of the mental, of the numinous, of the World of Forms.

With full awareness for how shoddily Catholicing people of traditional attachment have been kicked about, with every agreement for their aesthetics and spirituality, with all regard for their occasional heroism, how in God’s name does the “Eternal Rome” construction of Marcel Lefebvre, how does the “Faith of the Ages” which these people go on about differ from the Orthodox fantasy of the “Church of the First Millennium” or the protestant errand of reviving the early days of The Way?

Accepting the above thesis is only half our work. Once we painfully come to grips that decades of battling to restore Catholicism has been built on a foundation of sand, because all legalism is sand, once we swallow the hard pill that those of us who have grounded our identity on being Catholic are not in fact members of that faith, then we turn to the exciting part of our time together. What might Catholicism look like once it is freed from the tomb of a 19th Century ecclesiology and mindset which has both caused The Crisis and yet makes void all prevailing solutions of the same?

Fanboys Out!

At a certain point one must come to terms with reality. For many of us this is difficult. Perhaps we have experienced the unhappy condition of a friend or relation whom we hope will shape up in some way or another. Maybe we have known some kind of long-term estrangement, but we keep alive the hope that so-and-so will one day walk through our door. In some scenarios at some times it is no longer rational to maintain these hopeful positions. Alas, the bottle wins out b’times, the porch light stays on never to embrace a prodigal’s return, and the sick child wastes away. After a point to continue in hope is to live in fantasy.

No man ever held the Catholic vision of life and society as dear as I. In the second part of this essay I will describe how I blew a decade of my life trying to instantiate that vision. But time moves apace and I’ll just say here that it is literally impossible to want something for a society whose participants are not interested. So little by little among a thousand disappointments and failures and betrayals I saw among the flatteringly-adjectived that American Catholics are as myopic as protestants in their comprehension of the height and depth and breadth of what Christian life and society promises. All they wanted was their family and their Jesus, the world be damned. And so little by little my idealism died. I saw what was up. It’s cold comfort, but it is a good thing to be disillusioned.

Howsomever, as regards the Church that final disillusion was their participating in the Coronavirus Lockdown. That event was such an admission of faulty sacramental understanding, such a lack of faith interiorly and discernment exteriorly, and such a betrayal of a damn sight more people than you’d imagine, souls who rely on the Church not just for religious services, but also for basic social solace from the blast of cold modernity, that I should never think I will reclaim my long-suffering esteem for Catholicism.

Oh, don’t worry, I still keep up with my rosaries and my brevaries, and my holy boozy bones darken church portals exactly as regular as Rome’s shuffling lawyers have scratched out “obligation.” And my heart sinks at the precarity of saying this, but as lame and crooked as its clerics and attendees are, Catholicism is the only shovel out of the mess which the Enlightenment has brought us to. Still and all, after Covid my long-dying hope that Catholicism would prove a tardy counter to Modernity in my lifetime gave up the ghost.

More than my worthless esteem, however, the decision to belly-up to the Coronavirus hype killed in me my filial tendency to spin or downplay obvious Church mismanagement. For many moons it was obvious to me that the Church was part of the New World Order, but I tried to paper-over things when I saw them. This modest grace I do not extend to myself, and it is not something I extend to other actors on the world stage, but for decades my piety pushed me to “cover of nakedness” of Catholic governance and society. After two American waves of sexual scandals strung out over 20 years, after less flashy but more numerous financial wheeling-and-dealing, and after a tuneless and ham-fisted liturgical reform, as pastorally inept as it was iconoclastic, Covid was the straw which broke the camel’s back. Like a child watching his alcoholic father drink hand sanitizer, I can no longer fanboy for the Church. I’m not going anywhere, but I’m not papering over things either. And this includes nonsense in traditional Catholicville, they who think they most have their act together, they whose heads are as big as hot air balloons. Ergo this essay.

Ah, musha, you say, feeding me your best and most canned apologetics, one mustn’t judge the Church on the failures of her members. It is besides the point to mention that a tree can indeed be judged for its fruits. What is on point is that my difficulty is a bit more nuanced than leaving the Catholic Church. As I mentioned, I said my rosary today and I mean to be at Mass this Sunday just as I was last Sunday. I’m not going anywhere. But after Covid I must admit what you conservatives will not. Namely,

1) While the post-Conciliar traditionalist criticism is correct in its general outline,
2) The de jure Vatican I papacy permits each and everyone of these post-Conciliar aberrations to occur (i.e., Again, after Vatican I, Catholicism is whatever the people in the Curia says it is),
3) That a Roman Catholic corporate faithful does not have the liberty under the Syllabus of Errors, Pastor Aeternus, Denzinger, Ott, nor canon law to hold any critique related to point one above. Thus,
4) The only honest solution is indeed to keep doing Catholic things but not to claim to be part of that communion. To do otherwise is to lie to the agents of that
5) organization and oneself.

Two Worldly Comparisons and Three

“We The People”

Let me explain this selfsame tragic disconnect within two other communities whose denizens fail to grasp the true picture of things. These are they who advocate for social and political conservatism and those who work for educational reform. Like your orthodox Catholic sorts, I am profoundly sympathetic towards these positions and these communities. However, like Catholics, conservatives and pedagogues are clueless as to the actual dynamics at play in their respective bailiwicks.

For example, if one does not understand that legal states are foreign to the men they allegedly rule over, political happenings become one fluster after another. Many a talk radio host has made a career off of this reality. Taxes, wars, zoning, health regulations, inflation, and many more things besides, make no sense until the moment one realizes they are not part of The People. You indeed are a person, but you have no truck with The People to whom civil servants so oft’ refer. When this understanding happens, when one grasps that legal governments exist in a state of enmity towards those they rule, all the “crazy” and “insane” goings on in the political order are quite sensible. One realization can illuminate everything.

Occupy Wall Street, from the dear dead days gone by, and the late Ottawa and Washington convoys are examples of this reality at play. Those American and Canadian patriots could quote all the charters, and bills of rights, and court precedents, and moral laws they pleased, but The People—the bloodline descendants of those who constituted their nation-states generations ago – have no obligation to the Tom, Dick, and Harry regular people. As we will see with the educational critique, politics are not broken. They are working just fine. Everything is running smoothly, but only if we grasp the principles. If one does not get the principles at play then they run the risk of wasting an entire intellectual life in conservative-land by forever reacting to the symptoms but never the cause. Those Occupiers and those Convoymen were beautiful and democratic and wholesome, they were the best of their peoples, but like the orthodox Catholics, their efforts were moot because they never grasped the societies they operated in.

“My” (Birth Certificated) Children

Another example comes from my own avocation of education. It concerns public schools. Nowadays, in the best tradition of cringy conservative lingo, “government brainwashing camps,” have replaced the expression “public schools” in some circles. (Your real big shots use “indoctrination” in place of “brainwashing;” thus, “government indoctrination camps.”) What was once a pointed and thoughtful jab when used 20 years ago in a measured way has become a tedious pitter-patter hurled by parents, typically women, at America’s latest national pastime: emotional school board meetings.

Often at these sadsome gatherings two fallacies appear. One is that parents believe they have lawful rights over “their” children, the other is that public schools exist for the betterment of pupils in se. However, like the civic example above and like the Catholic one we’re dwelling on throughout this essay, there are profound misapprehensions at play by parents, and these lead to false conclusions and false solutions. Let’s take this nice and slow, partner.

Any child enrolled in a public school, and any state-registered private school, can only do so if they have a birth certificate. Anyone with a birth certificate—a process always initiated by parents, mind you, never by the state—is forever alienated in law from his former natural parents. By filling out the certificate application Daddy and Mommy unwittingly declare to the state that Junior is a foundling. They declare that Junior has no estate with them in law or in fact. Under pain of perjury Daddy and Mommy freely state that this selfsame Junior which came from their bodies is effectively a lost child. Via the birth cert application Junior is declared to be no different than a kid found wandering the mall or the streets or the woods. In benevolent response to this declaration the state seamlessly returns their new ward, Junior, back to the custody of Daddy and Mommy. The only difference is that now Daddy and Mommy are now mere legal parents who henceforth have conditional custody of the state’s child, Junior.

This is exactly what happens when we register our newly bought cars at the DMV. One’s actual ownership of the machine is traded for mere legal ownership which can be regulated by the state (e.g., speed regulations, taxes, seatbelt requirements). By the bye, anyone care to guess what happens when the Catholic priest takes the newly baptized baby and fills our the baptism certificate?. I care not whether this is good or bad, nor if this transfer of authority is moral; I care not what I believe about this, nor what you believe about this. All that matters is that this is the process at play. All the wine moms east of the Mississippi can roar about the school board’s obligation to them and “their” children, but until they grasp what they did in that hospital, nothing will be grasped.

Schools are Failing”

Secondly, at these school board meetings we often see objections to school curricula. Now the only thing more given over to fads and fancies than the world of pedagogy is the world of conservative bellyaching over schools. Like the parental mistake above, namely the misunderstanding parents have about whose registered children in fact attend registered schools, so here too people are so wrapped up in what they believe about schools that they do not grasp what schools are.

Public schools are municipal subdivisions of the township. Therefore, they are legal entities. Like all legal entities, public schools operate under the circumscribed parameters of legal language. In other words – and this is where we’re going as we return to the religious theme of this essay – it does not matter what I think the word “public” means any sooner than my impression of who constitutes “the People” matters. It matters what the public school board says “public” means, it matters what the state says its schools’ title means. At base it really only matters what legal attorneys say a legal entity is. Thus, like anything legal, the word “public” has a specific meaning. Public means commercial. Thus, the raison d’ être of public schools are to produce commercially successful consumers. Once all these points are understood one’s conclusions must be reevaluated. In the terrible justice of the points above, one sees the farce which is the critique of mainstream education. Pagan, Christian, or Jew, black man or white, no one denies that public schools do a solid job of making public—commercial—people.

As for Them, So for Us

The same goes for Catholicism. In place of, or in ignorance of, an appraisal of things as they are, to confront The Crisis the lot of us have thrown up our beliefs as to how things ought to be. More or less we believe we can ignore or actively scorn the things from Rome we believe don’t fit in our idea of what Catholicism is. This the Church does not permit. Remember that beliefs do not matter, fundamentals do. Post-1870 there is no appeal to anything outside of this moment’s Vatican, and the Vatican says a Catholic is someone in complete external and internal submission to Rome’s governance.

Once one understands that The Crisis of the present Roman Catholic Church is the logical outcome of Vatican I, and indeed that it is the result of trends going back nearly a millennium, and once one comes to accept that it is absolutely forbidden for Catholics to disagree with the popes, and the councils, and the liturgies of the Church, vocally or in the quiet of one’s mind (again, !), one can see what a fool’s errand the devout Catholic world has been on. Consider this statement from session four of the First Vatican Council,

Wherefore we teach and declare that, by divine ordinance, the Roman church possesses a pre-eminence of ordinary power over every other church, and that this jurisdictional power of the Roman pontiff is both episcopal and immediate. Both clergy and faithful, of whatever rite and dignity, both singly and collectively, are bound to submit to this power by the duty of hierarchical subordination and true obedience, and this not only in matters concerning faith and morals, but also in those which regard the discipline and government of the church throughout the world.

Pay attention to that last clause. “Discipline and government,” include everything trads gripe about. After 1870 those topics were off the table for Catholics to buck up against. And remember, in case you thought you could out-lawyer a lawyer, this cutting criticism from Pascendi Domini Gregis: “In the meanwhile the proper course for the [‘modernist’] Catholic will be to proclaim publicly his profound respect for authority – and continue to follow his own bent.” Those of us who drink deeply at the well of Western faith, orthodoxy, and tradition must simply admit we do not believe, much less abide by, the present tense de fide Magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church. In trying to be traditionalists we became modernists.

Reorientation

There’s a lot going on here, so let’s catch our breath. Again, firstly, this article intends in its own little way to ultimately advance the Catholic religion. There is no gotcha-ism here, no amble of a secular mien. But we must come to grips that a large segment of men who are often the most erudite, personally devout, and occasionally admirable are in fact not Catholics according to the present parameters of their religious leaders, and remember it’s those leaders who decide who is and is not a member. Not God, nor you, nor some appeal to the past defines a Catholic; once Rome threw itself headfirst into the barrister’s make-believe world only Rome gets to decide who is a Catholic.

On a note of sympathy here, I also do not suggest anything sinister in the legalism of Roman Catholicism either, neither its historical bent as compared to the Eastern Churches, nor ts 19th Century doubling-down on barratry. The statutory system is a deliciously tempting tool to organize human activity. However, because everything and anything legal is artificial, and because religion deals with reality, soon or late there must be a correction. Catholicism is paying that pound of flesh for its legal dalliance right now. However I have never sensed anything wicked or manipulative in this unhappy tryst.

One must also remember the context of Vatican I, its ultramontanism and its legalism. The 19th Century West was fast dechristianizing. Surely Churchmen thought they could fight fire with fire by reimagining the Church itself as a nation on parity with the rising nation-state order. Again, this was a regretful choice in hindsight, but in the moment – with the Church ringed ‘round with Masons and businessmen and barristers, with the Papal States literally compassed by Garibaldi’s barking legions – it may have seemed the best option. Rome’s decision was regretful but not wicked.

Play Time

Imagine if I filled my house with McDonalds paraphernalia from the ground up. Imagine if every shelf had a Happy Meal toy on it, every table featured menus going back to the ‘60s. Imagine if I forgo a staircase in my home for a slide, and if I chose neither carpet nor tile for my downstairs floor, but instead I put in a ball pit. Imagine if I dress in a McDonalds’ uniform on one day and as Ronald McDonald the next. Would any of this make me a member of the McDonalds’ organization? No, it would all be a Live Action Role Playing, it would all be LARPing. Even if I cooked their same food, and knew their history, even befriended the local managers and employees, I would never be a member of McDonalds following this methodology. I must be hired to work there, and to be hired I must fit McDonalds’ criteria and no one else’s.

This silly example is the condition which a good lot of Catholic-ing people are in at present. In place of the actual Church headquartered in Rome, and way-stationed in every dioceasan cathedral, and in every local town, these hapless and holy souls have more or less created a mental church, an ideal Catholicism, an “eternal Rome” which consists of whatever beliefs and practices the individual considers “traditional” (read: a late-19th or early-20th Century custom). In their quest for real Catholicism the flatteringly-adjectived have arrived at an ecclesiology somewhere between that of protestantism and Orthodoxy. Catholics have fundamentally failed to understand how the Church defines itself.

It’s Not as Easy as That, I’m Afraid

It’s only since traditional Catholic-ville left me that I’ve had cause to marvel that, while I heard loads and loads about Trent and Vatican II, while I even got plenty of Quas Primas and Pascendi, I cannot recall a single instance of Vatican I being referenced in all those 15-odd years. Reflecting on things since then, I see why. Adjective Catholics do not speak of Vatican I because that Council, which their logic binds them to in a way immune to their typical lawyering, defined the Magisterium in such absolute language that their typical appeals to previous usage, earlier synods, Church Fathers, famous Scholastics, saint quotes, and reason itself became dead points after 1870.

I assert that there are two points from the First Vatican Council which press upon the nerve of The Crisis. Most people involved in the dialogue about The Crisis, those laudably knee-deep in working to right The Crisis, come and go and live and die without ever considering these points.

The first is that the parade of novelty and rupture which has altered everything starting with St. Pius X’s fiddling with the Breviary to Pope Francis’ latest off-the-cuff heresy is absolutely and comfortably within the ken of the Vatican I papacy. (By the by, whatever his personal holiness, it is astonishing that Pius X is considered to be a hero by traditionalists precisely for his alleged fidelity to the liturgy. His trespass upon the Office gave precedent 50 years later to the Fathers of Vatican II to adjust the Mass. There would be no Mass of St. Paul VI without the Breviary of St. Pius X.)

New Masses, kissed Qurans, Communion for those in concubinage, Communion for those who publicly suborn murder, no Communion for people who want to go to the Latin Mass, yes, synods for days, each and every one of these things is permitted by the logic of Pastor Aeturnus. This is where the pious err. There has been no break with the past, at least not according to Church the reboot of 1870.

Indeed, if I may adduce America’s secular conservatives once again, isn’t it interesting that for as long as we have been following the state of the land the lot of us have seen nothing but “unconstitutional” actions. Literally nearly every action which state and federal administrations implement day in and day out is in shouting defiance of 1787. We can do the thoughtless thing as we roll our eyes at “the liberals” or “the Deep State,” and move on to our next outrage five minutes hence, or we can consider if perhaps another dynamic is not at play. Maybe there is a reality which we have never considered and one which better explains what otherwise appears to be a massive departure from America’s founding principles. As it happens, the latter is the case.

The answer, as plain as the nose on our face, is that the U.S. Constitution is not in effect. Period. The Constitution has had no force of law since March of 1861. That’s our answer. Go read the Congressional Record for March 28th of that year and learn what “sine die” means, and if that organic Congress ever reconvened. Do that and you can stop carrying around that pocket Constitution.

The same goes for Catholicism at this hour. Its former methodology ceased to exist on July 18th, 1870, the day Pastor Aeternus was passed. But we don’t want to face it. It’s too painful. As long as we are under the misapprehension that a pre-Vatican I methodology is a permissible route to take out of The Crisis, as long as we try to quote the Fathers and the Schoolmen and the old popes, we will be as pitiable as the dear and clueless Americans ranting about their voided Constitution, or the admirable and naive Canadians jabbering about their Charter of Rights. For a Catholic to cite anything prior to 1870 is as useless as an American arguing at the Department of Motor Vehicles about his right to travel under the Articles of Confederation, or for that matter the conclusions of Napoleonic Law, Islamic Fiqh, or the wisdom of Shaka Zulu. Those points may all be right in se, but they have no standing within the DMV system. Likewise, whatever faith of our fathers existed pre-Vatican I had no standing thereafter.

The second point which follows from the Vatican I ethos is that almost every critique of the Church across the diverse spectrum of Catholicisms (sic) is off the table. Everything from individual griping about alter girls on the way home from church, and a thousand annoyances besides, to the profound but restrained discourse of FSSP and Institute attendees, to the fantastically erudite theories of the SSPX, SSPV, Resistance, and sectarians farther afield, every moaning and groaning about Church administration from the small to the large, was completely shut down a century-and-a-half-ago. In our theories and criticism of Church development this last century we have run counter to the Oath Against Modernism we’re forever lauding when it says,

I reject the opinion of those who hold that a professor lecturing or writing on a historico-theological subject should first put aside any preconceived opinion about the supernatural origin of Catholic tradition or about the divine promise of help to preserve all revealed truth forever; and that they should then interpret the writings of each of the Fathers solely by scientific principles, excluding all sacred authority, and with the same liberty of judgment that is common in the investigation of all ordinary historical documents.

Have not the “anti-Modernist” conservatives taken this selfsame “modernist” tack? Have these Catholicing people not criticized Vatican II and everything since in the exact manner which their favorite secular and protestant radio hosts talk about any workaday topic? Do they not treat everything Rome has taught since the 1960s as being altogether on the natural plain?

Like many traditional-minded people, I will not square the circle. I cannot pretend to a continuity of Catholic belief and practice which is not altogether there. However, I’m not going to do the conservative cope and to set up a deus ex machina solution whereby I can ignore whatever I believe contradicts what I think Catholicism is. As queer as it sounds, the only honest solution is to keep doing Catholic things but stop pretending to be Catholic.

Let me put it this way. The Coronavirus regulations adhered to by the diocese by which I live, forbade the giving of Communion on one’s tongue for the length of the pandemic. Now I have my objections to Communion on the hand; those objections are somewhere different than your run-of-the-mill ones, but there they are.

As a result, I held back receiving Communion for much of those two years. This outrageous pastoral situation, however, is one which no one at that parish is aware of because I kept my thoughts to myself. My objection was altogether private. On the other end of the spectrum is Pope Michael of Kansas, USA. He is a most gracious gentleman whom I have had the pleasure of interviewing a couple of times as part of my show, A Conversation With. Given his vocation and his position, Pope Michael necessarily has a theological scaffolding and publicity miles away from yours truly in my Novus Ordo pew. Here’s the rub though: whether it’s my silent reservation or a public position like Pope Michael’s, or anything in between or elsewhere, neither of us are in union with the Syllabus of Errors nor with Vatican I.

If one might mentally wiggle out of Vatican II and all the 20th Century stuff they don’t like, take heed: you may not do so given the 19th Century and Pastor Aeternus. Oddly enough, the “whishy-washy” pastoral language so derided by the orthodox know-it-alls has itself allowed the traditionalist cornucopia of theories to spawn in the first place. Alas, the vaunted laser-beam language of the 19th Century Church leaves the lot of us ecclesiastically sprawling on a pin no less pitiably than Mr. Prufrock.

Of Death Rides and Dawns

Because we have focused on Vatican I in this article it seems right to me to make an analogy to that time. The Catholic Church is on a “deathride.” Deathrides were an interesting military feature in the 19th Century, that most literate era which came in with Romanticism and departed with Impressionism. In hopeless situations soldiers of the time would occasionally throw themselves against an irresistible foe in one last burst of virility. They might achieve their objectives, they probably would not. No matter, it was enough in any case to die with one’s boots on. The Charge of the Light Brigade is the most famous example of this; Pickett’s Charge is an American analogue, Easter Week an Irish. As the years wore on the frequency and enthusiasm for this kind of thing waned.

At this hour I have no doubt that a large percentage of upper clerics, including in the Curia, are intentionally liquidating the patrimony of the Church. If observation these past decades wasn’t enough, nor the Coronavirus shutdowns, the deliberate provocation and alienation of traditionally-minded people via Traditionis Custodes and the “Synod on Synodality” ought to seal the deal. Yes, the Church in its present constitution is on a deadride, one absolutely permissible according to parameters of Pastor Aeternus. But true to form in these, our chinless days, this deadride is less a Manilla Bay and more a Scapa Flow.

These military allusions from another century are most appropriate because it is from the 19th Century whence comes the ecclesiology which is smothering the Church of Christ. You see here’s the rub: both the hippest Novus Ordo devotee and the most self-imagined rock-ribbed traditionalist are both living out the consequences of Vatican I. Let me say that again, when Pope Francis utters his latest statement leaving the Acta Apostlicae Sedis men scrambling to explain him, and when the SSPX & co. have their latest schism over whatever minutiae gets their pride up, both are continuing lines of legal and ultramontanist thought initiated long before they came on the scene.

The Precision and Pain of Legalism

Let us explore dynamics of Catholicism which are rarely mentioned, the most operant dynamic being the nature of the strict or “legal” law.

In a sense the Catholic Church is the last department of the Western Roman Empire which is still functioning in our day. The Church is much like Hiroo Onoda, the last soldier of Imperial Japan, fighting on long after the fall of that regime. Imagine if your state or province’s government faded away but through happenstance the post office kept running. On a natural level this is what the Roman Catholic Church is: the last bureaucracy of the Roman Empire. Of course, the Church is more than an appendage of Ancient Rome, it is more than some antiquarian curiosity surviving into modernity. Because of that historical connection to the Imperium, Roman Catholicism adopted the governing system thereto. Again, I imply nothing underhanded here. This is simply an artifact of history. Just like the McDonalds example above, the Roman Senate operated under legal law, a system of organization wherein membership in a juristic body is solely determined by the creator and inheritors of the body. And so, the Church.

A Working Example

This talk of the First Vatican Council and the Syllabus has all been very theoretical. We need an example to clarify things. And have one we do in the mantle of public health. The discussion around Coronavirus vaccines illustrates the dead-end which the Catholic world finds itself in 150 years following Vatican I.

On the one hand is the Church corporate, a body which is tripping over itself to catch up to Mencius Molburg’s “Cathedral.” Thus, Rome approved their faithfuls’ reception of the Corona shots. If this counsel is advised or not is irrelevant; all that matters is that it is. As Pope Francis said, “Vaccines are not a magical means of healing, yet surely they represent, in addition to other treatments that need to be developed, the most reasonable solution for the prevention of the disease.”

On the other hand, we have Catholics who have refused the selfsame treatment. They do this on what they believe are moral grounds. And here as in a petri dish we see the sadsome corner which flattering-adjective Catholics are painted into. Unaware of their religion’s moral theologians, whose support guided their clerics to back the vaccines, these Catholics instead turned to radio personalities or online pundits to form their opinion. If they are right or wrong in their conclusions, if it is wise that Catholics’ have turned to secular radio hosts for their moral theology, if it is good they reason more like Evangelical sectarians each day, I care not. Like with the Curia’s position, so here.

All that matters is that this is the position many Catholics are in; that this position is not in conformity with their Church, and that to pretend that here—and in a hundred like places—there is not a direct break between their beliefs and their obligation under canon law to be in perfect external and internal submission to the Holy See is to play the proverbial ostrich. What is the point of having a de fide Magisterium, a Curial hobbyhorse a thousand years in the making, when people can quotemine themselves out of whatever they don’t like coming from Rome? What is the point of having a Magisterium if one can equally appeal to the tradition of Catholicism? How is this not different from Eastern Orthodoxy?

Wither Wanderest Thou?

What is to come of things? Who knows? God knows. This impasse over Vatican I will shake itself out soon or late. One scenario is that the structural Church will so belly up to an iron-toothed globalism that we will see replayed en masse the situation of the Church in France in the 18th Century. During the French Revolution the National Assembly erected the “Constitutional Church.” That organization served very much the same purpose which the Patriotic Church serves in modern China, namely, it made the Church a subsidiary entity of the State. Since the Tridentine seminary system was (and is) a factory for producing bootless yes-men, the Constitutional Church played into priests’ predilection for being told what to do by the civil power because now their bishop, after all, was a hireling of the state.

And here’s where things get interesting. You see, there was a problem in the French Church, called Gallicanism. This described the situation wherein the pope effectively had no jurisdiction in France. The agreement was distantly a relic of Conciliarism, made during about French military activity in Italy from an earlier age, and also detritus stemming from the Reformation.

The French Revolution forced an issue: did Catholic priests believe the pope had a supernatural jurisdiction which trumped the natural National Assembly or not? Up until 1789 there was a theoretical and humoring acceptance of the papacy in the Gallican Church. The Constitutional Church forced an issue which everyone was content to have remain ambiguous. Chinless seminarians became chinless priests, and you’ll not be surprised to hear that most French clerics joined the Constitutional Church. [As an aside, the nature of Roman Catholic clerical formation along the Tridentine model, a model wherein the candidate is profoundly—unbelievably—at the pleasure of his sponsoring bishop, joins Vatican I as being a twin culprit of The Crisis. If Vatican I has received little scholarly attention, then the seminary critique has received none.]

Then 1793 came and so did the radicals. The Constitutional Church was left to wither away until 1801 when Napoleon signed the Concordat that year. The result of all this is that Gallicanism resolved itself in a roundabout way. Those priests most given to it were either dead, had left religious life, or were so ignored by locals that they were a non-issue. On the other hand, those clergymen who refused to swear to the National Assembly all along not only won the esteem of the people, but their time “on the run,” as the Irish say of those on the outs with the law, produced a fervent, doctrinally solid, and organizationally competent presbytery. It is these men who rebuilt the strong French Church of the 19th Century.

My parallel between our situation and the Constitutional Church is not perfect. In our case the National Assembly is the Curia. However, the situation of Catholicism is not what it was two centuries ago. The Church in the 21st Century cannot and does not pretend to speak as an equal to the state. It scrapes and bows to globalists of various denominations and schemes like the NGO which Church leaders want the Church to be. Pope Francis will not be able to pull off with Mr. Schwab what Pius VII pulled off with Mr. Bonaparte.

For some time, the Roman Curia has subscribed to something like Arnold Toynbee’s concept of historical waves, and why it is that some societies survive and others do not. From Vatican II through to Laudato Si, the Catholic Church has been trying to crest an historical wave scholars have known is coming for the better part of a century. Only people with a deep reading of history and historical analysis can appreciate the dynamics of this. In this tack the Curia is to be commended for their provision. What we’ve lately come to call “The Great Reset” is something the Fathers of Rome have been bracing for since the 1940s.

Yes, the Curia is to be regarded on this point; but they have not grasped the sorts they’re dealing with. Again, Mr. Schwab is not Mr. Napoleon. The order which is rising will make the National Assembly’s anticlericalism seem quaint by comparison. What is coming wishes to remove root and branch all remembrance of God from the earth. It is a system of total fiction, including the falsification of the natural order down to DNA. It is a system I suspect only old John on Patmos could rightly tell us of.

Ergo, to my Gallican simile, the Catholic Church will belly up the powers that be. For a season all will be well. Those teeth will show themselves soon or late, however, and the episcopacy of the Roman Church will be as dead and marginal and scorned as were the Juring clergy of Napoleon’s day. The only functioning Church left will be the medley of extra-canonical (read: non-Catholic) “Catholic-ing” societies who have developed competent pastoral administrations as they’ve been “on the run” in their own way these last few decades.

I shudder to consider the jurisdictional, canonical, and theological mess that generation will face (a mess, be it said, which those same “traditional” groups have somewhat contributed to). The only thing that I caution future generation of is to be wary of recreating the same conditions which led to The Crisis in the first place. If people of devout habits do not confront that Pastor Aeternus created this situation, they will be setting back a minute hand which will strike again in the future. I know that to do so directly denies the Romans’ belief in their infallible Magisterium, but it is a pill which must be chomped.

Unless these post-persecution Christians confront what I am saying, they will be as luckless as American Conservatives wanting to go back to an 18th Century Constitution which set the stage for what the subsequent United States has become. One may keep setting things back to 1776, but they will only set themselves up for a future of Groundhog’s Day identical failures. But if those future churchmen men bravely extricate the habits of mind which have smothered the Church since the 19th Century, if they end Catholicism’s queer obsession with barritry and centralization, they will have an opportunity to truly revive tradition on a solid footing.

These points will be difficult, but capable men appear in every age. When they do, they will find that the Reformation is over. Secularism neutralized the mainline magisterial denominations decades ago. Mainline protestants have gone in for The Cathedral and there they will remain. The rump of the Reformation which carries on does so in a devout and sincere Evangelicalism, a sheepfold as chaotic as it is theologically and liturgically ambivalent. In other words, there exists no theological reason for protestantism. It exists as a sociological and historical artifact—and there is very little beyond those points standing in the way of reunion.

Catholicism in its own way separated from itself at the Reformation; and if protestantism is only 500 years old we can say something of the same for Catholicism. In this scenario of a Church steeled by persecution, liberated from the 19th Century, and reunited with other Western Christians, we will have in our hands an opportunity to reassert the dominant Hellenistic genes of Catholicism which were forgotten in the strident Semitic speechifying of the Reformation.

As the beast with teeth of iron makes war on the saints, circling the wagons will seem as advisable now as it was during the Dark Ages when the barbarians last trod through the West. Back then various Christian factions, the Roman Church, the Celtic Church, and the monastic movement, united into what we know as the Catholic Church. In the face of the new barbarians, it will be an easy thing closing up the schisms of the past to brave the brunt at hand. Catholic or protestant, Christianity has not been fun since the 16th Century. If something like this scenario works out, we will really see what the dynamite of the Gospel can do.


John Coleman co-hosts Christian History & Ideas, and is the founder of Apocatastasis: An Institute for the Humanities, an alternative college and high school in New Milford, Connecticut. Apocatastasis is a school focused on studying the Western humanities in an integrated fashion, while at the same time adjusting to the changing educational field. Information about the college can be found at its website.


Featured: “Healing the Blind Man,” by Václav Mánes; painted in 1832.

Kissing the Sky: Hilarious Misheard Pop Lyrics

In this article, Dr. Stocker promises to bring tears to your eyes—of laughter. Now, misheard pop music lyrics often aren’t normally subtle. But if a pompous and wordy commentary befitting someone with a Cambridge education is applied to them, adding a dash of autobiographical insight for good measure, then this constitutes the perfect guide to such a fascinating by-way of musicology. The majority of the lyrics are original mishearings, where Dr. Stocker alone is to blame, but a couple are better known and simply had to be included. Join him on his journey.


Misheard lyrics are on the one hand mere trifles that can be dismissed as being silly, but on the other they can be invaluable, particularly to the Freudian psychoanalyst, providing insights into one’s thoughts, feelings and love life that I never hitherto believed existed.

Perhaps my first memorable experience of such lyrics came not from me, but from my father, Oliver Stocker, whom I have written about before. He airily dismissed a lot of pop (“Here today, gone tomorrow!”) but like not a few middle-aged men in the 1960s, succumbed just a little to the charms of Sandie Shaw, a tall, skinny dollybird, who preferred to perform in her bare feet and had a very serviceable voice—though not a patch on Kathy Kirby or Dusty Springfield, mind.

Good, well-chosen songs, often by Chris Andrews (who almost certainly fancied her), provided hit material. Indeed, Sandie reached number one three times in the UK. The second such hit, “Long Live Love,” written by Andrews, chronicled a happy love affair:

I have waited a long, long time
For somebody to call mine
And at last he's come along
Baby, oh nothing can go wrong
We meet every night at eight
And I don't get home 'till late
I say to myself each day
Baby, oh long, long live love!

These are hardly memorable or profound lyrics. But they fascinated Mr Stocker, who told me: “This Sandie Shaw is a remarkable girl. She says of her boyfriend: ‘We meet every night at eight/And I don’t get home ’till eight.’ Now, pray, how is that possible?” (He talked like me, you see).

Well, it was indeed phenomenal; the bionic woman clearly had nothing on Sandie! I told Dad he was being silly. He told me I was being impertinent. Posterity, I think, has vindicated him.

Abba are wonderful; even that swinging historian Jeremy Black thinks so and has quoted the lyrics of their stunning debut, the 1974 Eurovision Song Contest winner, “Waterloo.” Yet Abba are Swedish; they are, let’s face it, foreigners. Their pronunciation of English, though far better than my Swedish, is faulty and unintentionally comical.

I don’t think humour comes easy to people of those Northern regions: Strindberg, Ibsen, anyone? Indeed, Nordic humour seems to centre on people doing idiotic things under the influence of the multiple glasses of schnapps that they down, to keep spirits up during their interminable winters. But precisely because Abba are being serious and earnest, they end up being doubly funny. “Dancing Queen” is arguably their most iconic hit. But the lyrics are forever creating linguistic problems.

The misheard chorus line “Dancing Queen/Feeling the beat of the tangerine” (tambourine) is merely silly. But when Abba start to become a little more ambitious in describing the disco ambience, they founder badly, especially the climactic passage where we are urged to “See that girl/Watch that scene/Digging the Dancing Queen.”

‘Digging’ is clearly meant in its informal sense, that of appreciation of this disco diva rather than anything horticultural or archaeological. But the change from the imperative “See/Watch” to the present participle is troublesome.

It is entirely understandable, therefore, that this has been rendered as: “See that girl/ Watch her scream/ Kicking the dancing queen.” Indeed, this would be a clinically accurate description of a working-class disco (perhaps infiltrated by angry, anti-Abba punk rockers) in late 1970s Britain; and Abba’s lines afford quite a poignant social insight thereof.

It is highly amusing when a song containing the customary platitudes about love is suddenly invaded by an incongruous outsider. I am not the only one who can testify to the ample talents of Mama Cass (Elliott) of Mamas and Papas’ fame.

“Dedicated to the one I love” is a song from the summer of love (1967) that I still cherish. She turned solo with some success before tragically succumbing to a heart attack induced by her obesity, aged just 32. Cass, blessed with that rich voice, and I suspect quaking laughter, was one big-hearted Mama. She could have done so much more.

One of her biggest solo hits was “It’s getting better,” a charming song written by the highly talented husband and wife team of Barry Mann/Cynthia Weil. The title itself would have appealed to the great optimists of history: Dr. Pangloss, Emile Coué and Boris Johnson.

Its message centres on the singer’s love affair that is more down to earth than extravagantly romantic, and there’s nothing wrong with that. As Mama Cass explains,

Once I believed that when love came to me
It would come with rockets, bells and poetry
But with me and you it just started quietly and grew
And believe it or not
Now there's something groovy and good
Bout whatever we got
And it's getting better
Growing stronger, warm and wilder
Getting better every day, better every day.

So far, so good. But the penultimate line is highly problematic. “Warm and wilder?” No, the great American writer “Thornton Wilder!”

But what on earth does this profoundly serious commentator on “the timeless human condition; history as progressive, cyclical, or entropic” think he’s doing, straying onto the set and disrupting Mama Cass’s homespun sentimentality? Were she to sing “Barbara Cartland,” it would be considerably more apposite.

Was she seeking to impress and go intellectually upmarket, or what? Heed your social station and your unsophisticated audience, Miss Elliott! Whoever will you be namedropping next, your namesake T.S.? Mr. Wilder’s sentiments thereupon (he outlived Mama Cass by a year) remain, alas, unrecorded.

Robert Palmer, like Mama Cass, died too young. A-pack-a-day (or more) smoker, he indulged in the terrible habit to give his voice a rasping power where needed. He was elegant, he was intelligent, he was kind: just listen to the humanity of one of his standards, “Every Kind of People,” and I defy you not to melt, if not to flirt dangerously with multiculturalism.

Palmer was above all, courageously varied and open to experimentation in his musical repertoire; very unusual in this regard, and all the more admirable for it.

From the blue-eyed soul of “Every Kind of People,” he could move into a convincing essay in proto-techno in “Looking for Clues,” to the Lounge genre in “Riptide” (Robert in his tuxedo), to—for want of a better word—the stylish sexism of his biggest hit, the multi-million selling “Addicted to Love.”

And then, in “Flesh Wound,” a little-known track on his “Riptide” album, we encounter Palmer the hard-rocker, a cigarette paper separating him from Heavy Metal. There was nothing that he couldn’t do. I had fond aspirations of his intellectual pursuits.

Palmer, one feels, would have enjoyed his Trollope and his Gide, and known his Rameau from his Rimbaud. In truth, according to his partner, he liked nothing more than getting up in the night and assembling model aircraft; shucks, one’s illusions were blown! But the music remains impressive, and it is to “Flesh Wound” that I wish to turn.

As befits the popular genre, Robert is intending to “pull the bird,” as it were:

We flew over miles of ocean, be prepared
I don't have the faintest notion, who'll be there
You underestimated, nobody sympathized
I think you'll soon feel better, once we get inside
I see the door is open, why don't we walk right in?
Let's put our party hats on, and let the fun begin.

It is when he is attempting to reassure his lady love, in his ardent courtship, that Robert comes to grief; she will “soon feel better.” Only I could swear he says “Zubin Mehta.” What on earth is he doing in the bedroom? Is this revered classical conductor going to make it a joyous threesome? (I hope I shock no reader who subscribes to this magazine’s wholesome family values, but do make allowances for the dubious morality of the rock music scene).

Worse, is Zubin a horrible voyeur? Did Mr Mehta seek damages from Palmer? A more charitable reading is that the namedropping of the conductor merely attests to the intelligently catholic range of music that Robert Palmer embraced. I would very much like to think that.

A wonderful misheard lyric is embedded within the signature hit of master rock guitarist and cult figure, Jimi Hendrix, “Purple Haze.”

Let me briefly digress: Jimi incongruously shared his birthday (27 November) with my great aunt, Miss Kate Henchman Stocker, MA (1895–1984), who taught English, Elocution and Drama to the grateful pupils of New Zealand’s most esteemed private girls’ academy, Samuel Marsden Collegiate School, Wellington.

In retirement, Kate rose to stellar heights in pteridology. Poor Jimi wouldn’t have had a clue. But to him, you and any other plebs, this designates the study of ferns, really quite a significant field in New Zealand. I definitely think this accident of birth made Aunt Kate more “groovy” than she could ever have believed, though when I told her this, she was decidedly nonplussed: “Who’s this man?”

To return to “Purple Haze”: in the lyrics, Jimi is, I think, holding forth upon the impact of nefarious substances, the liberal consumption of which, true believers swear, enabled his creative genius to thrive:

Purple Haze all in my brain
Lately things just don't seem the same
Actin' funny but I don't know why
'Scuse me while I kiss the sky

The last line is decidedly odd, but remember this was from the summer of love, when people in their thousands suddenly started behaving untowardly, particularly in the Haight-Ashbury quarter of San Francisco.

Famously, an alternative interpretation of the said line is “Scuse me, while I kiss this guy.” Now, that makes considerably greater sense, and is eminently consistent not only with the Zeitgeist of permissiveness, but with all the peace, love and whatnot that constituted such a vital part of the hippie ideology.

By all accounts, Jimi—author of “Electric Ladyland”—was joyously heterosexual, but perhaps he too was open to openness and experimentation. Yet it could still be “the sky’” and if the object of his attention had been a frilly “chick cloud”—to quote from an especially daft song by the Incredible String Band—then that would have made perfect sense.

Alternatively, yes, his lady love could have been “Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds.” Εὕρηκα, the perfect fit! Clearly there is method in Jimi’s hippie madness.

Readers may care to note that I received powerful intellectual vindication of my whole train of thought from the eminent linguistics expert (and poet), Emeritus Professor Koenraad Kuiper, who assures me: “The phonemic ambiguity of ‘the sky’ and ‘this guy’ is quite common and is disambiguated in context.”

Gee, thanks, Kon!

In retrospect, it is obvious that Herb Albert’s big hit, “The sky’s in love with you,” was a witty response to “Purple Haze.”

I will conclude this edgy, pioneering article with a reference to the gender fluidity that characterises our relativist age. In this regard, I sometimes use “It/Them” in my email and epistolary “signature” to confound and irritate woke folk, a proud assertion of my fundamental Otherness. But enough of this self-absorption.

Herman’s Hermits were a hugely successful pop group of the 1960s, part of the so-called “British Invasion,” led by the Beatles. Their success came partly because they were such a wholesome act, unlike the “long-haired vermin” that conservative folk would call the Rolling Stones, or the still-more egregious Pretty Things.

Lead singer Herman (aka Peter Noone) was a handsome, charming, youthful “boy next door” type, and with the Hermits enjoyed several US number ones, notably “I’m Henry VIII, I am,” and the poignant “Mrs Brown, You’ve Got a Lovely Daughter;” the latter sung in his broad, Mancunian accent.

A lesser-known hit by Herman’s Hermits was the jaunty, up-beat “Must to Avoid,” dating from 1965–66. It reached number 8 in the US, and number 6 in Britain. The lyrics commence thus:

She's a must to avoid
A complete impossibility
She's a must to avoid
Better take it from me.

Herman then goes on to explain: “She’s nothin’ but trouble/Better cut out on the double/Before she gets into your heart.” In short, she’s the sort of girl that your Mother would warn you against, unless that is your Mother is a hard-core feminist who joylessly objects to the systemic misogyny of this song.

The title poses a genuine problem. “Must to avoid?” A strange turn of phrase, and the early use of the verb ‘must’ as a noun would have made it even stranger nearly 60 years ago.

The alternative reading, “She’s a muscular boy,” makes infinitely greater sense. Clearly, Herman’s dangerous girl is transitioning, and avoidance during this difficult phase of her/his/their life is called for; really, this is sensitive counsel from him.

Alternatively, Herman might just have been alluding to those formidable East German women athletes who scooped up all the Olympic gold medals for tossing cabers, hurling garden gnomes and weightlifting, aided by performance-enhancing medication that deepened their voices. And what scary, hairy creatures they were, definitely to be avoided! This, though, is a more tenuous and frankly unsavoury gloss on an otherwise charming and innocuous song.

Indeed, perhaps after reading this, some sensitive souls are despairingly saying “Dr. Stocker is a must to avoid,” so he had better conclude.


Mark Stocker is an art historian whose recent book is When Britain Went Decimal: The Coinage of 1971.

Being a Superhero: A Conversation with Ian Jacklin

Ian Jacklin is documentary filmmaker, concert promoter, actor, and kickboxing champion. He has produced three films and holds one world kickboxing title. He is in conversation with Grégoire Canlorbe.


Grégoire Canlorbe (GC): You are ranked number two in the world by the World Kickboxing Association. Please tell us about this incredible accomplishment.

Ian Jacklin (IJ): Like many young men, I saw a Bruce Lee movie and was hooked. Especially when on the first day of grade 9 high school I had to watch a buddy of mine get beat up while being held back. I went home that afternoon and told my mom to put me in Karate at 14 years of age; and the rest is pretty much history.

Ralph Chinnick was my master at Professional Self Defense Studios in London, Ontario, Canada. His early instruction was to learn the technique. To just keep coming to every class and learn the technique. Which I did and did well.

Ian Jacklin.

By the time I was a yellow belt I was kicking like black belts. By the time I was a green belt I was beating black belts in sparring. And the great thing about Kenpo karate under the Ed Parker system was we actually kickboxed. No point sparring. Real fighting. And I heard then that Bruce Lee said that you learn to fight by fighting.

So it was a natural progression to go to other dojos and spar their best guys, which I did in Kitchener Ontario at Sifu Ron Day’s Kung Fu Academy, where was the future PKA lightweight champion of the world, Leo Loucks. He became my idol; and I learned from him. on his rise to the top, when he beat Cliff Thompson.

Our trainer Jimmy Fields was the best in proactive, positive mental instruction, while in the deepest and darkest moments of battles in that square circle.

I had other trainers that would try to scare you into being better. But that never worked for me. Militant instruction may work for some, but it didn’t work for me. I needed love and light, and Jimmy gave me that. I truly believe that if he and Ron Day were to be my handlers for my career I would have not only fought for the world title but would have won it and kept if for a long time. But alas… it wasn’t meant to go that way. Apparently, the universe had bigger plans for me.

I won the Canadian ISKA title by beating Conrad Pla in Montreal, when I was 18. I fought Mark Mongo Longo for the North American title in Gleasons Gym Brooklyn, which went to a draw. Many including myself thought I won that fight but it was in the US and I was Canadian, so… it was what it was.

Not long after that Lennox Lewis won the Gold in the 1988 Olympics, and he was from Kitchener Ontario Canada; so, it was only fitting for his pro debut to be in Toronto. They trained in our Kitchener Kicks/Ron Days Kung Fu Academy for that fight, so they got to see me in action. They saw a white boy that could fight and took me back to England with them.

I actually started in boxing, before karate, as a kid hanging, out at the Boys and Girls Club, London, Ontario, Canada. And although my kicks were my best weapon, my hands weren’t too shabby either.

But being in the Lennox Lewis pro boxing stable really improved my hands, and I had a lot of fun living in London, England for a while. John Davenport and Harold “The Shadow” Knight were my trainers.

After about 4 months, I decided I didn’t like where I was. I mean Lennox and the guys were cool, but London just rained every day and it was really depressing. My high school sweetheart was back in Canada and I really missed her and my family, so I eventually quit and headed home.

The main thing was, I couldn’t believe how many shots to the head I was taking in boxing compared to kickboxing. I mean my legs were wicked, so most guys never got the chance to punch me in the head; but in boxing that’s all you do. I knew if I stayed in that sport I’d be punch drunk and ugly within a few years. Besides, I had been watching Bay Watch on one of the 4 channels England had on their TV and had been California-dreaming.

Back in Canada, I worked the summer, continuing my electrical apprenticeship with Gordon Electric in my hometown of London Ontario, Canada. I had no plans. I just knew that I wasn’t done fighting and still had my dream of fighting for the world title as Leo did.

And then it happened. With 3 days’ notice, I broke up with my girlfriend, quit my job and packed up my motorcycle with a tent and sleeping bag, and headed to Hollywood, California.

Although heartbroken due to making that decision to follow my dreams, which didn’t accommodate a girlfriend whom I dearly did love… I also felt more alive than I ever had been, knowing I was going to take a shot at not only pursuing my dream to fight for the title, but maybe even get into Hollywood as an actor. After all Jean Claude Van Damme was there making all his martial art movies. So, I figured it was worth a shot.

It was such a dilemma leaving your girlfriend, family, friends, and career on a whim for the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. I sped through the mountains in various areas on the way to Cali with abandon. So much so that I even crashed once and almost fell off a cliff, if it weren’t for that 3-foot-high cement barrier. It was like I wanted to die for what I left, but wanted to live for what lay ahead… hard for me to put into words. But apparently, somebody up there likes me. And after picking the rocks out of my flesh and a quick stop at a local motorcycle shop, I was back on the road. It was the summer of 1990. It wasn’t my time to die yet. Hollywood here I come.

I stayed in Whittier, California with Les Sickles, the brother of one of my home boxing trainers. Jack Sickles was my mentor in Canada and his brother became that in California. He was 85 when I first met him. We became fast friends and I truly had some of the best years of my life with him as a newbie in Southern Cal. He was now a widower and had been a pro boxer when he was young, so just loved tagging along with me to the gyms.

I fought and won the North American WKA championship and eventually went to fight Javier Mendez for the world ISKA Cruiser Weight title fight in 1993. I fought him a few years earlier and beat him. Then he beat me this night and took the title. But the point is, my dream was to fight for the world title and I did that! Also, I wanted to star in a Hollywood movie, which I quickly achieved, thanks to befriending legend, Don “The Dragon” Wilson. He became my sparring partner which elevated my fighting skills and put me in a bunch of his movies like Ring of Fire II where I played the lead bad guy.

My film career included Kickboxer 3. The bad guys of the Kickboxer movies. I remember the night my agent told me I got the role. It was about a year to the date of me arriving in Tinsel Town. I was working as the VIP bouncer at the Roxbury which many know was the Studio 54 of the day. I babysat more drunk actors and rock stars than I could count in those days.

And sure enough, Jean Claude Van Damme was in the Roxbury that night. I asked Elie Samaha, one of the owners, to introduce me to him, which he did. I thanked him for doing Kickboxer the movie, so I was able to get the lead bad guy role in Kickboxer 3. He looked at me and squeezed my cheeks and said with a face like that you should be the star! I laughed and said maybe someday, man! Maybe someday! And sure enough, that did happen. I ended up being the good guy in Expert Weapon and Death Match down the line.

Many of you have heard that to make it in Hollywood you have to sell your soul. I’m not 100 percent on that, but I was offered a multi-picture movie deal if I would have slept with a gay producer. I said no thank you and left Hollywood. I had put 10 years into that place and was tired of the rat-race—and if that was the only way I was going to make it, I knew it was time to leave.

Long story longer… I went to NYC and became a filmmaker.

GC: Which leads me in to my next question. How did you move from being a kickboxing-champion to championing holistic medicine and alkaline?

IJ: So, Hollywood wasn’t a total waste of time. While doing a play I met an actress, J. Cynthia Brooks, who like myself had been on Days Of Our Lives among many other shows and movies over the years. We actually had met at the Roxbury years earlier, and now working together on a play, called Spoiled Women, I found out she had just cured herself of terminal cervical cancer. I overheard this at a rehearsal one day, and it lit a fire under me like few other things have.

I said, “What?! You can’t cure cancer. What do you mean, you cured yourself of cancer?”

And as I’ve said before the rest is history. Turns out instead of doing the usual chemo, radiation and surgery she followed a friends advice and did holistic medicine and dropped meat, dairy, sugar. Used a “Rife” machine and meditated a lot. Cured her terminal cervical cancer (of which she was given one year to live, if she did the western medical treatments) in 8 months.

I had thought cancer ran in my adopted mom’s family, so worried for her. I dove deeper. It was when the internet first started, so I researched others that claimed they too cured their cancers with holistic methods; and then I would call them too, so I could validate via their voice if they were real or not. And they were.

So, I decided to make a documentary about it, and called it by the name of the website I also started, ICureCancer.com.

Thanks to doing that I learned a lot about health and wellness, and have been a cancer coach ever since. The key is to drop the acidic lifestyle from what you eat, drink, think, breath, and these days the wifi radiation you sit in. You can book a health coaching session with me at IanJacklin.com, if interested.

GC: I must say that your fight with Sasha Mitchell at the end of Kickboxer 3: The Art of War easily ranks among the dramatic highpoints in the Kickboxer saga.

IJ: Wow! Thank you for that compliment. My favorite bad guy of the series (me included) was Tong Po! He was the best actor. The original kickboxer film with Van Damme was shot so well, too. Edited well. But for a sequel I thought KB3 was done quite well too. And we had Shuki Ron as the choreographer, who let me be the pro kickboxer I was, to make it, what I thought, one of the most realistic fight-scenes in the series, for sure.

I mean, I was actually still fighting pro kickboxing in the ring in between movies, and I don’t know how to movie fight. Just fight. And luckily by the time Sasha Mitchell and I worked together, he had been training as a kickboxer for a few years, so he was much more believable for Kickboxer III: The Art Of War.

GC: How did it feel to play a good guy (and leading character) in Death Match?

IJ: I loved being the good guy! I mean I’ve always said in real life I’m not an actor, I’m a super hero. But they don’t pay super heroes, so I have to moonlight as an actor.

GC: Do you believe a great action-movie could be made about what you call the “scamdemic?” Would you be ready to act in such movie?

IJ: Lol. Yes, that would be great! It would be me and a bunch of human beings fighting the reptiles like in They Live! I have the power to decipher who is one and who isn’t and boom we take out the ones that are. Finally, planet earth will be run by human beings, not Draconians!

GC: Thank you for your time. Anything else that you would like to add?

IJ: I’d just like to say for everyone that wants to be a hero in real life, start local. Go to your board meetings and vote out the leftist demoncrats. Watch the movie, 2000 Mules to see the truth. Trump won. End of story! Not saying he’s perfect—but come on… Biden? What a joke the bankers played on us!

Get to know your cops and sheriffs, and band together. We cannot let the Illuminati scum run us anymore. The whole scamdemic thing must never happen again. They just rebranded the flu and turned on 5G. That’s it!

I wrote my 3rd book, ConVid 1984: Antidote, which explains the hows and whys humanity got raped and pillaged by the bankers. I explain how to detox, for anyone that got suckered in to the shots. Or just wants to be healthy. You must get Alkaline, as explained in both my earlier books I Cure Cancer and Alkaline: Dr. Robert O. Young’s pH Diet & Mindset. Take good supplements: Whole food supplements. Grow your own organic food year-round.


Featured image: “Asian martial arts beauty,” by Phung Wang of Vietnam; painted in 2018.

Two Continents and Two Approaches

The visit of the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, who in the second half of May went to several small states in the South Pacific, ended with much fewer positive results than expected by Beijing (and feared by other states in the region). In fact, only East Timor has concluded an agreement with China, of limited impact on economic and security policies. This alarm bell has further strengthened the fears of many states in the region, starting with the US, of Chinese pressure in the area which, if it has suffered a minor set-back, will not diminish.

To counter the pressure from Beijing, President Biden, during a five-day visit to Asia (South Korea and Japan only) launched a new economic initiative, but which should indirectly also have influence security architectures of the Indo-Pacific macro region. Washington launched the IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, using terminology that should draw attention among local partners), a “multilateral partnership for the 21st century,” which should help “economies to exploit rapid technological transformation, also in the digital economy, and to adapt to the next energy and climate transition.”

The push for a new economic pact in Asia with an anti-Chinese function has become a priority for Biden, who on May 23rd announced 13 nations joining the IPEF, which together with the USA, represent 40% of world GDP (Australia, Brunei, South Korea, Fiji, Philippines, Japan, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam; while the EU, France, Great Britain, Germany, Spain would be interested in being part of it, even if nothing official has still emerged on the matter).

Such a vast and articulated area brings different responses: Japan, (and Taiwan, a ghost, but very important participant) and South Korea want to work with the US, especially on emerging issues, such as the digital economy, and help set a standard for future business. India also reacted favorably to the initiative; Australia, New Zealand, Singapore are easy adherents, while for Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia the outcome will be more difficult, as with environmental transition. As White House Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell noted, economic engagement is “an area where the United States, in effect, must step up its game.”

Unfortunately for Washington, this plan seems unlikely to have a significant impact. While partners in Asia appear eager to join any US-led economic initiative as an anti-Chinese shield, Washington’s proposed framework lacks the incentives that the region’s economies are seeking. Indeed, the plan does not offer partners greater market access in the US or tariff reductions (and the Biden administration, although at the ideological antipodes of the Trump administration, which dismantled the region’s network of bilateral and multilateral economic agreements, does not seem at all willing to go back to the concerns that the return to globalization would have on the US economy and labor market). The plan does not even consider the effect China has on regional supply chains and appears to be focused on what the US can unilaterally achieve instead of finding mutual benefits for all potential members. Poorly designed in this way, there is a risk that the initiative will remain a dead letter soon.

Biden’s Indo-Pacific drive Lacks Strength and Strategic Vision

In addition to the intention to protect themselves from China, many Asian nations want closer economic ties with the United States. But if the allies of the United States are critical of the lack of incentives and ambitions in the Indo-Pacific economic framework, they remain doubtful about the security initiatives, which although more numerous (AUKUS, ANZUS, RIMPAC, Shangri-La Dialogue, Quad, various bilateral agreements)—(1) seem disconnected from the economic dimension and therefore make Washington’s action not as effective as the Biden administration hopes. The perplexities of the regional partners, beyond the accession (a formal act that must be filled with content), are also obvious, since large regional agreements are already functioning, without the participation of the United States, such as CATTP and RCEP; and (2) the IPEF is built around four pillars: (a) supply chains, (b) infrastructure and clean energy, and (c) taxes and anti-corruption, (d) and fair-trade.

But since the agreement is not a commercial agreement, there will be no negotiation of tariff reductions, which the partners insist on.

While the details of these pillars are still being negotiated, the White House wants high standards, particularly in labor and environmental provisions. As many advanced economies in Asia are already committed to fighting climate change and have strong labor protections, meeting these high standards should not be difficult. However, given the amount of political investment the Biden administration has made to restore American diplomatic relations, these standards could make it difficult for some developing economies to join. And the Biden administration would prefer to have as many members as possible to present, in the US tradition, “a global crusade against evil,” in this case, China.

To address these problems, the IPEF is an open and a la carte structure; in fact, to be considered as a member, a state can join at least one of the four pillars of the initiative. A big hit could be a digital trade deal. The CAPTPP—with Japan, Australia, Vietnam, New Zealand, and Singapore as members—already has a digital chapter in place. The US and Japan have a similar deal, and Singapore and Australia have a separate digital economy deal. Singapore also supported its partnership agreement for the digital economy. This topic is likely to prove to be one of the few areas of IPEF success.

As mentioned, the difficulty related to the effectiveness is that the Indo-Pacific countries want to talk about access to the US market and reduction of tariffs, which, as mentioned above, Washington does not want to discuss. Removing regulatory barriers is good; but it can have a limited impact on the grand scheme of supply chains.

In addition to the lack of ambition that the US partners see in the picture, there are also concerns and skepticism about its functional architecture, given that the management of the IPEF is shared between the Department of Commerce and the Office of the Foreign Trade Representative, with fewer than 500 officials), while the Department of State has so far played a secondary role. The picture might seem more of a diplomatic victory than an economic one. Meanwhile, all ASEAN members (such as Cambodia, considered a Chinese protectorate, but a small economy) are unlikely to join the IPEF, given their inability to meet higher standards, or their animosity towards the US. Of course, it is doubtful that China will be invited to join.

A Basic Ambiguity for all Concerned

These aspects, which underline the complexity of the international scene, and the very close links between economy and security (understood as a set of foreign and defense policies), also highlight other problems. In addition to the willingness of the US to maintain global and pan-regional leadership, there is an underlying ambiguity that involves all members of the IPEF, including Washington. While everyone is afraid of Chinese pressure, be it political, military, economic, at the same time doubt arises that the economic or commercial ties with partners of importance like China will be reduced, which in some states, such as Australia (which is also the most concerned about the push from Beijing), represents a very important percentage of the national GDP. So, if Washington aspires to have its partners in the Indo-Pacific macro region apply “decoupling” from China, for itself, it wants to be an exception, and maintain a dialogue, on its own terms. Beijing is well aware of these ambiguities.

And despite the many internal/external difficulties (economic slowdown, environmental reconversion, the impact of the pandemic, a conference of the CCP that promises to be difficult, relations with Russia, the situation in Hong Kong and civil rights), China yet does play all its cards with unrelenting care, starting with the fact that it owns a considerable part of the US public debt, aided in this, unwittingly, by the structural weakness of the IPEF.

The Other End of the Thread

This situation is presented in very similar terms also in the western hemisphere. Here, too, the US arrived empty-handed at the IX Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles. Now that Washington has been surpassed by a China that is today the first trading partner of Brazil, Chile, and Peru, and the second of Argentina and Colombia, and this makes us think how much time has passed since the Monroe Doctrine and that of Theodore Roosevelt. In December 1994, Bill Clinton had brought together 33 heads of state and government from Canada to Chile—all but Cuba—for the first Summit of the Americas in Miami. The context seemed favorable to achieving the goals set by George H. W. Bush, in his so-called Initiative of the Americas, especially the most ambitious: the creation of a free trade area from the Bering Strait in Alaska to the Strait of Magellan in Patagonia.

Democratic advances and economic liberalization in Latin America and the Caribbean have generated expectations of greater and lasting political and economic consensus because the end of the Cold War also included the end of the Cuban model for the left and military dictatorships for the right. However, it was a clearly premature burial, as revealed by the Joe Biden administration’s difficulties in having the presence of several heads of state on the continent, where the rift between many Latin American countries and the US is evident. The US decision not to invite Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua led the presidents of Mexico and Honduras to stay home in protest, while the presidents of El Salvador, Bolivia and Guatemala refused to attend for other reasons.

The polarization was also evident in the summit’s civil society forum. Many local activists have complained about the missed opportunity to demand that governments engage productively with their respective oppositions and ensure free and fair elections. Local groups working with migrants have also called for attention not only to those arriving at the US border, but rather to the millions of Venezuelan refugees and other who have fled to other countries in the region. Here too Biden presented a kind of IPEF clone, to which the migration control pillar is added (a critical issue for the USA and for the impact it could have on internal political dynamics, increasingly polarized in a harsh ideological confrontation between Democrats and Republicans).

But the situation is even worse. In fact, even if many nations, although ruled by left-wing leadership, would have been willing to strengthen economic ties with Washington, and have access to US markets, there is still the problem of a weak and uncertain supply chain (as acknowledged privately by senior US executives), and clashes with the accelerating Chinese presence, which has made massive investments in infrastructure projects. Thus far, Chinese pressure is less strong in the field of security; but there is an increase in infiltration attempts, especially in the fight against drug-trafficking and illegal fishing control, with the proposal of using Beijing coast guard, in aid of local forces. Up to now, these offers have not received positive responses, but for the future it is difficult to bet, given that old dynamics are being re-proposed, such as Nicaragua’s availability to host the Russian military presence, which has just been expressed.

Conclusions

Despite praiseworthy rhetoric, mainly due to the rejection of what was dismantled and made conflicting by the Trump Administration, the action of the Biden administration remains overall not up to par for several reasons, starting with the priorities of internal policies (economic and social), while leaving the external ones dominated by the security approach, with all the weaknesses of a sectoral vision in the face of global problems.

(1) The militarization (and re-militarization) of the anti-Chinese coalitions in the area is witnessed by two elements. In the sidelines of the three-day Shangri-La Dialogue session, which ended in Singapore in mid-June, UK, and other regional countries (all belonging to the Commonwealth), announced efforts to expand and re-energize the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA), a 51-year-old series of mutual assistance agreements comprising the UK, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand. At its core, the pact commits the members to consult with one another in the event or threat of an armed attack on any of the FPDA members, and to mutually decide what measures should be taken, jointly or separately.

There are no specific obligations to intervene militarily even if there was the ANZUK set up, a joint tri-service force made up of Australian, New Zealand, and British units and formed in Singapore, on 1 November 1971 and disbanded on 31 January 1974. The FPDA was set up following the termination of the United Kingdom’s defence guarantees of the then Malaya (now Malaysia and Singapore) under the “Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement,” because of the UK’s decision in 1967 to withdraw its armed forces east of Suez. The return to the East of Suez by London was mirrored in the recent deployment of Royal Navy carrier group in the region, an answer also to strong domestic political needs, post-Brexit; but it a small presence in Singapore, and Brunei, two small territories in the Indo-Pacific region (Pitcairn Islands, practically depopulated, and the archipelago of Chagos, vacated by its original population in the 1970s and now used almost exclusively by US forces).

During the same session of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the recently appointed French Minister for the Armed Forces, Sébastien Lecornu, announced that Paris would strengthen and modernize its military presence and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific zone, particularly on New Caledonia and Polynesia. Lecornu said: “There are fears among our partners who are wondering if the crisis in Ukraine could distract us from the Indo-Pacific. It is not so,” France will deploy permanently, as of 2025, six new ocean patrol boats in the Indo-Pacific, including two in the Pacific this year, one based in New Caledonia, the other in Polynesia” for “surveillance and sovereignty missions…Similarly, the five Falcon (reconnaissance) aircraft in the Pacific will be replaced by five new, more modern models.” France will organize a sovereignty mission in the Pacific, “Pégase 22,” which is also planned with the combined deployment of the Rafale fighter jet and A400 M military transport aircraft. Thus, the French forces will continue to participate in multiple multilateral exercises, organizing some of them to maintain “a significant presence in the region, to show France’s attachment to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.”

(2) The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), or Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, was a proposed trade agreement between Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and which the US signed on 4 February 2016. Just after taking office, newly elected President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the TPP in January 2017. As a result, the agreement could not be ratified as planned and did not come into force. The remaining countries negotiated a new trade agreement, called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPATPP), which incorporates most of the provisions of the TPP and which went into effect on December 30, 2018. The TPP started as an expansion of the Transpacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPSEP or P4), signed by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore in 2005. Since 2008, other countries have joined the discussion for a broader agreement: Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, USA, and Vietnam, bringing the countries involved in the negotiations to twelve.

As mentioned, in January 2017, the US withdrew from the deal. The other 11 TPP countries agreed in May 2017 to restore it and reached an agreement in January 2018. After ratification by six of them (Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Singapore), the agreement entered in force for those countries on 30 December 2018. The UK joined the CPATPP in 2021; Taiwan, Philippines, Colombia, Thailand, and Indonesia, Bangladesh, India South Korea, Sri Lanka, and China have expressed interest in joining the CATPP.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a free trade agreement between the Asian and Pacific nations of Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The 15 member countries represent approximately 30% of the world’s population (2.2 billion people) and 30% of global GDP ($ 29.7 trillion), making it the largest trading bloc in history. Signed in November 2020, RCEP is the first free trade agreement between major Asian economies, including China, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea.

The RCEP was conceived at the 2011 ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia, while negotiations were formally launched during the 2012 ASEAN Summit in Cambodia. India, which took part in the initial negotiations but later decided to give up, has been invited to join the bloc at any time. Any other country or separate customs territory of the region can join the agreement, 18 months from the date of coming into force of the agreement, on 1 July 2023. The treaty was formally signed on 15 November 2020 at the ASEAN virtual summit hosted by Vietnam.

As of January 17, 2022, seven of the ten ASEAN signatories and all five non-ASEAN signatories have deposited their RCEP ratification instruments with the ASEAN Secretary General. For the top ten ratifying countries, the trade pact entered into force on January 1, 2022. The RCEP includes a mix of high-, middle- and low-income countries, and plans to eliminate around 90% of import tariffs among its signatories within 20 years of coming into force, and to establish common rules for e-commerce, trade and intellectual property.


Enrico Magnani, PhD is a UN officer who specializes in military history, politico-military affairs, peacekeeping and stability operations. (The opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations).


Jacques Baud: “The goal is not to help Ukraine, but to fight Putin”

This interview comes to us through the kind courtesy of the Swiss journal, Zeitgeschehen im Fokus. In it, Jacques Baud brings us up-to-date on the Ukraine situation, while providing us with great insights, in his usual, inimitable way. He is in conversation with Thomas Kaiser. [Note: This English translation of the original German interview has been exclusively updated by Jacques Baud. Translated from the German by N. Dass.]


Thomas Kaiser-Zeitgeschehen im Fokus (TK): You cannot recognize Switzerland in a certain sense. Everything that was of importance to the state is being thrown away, almost hand-over-fist. What’s your view?

Jacques Baud (JB): We are indeed in a state of hysteria; and it is unbelievable how people forget the fundamental principles of the rule of law. This is a fundamental problem—you forget your own foundations, your own identity. Regardless of who is fighting each other, it is not our fight, and it is an advantage not to be involved in the fight, because that creates the opportunity to develop better solutions and help defuse the problem.

TK: A neutral state could make a positive contribution here?

JB: Yes, but that is exactly what Switzerland is not doing. It behaves as if it were a party in this conflict. This prevents Switzerland from finding a balanced, objective and impartial solution. This is a key point, nota bene for the international community as a whole, not only for Switzerland. The difference is only that Switzerland should be neutral.

TK: How is that relevant?

JB: This neutrality could be exploited, not to take sides, but to help solve the problem, regardless of who is guilty or innocent. These are different things. It’s like an arbitrator. He is not supposed to be a party. We have forgotten that. It doesn’t matter what the referee thinks about a participant, whether he finds him sympathetic or not, he must keep the same distance from both participants. Switzerland should be in this situation, but it does take advantage of it. I don’t mean financially, of course, but intellectually, legally and morally. The problem is that Switzerland forgets that it is not a warring party in this conflict.

TK: If you listen to the Swiss government or even to the narrative of some lawmakers, this neutral stance is completely blurred, even if they claim the opposite is repeatedly..

JB: It is also interesting that if one takes some distance to assess the conflict and does not immediately side with Ukraine, one is declared a ” Putin-Empathizer.” This is unbelievable. What I think about Putin has nothing to do with the assessment of the situation. That is the business of the Ukrainians. I have said this several times: if I were Ukrainian, I probably would have taken up arms. But that is not the point. I, as Swiss, will not give up my Swissness. In order to help Ukraine, I don’t have to become a Ukrainian; but I have to look at the big picture I have as Swiss to bring a less passionate but more constructive point of view. The journalists who criticize me are more Russia-haters than Ukraine-lovers.

TK: Where, then, might Switzerland’s role in this conflict lie?

JB: When an onlooker sees an old lady being attacked by a thug on the street, he does not encourage her to fight back, but tries to separate the two. We are in the situation of this onlooker; but our response is to give weapons so that Ukraine fights. For a Ukrainian it is legitimate to want to fight. But for a Swiss or another European, our role is to try to limit the damage. But no one is even attempting to do that in the West. When Zelensky was looking for a mediator, he turned to Turkey, China, and Israel. He did not choose a European Union country or even Switzerland. He understood that Switzerland is no longer an independent partner.

TK: Isn’t that the result of current Swiss foreign policy?

JB: Yes, it shows the nature of the problem. We have to make a difference between what we think about Putin and what we want to achieve politically. These are two different things. In addition, I always ask myself if are we so keen to blame the aggressor. Why didn’t we blame and sanction the U.S., the UK or France when they attacked Middle Eastern or African countries?

TK: Yes, this question really does arise.

JB: Paradoxically, everything we give to Ukraine today only highlights the help and compassion we have not given to those who have been unjustly attacked by the West in the Middle East and elsewhere. This will have consequences in the future. Many have noticed this with the refugees. The “blond, blue-eyed” refugees are gladly helped; the others are not. Maybe we can understand this, even if we cannot approve of it. But what is incomprehensible, remains the fact that we keep silent about one attacker, while another is punished with more than 6 000 sanctions.

TK: Is this not the well-known double standard?

JB: Yes, it is. It also doesn’t mean that you have to be in favor of Russia; that has nothing to do with it. If you look at Justitia, she is blind and holds a scale in her hand. That is exactly what is missing today. Western countries are partial and biased. The same applies to the European Union. A modern state should not be guided by passion, but by reason. These principles were established by Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau in the 18th century. Our “woke” culture has forgotten them. We let our feelings guide us and we follow them. That is the problem.

TK: Does that mean that the principles of the rule of law have disappeared?

JB: The rule of law means that decisions are not based on feelings or intuitions, but on the basis of facts. That is why modern states have intelligence services. This is about supporting decision-making based on facts and not on the basis of divine inspiration. This is a fundamental difference between enlightened governance and despotic obscurantism. Fighting a dictatorship does not entitle us to forget the principles of the rule of law. Since the Balkan War, the West seems to believe that the end justifies the means. It is irrelevant what individual ministers think as persons, they are allowed to hate Putin, that is their right as citizens —but not as ministers. Feelings cannot be the basis of their policy. Here I would like to refer to Henry Kissinger. He said in 2014, “Demonizing Vladimir Putin is not politics; it is an alibi for not having politics.” That’s what Henry Kissinger said; not Putin or Lukashenko. It behaves like a monarch, like Louis XIV who was guided by a divine inspiration.

“It is not about solving the problem of ‘war,’ but about eliminating the problem of ‘Putin.'”

TK: So, the Swiss government’s decision-making is more based on emotions than on reason?

JB: It is not the only one, unfortunately. This “management by Twitter” that has the upper hand in the entire Western world at the moment is absolutely inappropriate. It leads to this situation where you react before you know exactly what has happened.

Obviously, things don’t get better as a result. We close the doors. We do not communicate anymore. Diplomacy has stalled. In reality, it is not about solving the problem of “war,” but about eliminating the problem of “Putin.”

TK: Reacting before you know the details is common practice?

JB: Yes, after the missile attack on civilians at the Kramatorsk train station on April 8, the Swiss minister of Foreign Affairs summoned the Russian ambassador. At that time, however, only few details of the attack were known. Nevertheless, the Russians were accused. Today, factual evidence, such as the serial number of the missile, the direction of the launch, the type of missile and the strategy tend to indicate a Ukrainian responsibility. But without an impartial international investigation, a direct accusation of Russia means an endorsement of a possible war crime by Ukraine. That is not the way to run states. The fact that the political leadership is unable to take distance to the events is extremely disturbing.

TK: Without distance, it is probably extremely difficult to judge a situation adequately?

JB: In most cases, we are not able to distinguish between a war crime and “collateral damage.” In large part, this is because the media dictate an answer to us. What was provocation, what was reaction, what is propaganda? We don’t know. Despite everything, we accuse and sanction Russia. But if you want to condemn something, first you need an international and impartial commission of inquiry to find out what happened. What we are doing tends to exclude any possibility of dialogue, and that prevents the formulation of a crisis management strategy.

TK: So, the citizen and the state cannot have the same approach?

JB: The citizen can believe what he wants. What the ordinary citizen thinks is completely up to him. He can mean what he wants about Putin, about Russia. He can hate people if he wants to. But a state and state media cannot afford that.

TK: Why not?

JB: The role of a state is not to express the emotions of its people, but to represent their interests. Ukraine’s interest is to protect its citizens from an aggression. Switzerland’s interest should not be to support a war, but to support achieving a peaceful solution. Switzerland’s role should not be to blame or condemn. Today, Switzerland decided the second largest number of sanctions against Russia, but it didn’t apply any sanction against the US, the UK or Israel. In other words, we accept crimes when they are committed by some, but not when they are committed by others.

It has been known for a long time that Ukrainian militias commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. Switzerland has not condemned them. Currently, many Ukrainian war crimes are beginning to be denounced by Western witnesses and humanitarian workers. Their revelations are censored, like the revelation of Natalia Usmanova, censored by Reuters and Der Spiegel, which tells that it was Ukrainian militias and not Russians who prevented civilians from escaping through humanitarian corridors. By turning a blind eye to them, Switzerland is supporting practices that are prohibited under the Geneva Conventions, of which it is the depositary state.

“Kiev and the West are waging a media war against Russia and the Donbas republics.”

TK: This means that the West is promoting crises?

JB: Yes. In 2014, a similar mechanism was observed. Western “experts” and media downplayed the Ukrainians’ resistance to regime change. It had to be shown that the Maidan revolution was democratic. So, they built the myth of a Ukrainian army that was victorious against the rebels. After the defeat of the government in Donetsk, the excuse of a Russian intervention had to be invented to justify Western propaganda. This is how the first Minsk agreements came about (September 2014). Immediately after, Kiev broke the signed agreement to launch the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO). This led to a second defeat at Debaltsevo and the second Minsk agreement (February 2015). Once again, the Ukrainian defeat was attributed to Russian intervention. Therefore, Western “experts” continue to claim that these agreements were signed between Ukraine and Russia, which is not true. The Minsk Agreement was signed between Kiev and representatives of the self-proclaimed republics of Lugansk and Donetsk.

TK: What is the current assessment of the war situation?

JB: Today we can see that Kiev and the West are waging a media war against Russia and the Donbas republics. Russia, on the other hand, is waging a war on the battlefield. As a result, Ukrainians and the West are stronger in the information war, but Russia and its allies are stronger on the battlefield. Who will win? We don’t know. But what has been observed in Mariupol and the Donbas since mid-April tends to suggest that Ukrainian troops have been “abandoned” by their leadership. This observation is also made by Western volunteers who have left the battlefield due to the shortcomings of the Ukrainian command and are reporting this in the media.

TK: What does this mean specifically regarding Russian war objectives?

JB: Russia started with a limited objective. After that, the decision was made to go further. It wanted to demilitarize the threat over Donbas. Based on the first success, it wanted to start negotiations on the neutrality of Ukraine. This was a new objective, which was defined later. Putin saw a chance to achieve his goal through negotiations. If Ukraine did not accept it, he would adjust the objective accordingly. The Ukrainians don’t want negotiations; so Russia is proceeding incrementally until Ukraine agrees to a negotiated settlement.

“The Russians understand war from a Clausewitzian perspective: war is the continuation of politics by other means.”

TK: What were the original war aims?

JB: On February 24, Putin clearly stated the two war aims: “demilitarization” and “denazification,” to end the threat against the Russian-speaking population in the Donbas. Moreover, Putin stated that he did not seek to take over all of Ukraine. This is exactly what has been observed.

Russians understand war from a Clausewitzian perspective: war is the continuation of politics by other means. Therefore, they move fluidly from one to the other. The idea is to get the Ukrainian side to enter into a negotiation process.

TK: Has Ukraine seriously engaged in a negotiated settlement?

JB: On February 25th, Zelensky hinted that he was ready to negotiate with Russia. The European Union then showed up on February 27th with a 450-million Euro arms package to spur Ukraine to fight. On March 7th, with the goal of “demilitarization” and “denazification” nearly achieved and Ukraine having made no progress in negotiations, Russia added that Kiev must recognize the return of Crimea to Russia and the independence of the two Donbas republics. It made clear that its position could change if Ukraine did not want to negotiate.

TK: Has Ukraine responded to this?

JB: After the capture of Mariupol, the situation in Ukraine weakened, and on March 21st, Zelensky made an offer that was accommodating to Russia. But as in February, the EU came back two days later with a second package of 500-million Euros for weapons. The UK and the US subsequently put pressure on Zelensky to withdraw his offer. Negotiations in Istanbul subsequently stalled. This was a clear indication that de West didn’t want a negotiated solution.

TK: To what extent has Russia changed its goals?

JB: At the end of March, the goal of “denazification” was achieved with the capture of Mariupol and removed it from Russia’s objectives as part of negotiations.

On April 22nd, the Russians adjusted their goal. The Ministry of Defense announced that the new goal was to take control of the southern part of Ukraine up to Transnistria, where the Russian-speaking never felt being well treated.

As can be seen, the Russian strategy adjusts the goals depending on the military situation. What the Russians are actually doing is to turn their operational successes into a strategic success.

TK: Does this mean that the Russian targets reported by the media never existed?

JB: That’s right. Vladimir Putin never said he wanted to take Kiev. He never said he was going to take the city in two days. He never said he wanted to overthrow President Zelensky. He never said he wanted to take over all of Ukraine. He never said he was aiming for a victory on May 9th. He never said he wanted to declare that victory at the May 9th parade. He never said that he wanted to “declare war” on May 9th, in order to trigger a general mobilization.

So, by setting the objectives, the West can now claim Putin did not achieve them. The narrative that Russia is losing the war against Ukraine is based on these claims.

TK: What should come out of the military action at the end?

JB: Of course, we do not know what is going on in Vladimir Putin’s mind. But obviously there is a logic. The West is not making it easier for the Ukrainians, and the Russians are moving ahead. In the near future, we’ll see the Russian coalition “liberating” more territories. Some provinces have already decided to introduce the ruble as currency. So, things are slowly moving towards the “recreation” of some kind of Novorossiya.

TK: What do you mean by “Novorossiya,” and how should it look territorially?

JB: After the abolition of the official language law in 2014, not only the Lugansk and Donetsk oblasts rose up, but the entire Russian-speaking south of Ukraine. As a result, in October 2014, the Unified Forces of Novorossiya were formed, with units from the self-proclaimed Republics of Odessa, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, and, of course, Lugansk and Donetsk. Only Lugansk and Donetsk survived. The other “republics” have been brutally suppressed by the Kiev’s paramilitary forces. Today, the Russians are using the revival of the Novorossiya as an incentive for the Ukrainians to go to the negotiation table. If they don’t want, Russia will increase the pressure.

TK: Does Russia have a chance of success in this way?

JB: Nothing is certain. What can be said, however, is that the popular resistance to Russia in the territories it occupies is much weaker than Western experts estimated. Moreover, it is clear that the Ukrainian conduct of operations has not been effective. It seems that the Ukrainian military has lost confidence in its authorities, as it did in 2014.

TK: How do we know this?

JB: The testimonies of Western volunteer fighters who have returned from Ukraine confirm that the Ukrainian leadership is weak. It seems that the Ukrainian leadership itself is a victim of its own propaganda, which overestimates the performance of Ukrainian Forces. One gets the feeling that the political leadership is more satisfied with the messages conveyed by the West than with the actual results on the battlefield. Of course, the Western media uses the civilian and military casualty figures given by Ukraine to claim Ukraine’s victory and Russian upcoming defeat.

TK: What conclusions can we draw from this whole situation?

JB: Western activities will only prolong this war, while leaving no room for negotiations. This is exactly what the EU and Switzerland are doing. They are more part of the problem than of the solution.

TK: German Chancellor Scholz has said very clearly, “Russia must not win the war.” With that, the war will continue?

JB: That is childish. The operational situation shows that Ukraine is in a very difficult situation. I do not know whether Russia will “win” or “lose” this war. But I do know that Ukraine is no longer in a position to win militarily. On the political level, the situation may be different. This is debatable, and the future will tell. From a Western perspective, it is certainly a political defeat for Russia. However, for the rest of the world, this may not be the case. In fact, the new Eurasian bloc that will emerge from this conflict will be a significantly stronger contender for the West. We are used to see the fate of the world revolving around the West. But Asia will probably be the next “center of the world.” By isolating Russia politically from the West, you push it into the Asian bloc. In the long run, this could give Russia an advantage over Europe and the United States.

TK: You said that Ukraine cannot win the war. Is that because it is too weak militarily?

JB: There is almost no Ukrainian military left, so to speak. Most of the Ukrainian army is encircled in the Donbas and is being incrementally neutralized by the Russian coalition. The Ukrainian government just started moving territorial units from the west of the country to the Donbas. This has increased tensions, especially in the areas of the Hungarian and Romanian minorities, whose people do not appear keen to fight against the Russians. We see demonstrations of mothers and wives in the west of the country and in Kiev.

TK: Obviously, Western countries behave as if they do not want peace. No one urges caution. Before anything is known for sure, conclusions are drawn, condemnations are made, weapons are supplied. The war is kept alive. What do you think of the announced increase in arms deliveries?

JB: Regarding weapons, there are several things to consider. First, feeding a war and thus keeping it alive is not the job of the international community. By international community, I mean primarily organizations like the UN or the EU. Whether a country pursues this policy like the U.S. or Poland, that is their decision. But the purpose of an international organization is not to support international conflicts.

“Weapons disappear before they reach the front lines.”

JB: Second, it is not known where the delivered weapons actually go. Even U.S. intelligence agencies admit they don’t know. However, it is clear that all these weapons disappear before they arrive at the front. There are reports of a rise in crime in Kiev. In fact, Western countries are fueling what the Global Organized Crime Index calls “one of the largest arms trade markets in Europe.”

TK: So, what do the weapons bring to Ukraine?

JB: That’s the third aspect to look at. The weapons don’t help anything. The arms deliveries are based on the myth that Ukraine will win the war and Russia will lose. This idea is the result of the fact that the West has determined the objective of the Russians. Zelensky is demanding additional weapons because the Ukrainian army has already lost hundreds of battle tanks and artillery pieces. The few dozen supplied by the West will not change the situation. As in 2014, the main problem of the Ukrainian armed forces is not the determination of the soldiers, but the incompetence of the staff.

TK: How can Ukraine finance these weapons, or will the supplier states bear the cost out of solidarity?

JB: The weapons are provided to Ukraine on the basis of the “Lend-Lease” Law. This is a form of “leasing” that was introduced at the beginning of World War II to supply weapons to United Kingdom and the USSR. In other words, Ukraine will have to pay back for the weapons it receives. Just to give an idea, Great Britain and Russia ended the payment of their World War II debts to the USA in the year—2006!

Moreover, Ukraine is accumulating huge debts to international financial institutions (such as the IMF and the World Bank). The paradox is that, because of Western rhetoric about a country that is doing well and on the verge of defeating Russia, these institutions are reluctant to cancel its debt.

TK: So, the weapons supplied and the volunteer foreign fighters have no impact on the course of the war?

JB: They have only limited impact. Remember that, in Afghanistan the Taliban were able to prevail against the Western forces even though they were much more powerful. The Afghans had almost no heavy weapons, at most small arms. Neither the number of weapons nor their quality is decisive for victory. The biggest weakness of the Ukrainian armed forces is leadership.

TK: Why is that?

JB: The Ukrainian military leadership is bad because it is not able to integrate all parameters needed for planning and conducting battles. It makes the same mistakes as NATO forces in Afghanistan. This is not surprising, since the latter train the former. Besides, you have to master these weapons to get the most out of them tactically. They were developed for professional soldiers trained for months, not for casual soldiers trained in two weeks. That is completely unrealistic.

“The weapons that are being supplied to Ukraine have no military effect.”

TK: Do I understand you correctly—the efficiency of these delivered weapons is very low and leads to more destruction in Ukraine?

JB: The weapons being delivered, some of which are obsolete, will not affect significantly Russian operations or give an edge to the Ukrainian forces. They will only attract Russian fire to certain areas. For example, Slovakia has supplied Ukraine with the S-300 air defense system, which, as far as I know, has been moved to the vicinity of Nikolaev. Within a very short time it was destroyed by the Russians. The Russians know very well where this equipment is, and where the weapons depots are. In Zaporizhzhia were stored brand new weapons from the West. The Russians destroyed the depot with a missile, with pinpoint accuracy. The weapons delivered to Ukraine have no military impact on the course of the war.

A few howitzers are ineffective because the Russians can destroy them very fast. The Ukrainians, of course, have to get these systems to the front as quickly as possible. They have to do that by rail. The Ukrainians have electric railroads in the western part of the country. The Russians destroyed most of the electric substations of the network and the main railroads. Today, no electric locomotives are running on the network anymore. As a result, they have to bring weapons, such as tanks, to the “frontline” by road, one by one, using transporters. The problem is that these destructions affect not only military logistics, but also the economic life of the country.

TK: How did Russia react to these arms deliveries?

JB: It should be noted that before the Western arms deliveries, the Russians did not attack the railroad network. If the goal is to totally destroy Ukraine, then you have to do exactly what the West is doing now. If that is what we want. Whether it is what the West wants or not, I don’t know. But if this is the goal, this is the way to go.

Also, it is said that Russia currently has the largest inventory of Javelin missiles in the world. I don’t know if that is true, but it suggests that a large part of the weapons supplied by the West are not getting to Ukrainian fighters.

TK: The Gepard tank that the Germans want to supply has been decommissioned in the Bundeswehr. There is also no more ammunition for it in the Bundeswehr stocks. Isn’t that a point you mentioned earlier?

JB: The Gepard is an antiaircraft tank based on the chassis of the Leopard 1 main battle tank. It is a vehicle whose development goes back to the 1970s. It is a good weapon system, but it is no longer suited to modern threats. A weapon system also means logistics, maintenance and special training for the crews and mechanics. Furthermore, to be effective, such a system must be integrated into a command-and-control system. However, all of this cannot be accomplished in a matter of weeks. Basically, these weapon systems only draw Russian fire.

“A British volunteer fighter who returned from Ukraine speaks of the fighters sent to the front as ‘cannon fodder.'”

TK: Do Western countries have any hope that all this will help accomplish something?

JB: One thing is for sure—it doesn’t do anything. The British made a study of the weapons they had supplied to the Ukrainians. The results are extremely weak, and disappointing. They realized their weapons systems are too complicated, and the Ukrainian soldiers cannot operate them because they are not sufficiently trained. As for volunteer fighters, the picture is also disappointing. A British volunteer fighter who returned from Ukraine speaks of “cannon fodder,” of the fighters sent to the front. The British themselves realized that it was a waste of life and resources. That is why Boris Johnson started back-pedaling, after urging young people to fight in Ukraine. So, everything that is being done only serves to continue the war, without bringing a solution, or decisively winning over Russia. It only leads to the destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure.

TK: So, it is not a matter of helping the Ukrainian army?

JB: In theory, yes. In practice, no. Ukraine already has enormous logistical problems with its troops in the Donbas. It can hardly supply them with weapons and ammunition. And now they are creating a new problem with weapons that cannot be repaired. The mechanics are not trained to do this, nor are the crews trained to operate the equipment. Moreover, in the systems supplied by the West, the instructions and user manuals are in German, English or French, but not in Ukrainian. This sounds so trivial, but it is a problem.

That is why I say Germany also wants to stoke the crisis. This is the attitude of German politicians like Scholz, Baerbock, etc. They want to fight Putin “to the last Ukrainian.” That makes no sense.

TK: But if it is so obvious, why is the West going this way?

JB: I maintain that the West is using Ukraine against Russia. The goal is not to help Ukraine, but to fight Putin. In the English-language media, many analysts confirm that the West is waging a war against Russia through Ukraine. This is called a “proxy war.” This is the point. We are not helping Ukraine. Everything else is a lie. If I were Ukrainian, I would condemn Putin as much as Ursula von der Leyen or even Ignazio Cassis. Because instead of playing a mediating role, these politicians are satisfying their own ambitions by fueling the war in an unhealthy way.

TK: Guterres has let it be known that the war would stop, if Russia would stop the war.

JB: A war always has two parties, and in our case there are even three. We have Russia, Ukraine, and the so-called international community, that is, the Western world. It is clear that if the war is to be ended, it needs both parties, not just one. To this end, negotiations are underway in Turkey, but they are not really moving forward. Why has Ukraine withdrawn its own proposals? So, it is clear, the solution is not only on the Russian side.

TK: One has the impression that history is repeating itself.

JB: Yes, today we are in a similar situation as in 2014. The West does not want to talk to Putin because he is a dictator, and the West urges Zelensky not to make any concessions. Dialogue is therefore impossible. The problem is that Russia achieves operational success and increases its gains when there are no negotiations. The West hides behind the illusion of a Ukrainian victory. But the likelihood of it occurring is diminishing as time goes on, even though on a strategic and media level Russia appears to have lost.

TK: What should Ukraine have done?

JB: One only has to read the Minsk agreements to understand that their implementation essentially depends on constitutional reforms in Ukraine. These reforms, however, require dialogue with the autonomists. Kiev, however, has never taken these steps, and the West has never tried to get the Ukrainian authorities to do so.

What happened since 2014, happened because of Ukraine’s behavior. These agreements are not implemented, and the situation got worse and worse. That led to today’s situation; and this is a result of the previous history; the things that went on before.

TK: France and Germany were the guarantors of the Minsk agreements. What have they done to ensure that these agreements are implemented?

JB: The failure of the Western states is blatant. Ukrainians themselves have invented a new word. It is called “Macronize.” It means “doing everything to look worried, showing that to everyone, but doing nothing.” This sums up Western behavior.

No, the Western states have not taken up their responsibility in any way. Russia has now reacted to an armed conflict that has been going on since 2014 and started with the abolition of the official language law in February 2014. European states did nothing to bring peace. That is why Putin does not want to talk about war, because the war started in 2014. With the Minsk agreements, a solution was found. That is the situation. Guterres is a politician—and the problem is, we don’t have any space in the UN or in our country for politicians to express a balanced opinion. This is exactly as when George W. Bush said, “Whoever is not with us is against us.” We are exactly in that situation today—and there is no space in between at all; there is only good or evil.

TK: Are these developments intentional?

JB: The whole conflict is the result of a scenario carefully worked out by the West. Its basic components were laid out in 2019 in two papers published by the RAND Corporation, the Pentagon think tank, entitled, Overextending and Unbalancing Russia and Extending Russia. These describe the sequence of events that led to the Russian offensive in February 2022. In addition to that, promises were made to Ukraine that it would become a member of NATO if it instigated a war that led to Russia’s defeat, as Oleksiy Arestovych explained in an interview with a Ukrainian television station in March 2019. In fact, Ukrainians were lied to, as Zelensky noted on CNN on March 21, 2022.

As a matter of fact, the Russians knew for a long time that this confrontation would occur. That is why they prepared for it militarily and economically. This explains why they are withstanding the sanctions and pressure better than expected. This is also the reason why the West is using its imagination to elaborate new sanctions or new methods to impose them, such as abandoning the principle of unanimity in the EU. We have entered a phase of “cockfighting” between the West and Russia. As a result, the problem is that international institutions are no longer fulfilling their role as arbiters, but have become parties to the conflict.

TK: But then the EU won the Nobel Peace Prize a few years ago. Where is the commitment to peace?

JB: Obama got it, too. And Obama was the American president who kept his country at war from the first day of his mandate to the last. He started three wars, and the number of air strikes increased tenfold compared to his predecessor. I don’t think anybody takes the Nobel Prize seriously anymore at this point. It is purely political.

TK: Mr. Baud, thank you for talking to us.


A Philosophy of Victory

Essential internal reforms must logically begin in Russia. This is required by the Special Military Operation (SMO), which has intensified the contradictions with the West—and with the entire modern Western civilization—to the extreme. Anyone can now see that it is no longer safe to simply use the norms, methods, concepts, products of this civilization. The West spreads, along with its technology, its ideology, which then permeates all spheres of life. If we recognize ourselves as a part of Western civilization, then we must readily agree to this total colonization and even enjoy it (like in the 1990s). But in the case of the current confrontation, which is fatal!—such an attitude is unacceptable. Many Westerners and liberals have already become fully aware of this and have therefore left Russia just when the break with Western civilization had become irreversible. And it became irreversible on February 24, 2022, and even two days earlier—at the moment of recognition of independence of the DPR and LPR—on February 22, 2022.

In principle, everyone has the right to make a civilizational choice of loyalty or betrayal. At least with those who are involved, everything is clear—it is clear now and was clear before. At least they are consistent—after losing liberalism in Russia, they went off to their own.

It is more complicated with those who are still here. I mean those Westerners and liberals who still share the basic norms of modern Western civilization, but for some reason continue to stay in Russia, despite the rupture that has already taken place between it and the West. They are the main obstacle to real and full-fledged patriotic reforms.

Reforms were inevitable, because Russia found itself not only cut off from the West, but also essentially at war with it. On the eve of World War II, the USSR had a sufficient number of important strategic industries created by Nazi Germany. And relations between the USSR and the Third Reich were not particularly hostile. But after June 22, 1941 obviously the situation changed dramatically. Under those conditions, continuing cooperating with the Germans—legitimate and encouraged before the war—took on an entirely different meaning. Exactly the same thing happened after February 22, 2022—those who continued to remain in the paradigm of the hostile (liberal-fascist) civilization, with which we are at war, found themselves outside the ideological space that clearly emerged with the beginning of the SMO.

While the presence of Germany on the eve of WWII in the USSR was specific and single-pointed, the presence of the liberal-fascist Russophobe West on the eve of the SMO was well-nigh total. Western technologies of methodology, norms, know-how, and even, in part, values permeate our entire society. This calls for a radical revision. But who will carry it out? The people who were educated during perestroika? The liberal and criminal 1990s? The people of the 1980s and 1990s who were trained and educated in the 2000s? All of these periods were under the basic influence of liberalism as an ideology, as a paradigm, as a fundamental and comprehensive position in philosophy, science, politics, education, culture, technology, economics, the media, even in fashion and in life. Contemporary Russia knows only the inertial ruins of the Soviet paradigm and everything else is pure liberal Westernism.

There is no alternative paradigm; at least none in power or among the elite, at the level at which the civilizational confrontation should now unfold.

Today, we oppose the West as a civilization against a civilization. And we need to define what kind of civilization we are. Otherwise, no military, political and economic successes will help us. Everything will be reversible. The trend will change and everything will collapse (I’m not even talking about the necessity to explain to Ukrainians, who will henceforth be inside our zone of influence or directly inside Russia) who are we, after all? At the moment there is only the inertia of Soviet memory (“granny with a flag”), Western Nazi propaganda (“vatniki”, “occupants”), our—so far only initial—military successes and complete confusion in the local population. And here the voice of Russian civilization should sound. Clearly, distinctly, convincingly. And its peals must be heard in Ukraine, and on the territory of Eurasia, and in the whole world. It is not only desirable, it is vital, just as cartridges, missiles, copters and bulletproof vests are needed at the front.

It is most logical to begin the reforms with philosophy. It is necessary to form the General Staff of the Russian Logos, either on the basis of an existing institution (after all, not a single humanitarian institution can or will ever do this: liberalism and Westernism still dominate everywhere), or in the form of something fundamentally new. Hegel said that the greatness of a nation begins with the creation of a great philosophy. He said it, and he did it. This is precisely what Russian philosophers need today, not vague and out-of-touch agreement about the SMO. We need a new Russian philosophy. Russian in content, in essence.

And the reform of all other branches of humanitarian and natural science knowledge should start from this paradigm. Sociology, psychology, anthropology, culturology, as well as economics, and even physics, chemistry, biology, etc. are based on philosophy, are its derivatives. Scientists often forget this; but recall what “PhD” actually means, in any of the humanities or the natural sciences. PhD—“philosophiae doctor;” that is, “doctor of philosophy.” If you are not a philosopher, you are an apprentice at best, not a scientist (“doctor” is Latin for “scholar,” “learned”).

This is where the most important internal battle of starting civilizational reforms in Russia itself (as well as in the entire space of our expansion, in the entire zone of our influence) will unfold—the battle for Russian philosophy begins.

And here there is a clearly shaped pole of the internal enemy. These are representatives of the liberal paradigm—from analytical philosophy to the postmodern, to the completely feeble-minded cognitivists and transhumanists, who maniacally insist on reducing man to a machine. I’m not even talking about outright liberals and liberal progressives, proponents of the totalitarian concept of “open society,” feminism, queer studies, and the “queer culture” raised on sorority grants. This is pure “fifth column”—something like the Azov Battalion banned in Russia.

It is very easy to draw a portrait of the philosophical enemy of the Russian Idea and Russian civilization. It is not simply a question of connections with Western scientific and intelligence centers (which are often on quite close terms), but also of adherence to a number of quite formalizable attitudes:

  • belief in the universality of modern Western civilization (Eurocentrism, civilizational racism);
  • hyper-materialism—up to and including deep ecology and object-oriented ontology;
  • methodological and ethical individualism—whence the philosophy of gender (as a social option) and in the limit transhumanism;
  • techno-progressivism, the development of Artificial Intelligence and “thinking” neural networks;
  • hatred of classical theologies, spiritual Tradition, philosophy of eternity;
  • denial or ironic ridicule of identity;
  • anti-essentialism, etc.

This is a kind of “philosophical Ukraine,” scattered throughout virtually every scientific and educational institution that has anything to do with philosophy or basic scientific epistemes. These are signs of philosophical Russophobia, since the Russian Idea is built on the basis of directly opposite principles:

  • the identity of Russian civilization (Slavophiles, Danilevsky, Eurasians);
  • placing the spirit over matter;
  • communality, collegiality—a collectivist anthropology;
  • deep humanism;
  • devotion to Tradition;
  • careful preservation of identity, nationality;
  • belief in the spiritual nature of the essence of things, etc.

Those who set the tone in contemporary Russian philosophy vehemently defend liberal attitudes and just as vehemently reject Russian ones. Such is the powerful stronghold of liberal Nazism within Russia.

It is precisely this firing-point of the enemy, this high-ground, that we will have to take in the next phase. Moreover, liberal Nazis are defending themselves against philosophy no less fiercely than the Azov Battalion or the desperate Ukrainian terrorists from Popasna. They wage information wars, write denunciations of patriots, and use all levers of corruption and apparatus influence.

At this point, it is appropriate to recall a little—personal, but very revealing—incident about my dismissal from the Moscow State University (MSU) in the summer of 2014 (note the date).

From 2008 to 2014, at the Sociology Department of MSU, together with the Dean and founder of the department, Vladimir Ivanovich Dobrenkov, we organized the rigorous work of the Center for Conservative Studies, where we did just that—undertake the development of a Russian civilizational epistemological paradigm. Without hesitation, we supported a “Russian Spring.”

But, in response, we received a vicious letter from…Ukrainian philosophers (initiated by the Kyiv Nazi Sergey Datsyuk), demanding the “expulsion of Dobrenkov and me from MSU. And most strangely—but then, not very strangely—the leadership of MSU met the demand. Dobrenkov was removed from the post of Dean, and I, frankly, left of my own accord, although it looked like dismissal. I was asked to stay, but on humiliating terms. Of course, it was not Sadovnichy who resolved this issue, but he was rather gracious and open-minded and approved my appointment as the Head of the Department, which passed all voting procedures at the Academic Council of Moscow State University.

But then, something happened. The “Russian Spring” was curtailed. And the question of the Russian world, Russian civilization, and the Russian Logos was removed from the agenda altogether. But it was symbolic—the initiators of the abolition of the Center for Conservative Studies at Moscow State University were Ukrainian Nazis—theorists and practitioners of Russian genocide in Donbass and Eastern Ukraine as a whole. Exactly the same people with whom we are now at war.

This is how liberal fascism penetrates Russia. Or rather, it penetrated a long time ago; but that is how its mechanisms work. A denunciation comes from Kiev; someone inside the Administration supports it; and the next initiative to deploy the Russian Idea collapses.

Of course, you can’t stop me—over the years I’ve written 24 volumes of Noomachy, and the last three are devoted to the Russian Logos. But the institutionalization of the Russian Idea has again been postponed.

My example, of course, is not an isolated one. All or almost all thinkers and theorists involved in justifying the identity of Russian civilization have experienced something similar. We are dealing with a philosophical war. A real one—a fierce and well-organized opposition to the Russian Idea, supervised from abroad, but carried out by local liberals or just ordinary officials, passively following fashion and trends and a well-organized information strategy of direct agents of influence.

We are now at the point where the institutionalization of Russian Discourse is needed. Everyone has seen in our information war how controllable and manipulable the attitudes and processes in society are. But this is a consequence. The most serious clashes take place at the level of paradigms and epistemes. He who controls knowledge, Michel Foucault wrote, is the one who has true power. True power is power over the minds and souls of people.

Philosophy is the most important front line, and its implications are far superior to the news from Ukraine that every Russian is so avidly watching today—how are our people doing? What new frontiers have they seized? Has the enemy wavered? Herein lies the main obstacle to our victory.

What we need is a philosophy of victory. Without it, all will be in vain, and all our successes will easily be turned into defeat.

All true reforms must begin in the realm of the Spirit. And as news from the front is sought in the news—what about the institution of philosophy? Still holding its ground? Has it surrendered yet?


Alexander Dugin is a widely-known and influential Russian philosopher. His most famous work is The Fourth Political Theory (a book banned by major book retailers), in which he proposes a new polity, one that transcends liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. He has also introduced and developed the idea of Eurasianism, rooted in traditionalism. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geopolitica.


Featured image: “Fireworks on Victory Day,” by Mikhail Bobyshovl painted in 1961.

Democracy: The Failure of a System become Religion

What is democracy? The answer given by civics textbooks and constitutional law treatises has the merit of being simple. Democracy has its origins in the Greek demokratia, formed from demos, “people,” and kratos, “power.” It is the power of the people, the government of the people; a political system where the people are sovereign. It is close to the republic, but it is not confused with it. The word “republic” comes from the Latin res publica, which means “the public good,” “the public thing.” The republic is the political system in which power is not exercised by one person, a hereditary monarch, but by elected representatives of the people. Democracy and republic, therefore, have very similar etymological meanings, but they cover different historical realities. In theory, in a pure democracy the voting majority has unlimited power; whereas in a pure republic a set of fundamental laws, a constitution, protects the rights of all against the will of the majority. Of course, in practice, modern nation-states are neither pure republics nor pure democracies.

Lawyers and political scientists distinguish between direct democracy, where citizens meet in assemblies and exercise power directly, and representative democracy, where citizens choose representatives to exercise power on their behalf. They point out that in a democracy, rulers are chosen through free elections, based on universal suffrage and free and secret ballots. They also point out that power is exercised by the elected representatives of the majority party, who have the legitimacy to govern, but under the control of the opposition, which has the freedom to criticize the government. Finally, they agree that the system can only function when there is a separation of powers (legislative, executive and judicial, not to mention the media, which has acquired the status of a fourth power since the 20th century) and, above all, a broad social consensus around values and legal provisions, which, in the case of France, are summarized by the motto of the Republic: liberté, égalité, fraternité (Liberty, Equality, Fraternity).

Democracy as a Modern, Secular Religion

Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America (1860-1865), is said to have once declared that democracy is “government of the people, by the people and for the people,” meaning that sovereignty belongs to the people, who choose those who govern them. To this day, this principle is the theoretical foundation of Western democracies.

But to say that the people should be sovereign does not mean that they are. There is the admirable ideal and the prosaic reality. Paradoxically, the word “democracy” has become a cliché, a demagogic commonplace, a superstition, a mystification. Democracy has become over time a substitute, a surrogate, a semblance of faith, a kind of secular religion, even a religion of war. To cite only one example, that of the United States of America, the military interventions and aggressions committed by the US in the world in the name of democracy and freedom (the “democratic crusades” of the “benevolent policeman of the world” or of the “indispensable nation”), are countless.

It is not only the few cases from the turn of the 21st century, repeated in the mainstream media, nor the 400 interventions over two centuries in the whole of Hispanic America, as meticulously listed by the Argentine historian, Gregorio Selser (Cronología de las intervenciones extranjeras en América Latina, 4 vols., 2010)—the balance sheet is in fact far worse. The United States has fought or fomented government overthrows all over the world: the Philippines, Laos, Vietnam, Korea, Cambodia, Cuba, Lebanon, Congo, Brazil, Peru, Dominican Republic, Iran, Guatemala, Ecuador, Haiti, Chile, Angola, Nicaragua, Grenada, Panama, Sudan, Somalia, Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo), Iraq, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Indonesia. Since its inception in 1776, the U.S. has been more or less at war 80 to 90% of the time. Today, it has 175 military bases in 130 countries. By comparison, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia between them have barely 30 bases abroad. In 2019, the defense budget of the United States and its NATO allies amounted to more than $1 trillion (52% of the global defense budget), while Russia’s budget amounted to $65.1 billion.

Under the guise of good intention and the defense of democracy, Washington defends above all the interests of American companies. We all know Theodore Roosevelt’s formula: “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.” Soft power to seduce and convince, and hard power to hit and punish! But rather than colonizing territories and peoples, US governments have made the wise choice of controlling decision-makers and gaining access to raw materials and national markets for their corporations or multinationals. The hawks in Washington are doing in Europe and around the world what they did in Central and South America—they are making sure they dominate militarily as well as economically. To do this, colonizing the elites is the most effective way. And in the end, the Empire’s allies are not simply friendly states, but rather protectorates or vassals with no real say in the matter. In the end, all have to obey. De Gaulle, who was to be a faithful, even unconditional friend of America in the most difficult moments of the Cold War, understood this well. He knew that Roosevelt hated him, that he considered him a “madman” and that he wanted to bring him down in one way or another because of his desire for sovereignty and independence.

The American myth of liberal democracy has slowly collapsed in favor of a plutocracy or corporatocracy. The values of the Founding Fathers have gradually disappeared in favor of the financial-industrial-military complex that Eisenhower warned against in 1961. And this situation was not new then. The nineteenth U.S. president, Rutherford Birchard Hayes, had already expressed concern about the evolution of such a system in his diary on March 11, 1888: “The real difficulty is with the vast wealth and power in the hands of the few and the unscrupulous who represent or control capital. Hundreds of laws of Congress and the state legislatures are in the interest of these men and against the interests of workingmen. These need to be exposed and repealed. All laws on corporations, on taxation, on trusts, wills, descent, and the like, need examination and extensive change. This is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people no longer. It is a government of corporations, by corporations, and for corporations.”

In a November 21, 1933 letter to Edward House, a former Wilson advisor, Roosevelt also made this admission: “The truth is that, as you and I know, a financial element in the great centers has owned the government since the days of Andrew Jackson.” Significantly, 15 billionaires now control the US media.

American democracy has undoubtedly turned into an oligarchy. The people still have some influence at the local level, but they no longer have much of a say at the federal level. At the top level, a tiny number of people make the decisions and reap most of the benefits. Blinded by the material comforts that the system has provided for decades, the American people have not been able or willing to see that their democracy has been progressively confiscated by their elites, that these elites have hijacked power for their own ends, and that the “deep state” has other ambitions than to help the American people, the real deep state. This lucid diagnosis is not the monopoly of dangerous radicals, anarchists, Marxists or other “anti-capitalist” revolutionaries. It is the work of a great many authors (and sometimes even presidents of the Republic) with the most diverse political sensibilities, such as Howard Zinn, John Perkins, Diana Johnstone, Michael Parenti, Eliot A. Cohen, William Blum, Noam Chomsky, Ron Paul, Pat Buchanan, Carroll Quigley, Christopher Lasch or Paul Gottfried, who denounce this situation of capture or perversion of the democratic system and of dangerous overextension of the Empire. Among them, the vast majority have as their essential concern the scrupulous respect of the principles of the Founding Fathers, collective security and the common good of the American people.

On this point, the “conventional” and somewhat “angelic” thesis of historian Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman (American Umpire, 2013), built around the slogans “we are exceptional,” “we have made the world a better place because of our activities abroad,” “we are not an Empire” because “we are a democratic republic,” proves to be confoundingly biased and shallow, especially when compared to the historically and geopolitically sound argument of Nikola Mirkovic’s recent book (L’Amérique Empire, 2021).

However, it is rare to hear someone declare or “denounce” himself as a “skeptic” or moderate democratic, and even less as a “non-democratic” or “anti-democratic.” Even more so, no political regime would dare to define itself in this way. Democracy has been, for more than a century, a true political messianism that pursues the realization of the ancestral myth of the perfect City, of the ideal City and of the new Man. Not so long ago, Stalin (at least that’s what Yuri Zukhov says), and all the Bolshevik socialists, such as Lenin, Trotsky, Mao or Pol Pot, wanted to be partisans of a “new democracy.” Mussolini proclaimed the rejection of the “conventional and absurd lie of political equality and collective irresponsibility,” in favor of an “organized, centralized and authoritarian democracy,” “the purest form of democracy.” Not to be outdone, the doctrinaires of National Socialist Germany condemned, like their counterparts in the Soviet Union, “formal, bourgeois democracy.” The “Fuehrer State” was supposed to be, according to them, “directly democratic in the best sense of the word.” One can always dream about intentions and deny realities.

Most Europeans and Westerners today believe that freedom goes hand-in-hand with democracy, just as the stars go with the moon. There are of course false notes in the polite speeches of the “elites,” as when the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, issued his startling warning: “There can be no democratic choice against the European treaties” (Figaro, June 29, 2015). There are also scandalous manipulations of the popular will, as when in 2007, President Sarkozy had the National Assembly ratify the Lisbon Treaty on the new European Constitution, even though it had been rejected by the people in the referendum of May 29, 2005. (In the Netherlands, it was the Senate that was responsible for adopting the same treaty first rejected by the people; and in Ireland, the voters had to vote and re-vote until they finally said “yes”). As the somewhat chameleonic and communist-courting poet Bertolt Brecht wrote in the aftermath of the East German uprising (June 17, 1953): “Since the people vote against the government, the people must be dissolved.”

However, the voters whose eyes are permanently unblinded are not legion and many are disillusioned. Democracy and freedom are taken for granted (even more so when the Western media compare the situation of their countries with the rest of the world), whereas in reality both are only partially implemented and sometimes even largely forbidden. In such a political and social context, to question the value and foundations of democracy, or to express doubts about the possibilities of its practical realization, is to attract the wrath, contempt and hatred of the high priests of the cult and other opinion-makers. To be accused by the media and the champions of virtue of the capital sin of antidemocracy is to expose oneself to the danger of a condemnation to silence, to a life of a pariah. A political regime and those who serve it rarely understand that one criticizes it or that one does not accept to sing its praises. Strangely enough, modern censors and neo-inquisitors have forgotten that generations of prestigious historians, jurists, philosophers and political scientists have carried out for almost two centuries, in an honest, rigorous and disinterested way, the most implacable analysis and dissection of Western democracy.

In the 1920s, the liberal philosopher José Ortega y Gasset had already denounced “morbid democracy.” In his famous lecture “De Europa meditatio quaedam,” in 1945, he warned Berlin students that the word “has become prostituted,” because it has many meanings that coexist. The word “democracy,” he said, has become “stupid and fraudulent;” its daily use, for whatever reason, resembles the invocation of a civil religion. The philosopher of law, Hans Kelsen, also wrote as early as 1929: “Democracy is the slogan that generally dominates the minds of the 19th and 20th centuries. But that is precisely why it loses its true meaning—like any other slogan.” No less lucid, the economist Joseph Schumpeter, noted in 1942 that “residual democracy” is “an organized hypocrisy.” It is reduced, said Gonzálo Fernández de la Mora (La partitocracia, 1977), to the opportunity that the partitocratic oligarchies offer to the governed to periodically pronounce on an option, generally limited, after having carried out a great operation of informing, or marketing to, the public opinion. In Du pouvoir (1945). Bertrand de Jouvenel was no less severe: “Discussions about democracy, arguments in its favor or against it, are struck with intellectual nullity, because one does not know what one is talking about.” Significantly, many intellectual and academic personalities, with openly democratic convictions, prefer to speak of “deficient democracy,” “precarious democracy,” “democratic deficit,” “impolitic regime,” “fatigue” and “exhaustion” of the Welfare State, “end of the democratic ideal,” “twilight” or “winter of liberal democracy.” Such is the case with Guglielmo Ferrero, Giovani Sartori, Angelo Panebianco, Stephen Krasner, Gaston Bouthoul, Julien Freund, Michel Sandel, Danilo Zolo, Guy Hermet, Michel Maffesoli and many others.

The Various Meanings of the Word “Democracy”

The reality is that the concept of democracy has multiple meanings that can satisfy everyone. The word has served and serves to designate and ennoble contrary doctrines and practices. With the exception of the last disciples of traditionalist thinkers, such as Maistre or Bonald, for whom only an order inspired by God is legitimate, and even of the last positivist monarchists of the Action française, everyone today declares himself in favor of democracy. But which democracy?

Historically, democracy, or rather a form of democracy, was established in Greece in the 5th century BC. But the current forms of government that claim to be its heirs only borrow its name. In the Athens of the 5th century B.C., out of a population of 400,000 inhabitants, only 10% of the men were recognized as citizens and represented their families (less than 200,000 souls); women, metics and slaves did not participate in political life. The Greeks also considered the election as an antidemocratic and aristocratic process that gave a notorious advantage to the most educated, the richest, the most gifted and the most cunning. The drawing of lots was, according to them, the only device capable of ensuring the democratic character of government.

On the other hand, neither Plato nor Aristotle claimed to be democratic. Plato believed that it violated freedom and dignity under the guise of equality. As for Aristotle, he preferred the “mixed” regime, a subtle mixture of democracy, monarchy and aristocracy. Ancient democracy thus remained for a very long time an object of study reserved to the scholars. The medieval proto-democracy having led to a dead end, and the revolutionaries (1642, 1763 and 1789) having not given their trust to the people any more than their counter-revolutionary opponents, it was not until the first waves of democratization in the 19th century (in the United States with Andrew Jackson in 1829 and in Europe with the revolutions of 1848), and especially after the First World War that mass democracy and universal suffrage began to develop in Western Europe and the West.

Democracy can be considered from two approaches: normative or descriptive. From a normative point of view, political democracy is above all a principle of legitimacy. Thus conceived, it is both the smallest and the only common denominator of all democratic doctrines: power is legitimate when it derives from the authority of the people and is based on their consent.

Let us immediately point out a major difference here. For the realist normativist (moderate liberals or conservative-liberals, who have not ceased to multiply throughout history the procedures aimed at diminishing the influence of universal suffrage, despite the fact that it is proclaimed by them as a constitutional principle), the end cannot justify the means. On the other hand, for the idealist or utopian normativist (liberal-Jacobin, socialist-authoritarian or Marxist-totalitarian), the use of non-democratic means for ends deemed to be democratic is always ultimately justified.

The example taken from French political history is eloquent. What matters for the French utopian normativist is not that the democratic system guarantees social order and the common good, internal harmony and external security, but that it maintains above all and at any cost the humanitarian values of the revisited ideal of the Enlightenment. All those who do not accept the rules of the game are thus excluded ipso facto. The power is held by the people and the “values” are in theory a function of the will of the people; but in reality, for our “progressives,” “defenders of the Republic and of Democracy,” the people can never have the power to question the “republican and democratic values,” these being able to be altered or redefined only by the members of the self-proclaimed republican elite. The same is true of the social-democratic theorist Jürgen Habermas. In the name of “constitutional patriotism,” the German philosopher wants to be the intractable censor of historical-cultural or social-identitarian patriotism. He intends to save the possibility of a “universal consensus” of substance; and to do this he expressly excludes those who are “clearly and voluntarily” (according to his own criterion), “beyond the borders of society.”

American neoconservatives and neoliberals (Alan Bloom, Wolfowitz, Hanson, Kagan, Podhoretz, Kristol, etc.), but also many of Strauss’ disciples (with their French epigones Bernard-Henri Lévy, Jacques Attali, Alain Minc, etc.) are all on the same ideological page when they defend the right to interfere, or the right to humanitarian intervention all over the world, in the name of “equality, freedom and human rights”) and advocate the universal application manu militari of the American or Western democratic model.

The irony is that since the 19th century, the arguments of European colonialists have also generally been developed on a triple register: economic (search for markets and raw materials), political (imperatives of grandeur and power) and moral (benefits of science, reason, education, progress, civilization, the Enlightenment, human rights, secular morality and/or religion). The origins and justifications of the Western right to interfere can be found much further back, not only in the Protestant jurist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) or the economist John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), but also in the theologian and founder of the School of Salamanca, Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546). According to the Dominican Vitoria, the following are legitimate grounds for intervention: natural law and the law of nations, the right of natural communication, the right to preach the Gospel freely, the tyranny of the indigenous rulers, the agreement or approval of the majority of the indigenous people, the alliance and the appeal for help from friendly peoples and, finally, a ground that he considers more debatable, the temporary incapacity of the indigenous people to administer themselves. One is tempted here to quote Ecclesiastes: “What was, will be; what was done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun.”

In this case, American democratic interventionism at the turn of the 21st century, so often described as hegemonism or imperialism by its opponents, is neither new, nor original, nor modern. Strauss was fond of explaining that one should always judge political thinkers by the fruits of their ideas. But in view of the havoc wrought in the name of his ideas by his followers, one cannot help but return the argument. Relativism, historicism, non-interventionism and, more generally, the democratic realism of authors like Tocqueville, Ortega y Gasset, Buchanan, Mearsheimer or Paul Gottfried is infinitely less dangerous than the democratic humanitarianism of the Straussian warmongers or the neoliberal globalists.

From a second point of view, no longer normative but descriptive, political democracy is a system based on the competition of parties and elites, a competition arbitrated by the masses, as well as on the limitation of the power of rulers. Within this system, the majority must respect the rights of minorities. The reasoning here is centered on the concepts of electoral participation, selection of leaders, representation, opposition, control, limitation of power—but it is not at all centered on the idea of a self-governing people. However, in a democracy, the key notion is neither the number, nor the suffrage, nor the election, nor the representation—but the participation of all the citizens in public life. Everyone must play an active role as a member of the community, as part of a whole. The maximum of democracy merges with the maximum of participation.

In fact, depending on the convictions of its exegetes, democracy rests on different, if not contradictory, foundations. It can be founded either in reference to the individual without belonging—this is liberal democracy; or in reference to the masses, or to the working-class as the potential negation of other classes—this is popular democracy; or, in reference to the people conceived as a collective organism and as the privileged authors of all historical destiny—this is organic democracy. “Liberty, equality, fraternity,” proclaims the French Republican motto. Liberty is attached to liberal democracy. Equality has been exploited by popular democracies. Fraternity is at the heart of organic democracy.

Let us recall a key element that is at the heart of popular, social-Marxist democracy. At the time of its creation and development, socialists and Marxist communists castigated universal suffrage as essentially mystifying. The revolutionary minority was not to abdicate to the average opinion. “True democracy” was the one imposed and guided by the “conscious minority.” The “revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat” had to act without taking into account the refractory mass, the unconscious majority, charged with the great mission of awakening men to freedom. The exercise of universal suffrage in Western democracies could be, in this optic, only a simple propaedeutic to revolutionary action and to the seizure of power that was expected from it, at the same time as an exceptional occasion of agitation and propaganda. Lenin and all Marxists announced as the last stage of their regime the stateless and classless society; but the stage of “dictatorship of the proletariat” in charge of oppressing the bourgeois class was quickly converted into a permanent and definitive dictatorship of the minority of the Party over the whole society.

Third type of democracy: organic democracy. Here, representation takes place, partially or totally, through the municipality, the family unit, the region, the union, the professional associations or the corporations. These different forms of participation are themselves supplemented by the practice of referendums. Organic democracy is almost always held by its opponents (especially Anglo-Saxon Protestants) to be the exclusive invention of authoritarian or even totalitarian regimes (that of Franco’s or Italian Fascist doctrinaires) or of Catholicism (that of Catholic-socialist or traditionalist authors, such as Ketteler, Le Play, La Tour du Pin, Toniolo, Chesterton, Belloc, etc.). But this assertion is totally false. Social organicism has its origin in German idealism (Hegel, Fichte, Ahrens and Krause). Later, it is found in eminent liberal and socialist authors, often Freemasons, such as Renan, Carlyle, Durkheim, Duguit, de Man, Laski, Weber, Prat de la Riba, Madariaga or Besteiro. For the proponents of organicism, any political doctrine whose implementation favors the disintegration of peoples, or the erosion of popular consciousness in the sense of a consciousness of belonging to the organic entity that is the people, must be considered undemocratic.

That said, the problem of terminological confusion and the correct meaning of the word “democracy” is not reduced to the simple triad of liberal democracy, popular democracy and organic democracy. Other meanings have spread with varying degrees of success. We speak of representative or liberal democracy to describe a system based on the power of parliamentary assemblies. We evoke polyarchic democracy to emphasize the plurality of pressure groups and decision-making centers. We refer to direct democracy to name a model based on the practice of referendums. Direct or plebiscitary democracy is opposed to representative, partitocratic, pluralist or polyarchic democracy. The former, supported by the national and/or populist right, is criticized on the right and left, often with arguments reminiscent of those of the traditionalist right. Referendum democracy would be an open door to demagogy, madness, passions and irrationality. The argument is strong, but in representative democracy, the delegation, the exercise of the mandate, does not prevent the manipulation of parliamentarians by lobbies, economic arms of strong, invisible powers, nor the taking of ill-considered decisions, questionable or prejudicial to the interests of the people.

We also speak of social democracy, to define a way of life characterized by the levelling of differences in condition, or of economic democracy, to signify the will to equalize wealth. The State (Welfare State) is entrusted with the task of compensating for socio-economic inequalities through measures to protect the most disadvantaged and to redistribute wealth. Industrial democracy is also referred to as self-management or direct self-government in the workplace; or local or grassroots democracy, to avoid using the term organic democracy. Since 1997, reference has also been made to illiberal democracy, to qualify and criticize the regimes of Eastern Europe (notably Hungary and Poland) which oppose liberal globalization, without denying freedoms, and which claim control over the collective destiny and cultural integrity of their peoples. Finally, the concepts or terms of moral, populist, citizen, absolutist, prophylactic, belligerent, ballistic, strategic democracy have appeared, as well as those of market democracy, technocratic democracy, internet democracy, teledemocracy, “cyber-democracy,” “democratic governance” (a system that in reality reserves “serious” decisions for the small number of technocrats), participatory, deliberative, diversitarian, multicultural, global, globalized democracy, etc. Welcome to Orwellian newspeak!

With the latest “progressive” fads, classical democracy has been turned against itself to become a real enterprise of permanent deconstruction of Western values and institutions. Citizenship is no longer based on the equality of rights between citizens. The new social struggles claim to be articulated around identity, cultural and racial struggles. Multicultural democracy is in charge of enforcing political correctness, using coercion if necessary. It must pursue equality between groups by refusing the norm that is imposed on all. It must neutralize the majority for the benefit of the different cultural minorities. Consequently, the popular referendum must be prohibited as an instrument and expression of the tyranny of the majority. It is no longer a question of representing a pre-existing people (whose existence is denied), nor a relatively coherent collectivity, but of setting up a mechanism of representation allowing the various particular identities (homosexuals, LGBT, decolonial indigenous people, racialists and others) to assert themselves and to emancipate themselves. Democracy, writes political scientist Dalmacio Negro Pavón, “is thus reduced to political correctness defined and sanctioned by governments with the active or passive assent of the governed, previously infantilized by massive propaganda” (La loi de fer de l’oligarchie: Pourquoi le gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple, pour le peuple est un leurre [The Iron Law of Oligarchy: Why government of the people, by the people, for the people is a sham], 2019).

Aristotle, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Jefferson, etc. explained that democracy is impossible without a limited territory, an ample middle-class balancing the extremes, and a high degree of homogeneity or socio-cultural cohesion. Montesquieu taught that “political virtue,” which he identified with love of law and country, was indispensable to democracy. Generations of political scientists have insisted on the cultural (Tocqueville, Mill) or economic (Lipset) conditionality of democracy’s development. Others (such as Juan Donoso Cortès, Lord Acton, Christopher Dawson, Julien Freund, etc.) pointed out that all forms of democracy are conditional on the development of the state and have argued that all known civilizations have drawn their strength and stability from religion; that the fundamental ideas that shape Europe and the West (universalism, recognition of the value and natural dignity of the individual, distinction between religion and the State, importance of the election of assemblies since the Middle Ages) are practically all of Christian origin or have been re-elaborated or re-adapted by Christianity, and that the decline of Europe and of Western civilization has its origin in the rebellion, the abandonment or the negation of Christian roots.

Still others have emphasized the inevitable political and social consequences of the demographic suicide of the West (the famous work of P. Chaunu and G. Suffert, La peste blanche [The White Plague] now dates from almost half a century ago). But the deconstructionists and other modern utopians don’t care about that. They blithely and thoughtlessly take the exact opposite view of classical political science. In the final morbid phase of modern democracy, the totalitarian temptation is irresistible. The Orwellian newspeak is at work. Is it necessary to underline further the extent of the semantic and ideological confusion that reigns around the magic word of “democracy?”

Criticisms of the Liberal-Democratic Model

The theoretical critique, whether radical or balanced, of the liberal-democratic model has been systematized by multiple authors on the right and the left. Jusnaturalists, defenders of metaphysical natural law, have resorted to dogmatic arguments, such as the divine right of kings. Others have argued philosophically that what is true and just is independent of its recognition by the majority. German idealism (Hegel, Krause), elitist socialism (Saint-Simon, Fourier), anarchism (that of the republican Proudhon of the Solution of the Social Problem, 1848), Comtian positivism, Le Bon’s social psychology, Le Play’s empiricism, Maurras’ monarchist nationalism, Guénon’s integral traditionalism, all deny the individualistic and inorganic principle of the political representation: man is not a solitary being who constitutes the state by means of a pact, as if it were an anonymous society. He is born into a community, and his voice can only really be expressed through the intermediary bodies into which he is really inserted: family, municipality, region, professional body, etc. The jurist Carl Schmitt, for his part, has shown that there is a contradiction at the heart of the liberal-democratic regime: liberalism denies democracy (the logic of identity) and democracy denies liberalism (the logic of difference). There is an invincible opposition between the consciousness of the individual and democratic homogeneity, which presupposes the identity between rulers and ruled. In the eyes of Schmitt, liberal thought overlooks the political, because its individualism prevents it from understanding the formation of collective identities.

On the other hand, the Marxist, anarchist and syndicalist-revolutionary schools (Sorel, Labriola, Valois) have denounced in the liberal-democratic model a system of formal liberties, which become real only for the bourgeoisie. Political realist sociology (Ostrogorski, Pareto, Mosca, Michels) has demonstrated that political elites are never the product of the will of the masses, but that minorities select themselves by means of competition and self-affirmation, that political leaders are not the agents chosen by the people, but oligarchies, all the more closed in on themselves, as they belong to structured and organized parties.

All the criticisms of democracy can be grouped into two categories. Some of them concern the democratic principle itself and are generally anti-democratic. The others deplore the fact that democratic practice rarely conforms to the ideal and propose various solutions to remedy this. But often the authors adopt successively one or the other position, so that it is not easy to situate them clearly. Most of these criticisms are well known: democracy is par excellence the reign of division, instability, endemic civil war, rhetoric, the dictatorship of quantity (“the superior cannot emanate from the inferior”), disguised oligarchy, incompetence, mediocrity, corruption, influence peddling and the omnipotence of money. Democracy has no other philosophical foundation than skepticism and relativism. Until recently, many of the authors of these critiques were not so much fighting parliamentary and representative democracy in principle as the capitalist or market democracy in which it is embedded. The problems of social justice, of class struggles and of socio-economic exploitation were not then considered as accessory or subsidiary. The “social sciences” did not yet claim to have “discovered” the “real” enemy of redeemed humanity that is Western civilization dominated by the white, heterosexual, colonialist, slave-owning male, responsible for all discriminations.

Comparing “constitutional ideology” to “political reality,” many legal scholars and political scientists have criticized the abstractions, metaphors and fictions of liberal democracy.

The first example of a fiction is the principle of the division of powers (executive, legislative and judicial). In reality, the parliament regularly invades the domain of the executive when it legislates in concrete, not general, matters; the government promulgates decree-laws of general content and thus assumes the functions of the legislature; and the judges of the constitutional court exercise the supreme legislative or even constitutional function when they interpret an ambiguous, fundamental precept.

The second example of fiction: the main justification for parliament is that it streamlines discussion, ensures political transparency and expresses the national will. But the reality is quite different. Most deputies or representatives are not those whom the people consider the best, but those who belong to the class of “politicians.” Their non-imperative mandate is not enough to ensure their independence, as they are usually subject to the discipline or instructions of their party. The voter puts a ballot in the box and the parties then arrange to form a coalition government or not at their convenience. The more important the deliberations, the more secretly they are conducted by senior party officials. The same applies to the selection and nomination of candidates for election and the appointment of offices. Nor is parliament the instrument of political integration, of the submission of divergent wills to a single national will, but the means by which a political faction occupies the entire state and imposes itself on its opponents.

Third example of fiction: the liberal-democratic State intends to ensure the equality of power to all deputies and the equality of vote of all citizens. But then, why does the simple majority in the constituent assemblies undemocratically provide that qualified majorities will be needed to reform the Constitution? Why do most electoral laws establish very high electoral thresholds (5 to 10%) and majority bonuses (of 25 or 50%), so that some ballots are worth more than others? Wouldn’t the basis of the anti-democratic spirit finally be to consider that the primary goal of an election is not to allow the people to express themselves freely but to force them to elect a “stable majority” of an oligarchic nature?

To this, the realist democrat retorts that a regime based on the plurality of parties, the limitation of powers and the respect of minorities, may be execrable, but that the others are even worse. We know Churchill’s ironic or cynical phrase, “democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” In Democratic Theory, the famous liberal political scientist Giovanni Sartori agrees that “anyone who wants to prove that the democratic system has a rational basis is at a dead end…. It is no accident that in the realm of rationalist philosophy one rarely encounters theories of democracy.”

The only exception to the rule is that of the rationalist Rousseau; but he is forced to resort to the fiction of the general will in order to better evade the fallible and changing will of all. In truth, it is difficult to affirm that there is more rationality among the supporters of democracy than among its opponents. The liberal Hans Kelsen, for example, readily admits that he finds it difficult to believe that the people and only the people possess the truth and the sense of the good; for this would imply a belief in a divine right of the people as inadmissible as the belief that a man is king by the grace of God. Kelsen goes even further. He admits, as do many other lucid democrats, that the cause of democracy is hopeless, if one starts from the idea that man can attain absolute truths and values. The liberal philosopher Pierre Manent also concedes that “under the guise of democracy, it is in reality an oligarchy that thrives.” He does not hesitate to add: “the minority of those who possess material and cultural capital manipulate political institutions to their benefit.”

The “democracy or dictatorship” dilemma, in which idealistic democrats seek to confine their opponents, is more seductive than it is well-founded. No political procedure is an absolute guarantee against autocracy and despotism. Even the least brilliant student of the history of political ideas knows this. Tyranny and dictatorship represent a corruption that is always possible and that also threatens, in different forms, the totality of political systems.

Real Western Democracy

Historically, the world has never known any other form of government than that of the few, of the ruling minority (the oligarchy, the establishment, nowadays the European-American-globalist “elite bloc,” i.e., all the financial, industrial and media elites, without forgetting Gramsci’s “organic intellectuals” and, of course, the so-called “experts” of the consulting firms). Moreover, every government needs the support of public opinion. Behind all known forms of government (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy—according to the classical classification; democracy and dictatorship—according to modern classification), there is always a minority that dominates the immense majority. The multiple possible variants depend on the mode of renovation of the minority and the limits and controls to which this minority submits in the exercise of power. The positions of power are never contested by the masses; they are contested by the different factions of the political class. The governed are spectators, sometimes facilitators, but rarely arbiters. When a political oligarchy is discredited, it is replaced by another in search of prestige, of legitimacy of exercise, ready if necessary to use demagogy. All political power seeks to simulate, to operate in secrecy, to control information, to manufacture consent through the mass media.

The works of Gustave Le Bon (The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, 1895), Edward Bernays (Propaganda, 1928), Lord Ponsnonby (Falsehood in War-Time, 1928), Sergei Stepanovich Chakhotin, (The Rape of the Masses. The Psychology of Totalitarian Political Propaganda, 1939), or Jacques Ellul (Propaganda, 1962) or Anne Morelli (Principes élémentaires de propagande de guerre, 2001) to name but a few, have explained in great detail how propaganda (or “communication” as we hypocritically call it today), whether “good” or “bad,” “white” (for the Good) or “black” (for the Evil), works in Western democracies. They have demonstrated that it is, paradoxically, an invention of liberal democracies and not, as is often heard, the creation and practice of totalitarian or authoritarian states alone. When today’s politically correct journalism (opinion journalism camouflaged behind the cloak of so-called news journalism) criticizes, not without corporatist ulterior motives, the “fearsome character” of the new cyber propaganda, it is the hospital that mocks the charity. In reality, the often-vaunted pluralism of the Western mainstream media is nothing but a deception, fully described by the allegory of the horse and rabbit stew.

On the evening of the re-election of French President Emmanuel Macron (April 24, 2022), an independent journalist mischievously asked in the columns of a non-conformist blog: “What is the name of the country where almost 100% of the subsidized press supports the government? What is the name of the country where all taxpayers finance, forced and coerced, media “committed” to the same side, that of the elites, the power and a huge hegemonic party that criminalizes its opponents? What is the name of the country where half of the citizens no longer trust any major media?” (G. Cluzel. BV, April 24, 2022). Of course, the almost unwavering attachment of the people of the United States of America to the First Amendment of its Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech, press and expression, makes all the difference and seems to protect them from a similar situation. But while the American citizen-voter can ignore the precepts of political correctness and say in theory just about anything he or she wants, he or she cannot do so without risking serious disadvantages in his or her professional and social life.

Politics, said the poet Paul Valery, “is the art of preventing people from meddling in what concerns them.” But public opinion is much more aware of this today. The consequence is that the oligarchy or “elite bloc”—increasingly fearful—tightens the screws that subjugate the demos. We know the hostility, contempt and fear that populist movements and popular rebellions such as the “Yellow Vests” arouse. People fear the power to which they are subjected—but power also fears the community over which it rules.

To conclude, real Western democracy is, after all, only an oligarchy elected by the people. It excludes the use of physical violence but not moral violence (unfair, fraudulent or restricted competition). Two conditions would make it possible to reform it in depth for the benefit of the people. First, the represented should be able to recover the freedom to directly control their representatives or elected officials, a freedom that has been abusively taken away from them. This would require the introduction of an electoral system with an imperative mandate; representatives would thus be obliged to respect the mandate of their respective electors. Then, for the people to be able, if not to direct and govern de facto, at least to participate durably in political life, it would be necessary for the principle of direct democracy to be widely accepted [with, of course, the referendum of popular initiative (RIP) or citizen initiative (RIC)]. A realistic ideal, which, one can well imagine, is not close to being achieved. The crux of the matter is, however, to prevent those in power from being mere transmission belts for the interests, desires and feelings of the political, social, economic and cultural oligarchy.

As the political scientist Dalmacio Negro points out, “The only effective attitude in politics is the rational criticism of reality in order to keep the spirit of collective freedom alive.” Realistic and lucid, he wisely adds that there is an essential condition for political democracy to be possible and for its corruption to become much more difficult if not impossible. It is necessary that the attitude towards the government be always distrustful, even when it is a question of friends or people for whom one has voted. Bertrand de Jouvenel said in this regard: “the government of friends is the barbaric way of governing.”


Arnaud Imatz, a Basque-French political scientist and historian, holds a State Doctorate (DrE) in political science and is a correspondent-member of the Royal Academy of History (Spain), and a former international civil servant at OECDHe is a specialist in the Spanish Civil War, European populism, and the political struggles of the Right and the Left – all subjects on which he has written several books. He has also published numerous articles on the political thought of the founder and theoretician of the Falange, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, as well as the Liberal philosopher, José Ortega y Gasset, and the Catholic traditionalist, Juan Donoso Cortés.


Featured image: “World’s Constable.” Cartoon by Louis Dalrymple. Published in Judge, January 14, 1905.

Civilization State, or the Multi-Polar World

The Special Military Operation in Ukraine (SMO) is widely recognized by competent experts in International Relations as the final and decisive moment in the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world.

Multipolarity often seems intuitively clear; but as soon as we try to give a precise definition or a correct theoretical description, everything becomes less obvious. I believe that my work A Theory of a Multi-polar World is more relevant today than ever before. But since people have forgotten how to read—especially lengthy theoretical texts, I will try to share the main points.

The main actor of a multipolar world order is neither a nation-state (as in the realist theory of International Relations), nor a unified World Government (as in the liberalist theory of International Relations). It is civilization state. Other names for it are “big space,” “Empire,” “ecumenism.”

The term “civilization state” is most often applied to China. Both ancient and modern. As early as ancient times, the Chinese developed the theory of “Tianxia” (天下), the “Celestial Empire,” according to which China is the center of the world, being the meeting place of unifying Heaven and dividing Earth. And the “Celestial Empire” may be a single state; or it may be broken up into its components and then reassembled. In addition, Han China itself acted as a culture-forming force for neighboring nations that were not directly part of China—primarily Korea, Vietnam, the Indochina countries and even Japan, which is quite independent.

The nation-state is a product of the European New Age, and in some cases a post-colonial construct. The civilization state has ancient roots and uncertain, shifting boundaries. The civilization state at times pulsates, expanding and contracting, while always remaining a constant phenomenon. (This is what, above all else, we need to know about our SMO.)

Contemporary China behaves strictly according to the principle of “Tianxia” in international politics. The One Belt, One Road Initiative is a prime example of what this looks like in practice. And China’s Internet, which cuts off any networks and resources that might weaken the civilizational identity at the entrance to China, demonstrates how the defense mechanisms are built.

The civilization state may interact with the outside world, but it never becomes dependent on it and always maintains self-sufficiency, autonomy and autarchy.

Civilization state is always more than just a state in both spatial and temporal (historical) terms.

Russia is increasingly gravitating toward the same status. After the beginning of the SMO, this was no longer mere wishful thinking, but an urgent necessity. As in the case of China, Russia has every reason to claim to be precisely a civilization. This theory was most fully developed by the Russian Eurasians, who introduced the notion of a “world-state,” or—which is the same thing—”Russian world. Actually, the concept of Russia-Eurasia is a direct indication of the civilizational status of Russia. Russia is more than a nation-state (which the Russian Federation is). Russia is a separate world.

Russia was a civilization in the era of the Empire, and remained so in Soviet times. Ideologies and regimes changed, but the identity remained the same.

The struggle for Ukraine is nothing less than a struggle for the civilization state. The same as the peaceful Union State of Russia and Belarus and the economic integration of the post-Soviet Eurasian space.

A multipolar world consists of civilization states. This is a kind of world of worlds, a megacosmos that includes entire galaxies. And here it is important to determine how many such civilization states can even theoretically exist?

Undoubtedly, this type includes India, a typical civilization state, which even today has enough potential to become a full-fledged actor in international politics.

Then there is the Islamic world, from Indonesia to Morocco. Here the fragmentation into states and different ethno-cultural enclaves does not yet allow us to speak of political unity. Islamic civilization exists, but the question of its assembly into a civilization state is rather problematic. Moreover, the history of Islam knows several types of civilization states, from the Caliphate (the First, Umayyad, Abbasid, etc.) to the three components of Genghis Khan’s Empire that converted to Islam (the Golden Horde, the Ilkhan and Chagatai ulus), the Persian Safavid Empire, the Great Moghul state, and finally, the Ottoman Empire. The borders once drawn are still relevant today in many respects. But the process of gathering them into a single structure requires considerable time and effort.

Latin America and Africa, two macro-civilizations that remain quite separate, are in a similar position. But a multipolar world will somehow push integration processes in all these zones.

Now the most important thing—what to do with the West? The theory of a multipolar world in the nomenclature of theories of International Relations in the modern West is absent.

The dominant paradigm there today is liberalism, which denies any sort of sovereignty and autonomy, abolishes civilizations and religions, ethnicities and cultures, replacing them by a forced liberal ideology, the concept of “human rights,” individualism (in the extreme leading to gender and transgender politics), materialism and technical progress elevated to the highest value (Artificial Intelligence). The goal of liberalism is to abolish nation-states and establish a World Government based on Western norms and rules.

This is the line pursued by Biden and the modern Democrat Party in the U.S., as well as most European rulers. This is what globalism is all about. It categorically rejects civilization state and any hint of multipolarity. That is why the West is ready for war with Russia and China. In a sense, this war is already going on in Ukraine and in the Pacific (the problem of Taiwan)—but so far via proxy-actors.

In the West, there is another influential school—realism in International Relations. Here the nation-state is considered a necessary element of the world order; but only those who have achieved a high level of economic, military-strategic and technological development—almost always at the expense of others—have sovereignty. While liberals see the future in a World Government, realists see it in an alliance of major Western powers setting global rules in their own interests. Again, both in theory and in practice, civilization state and a multipolar world are categorically rejected.

This creates a fundamental conflict already at the level of theory. And the lack of mutual understanding here leads to the most radical consequences at the level of direct collision.

In the eyes of supporters of multipolarity, the West is also a civilization state or even two—North American and European. But Western intellectuals do not agree with this; they have no theoretical frame for this—they know either liberalism or realism, and no multipolarity.

However, there are exceptions among Western theorists, such as Samuel Huntington or Fabio Petito. They—unlike the vast majority—recognize multipolarity and the emergence of new actors in the form of civilizations. This is gratifying, because through such ideas it is possible to build a bridge for supporters of multipolarity (Russia, China, etc.) to the West. Such a bridge would at least make negotiations possible. As long as the West categorically rejects multipolarity and the very notion of the civilization state, the conversation will be conducted only at the level of a clash of brute force—from military operations to economic blockade, information and sanction wars, and so on.

Finally, to win this war and defend itself, Russia itself must first clearly comprehend multipolarity. We are already fighting for it, but still do not fully understand what it is. It is necessary to urgently dissolve the liberal structures created in the Gorbachev-Yeltsin period and establish new multipolar structures. It is also necessary to restructure the educational paradigm itself—first of all at MGIMO, MGU, PFUR, the Maurice Thorez Institute, the Diplomatic Academy, and other specialized universities. Lastly, we need to really turn to a developed and fully-fledged Eurasian school of thought, which has proven to be highly relevant, but against which the overt and covert Atlantists and foreign agents, who deeply penetrate our society, continue to fight.


Alexander Dugin is a widely-known and influential Russian philosopher. His most famous work is The Fourth Political Theory (a book banned by major book retailers), in which he proposes a new polity, one that transcends liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. He has also introduced and developed the idea of Eurasianism, rooted in traditionalism. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geopolitica.


Featured image: “The Course of Empire: Consummation,” by Thomas Cole; painted in 1836.

Poland and the Partition of Ukraine

In regards to Poland… The plan to hand Western Ukraine over to Poland existed even before the start of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in the Ukraine, when the West was only considering the possibility of such a conflict. NATO believed that Russia would destroy the command center in Kiev at the very beginning of the SMO, and this would be the cue for Poland. The transfer of embassies from Kiev to Lvov was linked to this.

Russia’s strategy of focusing on Donbass and liberating Novorossia, with some delay in the operation as a result of Kiev-sanctioned terrorist (Syrian) strategy by the Nazis in eastern Ukraine, as well as the withdrawal of Russian troops from Kiev, modified the initial plan. For a moment, it seemed to the West that the Russian attack had fizzled out. In this situation, the Polish scenario was postponed.

It was revived after the sorry surrender of the neo-Nazis from the Russian-banned Azov Battalion. It became clear that Russia would sooner or later liberate Donbass and then Novorossiya, and that the Nazi front was about to fall. It was at this point that the West again turned to the “Western Ukraine as part of Poland” plan. Duda’s visit and Zelenski’s unprecedented moves to integrate Ukraine with Poland—in fact, the abolition of the border—are a watershed moment. The plan, ready from the start, has become valid again.

On the one hand, this greatly simplifies Russia’s task. Now it is obvious to everyone that the Western line in Ukrainian politics has reached a critical point, and the choice is no longer between a “non-independent Ukraine” and the return of Novorossia to Russia, but where Ukrainians will live—in Russia or in Poland. This is how the dream of the EU and NATO is realized.

But for Eastern Ukraine it is not acceptable at all. It will finally become clear to everyone here what Russia came for. And this means that the pro-Russian underground will revive, and the patriots will begin to exterminate the gravediggers of Ukraine little by little on their own.

There will also be some resistance in the west of Ukraine, but it is not yet clear what will come first—the slavish aspiration to join the EU and NATO, or straightforward Ukrainian nationalism. However, this is of secondary importance: Kiev is controlled from Washington, and the local population and its sentiments are irrelevant. Russia acts as the liberator of the united Russian people, which is what it has been since the 17th century.

Apparently, that is why the question of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and the banning of the deputy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine has become so acute. Everything indicates that integration into Poland is being prepared at an accelerated pace.

This could have been advantageous, if it were only about Novorossia for us. We will liberate the territory from Odessa to Kharkov, and in one way or another we will annex it. This is already beyond question. Western Ukraine as part of Poland is, at first glance, acceptable. For us it is ours; and the other half of the failed Ukraine goes back to what it was hoping for.
But there is another side.

First, NATO will still expand in our direction, and significantly. Even if not to the full extent, but half as much.

Secondly, the introduction of Polish troops would mean the direct participation of NATO in the conflict, which means that everything moves to a new level of escalation. The likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons increases. The question again arises about the red lines, which Russia has established with such difficulty and at such a price. And the borders between Eastern and Western Ukraine, or more precisely between Poland and Russia, will have to be defined in battles with the NATO contingent. This is highly problematic and risks moving the situation into the category of World War III.

And finally, in the third place. Russia, by agreeing to Poland’s annexation of Western Ukraine, loses its status as friend and liberator of the fraternal Ukrainian people, albeit a status that is not yet obvious to many. The state “Ukraine” no longer exists. But there are Ukrainians; and there are Orthodox Ukrainians; and in Western Ukraine they are still a majority. This is a problem. It turns out that we exchange “our” half of the Ukrainians for “someone else’s” half. And that is a trade transaction, not the fulfillment of a liberation mission.

As a private matter: the withdrawal of Western Ukraine to Poland can serve as an excellent argument for captive Ukrainians to take our side with fervor and rage and liberate what they consider “their land” under our command.

After Duda’s visit, Moscow has to solve a new dilemma. How should one deal with the direct involvement of Poland in the war against us?

Historically, the Russian Empire and then the USSR expanded westward in stages. One zone after another was conquered from Poland and the Ottoman Empire, right up to the Great Patriotic War, when Western Ukraine was also included in the USSR. Of course, this is not a linear process—there were also partitions of Poland, which for centuries ended up under the direct rule of Russia. And even earlier, there were battles for Kiev between the princes of Vladimir and Galicia. There were also repeated attempts to establish in Western Ukraine a metropolis, separate from the Great Russian metropolis. Ukraine is a frontier; a zone between two civilizations—Russian (Eurasian) and Western European; and earlier a zone between three—the Turkish-Islamic, from which the Russian Empire recaptured Novorossia, populating it with its own—both Great Russian peasantry and brotherly Little Russian Cossacks.

Therefore, changing hands was the fate of Ukraine. Hence the dual identity of being Russian, or anti-Russian. Hence the loyalty and betrayal deeply rooted in frontier culture. Taras Bulba and his son. Bogdan Khmelnitsky and Mazepa. The border runs through families, through hearts.

The activation of Poland’s role in the conflict aggravates the degree of the war between Russia and the West, civilization against civilization.
Theoretically, there are two solutions:

Agree to partition Ukraine, while trying to take as much as possible, and allowing Poland to act for itself rather than on behalf of NATO;
or go all the way with the risk of escalating the confrontation to the level of nuclear confrontation.

From the beginning of the SMO, I assumed that we would come to exactly this dilemma at some point. But it seemed to me that it would come to the fore during the fighting for Kiev. Events are unfolding according to a somewhat different logic, which does not cancel the basic geopolitical regularities, only framing them each time in an original and unpredictable way. This is what living history is all about—both to follow the lines of destiny and to deviate from them. If one raises the question of ending the SWU and any negotiations before the complete liberation of Novorossia, it is pure betrayal—only a “foreign agent” can advocate this. But the question of Western Ukraine is not so clear.

If it were not for the risk of nuclear war, I would be inclined to establish control over the entire territory of Ukraine. This would coincide with the president’s stated goals of demilitarization and denazification—in order to realize them, full control over the territory is necessary. It is clear that we would get a time bomb inside our territory. But after the excesses inevitable during military operations, normalization of both eastern and western Ukraine would require extraordinary efforts, from our side in any case. Things have become too brutal and bloody to hope for simple solutions. All of Ukraine is a challenge to our very being, and if we can deal with Eastern Ukraine, we will somehow deal with Western Ukraine as well. And, very importantly, we will preserve the church.

But at the same time, to limit ourselves to liberating Novorossia—with or without Kiev—would not be a direct “betrayal.” This plan can be considered, without betraying Russian destiny. There is room here for political realism, weighing the pros and cons, and considering the consequences. But at the start of the SMO—there was no such opportunity. It is a question of to be or not to be; and it is decided in favor of to be. The foothold of traitors is undone; and most importantly, the decision is irreversible.

With Poland the situation is different. And in some ways, it is no less complicated. If the duty of a patriot is to demand from the authorities the complete liberation of Novorossia, no matter what, then, in my opinion, in regards to the situation with Poland, the duty of a patriot is to accept the decision that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief will make.

A true victory begins with the liberation of Novorossia. After that, it’s up to God.


Alexander Dugin is a widely-known and influential Russian philosopher. His most famous work is The Fourth Political Theory (a book banned by major book retailers), in which he proposes a new polity, one that transcends liberal democracy, Marxism and fascism. He has also introduced and developed the idea of Eurasianism, rooted in traditionalism. This article appears through the kind courtesy of Geopolitica.

The Importance of Gaetano Mosca

A great book opens one’s eyes to processes that one may have missed had one not read it. Likewise, its power lies in activating one’s own abilities of thought to see more clearly what others may not notice at all or merely glimpse as a blur in the fog.

Few books I have read are better guides and eye-openers about how to think structurally, historically, and comparatively about politics generally, and the major crises of our time, crises that have largely been induced by a ruling class that has globalist ambitions, than Gaetano Mosca’s Ruling Class. Reading it can also help one be better attuned to the political fluxions that draw us toward the break-down of politics as the means for staving off those terrible forces of human destruction and rejuvenation—war and revolution, which are the inevitable consequences of a failure to adequately maintain and cultivate the powers of peace.

The ruling class of the West, which forms the core of a globalist elite, draws us into an external war—that remains at this stage a proxy war—and (most conspicuously so in the United States and Europe) a civil war that is playing itself out politically and institutionally and has already destroyed the very possibility of a common political culture.

1. Canonical and Great Books

Some books found peoples and nations; some assist in the founding of institutions; some open pathways for new types of orienting of human beings and help us forge a new reality; some provide the language and thought patterns of an epoch; some books are prophetic; and some provide the wherewithal that best defines the problem of an age. The most influential of these great books are canonical. And in spite of the ideological attack upon the canon which was part and parcel of a sweeping attempt to accommodate Western institutions to the knowledge and intellectual capacities of poorly-educated and under-read undergraduates and graduate students, canonical books exist because our world would simply not be the same were they to not have existed. This was also why it was commonly assumed amongst professors, teachers, and the professional classes that every educated person should acquaint himself with certain books at some point in his life-time.

The canon also reflects the problems of the ages and the most significant of attempted solutions—which is why it is so diverse, if I may be permitted to use a word that has become an ideological truncheon in the arsenal of managerial and progressive moral absolutes. A canonical work might not be error free, or it may be fraught with problems (Marx’s Communist Manifesto or Capital or Rousseau’s Èmile and Social Contract are obvious examples), or just simply defiant of traditional ethical appeals (Machiavelli’s Prince). Nor does the canon contain a collection of like-minded sentiments or responses to the human condition. And the idea that it is simply the point of view of white men makes no sense, given the shoddiness of the category—are people from what is now the Middle East, Northern Pakistan and Central Asia white?—or the authors of the Epic of Gilgamesh, the Egyptian Book of the Dead, the Koran, the Analects, the Tao Te Ching, and the Bhagavad Gita, which all are canonical works?

Then there are books which, though lesser known, if read attentively, can change how you see the world forever. They may not be canonical, but they express profound insights which, if remembered, would help us greatly in making sense of our world. I consider the writings of J.G. Hamann and Herder, of Franz Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy to be good examples of these kind of books. In the case of both pairs of thinkers, they were contemporaries of much more influential and famous philosophers—viz., the former were contemporaries of Kant, the latter of Heidegger. But whereas Kant and Heidegger remain essential to the philosophical tradition and hence to the curriculum of Philosophy (at least to that curriculum that breathes outside of the straightjacket of Analytic Philosophy), if one has attentively read Hamann et. al., then one can quickly identify a range of egregious deficiencies in the philosophies and legacies of Kant and Heidegger, and his ‘68 progeny.

Then there are books that were ignored at the time of their publication; or having made a strong impression upon a discipline or the public have faded from view, only to undergo a revival because they have been (re)discovered by later generations who see that they address something of profound importance about their lives and times. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, for example, were “stillborn” only to be reborn; while Mises’s Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis, took on a new life when the Soviet Union was collapsing.

Explosive times, invariably, call out for the most thoughtful and inventive of people to make sense of them. And great books are inevitably forged out of the explosive fall out; the materials and problems of times in great crisis. Though, we should note, that human beings are crisis producing creatures—which is why those who believe in progress invariably are forced to temper their enthusiasm when their own circumstances and age go to hell.

But let us first address the tumult of our time, which is the reason I suggest Gaetano Mosca’s Ruling Class is a must read.

2. Global Leadership Aspirations versus those Non-Compliant Critics from the “Led-ship”

We are living in a period of civil wars in the West being played out in its institutions, as the ruling political class, and the various interests it represents and deploys for its objectives, overturns (in large part by redefining the character and roles of all) traditional social institutions. It is a civil war that is rather typical of all civil wars—a ruling class furnishes the world in a way that suits its interests; but such furnishing requires great sacrifice from those whose lives are an important part of this new furnishing. And the proposed purpose, the changing circumstances, and the new future being made, do not fit well with the interests (the ways of being in the world) of those who are required to get in step with the dictates of the ruling class.

The civil war of our time, in other words, is the struggle over whether the future will be dictated by a globalist elite and those who (often unwittingly) work on their behalf, or by those who oppose the goals and means of that elite, and the sacrifices that are required to achieve it. On the one side stand those who believe they are striving for human progress, and that progress involves greater “emancipation,” “safety,” “diversity and inclusion,” and “equity.” Yet, as their critics point out, they are creating a world which is far less equitable, safe or free. They are contributing to a divide between the immensely rich, the highly paid leaders, and administrators, celebrities, elite athletes, and all those who are employed to do their bidding by supervising and instructing everyone in what to think and say, on the one hand, and the rest.

The rest are those who are meant to make up the great “led-ship,” who are to do the bidding the various leaders, the “representatives” of sustainability, global justice, world health—and pretty much anything else said leaders can think of—and thus the “rest” find themselves increasingly beholden to leaders. Irrespective of their intentions, the more vocal opponents of this ruling elite can see that they are aiding and abetting corporate technocratic globalism, and its accompanying suppliers of governance (administrative states beholden to larger global administrative powers, such as the EU, and the UN), knowledge (from big tech/media and its fact-checkers to the requirement that scientific research be funded by state-corporately authorized research institutions and bodies which comply with consensuses that are manufactured within various professional associations, again complying with corporate and state requirements, and standardized curricula crafted around ostensibly universal rights), health (Big Pharma, and WHO, medical associations, and boards), and safety (the Industrial Military Complex and international military alliances whose very existence requires manufacturing wars, which may never be won, but which help ensure a continuous resource stream from tax-payers to arms manufacturers, bureaucrats and the military so that a global standing military reserve will never cease to exist).

What to those who embrace this globalist order and its rulers and minions is a more caring, safe and compassionate, environmentally sustainable world order, is to others but mindlessness and mental enslavement, infantile indulgence, and the suppression of the more traditional institutions and roles, which have provided people with a sense of the fit between themselves and the kind of freedom that was worked out over multiple generations in the numerous spheres of sociality. Whereas supporters of globalism can be found everywhere—though, the further away one gets from the West, such supporters exist in ever smaller numbers—the opponents of this global elite do not form a natural alliance: being a traditional Muslim, Jew, or Christian does not mean that the common ground—one’s traditional faith—is very common or solid as a base for an alliance. Conflict and wars are the inevitable accompaniments of traditional life-ways. But the delusion of the globalist elites is that under their direction there will be perpetual peace.

Again, critics of the globalist elite (which take NATO as its military shield) will point out that what is happening is not that war as an existential feature of human existence has ceased, or even diminished, but the grounds for its existence have shifted, and the beneficiaries for its existence have assumed the authority of being the planetary peace-providers.

If nature abhors a vacuum, then the nature of our global administrative, financial, communication systems have created a vacuum that has been filled by a globalist ruling class—a Superclass, as David Rothkopf, who served in the Clinton administration, formulated it in his book of that name. (Rothkopf, who is not at all hostile to this elite, makes the case that while membership is relatively mobile, it numbers around six thousand people at any given time). In filling that vacuum, the global elite have required that the world adopts itself to their interests, which are the interests that support their authority. But, again, their interests, simply do not suit the overwhelming number of people who live on planet earth, and do not feel that this superclass is of any benefit to them—critics of the superclass go further and see it as a class whose ambition wildly outstrips its competence, and is thus a destructive force, far greater than what nature and our other social formations would generate.

The globalist ruling class inaugurates another fundamental break with tradition—and at the danger of repeating myself—the modus operandi of the globalist elite is its break with all real traditions, involving a kind of substitution racket, like fake gold being passed off as real gold. This particular break is that previously whereas power formations which move beyond those of outright enslavement or tyranny are historically formed symbiotically, so that a sacrificial order is established—no serious sacrifice is required of the globalist elite themselves: they can pay others to enforce others to make the sacrifices that are intrinsic to social reproduction (notably sacrifices of the independence of mind to the ruling ideas, the sacrifice of one’s faith to the higher absolutes of globalist/corporatist/progressivist ideology, and sacrifice of one’s relative economic well-being).

For all its aspirations, though, Globalism Inc. remains largely politically ineffective outside of the West, and the great geo-political non-Western globalist alternative to Western globalism, China, is one that far more carefully attends to bringing along the ruled with its ruling class—which is not to say that on certain divisive issues it will not do what ruling classes always do, i.e., brutally enforce its authority. The way it has managed to cement its authority by avoiding a civil war is to ensure its adherence to traditions in a way that makes it something of a mirror image of the West. But, to repeat, there is no natural allegiance between the traditionalism of the Chinese and those in the West, who find greater solace in their traditions than in the new elite counterfeit fabrications. To question these fabrications in the West as counterfeit, based upon (collective self-)delusions and/or deception, is now to be a “right-wing extremist,” and to question any of the ticket items that are advanced through these fabrications, and to even speak of a globalist elite is to be a dupe of a conspiracy theory, which is to say that those making a play to be the global ruling class smother resistance by ideological indoctrination, accompanied by social, economic and political enforcement.

The primary reason that the West has been the leader of the globalist agenda, from its social alliances, to policy, to ideology is because the West has been created through wars and revolutions, and the relative success of its institutions, prior to breeding a class determined to destroy them, has been the incorporation of a dynamic which enables adapting to its changing technological and socio-economic circumstances. In the West, it is not the case that those who wish to preserve their traditional way of life are wishing to leap back to pre-modern times, as, for example, has been the case in much of the Islamic world’s response to modernization. Thus, for example, in the United States, those who are most outspoken against the progressive direction of their country identify themselves as “patriots,” i.e., as defenders of the American revolution and the principles it founded and which have evolved in its wake.

Today, the ruling class in the United States has largely embraced switching the founding of the United States from the date marking the independence of a colony from a foreign oppressive power it defeated in a civil war by declaring “that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,” to a date which takes its founding as an act of enslavement, and its perpetuity as one of a trail of injustices that must now be rectified by those who will lead its people (who no longer are merely the citizens and their children) via the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, the media, the classroom, and wherever else people may assemble, speak, or reflect.

Of course, there are still some people who belong to the political class who are on the “wrong side of history,” the side that identifies in the United States with the founding fathers, who are appalled that the new ruling class works in tandem with the youth of the nation and its educators to overturn institutions, tear-down statues, change the names of military bases, schools and other buildings and, rewrite their history books and school curricula, so that the men who founded the United States may have their status removed and their personage shamed, and the more diverse, and the tolerant ruling class who represent the truth of power and an emancipated future may live in safety, free from the “moral odium” of their forebears. The civil war that is taking place is one which exists because the ruling class has changed. It has gone globalist, become “virtuous,” and got “woke.”

There is, I believe, no better book for making sense of what is now transpiring than Gaetano Mosca’s Ruling Class.

3. Mosca Elements of Political Science and Their Importance for Understanding the Affinities Between Totalitarian Ruling Classes

Apart from its providing a number of key elements to help make sense of the times we are living through in the West, I came to the conclusion, right at the end of my academic career, after picking the book up again for the first time in nearly fifty years (when I had been too young and stupid to realize what gold it was) that Mosca’s Ruling Class is, along with Aristotle’s Politics and Thucydides’ Peloponnesian Wars, probably the best foundational text for studying Political Science that has ever been written. (For all its greatness, I would not say that Quigley’s Tragedy and Hope is a foundational text for studying Political Science)

The Italian title of The Ruling Class (when literally translated) is Elements of Political Science, the first edition of which appeared in Italy in 1896; the English translation of the revised edition of 1923 appeared in 1939. The English title is perhaps a more catching one, and it does capture the content of the book. But I think it regrettable that in an age where Political Science is little more now than a disciplinary name rather than a genuine academic discipline that this book is rarely read by those who study Politics. Today, as would be evident to anyone who simply read the titles of papers presented at the American Political Science Association, with the possible exception of rational choice theory (which I think is irredeemably flawed by its inattention to culture and history), most who teach Political Science are morally committed political partisans who have little or no interest in exploring their role within the ruling class. Or indeed thinking outside of the two-dimensional model and its intersectional variant, which would make them and their chosen groups oppressed members of a society they wish to transform, instead of being paid employees (mostly of) the state whose task it is to educate and socially prepare the next generation for reproducing the kind of society that its “leaders”—its ruling class—deem as desirable.

As the Italian title suggests, in dealing with elements of a science of politics Mosca’s book is one that cuts across cultures, which is to say it is a structural examination, a study of the laws that lead to rulership and its class-based nature. Though the structures and laws examined by Mosca are analyzed in their historical genesis and mutations, which is to say Mosca’s study is also an historical study, as it must be given that history provides the condition of our circumstances, just as our response to circumstances also make history. Thus, it examines the changing conditions which give birth to the different social needs and opportunities for different types and classes, and hence the different priorities of governance and those who form the political class of a time and people. It is also comparativist in its approach. In his “Introduction” to the Ruling Class, Arthur Livingstone provided a good summation of Mosca’s method:

He will of course take the facts about society from any source or method that can supply them, only so they are facts—from economics, from anthropology, from psychology, or any similar science. He does explicitly reject for the political-social field any absolute exclusive acceptance of climatic or north-and-south theories, anthropological theories based on the observation of primitive societies (the question of size is important), the economic interpretation of history (it is too unilateral), doctrines of racial superiorities and inferiorities (many different race theories have had their moments of splendor), and evolutionary theories (they fail to account for the rhythmical movement of human progress—biological evolution would require continuous improvement.

The book opens with Mosca showing the inadequacy of most competing approaches to Political Science, noting that various claims to Political Science “are still, little more than philosophical, theological or rational justifications of certain types of political organization which have for centuries, played and in some cases are still playing, a significant role in human history.” Then, it proceeds to lay down the foundational fact upon which there can be political life, as well as a science of it:

Among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in all political organisms, one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies—from societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawnings of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies—two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first; in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent, and supplies the first, in appearance at least, with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism.

Mosca then notes that “in every political organism there is one individual who is chief among the leaders of the ruling class as a whole,” but that person may not hold supreme power according to law. No head of state can rule without the support “of a numerous class to enforce respect for his orders and to have them carried out.” Indeed, it is because of the need for competing and potentially conflicting forces to be coordinated, so that peace between them reign, that a figure symbolizing unity and bearing ultimate sovereignty can act as a mediator between them. That is, it is sovereignty which is a consequence not a precondition of a larger class of “interested” parties; but once established its success depends upon a fit between the sovereign’s interests and that powerful class that commands and coordinates subordinate powers. Of course, that power is originally martial—and the Ruling Class is particularly attentive to the importance of the changing nature of armies in the transformation of ruling classes.

Mosca also notes that just as states require a unity of ends and agreeable means between the sovereign and the most powerful class which girds its authority, there is also a need to draw from the “masses” a group to facilitate and enforce the functions of the rulers. As he puts it:

and granting that he can make one individual, or indeed many individuals, in the ruling class feel the weight of his power, he certainly cannot be at odds with the class as a whole or do away with it. Even if that were possible, he would at once be forced to create another class, without the support of which action on his part would be completely paralysed. On the other hand, granting that the discontent of the masses might succeed in deposing a ruling class, inevitably, as we shall later show, there would have to be another organized minority within the masses themselves to discharge the functions of a ruling class. Otherwise all organization, and the whole social structure, would be destroyed.

…the real superiority of the concept of the ruling, or political, class lies in the fact that the varying structure of ruling classes has a preponderant importance in determining the political type, and also the level of civilization, of the different peoples.

In the chapter “Principles and Tendencies in Ruling Classes,” Mosca notes that it is the middle-class that generally supplied the personnel for the bureaucracy; that it is the moral level of the bureaucracy that signifies the moral level of the ruling class; and that the members of the bureaucracy tend to “believe in their own infallibility,” and are “loath to accept criticisms and suggestion from persons who are not of their calling.” With the expansion of the state into ever more areas of what were once considered private domains of life, and the expansion of those who work with the state, combined with those who are not of the bureaucracy generally but who are affiliated to a party and/ or committed to a political program and work in the corporate and private sector to achieve the kind of state they desire, this combination of moral assuredness and hostility to criticism threatens to generate the kind of opposition that typically leads to the overthrow of a ruling class. Just as the partitions between private and public spheres, the market and state have been pushed aside, thus indicating the death of old fashioned liberal democracy, the bureaucracy no longer has either the aspiration or pretence of being non-partisan. Its members now almost totally represent the program of the “liberal (anti-democratic) progressive.”

The totalitarian trinity of people, party, and leader(ship) has been a complete success in the United States, while most other nations still play by two party rules when it comes to the parliament, but administrations, service providers, school and university curricula, legislation regarding sexuality, policies for multiculturalism, advancement of identity politics and minorities, hate speech etc. are systematically progressive and utterly globalist. And when even it comes to the parliament, as the example of Boris Johnson and BREXIT illustrates, today there are all manner of serpentine ways that political rulers may slip from defender of the nation and its mores to employee of Globalist Inc. Ultimately the most ambitious and most driven members of a ruling class have little regard for older rules of etiquette precisely because of their own sense of moral conviction, and the ability they have to appoint and reward those who share their convictions.

The greater part of the Ruling Class is an historical analysis of the varying ruling class structures and the historical and social conditions that have given rise to them. Apart from any comparisons between Mosca and his contemporaries, who also were developing an elite theory of politics, which I touch upon below, the idea of a ruling class is most commonly associated with Marxism. But the difference between the Marxian deployment of the term to advance its own political program, and Mosca’s analysis, is two-fold—and it is this difference which I think enables us to see why Marxism is ideology, while Mosca’s work a contribution to Political Science.

First, the Marxists promise a future where there will be no ruling class. But that future could only be realized if there were a unity of purpose and such a vast coalition of interests that politics, rulership, class, and divisions between people would have ceased to exist. Thus, Marx’s claim that communism would eliminate the division of labour whist providing material abundance of a sort so that all could live according to their ability and needs. This is a unity that simply has never existed for any protracted period of time, and could only exist were different social interests eliminated—but they are generated out of the division of labour—and it is the division of labour that is the sine qua non of large-scale production, not the desire of someone to dabble in one or other form of creative productivity as it suits him.

Marx simply could not demonstrate how the elimination of the division of labour could defy everything known about economic production and create more abundance than it did when groups existed on such a small scale that what division of labour existed (such as between the sexes and the ages) was negligible. Which brings us to the second point: the Marxist future, irrespective of Marx’s own inability to see what he was doing, is nothing more than a verbal conjuration. In that sense it is the perfect means for those whose primary “skill” is rhetoric. The link between oratory, sophistry (the use of education for the advancement of one’s political power), demagoguery, and tyranny was critically observed by Plato; and that link has only become more intense within the displacement of the old ruling class by one in which verbal prowess and rationalization is fundamental to political legitimation.

Marxism is but one means by which a class, trafficking in words and ideas and persuading people to follow the objectives they lay down, and the means they authorize to achieve those objectives, has come to rule. Of course, that class needs resources; and the most common means available to it are: theft (a means used by the Bolsheviks for a relatively short while, and a means which the United States and, with the European Union, set to follow, are using in their proxy war against Russia), taxes, and donations to political parties.

Marxism did not die with the end of the Soviet-style central planning. In the West, it has survived in its non-Leninist incarnation, as an intrinsic ideological component of the Humanities curricula of elite Western universities. It has survived because it is an ideology whose endgame irreality is of no relevance to its success as an ideological way of oversimplifying reality for an aspirational ruling class keen to find a path to professional careers providing them with the power to build the world around its leadership. The particular interests of those who identify with any one of the radical variants that have come out of Marxist critique is to rule and thus decide how resources are to be deployed for which purposes by which people. This is ideologically passed off as achieving an absolute good – universal emancipation.

Marx himself appealed to a future of spontaneous universal cooperation based upon the complete mutuality of interests of the species (once the bourgeoisie were eliminated). But the impossibility of having large scale productivity and consumption growth without a market and capital investment, and of having political direction without a ruling party and state has meant that Marxism, and its various academically refined spawn, is but one piece of the ideological puzzle justifying the actuality of a ruling class that deploys a combination of value imposition, technocracy—its inevitability and spread being well noted in another very important book, James Burnham’s The Managerial Revolution—and financial control. It is achieved by a completely politicised social, pedagogical, and economic alignment or coordination of human action- what the Nazis call Gleichschaltung, which in turn requires suppressing any resistance whether of thought or deed. In so far as the process is ideological – the result of thinking built around political ideational alignments—this ruling class is far more attuned to the dangers of thoughts and words than were any inquisitors or contemporary mullahs.

In sum, while Mosca sees the ruling class as the inevitable accompaniment of all large-scale social organization, Marxism passes off the notion of the ruling class, and indeed politics itself, as but a transitory phase of social existence, whilst creating a rhetorical smokescreen for the rise of a political class that, if successful, claims to speak on behalf of universal interest and thus, if successful, should be able hold its power into perpetuity.

Typically, when Mosca’s work is raised, it is grouped along with other theorists of political elites, most notably Roberto Michels and Wilfried Pareto. Unlike Michels who had been a Marxist before becoming an anarcho-syndicalist and supporter of Il Duce, and Pareto, whose support of Mussolini was brief (Pareto died in 1923) and something of an ill-fit, given the liberal nature of his economic thought, Mosca was a liberal, but not one who was oblivious to its failures and shortcoming, and the threats posed to it by fascism—he wrestles with the problems of representative government in the book’s final chapter.

Although there was some dispute between Pareto and Mosca over who should get the prize for being the first to focus upon political elites as forming the basis of political science, the more important contrast within the elite theorists is between Mosca and Michels.

Michels’s study of the social democratic movement had led him to the observation that oligarchy was the inevitable type of all political organization; and his support for Mussolini expressed his willingness not only to embrace the fact of the inevitability of elite authority, but to endorse a political ideology in which elite power was openly factored into the political program and party.

Ironically, today, while fascism is the pejorative hurled about to discredit anyone who objects to the ticket items of globalist progressivism and corporatism, the globalist program and agenda is built around the unquestionable moral and political authority of cultural and global “leaders” who are increasingly schooled in leadership programs. The preoccupation with leadership today reaches from culture to industry to universities to politics. A jarring example of how central leadership is to politics today was to be seen in an election poster I saw nailed up all over the place in Australia’s recent election. When the poster is translated into German my point needs little further comment: ”Australien braucht einen Füherer, keinen Lügner.”

People in liberal democracies so frequently and blithely speak of politics in terms of the need for political leadership that they seem completely ignorant of the fact that unlike fascist, or communist states, in liberal democracies the most important role of the government (at least in peace time) was not to lead but to provide the conditions so that people might peaceably lead their own lives as best they saw fit.

Michels, like our present globalists, is rather typical of a certain kind of mentality that begins with abstractions and ideals about what political power may achieve if expressing the popular will, but which, in dealing with the actual requirements of maintaining political power, readily either abandons its more democratic rhetoric or simply twists it haphazardly so that it can get on with the business of directing who does what. The business of deciding who must do what—and along with this, who gets what from whom, and deciding what occurs to them, if they won’t do it, is the end of politics; and thus, a task that befalls every ruling class.

Moreover, for all the idolatry surrounding politics today, as if it is the means for solving all our problems, the state, though impossible to do without, is a blunt means (its powers are force, persuasion, and bureaucracy) of orchestrating human action. The problem with totalitarian forms of government is not that their political class makes political decisions, but the expansive combination of the range of decisions and components of life that become absorbed under their political reach and authority, and the intolerance shown towards those who question its authority.

Apart from the idolatry of progressive ideas, and leadership, the use of the state and corporations to ensconce a technocratic elite doing the ideological bidding of a globalist ruling class that demands unity in peacetime, of the sort that in a traditional liberal democratic society would only be required in wartime, is indicative of the totalitarian nature of the modern globalist project. Hence too it must control what can be said, and the best way to control that is to indoctrinate children into the values and narratives that the ruling class holds as absolute.

Also, all distinction between war and peace is being destroyed in Western democracies—we are being attacked by a never-ending series of threats requiring militant response, from the destruction of the planet due to anthropogenically induced climate change, to viruses and infectious diseases that can only be stopped if we all follow the leadership provided by pharmaceutical companies and state authorized medical “advisors,” and the numerous others who have been authorised to identify the correct information and “facts” on any topic warranting totally unified militant action.

Thus, there can never be a time when the ruling class takes a step back from its leadership role. Now we have the impending threat of an actual war—just yesterday General Milley advised the graduating class of West Point of the “increasing risk of global war.” There is, indeed, an impending threat, though the question is not only why, but whether the alliance of Western powers is actually less rather than more totalitarian than the global powers it opposes.

The great challenge of modern liberal-democracy is to maintain a political culture in which the social tensions are fecund enough to make social adaptations of a sort that prevent the political body from succumbing to either traditional ossification or progressivist delusions of governance becoming a mere shell concealing implacable wills. It is an irony that the ruling classes supporting fascism and globalism respectively positioned themselves in antithetical ideological terms with respect to the past and future—whilst both were captured by the internal dialectic of their political means: the fascists presented themselves as Rome reborn, but their emergence and the forces they mustered were all extremely modern. The globalists, on the other hand, appeal to a future free from oppression (a utopia); but they can only achieve this by the old-style means of enforced unity; what Friedrich von Hayek saw as the limited power flow of an order of taxis, which is typical of military and bureaucracy.

The Marxist tradition had gone along with the Saint-Simonian formulation that the future would be free of politics; and in its place there would simply be the administration of things. That tradition had a longer pedigree in utopian writing generally, though Rabelais’ depiction of the Abbey of Thélème had identified the nub of a tradition that runs through Rousseau, and the various socialist writers like de Mably through Saint-Simon and (in spite of their polemics against utopians) Marx and Engels: that nub was political unity. As in the Abbey of Thélème, there would be no leaders because everyone wanted the same thing and everyone did exactly what was required at the time of its requiting.

Both fascism and Marxism were born out of this faith in unity—though in the case of fascism the unity (people, state, party) required at its theoretical foundation an all-knowing, caring leader. In the case of communism, the cult of the personality was not something that was forged theoretically but developed out of necessity, as a party that had seized power in a coup, and defended it in a civil war, was faced with conflicting decisions about what to do about the food supply—should it be collectivized immediately, or allowed to operate through market inducements?—and workers who did not like the labour conditions required of them by those who had promised such liberation and now were shipping people off to prison camps.

Whether fascist or communist, these two modern responses to future-building not only required a mass that complied with what its ruling class dictated, but a mass which was ideologically committed to that ruling class and hence indoctrinated in supporting all its choices. The real difference between liberal democratic regimes and fascist and communist ones had nothing to do with abstract theories—which were, of course, prevalent enough—but with how openly one might grumble about the ruling class. One might say that the grumbling made little difference; but taking away someone’s right to grumble involves deploying state and corporate resources to that end – and hence job opportunities – it also only fuels the grumbling and discontent. Which is also partly why the levels of social discontent in so much of the Western world is so high.

The ruling class of today’s Western democracies now has no compunction in doing what the fascists, and Marxists before them did: and ultimately that is because it is the same kind of people demanding the same objective—that their will be done on earth as it is in the heaven of their ideas.

Reading Mosca will not help anyone prevent this; but reading him does help one place what is happening now in a larger, historical perspective, whilst also providing one with a healthy dose of scepticism, so that one does not fail to note that the primary interest of a ruling class is the preservation of its right to rule. In and of itself that is understandable; but the matter of whether they are doing a good enough job in facilitating the interests of the ruled is something else. And a ruling class that must control information-flows is one that has shown that it no longer cares about the interests of those they rule—which is always the beginning of their own demise.


Wayne Cristaudo is a philosopher, author, and educator, who has published over a dozen books.


Featured image: “New Gods, Old Monsters,” by David Whitlam; painted 2020.